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Abstract
This thesis is about equity in the Chinese law. In the classical Chinese literature, it was 
referred to as qingli lit S ,  which means ‘social obligations’ to balance the rigidity of 
positive laws. Like its Western counterpart, this equity entails a twofold meaning: (1) the 
moral principles that have been into the positive laws (which Huang referred to as ‘official 
representation’) and (2) in judicial practice, the correction of hardship that arises out of 
the deficiency as inherent in positive laws. As far as its historical evolution is concerned, 
this thesis examines three consecutive periods, namely imperial China (221BC to 1911), 
revolutionary period (1911-76) and reformist era (1978-present). In imperial China, equity 
followed a path similar to its Roman counterpart in that there was a harsh law first, into 
which equity was gradually incorporated, until it reached its maturity in the Tang Code of 
653 AD. This imperial construct was swept ruthlessly away by the revolutionary 
thunderstorm in the early 1910s. In the midst of this tempest, the communist effort to 
seek an alternative to both traditional and imported models culminated in creating a legal 
system called People’s Justice. Equity in this period was reinterpreted as mass 
participation and mobilisation. However, Mao’s idealism not only turned the whole nation 
into chaos but also devoured its own devoted followers. This was partly the reason why in 
1978 the Deng-led government unanimously held that China should relink with the 
outside world. In this state-led integration to global capitalism, equity underwent its 
second turn, now defined as local contextualisation of the rapidly formalised and 
westernised laws. The conclusion duly analyses both predicaments and opportunities for 
further development of equity in China. It calls for as much a reinvention of traditions as 
an attention for local contexts to construct a modern equity in China.
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Introduction
Since I was a law student, the relationship between equity and law has been of 
great interest to me. Equity, commonly defined as correction of positive law, 
extends beyond the confine of written letters by taking into account various 
elements, such as morals, custom and political ideology. Law, apparently, cannot 
be readily detached from politics and socioeconomic contexts, which is partly 
channelled by equity. This general impression certainly leaves the main issues 
intact: what is equity? What is its relationship with law? What is the Chinese equity, 
if any? Does equity have to be administered separately from the positive law, as in 
the common law system? Does departure from this system of equity and law 
necessarily mean bypassing equity per se?
Previously the study of equity had been concentrated on the common law 
system wherein equity for long was administered separately from the courts of 
common law, thereby assuming a distinct birthmark from other legal systems. 
This in general gave a stereotyped impression that equity received sufficient 
attention only in the common law tradition as a compartmentalised institution. 
This led to Roscoe Pound’s complaint that after abolishing the separation of 
equity and law, equity tended to receive inadequate attention1. He pessimistically 
called for a return to the tradition. The long history of the separation of equity and 
law was thus mysteriously mixed with a lurking nostalgia, which can easily lead to 
the conviction that such a separation was not only desirable but also the only 
desirable modus operandi.
Newman’s comparative studies2 opened a new page on delineating the historical
evolution of equity and law. His study showed that the civil law system followed a
path different from the common law in that equity and law were well administered
in one court. The maturation of equity and law, so to speak, can assume different
forms and paths. He systematically studied equity with reference to such topics as
enforcement of rights, the effect of unfairness and mistake in the negotiation and
formation of contracts, frustration, plaintiffs default, unjust enrichment, hardship
in law of property and tort actions. His conclusion was that between separation
and non-separation of equity and law, both merits and demerits stand out for 
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credit. The modus operandi as in common law tradition, far from exhausting the 
totality of legal administration, could even in certain aspects be less desirable than 
that in the civil law system.
Newman’s study, however, was confined to common law and civil law systems, 
where other legal systems like the Chinese, or the Islamic, were only peripherally 
mentioned to attest one legal system or the other3. It in general gives a wrong 
impression that other legal systems either conform to these two major legal 
systems, or otherwise deserve no mention. Does the Chinese legal system really 
present no more than a ‘not-alien-to-us’ Eurocentric confirmation?
Moreover, when we turn to the more thorny question of historical evolution of 
equity, the Chinese picture is largely forgotten. Although there have been scholars4 
to discuss equity, an overall historical study of its development still awaits to come. 
This thesis, therefore, aims to clarify equity in the Chinese context, trace its 
historical development and identify its modern reinventions. To do this, I shall 
first look to the definition of equity by tracing the early formulations in the 
classical Western literature, to be followed by a review of Newman’s studies which 
were focused on historical evolution of equity and law.
Section 1: N ature o f E quity
Equity has long been regarded as a correction or containment of the rigour of 
positive law5. As early as Aristode, equity is held to be ‘correction of that wherein 
law is deficient because of its universality’6. For one thing, Man is capable of 
recognising the deficiency inherent in the hierarchy of positive commands, 
refusing such an element and replacing it with the demands of ‘higher law’. This 
trait o f ‘doing justice’ can be seen from ancient legal systems as well as primitive 
societies alike7. In the English law, Lord Denning remarked that ‘if the law should 
be in danger of doing injustice, then equity should be called in to remedy it. 
Equity was introduced to mitigate the rigour of the law’8.
Such an antithetic view is popular. Where this conflict between positive law and 
equity is defined as ‘between the desire for certainty in legal results and the desire 
for modification and improvement’ 9 , Amos went further to argue for its
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everlastingness, as ‘the alternative appearances of law and equity as the mutual 
checks and corrections of one another are lasting and not transitory 
phenomenon10.
While it is true that there are moments when the exact application of positive 
laws can give rise to rigid inelasticity, what if the law itself has already 
incorporated a great many of the equitable principles? Under such condition, the 
assumption of a conflicting relationship between equity and law is no longer 
applicable. Socrates11 argued a non-separable blend of State and justice, arguing 
that justice is the order of the State, while the State is the visible embodiment of 
justice, which manifests itself through either the inner law of the individual soul or 
the principles of rewards and punishments as enshrined in the State constitutions. 
Justice is fundamentally the idea of good and harmony of the world12. Such a 
definition of justice is strikingly similar to the Confiician ideal of a benevolent 
Throne in administering what is in the best interests of his subjects. For both 
Confucius and Socrates, the positive law, as embodied in the State or the Throne, 
embraces as much principles of equity as formality. The interests of justice and its 
administration are not separated. Henceforth, the interests of equity are not 
divorced from those of the positive law.
It is true that even such a coalescence of equity and law will not be sufficient to 
account for the vicissitudes of human affairs, as codification of any form shall 
carry with it the risk of rigidity. All the same, it should be noted that under such 
circumstances, conflict is not so prevalent, let alone prominent, as has been 
assumed. For Newman13, substantially equity refers to the body of principles 
dealing with relief from hardship, as part of the broader sense of justice and 
fairness upon which the law is also based. The absorption of equity into law had 
gone through two stages: first, equity operates as a body of rules that is external to 
the law but corrects the latter, under individual circumstances where the rigidity of 
law would result in uncalled-for hardship; while at a later stage, equity and the 
general law gradually coalesce and integrate into a unitary legal system.
If we can accept this symbiotic rather than lean-to-one-side antithetic view 
between equity and law, then there is a second layer of question left intact: apart
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from the ideal condition where both equity and law are observed, should there 
arise hardship, how should it be resolved? This layer thereby mainly points to the 
techniques in judicial practice to bring about a harmony between equity and law. It 
points to the legal vacuum where ‘the rule of law does not define exactly but 
leaves to the discretion of the good man’14, or in other words, equitable doctrine 
and principles established by jurists without express legislation. More importandy, 
equitable remedies also include within the existing framework of the law ‘[those] 
principles by means of which [the jurists] modified the working of institutions 
with which they had to reckon, and made their operation conform to the needs of 
an increasingly complex civil life’15. According to De Ruggero, equity is ‘a criterion 
inducing the judge to take into consideration other circumstances not covered by 
the rule of law...and to mould his decision,...in such a way as to restore the 
supreme principle of equality...Equity aims at...eliminating any possible 
discordance between the rule of law and its concrete application...in 
contemporary law such an antithesis [between law and equity] has disappeared, 
since equity...is an element of the positive law itself, as well as a criterion of 
interpretation and application in particular matters and not an extraneous and 
conflicting principle’16.
The necessity of adjusting the law to suit social needs is well argued by 
generations of scholars. Maine defined equity as ‘instrumentality by which the 
adaptation of law to social wants is carried on’17, while Holdsworth holds that the 
root o f equity is ‘the idea that the law should be fairly administered and that hard 
cases should as far as possible be avoided’18. As Newman put it, equity is ‘a way of 
adjusting the burdens of misfortune arising out of human encounters in 
accordance with standards of generous and honourable conducts (such as good 
faith, honesty and generosity) that are commonplace facts of all systems of ethics, 
morals and religion’19.
Apart from this social need, equity calls for particularising to make law suit 
specific circumstances20. Equitable considerations mean ‘special circumstances of 
the case ... [that] influence the decision of the judge so as to arrive at a just 
result’21. Equity bridges the distance ‘between a just solution which is unique for
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the particular case, and a general rule of decision for ordinary situations which 
provides no guidance for specific decisions’22. As was pointed out, the law is 
constantly faced with a dilemma to balance the need for generality, equality, and 
certainty on the one hand23, and the concern of morality with relief o f hardship in 
individual cases24 on the other hand25. A school in German legal theory regards 
equity as ‘relativity towards some legal status’ with its function ‘to counteract 
certain legalisms’; in other words, to ‘adjust the legal situation of written law to the 
requirements of a specific individual case’26.
Maine discussed the distinction between individualised commands and 
universalised law. As Maine argued, ‘The “Themistes” have...the characteristic 
which...distinguishes single or mere commands from laws. A true law enjoins on 
all the citizens, indifffently a number of acts similar in class or kind; and this is 
exactly the feature of a law which has most deeply impressed itself on the popular 
mind, causing the term “law” to be applied to mere uniformities, successions and 
similitude. A command prescribes only a single act, and it is to commands 
therefore, that “Themistes” are more akin than to laws. They are simply 
adjudication on insulated states of fact, and do not necessarily follow each other in 
any orderly sequence’27. Here, although Maine did not equate directly these 
Themistes’ commands with equity, his insinuation of such commands as being of 
higher imperative than law was obvious. His discussion was reminiscent of the 
natural law theorists who argued for a divine inspiration for equity to correct the 
rigidity of law.
In Italian jurisprudence, Carnelutti defines equity as proceedings in accordance 
with natural law. Equity, however, is not equal to natural law, but rather a manner 
of legal interpretation of the natural law; while Perris held that equity be essentially 
relative, empirical and subjective criterion. He further distinguishes three sets of 
equity: formative, supplementary and interpretative. The former equity is 
concerned with formation of rules of law, while the supplementary with supplying 
rules wherever there is a legal loophole or gap, and the interpretative with 
following the lawmaker’s intentions.
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The opinions of the Italian court concerning equity also deserve attention. On 
the one hand, the court regards equity as meaning ‘to confer on the judge the 
power of attenuating the harshness of “summum jus” when applying the rules of 
law to concrete cases and harmonising it with the specific requirements of an ethic 
or social character, connected with the circumstances of the case’; while on the 
other equity is defined as a benevolent interpretation of the legal rules. Be it jurists 
or court’s opinions, it is generally recognised that legal norms need to keep abreast 
with the time and evolution of social and moral conscience. Moreover, the 
positive law has an inherent insufficiency in that it cannot predictably account for 
the infinite human affairs. In the case of Italy, due to the absolute supremacy of 
statutory law and general requirement that the court construe a legal rule stricdy in 
accordance with what is allowed legally, recourse to equity is allowed only where 
the law expressly grants such power28.
In general, it is argued that equity as fundamentally a sense of fairness, justness 
and right dealing, is a mass of principles of social solidarity, in the maintenance of 
which law can be administered to answer to man’s best social needs. It has two 
functions: one, in daily legal routines to ‘mitigate hardships, balance needs and 
achieve an essential degree of “fairness” in the resolution of legal conflicts’; and 
two, to promote the moral evolution of law and society29.
To sum up, equity in the Western discourse denotes in a bifurcated sense as 
much a coalescence of equitable principles into positive law as a flexibility in the 
judicial practice of correction where rigorous application of positive law frustrates 
the purpose of social justice, discretion where there is a legal vacuum and 
interpretation where the particularities of individual cases should be accommodated. 
As law is a diverse term that could be used as interchangeable with written text, 
legal practice, or even a legal system at various times, to avoid such confusions, 
throughout this thesis, I will rely upon two borrowed terms from Huang30, namely 
official representation to refer to ‘positive law, written legal code, or legal policies’ and 
legalpractice to mean the application of law in local, practical contexts.
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C hinese Equity: qingli*fitS
Among the earlier discussion of equity in Chinese legal tradition, Tsao proposed 
that despite the absence of equity as a legal concept in the classical Chinese 
literature, an approximation could be found in the argument of qm gli^n^, which 
means compassion31. As much as the Western discourse, he regarded qing as 
antithetical to positive law (/affi), where positive rules, when in conflict with qing, 
would be rejected32. This approximation was later taken up by Shinga, who further 
defined qing in more detail as facts on the one hand while on the other, renqing A 
fit- ‘commonsense in every living soul, as well as mutual considerateness and 
expectations based upon commonsense’33.
This antithetical view was popular among Chinese scholars34. Ma, Xiaohong35, 
though holding that qing could be incorporated into law and enhance the latter’s 
flexibility, complained that qing would weaken positive law’s authority all the same. 
For Zhang, Jinfan36, though dialectically arguing that the relationship between fa  
and qing is both antithetic and supplementary, his discussion nonetheless was 
focused on the antithetical side.
Contrary to this antithetic view, Lin Duan (2003) proposed that fa  and qing are 
essentially the same, with fa  defined in its broadest sense, extending far beyond the 
confine of written letters. Fa thereby includes as many formal laws as the 
unspoken customs and folk ways of behavioural patterns. Fa and qing so to speak, 
are just two different sources of law in China and ‘decision in accordance with 
law’ thereby should be read as ‘decision in accordance with [formal] law and 
[informal] q in ff1.
Apart from the aforementioned antithetical and unitary propositions, there was 
also an operational view in studying the informal practice of law in Qing. Quoting 
Tsao and Shinga, Philip Huang38 argued that qing has two layers o f meanings from 
actual practice to Confucian idealisation, the former defined as human feeling of 
human relations with an emphasis on maintaining decency among close 
relationships, while the latter as ‘moralistic human compassion’. Operationally, 
qing means ‘the resolution of disputes through mediated compromise’.
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Despite this academic debate, notably there was in imperial tradition a saying, 
namely qii fa j i  shen qing fit)39 - Bend the ham to Suit Social Obligations.
Unlike fa  that involves far less controversy in its translation as ‘positive law’, qing 
was rendered diversely as ‘human compassion’, ‘human relationship’, ‘human 
circumstances’, ‘disposition’, ‘facts’, ‘interpersonal relationship-based emotions’40. 
My exegesis of qing has revealed that this is a word that has multilayered meanings. 
Commonly it means ‘emotions’, ‘nature of objects’, ‘facts’, ‘circumstances’, 
‘personal favours’41. For my thesis, qing should be read as qingli fin  3), which 
contains both qing (or renqing A fit) and lii (or tianli AS)42. For renqing, compared 
with its normal meanings of ‘human emotions’, ‘human circumstances and 
commonsense’, ‘Zeitgeist’, ‘gift-giving’, in this thesis it has a narrower sense, only 
to mean ‘human circumstances and commonsense’ (ren^hichangqing A ^ l ^ H ) 43. 
Tianli literally reads as ‘Reason of Heaven’ and yet it normally means ‘[human] 
reason’, as Chinese philosophy emphasises the unity of Heaven (tian A) and 
human (ren A)44.
Since qing contains such multilayered meanings, it makes it difficult to render the 
words satisfactorily, not to mention the prevalent negative appraisal of qing by 
reducing it to mere guanxi (connection, nepotism). It is true that qing does contain 
the layer of ‘gift-giving’ and nepotism. However, this does not exhaust the totality 
of its meanings. For this thesis, I would mainly denote qingli in two parts: in terms 
of official representations, it contains within it a large part of moralistic principles 
that have been incorporated into law; while in judicial practice, it has an element 
of flexibility, conditioned by social realities. Its imperative and authority, thereby, 
do not rely upon written letters alone, but rather a higher command of social 
justice. This is reminiscent of justice defined in natural law, but it does not stop 
here. Although I recognise certain traits of universality of human compassions 
shared by all the races as held by natural law theorists, I also wish to point out its 
subjectivity and particularism. For me, universality is not the antithesis of 
particularism. The relationship between these two entities can be as much 
antithetical as supplementary. While addressing the generality o f human nature,
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both equity and positive law operate simultaneously in a particular socioeconomic 
environment, which dictates the equity and law to be concretely contextualised for 
sake of operationalisation. Therefore, I wish to seek a dialectical relationship 
between qingli and law. My rendering of qingli as social obligations is thereby based 
on this dialectical relationship between equity and law, as qingli has a culturally and 
socially particularistic nature. On the one hand, it renders the law into which it is 
incorporated different from one country to another, while on the other, in the 
legal practice, its particularistic nature is all the more prominent, as it is not readily 
intelligible unless and until it is contextualised within the local environment. In 
China, this qingli bears a distinguishable feature of grassroots in its practical 
account. It is therefore, a sum of the calls from the lower estate of the society that 
are distinctively ‘social’.
Having outlined qingli as a Chinese equivalent of equity as in Western discourse, 
in the following, we shall trace the discussion of qingli in classical Chinese 
literature.
qingli in  Classical Chinese Literature: Its Nature
In Classical literature, there had already existed a plethora of arguments on the 
relationship between qingli and law. On the one hand, it was suggested that law 
should accommodate qingli, while on the other, during judicial practice, a balance 
should be struck between qingli and law.
Shenzi argued that law originated from the Heart of Human:
‘Law is neither borne out from above, nor unearthed from below, but instead, 
from among the people and in accordance with the Heart of Human’45.
This need for law to satisfy the Heart of Human was also argued by Yinweizi, who 
said that ‘the [great] Way of Heaven is to side with the social obligations’46 while 
Guanzi has a more detailed account, ‘The way for the ruler’s ordinance and 
prevention to be implemented lies in the accommodation of what the people like 
into licenses and of what they do not into prohibitions. ...G ood governance 
should accommodate the social obligations while the bad governance contradicts
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the latter. Where the people dislike worries and exhaustion, the ruler should offer 
entertainment and relaxation accordingly; where the people dislike poverty and 
humbleness, the ruler should offer wealth and nobleness; where the people dislike 
perils and danger, the ruler should offer shelter and security; where the heirs are 
intercepted47 the ruler should then offer reinstatement... [in short], the laws 
should accommodate the social obligations’48. Similarly, the lord of Shang Yang 
argued that for the Sage to rule a nation, good governance comes from his 
accommodation of customs into law49.
This point was furthered by Zhao Cuo -  a Han scholar, who commented on 
‘the social obligations of commoners’. In a proposal to the Emperor, he said,
‘I have learned that in the [state of) Three Kings, all the rulers and the 
subordinate officials were so sapient that with their wisdom combined and 
mutually supporting each other, they had governed the country very well. This 
was all because of the social obligations, in which, no desire is not after longevity 
and the Three Kings made [the people] live without harming them; no desire is 
not after wealth, and the Three Kings enriched [the people] without 
impoverishing them; no desire is not after security, and the Three Kings 
supported [the people] without endangering them; no desire is not after 
relaxation and the Three Kings saved their labour without exhausting them. The 
laws, when being made, incorporated the social obligations and then they were 
implemented in the society without resistance ...the people were not forced to 
do what they do not like, or prohibited from doing what is deemed acceptable in 
the social obligations’50.
If law did not accommodate social obligations, it is warned, or if the law were 
modelled on what can only be achieved by a minority of the Sage and Wise, then 
such laws will be unreasonable51 and henceforth it is a law ‘designed to be 
breached’ (bifan % h i ‘Social education, without considering what the 
people are capable of, is made to be breached definitely — it is thereby no less than 
to bait the people to evil-doings, which is called anti-civilisation. The law, without 
considering what is regarded as acceptable to the social obligations, is made to be 
definitely violated — it is thereby no less than to entrap the people in 
incriminations, which is called “to harm the people’”52.
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In short, it is emphasised that law should accommodate the nature of mankind. 
In other words, ‘Allow what the people like as license while prohibit what the 
people dislike as crime’53, which can be learned from the experiences of the 
departed Sage54.
To strike a balance between qingli and law in judicial practice had a history in 
intellectual discourse as long, if not longer, as to accommodate social obligations 
into law. As early as 684 BC, taking qingli into consideration in judicial practice 
was hailed as the fundamental basis of popular loyalty to the regime, which could 
then be counted on to win a war55. Even Confucius proposed that moral 
sympathy is indispensable for the administration of justice. As in the Analects, 
‘Yangfu, having been made the judge for the Meng clan, consulted with Zengzi, 
who advised him, “For a long time the rulers have failed in their Way [of 
government], and the people have become unsettled. When you discover the facts 
of their cases, do not rejoice your success in that, but rather show your sympathy 
and grief”56. Here Confucian scholars unequivocally suggested that the judge, in 
his adjudication, should sympathise with the parties involved. He should not 
concentrate on investigating the facts of the cases, but more importantly, side with 
the people, rule with sympathy and charge the case with humaneness. Fan Yue 
interpreted it as that ‘for the judge, instead of rejoicing his success of investigating 
the facts, he should employ his Heart of Considerateness, with which he can 
thence distinguish right from wrong. This is the Way for the Excellent and the 
Wise’57.
This teaching exercised a far-reaching influence upon many a magistrate in 
imperial dynasties58. The Lord of Shang Yang proposed that ‘the law, if without a 
full consideration of the social obligations, will not work’59. As early as late 
Eastern Han, Xun Yue, proposed that the magistrate should ‘carefully decide 
cases to exemplify humaneness of the social obligations’. He argued that one 
should learn from the Sagacious Ancestors who, in the practice of law, ‘delegate 
authority to officials, devise just means to rule it, offer leniency by incorporating 
the particularities and social obligations, open court to fully investigate and 
considerately treat [the people] with sympathy and grief60. Similarly, Wang Huizu
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argues that ‘[i]n legal practice, [the very principle should not be forgotten] that law 
should accommodate the social obligations.. .the law is fixedly universalistic while 
the social obligations are particularistic. The only way not to contravene the Spirit 
of harmony is to suit the social obligations when applying the law’61. Zhang Feng, 
a scholar in North Song Dynasty, took a step further to define the perils for not 
accommodating social obligations in judicial practice. As he argued, ‘Why so often 
the laws, after being made, are resisted and have difficulties with enforcement? 
The reason is that the law is against the social obligations. What is it meant, then 
by “against the social obligations”? It refers to lessening the punishment on what 
is deemed evil and aggravating the punishment on what is deemed forgivable; and 
the situations when the unforgivable [behaviour] is set as exemplary by force while 
the not necessarily evil [conduct] is made culpable with punishment. All of these 
are against the social obligations’62.
It is not uncommon, therefore, for such words to appear in decisions as 
‘consider both the social obligations and the Spirit of law’, ‘to satisfy both the 
social obligations and the law’, ‘it not only contradicts the Spirit of law, but also 
the social obligations*. Hu Shibi, the magistrate who wrote these decisions, 
pointed out explicidy, ‘The spirit of law is de facto the same as the social obligations. 
It will be unacceptable either to ponder the spirit of law over the social obligations 
or vice versa. The acceptable and impeccable way should be to strike a balance 
between the two, neither against the spirit of law from the higher order, nor 
against the social obligations from the lower order’63.
Apart from qingli, in early period there was a discussion of striking a balance 
‘between constancy and flexibility, or the general and the particular’64, which 
equally shed light on equity in judicial practice. This philosophy can be dated back 
to as early as the jBook of Changes, which centres on the belief that permanence and 
change, or mutation and regularity are the two fundamental elements of the 
cosmos65. Later, this philosophy was taken up by Confucius66 and later proposed 
as jing regularity) and quan (fe flexibility)67, as discussed by Mencius68 and 
Dong Zhongshu69.
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In judicial practice, this jing-quan philosophy was translated into striking a 
balance between law and social obligations. jing is the regular, stable canon, while 
quan is the irregular, flexible consideration of particularities70. Jiao Xun had a 
detailed discussion on jing and quan in judicial practice, tQuan is comparable to the 
balance, which moves in accordance to the weight of the object until it reaches a 
balance. The balance can adjust itself to the weights of the objects... [which shows] 
flexibility but without losing constancy.. jing  is the law. If the law does not change 
with time and space, problems will arise. Therefore, it needs to be bent in 
accordance with exigencies’71. In Song, Fu Lin, a legal scholar, argued that the law 
should rest upon regularity (gheng\E) but still retain flexibility so that decisions can 
be made to suit exigencies {quan f t ) 72. Here %heng is used in a similar meaning to 
jing, namely the constant, regular laws and principles. Ma, Zuowu73 further 
categorised three circumstances for jing-quan in traditional judicial practice: 
discretionary interpretation of the law (yongjing %hi quan f t ) , adjustment of
the law (hian jing %bi quan 3£^&^lft), and setting aside the law where necessary (fan 
jing da quan S ^ i i f t ) .
The spiritual outlook of this jing-quan thesis was no different from that of qing 
and fa , as both cautioned against mechanical application of written rules by 
introducing moralistic principles. This was the reason why this jing-quan thesis was 
later integrated into qingli, which was legally recognised and arose to dominate the 
discourse74. Since Ming, there emerged a popular saying of ‘considerations of all 
three elements - qing, lii and fa  {qinglifajiangu‘\n Ma, Zuowu 2004: 270).
From the order of qing lii andfa, it was suggested that for the Chinese, qing is the 
most important factor for consideration, with lii the less and fa the least important 
{qing > lii > fa )15. This argument of deriving differential significance from the 
ordering of words, however, overlooks another popular phenomenon in 
traditional China. Normally m y amen (magistrate’s office © H ), on the top of the 
gate there was always hung a horizontal board (bian’eELKS) with inscribed on it 
three words, namely '‘tianli, guofa and renqinf16. By the same token, it is easy to 
conclude that tianli (or lii) is the most important, with guofa (or fa) the less and
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renqing (or qing) the least {lii > fa  > qing). Henceforth an irresolvable contradiction 
occurs.
To solve this discrepancy, I suggest that, for the Chinese, there is no such 
preferential weighting of one element against another when speaking of 'qing, lii 
and fa \ It is meant more as a trinity of all three elements — that is to say, to 
consider all three elements in practising the law, as ‘guofa is the symbolisation of 
tianli and a representation of renqing, all of which should be abided by’77. The 
ordering of qing lii and fa  is o f no more significance than that of tianli, guofa and 
renqing, as both stress the same trinity of all three elements. Changing the ordering 
perse does not change the real meaning of these two phrases, as their ordering was 
only a matter of custom.
Such a trinity was nothing new to Chinese legal thinkers. As is argued, ‘the laws 
are borne out of tianli and renqing78. Liu Weiqian analysed that the reason why the 
Great Ming Code can become ‘a prototype for hundreds o f [the following] 
dynasties’, crediting the cause to its incorporation of both tianli (from above) and 
renqing (from below). Li Zunian commended that Xu Shilin, a local magistrate, ‘has 
mastered superbly the essence of a suit with a clairvoyance through the claims by 
various mouths and then rule with the very appropriateness of justice, which is in 
harmony with tianli and suits renqing. [Moreover], it is not in the least discord with 
guofa. Alas, what a Great [judge]’79. Fang Dadi remarked in no uncertain terms that 
‘for the lawsuits brought up by the litigants, there is no need to conform to the 
law at all times. Nonetheless, one should be clear about which law to apply to the 
facts of the case. Then bend the rules by accommodating the local customs, mores 
and manners, as long as it does not contradict the law too much. Otherwise the 
decision would be indefensible once appealed and reviewed by superior officials’80.
In imperial China, with the aim to restore harmony in human relationships and 
to satisfactorily solve the case to its particularity, how to flexibly, practically 
maintain a balance among qing lii, fa  became a matter of importance for their 
decisions81. As is suggested, ‘If  the harmony was restored and the case solved best 
by discreetly applying the law, then expectedly the law would be strictly followed; 
however, if the case could not be solved reasonably when directly applying law, or
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if harmony could be better restored not by law but by qingli, then without 
hesitation [the local magistrates] should abandon the law. In ancient Chinese 
culture, this is not a breach of law...but on the contrary, regarded as a more 
flexible and more efficient justice’82.
Thus, to strike a balance between the social obligations and law is perceived 
with great importance in traditional China. A judge was publicly expected to 
‘considerately sympathise with the people (tixue m nq ingW W ^\n )m  - Not only in 
official representation law is derived from the social obligations84, but also in 
practice, it should accommodate the social obligations85. In short, equity was not 
only formulated in both Chinese and Western discourses, but also existed 
concretely in both official representation and judicial practice. In the following we 
shall turn to the historical evolution of equity. We shall start from the classical 
laws and later the common and civil law systems.
Section 2: Origin o f Equity, Its Coalescence with L aw  and its  
Principles
The rise of equity was a gradual course. At the early stage of law, the rigidity often 
compromised the applicability of law during practice86. For this very reason, equity 
was introduced to mollify the rigidity of law, leading to a gradual coalescence of 
equity and law. In many early legal systems, there arose specific rules as auxiliary 
system of commutative justice87 to mitigate the harsh effect of the general rules of 
law in unusual situations88. This part shall look into the coalescence of equity and 
law in both classical and modern Western legal systems.
Classical Laws: Roman and Canon Laws
A development of strict law first, superseded later by the coalescence of equity 
into law could be seen in the early development of the Roman law. In its classical 
period (the first two centuries AD), there was a strict formula to follow for praetor 
- the magistrate, who could only settle the issue, consolidate its terms, and prepare 
a written document (the formuld) that was further passed onto a second stage {apud 
iudicem) where proof was presented and heard by the iudex (normally a private
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citizen chosen by the parties or in certain cases several persons, known as 
recuperatores). Therefore, both the magistrate and the iudex were limited by law and 
custom.
During this period of time, equity was mainly administered separately through 
ius honorarium, which was a published praetor’s edict contained with available 
remedies. It supplemented or corrected the ius civile by granting remedies to those 
who did not have rights of action at law, by offering a remedy entitled by 
someone else at law when the praetor felt the grantee more worthy of protection, 
or by giving more convenient remedies to persons who already held rights of 
action at court. Such equitable remedies also included defences at court, and 
orders of restitutio in integrum, which by its name means restoring the party 
prejudiced to his original position by annulling an inequitable transaction89.
The emperor can also be an important source of equitable jurisdiction in this 
period of classical law. It was recounted that Claudius, determined to make the 
law lars boni et aequf, tempered the severity o f the law ex bono et aeguo. For instance, 
he granted to plaintiffs who lost their actions plus petitio - license to renew their 
claims. Diocletian allowed actio doli (action of fraud) against a misjudgement 
occurring where one of the parties concealed important documents, which was 
regarded as fraud90. Hadrian ordered the rehearing and retrial of a case of 
judgment obtained through perjury, which developed into the usual practice of 
restitutio in integp4m in later emperors. In another recorded case, an infant heiress 
brought her tutor under her father’s contract to the Praetor for restitutio in integrum. 
As the classical law took no account of remedy against one’s tutor, her application 
was rejected by the Praetor, and by the Praefectus Urbi when she appealed. 
However, when petitioning to the Emperor’s Auditorium, the Emperor granted 
her request despite contrary advice from Paul, his prominent jurist. This was 
incorporated into later law. In another case, Antonius Pius upheld a will which 
was regarded as nullity due to its failure to satisfy institutio - the legal formula. The 
emperor also intervened on equitable grounds by issuing royal rescripts to transfer 
of actions in actiones utiles91.
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In the post-classical period that started from the beginning of the third century 
AD, this rigid formulary procedure was replaced by a more flexible one (cognitio 
procedure) where a judge conducted the whole judicial process from deciding the 
issue to hearing the evidence. Like the English law, the formulary procedure only 
allowed actions for damages, not for specific performance. It was not until the 
cognitio system that the judge can apply both actions for damages and specific 
performance92. The practice of fusing equity and law thus began, until it 
culminated in the sixth century AD Corpus luris of Justinian. During this period, 
the Roman jurists were increasingly convinced of the necessity of subjecting the 
law to interpretations of reasonableness rather than an unchanged absolute 
meaning. Dominium, the Roman ownership, for instance, portrayed in the classical 
period as so absolute that the owner could abuse and dispose of his property as he 
wished, now could only be exercised in the interests of good relations between 
neighbours. The absolute control of a testator over who should succeed to his 
property, as long as certain formalities were adhered to, was now subject to court 
review through querela inofficiosi testamenti, by which the relatives that should have 
been entitled to a reasonable share in the estate but were excluded in testament 
could bring actions against the will. The classical law’s failure to attend to unequal 
bargaining power in the formation of contract was replaced in the post-classical 
period by a legal relief from contracts where the price was unreasonably or 
unconscionably low, until it culminated in the rule of laesio enormis in the Corpus 
luris, by which a sale of land is voidable if the contract price is less than half the 
‘just price’.
In the history of canon law, for the length of time as long as half a millennium 
from the 9th century, equity was administered separately in the court of Signatura 
Gratiae that served to correct undue harshness in applying the law as in the 
Signatura Justitiae. At the Signatura Gratiae, equity can be seen from two levels, in 
terms of legislation that intentionally, expressly provided for the intervention of 
equity; and in terms of judicial practice where the judge could have recourse to 
equity. In penal law, the ecclesiastic superior might impose a penalty, provided for 
by law or otherwise, to be paid by the guilty party through taking into account the
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particularities of the case, such as gravity of the wrong, torts and slander. The 
doctrines of imprevision or rebus sic stantibus (obligations becoming disproportionate 
or unjust due to unforeseeable events) concerning contract were accepted into 
private law, while in procedural laws, the judge was given discretion to soften the 
rigour of written law so as to attain justice. The equitable character was prominent 
in the canon law, which was based on two assumptions: (1) equity must prevail 
over positive law where necessary; (2) when the application of law would lead to 
damage or disproportionate inconvenience, by a reasonable interpretation of the 
purpose of the legislation, the positive law could be evaded.
In judicial practice, the judge must consider the nature of the law, a just cause 
that is indispensable and the principle that the rule applied must reveal its own 
purpose93. It should be noted that equity does not mean avoiding the application 
of statute, but an extraordinary favour to circumvent difficulty that might result 
from a rigorous application of the law. This separate administration of law and 
equity did not end until in the 13th century, when the power of administering 
equitable principles was transferred to the Signatura Justitiae, with the Signatura 
Gratiae abolished94.
Civil Law and Comm on Law Systems
Both common law and civil law systems were influenced by Roman and canon law 
traditions. The civil law system followed more closely the model of ancient 
Roman law in coalescing equity into law from 12th to 19th century. The 
development of law to a large extent kept abreast with that of socio-economic 
conditions and moral progress. Concepts such as fraud, mistake in contract, and 
restitution that were developed out of equity had been refined in such legal codes 
as in Germany and France. The law extensively incorporated moral principles 
while devising certain safety valves to allow judicial discretion. New socio­
economic conditions were later fused into the main body of law. In this way, 
equity and law developed within the same framework of positive letters. For 
instance, the French civil law had systematically integrated equity, leaving the 
judges a broad discretion in reaching solutions deemed desirable and just. The
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permeation of equity into law can be envisioned in the following four areas: (1) 
equitable concepts such as bonnes moeurs (good morals), ordrepublic (public order), 
and bonnefoi (good faith) have been incorporated into law, giving the judge great 
latitude to decide, especially where there was no legal provision or definition of 
‘fault’ over calculating damages to be paid by the party at fault; (2) judge-made 
legal theories supplementary to statutory law95; (3) interpret contracts according to 
the common intent of contracting parties; (4) parties can elect to give judges full 
freedom in settling the case. The judge in solving the contests must also consider 
the public utility or common interests; in enforcement, ‘whenever the 
performance depends on the debtor’s necessary initiative or requires certain 
personal qualities, the judges have discretionary power to substitute payment of 
damages for the performance itself96. Lasdy, other equitable principles, such as 
‘where there is a right, there is remedy’, ‘equity regards substance rather than 
form’, ‘nemo auditorproprium turpitudinem allegani (he who comes into equity must 
come with clean hands) have also found their way into French private law97.
In Germany, such influences as the Enlightenment, canon law and humanism 
have integrated positive law and fairness. Equitable considerations such as billigem 
Ermessen (fair estimate), carte-blanche (standard rules), erforderliche Sorgfalt (necessary 
care) of good morals, bonus pater familias (reasonable man), Zumutbarkeit 
(reasonableness) were institutionalised into the law98. Equity was seen as ius 
aequum correcting ius strictum" ,  application of un^umutbarkeit (unreasonable burden, 
disproportion), or the principle of good faith that expands obligation100, limits 
exercise of rights101 and provides extraordinary remedies such as adjustment or 
relief from contractual obligations due to unforeseeable events102.
In Italy, equity is infused into the main body of law, such as (1) in civil law: relief 
from duty due to extraordinary and unforeseeable events; the court’s discretionary 
power to equitably assess the amount of damages or compensation, due to the 
tenant of an estate making unauthorised improvements that resulted in a higher 
revenue, or in case damages were compelled by the necessity of saving human life 
or from serious personal damages, or when a person without legal capacity caused 
damages; (2) in civil procedure: where by law the action concerns justifiable rights
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or when the parties request an equitable decision of the case; (3) in criminal law: 
‘formulating the rule of law in such general terms as to permit adaptation to the 
innumerable variety of cases’ and when the judge measures penalties between the 
maximum and minimum fixed by the law; (4) in administrative law: reconciliation 
of the principle of authority and the principle of liberty where the citizen can have 
his own rights equitably considered in the process of formation of public policy103.
Equity is also well coalesced into the Dutch law. In civil law can be seen such 
equitable principles as good faith, needs and means of support as the basis of the 
limits of obligations, balancing the interests and the protection of the weaker party; 
while in penal law, (1) the prosecutor may waive prosecution on the ground of 
public interest; (2) by the rule of nemo debet bis vexari, the prosecutor, after 
terminating prosecution, cannot re-prosecute the suspect unless with new 
evidence; (3) the principle of fair trial; (4) by ‘judicial pardon’, the court can decide 
no penalty be inflicted in insignificant cases; (5) mental constraint (force majeure) 
is ground for immunity; (6) the judge has discretion to inflict penal measures 
between maximum and minimum by considering all special circumstances of the 
case104.
By comparison, the common law first followed a route similar to the Roman 
tradition of administering equity and law in the same court, but later took on a 
different track from that of the civil law system.
In England, from the very beginning, law and equity were both administered in 
the common law courts105. The separation of equity and law in the common law 
system was mainly due to the increasing deficiency of the common law courts106. 
Since Edward I, the Chancellor was appointed as the Secretary of the King’s 
Council with his main duty to supervise the assignments of cases to the three 
courts, namely the Court o f King’s Bench, the Court of Common Pleas and the 
Court o f Exchequer. In the 12th and 13th centuries, the Keeper of the King’s 
conscience, the first type of chancellor, issued writs to the itinerant courts in Eyre 
to confer jurisdiction for hearing and adjudication of disputes; starting in 1258, 
when the Provisions of Oxford forbade the Chancellor to issue new writs without 
seeking the King and Council’s approval first, the natural law concept of equity
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entered a period of restriction. In 1285, Westminster II prohibited the Chancellor 
from issuing new writs unless in so far as in accordance with those already in 
existence. Equity thus entered a time of amoralised positivism where fictions 
(changing the facts so as not to change the law) and the issue of analogous writs 
(to utilise the moral content already absorbed by the original legal precedent) were 
complacently believed to be capable of satisfying social requirements. With the 
passage of time, the common law courts became increasingly inflexible and 
mechanical in handling the suits brought before them by fitting the case to the 
fixed forms of a rigid writ system107, for which the Chancellor was faced with an 
increasing amount of petitions by aggrieved parties turned down at the common 
law courts108. This situation did not change until the latter part of the 14th century 
when the problem of providing a remedy for the feoffor to uses109 resulted in the 
creation of the Court of Chancery.
The Court of Chancery was mainly in charge of administering equity, as an 
auxiliary system to supplement, correct the law as administered at the common 
law courts110. Other deficiencies of the common law courts included its refusal to 
accept testimony of parties, thereby resulting in its inability to deal with cases of 
trust where the parties were the only witnesses. Plus, common law courts 
presented certain difficulty for the poor to challenge the rich and powerful, for 
which reason the disadvantaged party preferred to resort to the Court of Chancery 
for protection111.
Starting in the 15th century, the court of Chancery started compiling its records 
of enforceable decrees. In the 16th century, a new notion of natural law, argued by 
positivism, denied the existence of objective moral principles, but dependence on 
the subjective conscience of each individual Chancellor. Since the 17th century, 
equity entered a period of hardening, codified into doctrines as fixed and rigid as 
the doctrines of the common law112. In the course of time, it gradually became a 
system as technical as the common law113. From late 18th century to early 19th 
century, the English equity attained under Eldon a fixity and certainty as much as 
that of common law114. This unsatisfactory situation continued into early 19th
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century until the separation of law and equity was no longer regarded as necessary. 
A storm to bring these twin brothers together was imminent115. .
In the US, a similar situation occurred: in the first half of the 19th century the 
deficiency of administering law and equity separately became increasingly manifest, 
resulting in a call for abolishing the separation that took heavy toll116. In this 
process of fusing equity with law, two years must be marked, namely 1848 in New 
York and 1873 in England. In 1848, procedural reform of the New York Field 
Code abolished the separation between equity and the common law, which swiftly 
swept through the US except for a few states that maintained the separation117. In 
England, although as early as 1828 fusion was suggested and the Common Law 
Procedure Act of 1854 brought about partial fusion, it was not until 1873 when 
the Judicature Act was made to abolish the separate administration of equity and 
the common law118.
Equitable Principles
The equitable principles thus developed in this evolution of equity and law include 
a few layers. The Latin etymology of equity is aeqitas, aequus, which means equal. 
Therefore, Gassin maintains that at one layer, equity carries the meaning of 
equality before the law and respect for the rights of each119.
The equitable principles administered by the praetor in classical period can be 
summarised as follow: (1) intention of agreement prevailed over its letter of 
expression, such as in case of important property {res mancipi) transferred by mere 
delivery, of dowry {dos) and of fideicommissum (i.e., testator left instructions to his 
heir to perform certain obligations for particular beneficiary who thereby can 
bring action to his benefit), in all of which circumstances overstrictness of legal 
formalities were circumvented; (2) By the old civil law, a contract would be 
binding as long as it satisfied the prescribed form, irrespective of whether it was 
induced by duress or fraud, which by praetor can lead to defences {exceptio doli and 
exceptio metus), restitutio in integrum, or action for damages; (3) error as to the subject 
matter of the transaction (error in substantia) and as to the sex of a slave, under both 
circumstances, would void the contract; action for damages was available where
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there was a misrepresentation by the other party or in the absence of this, when 
the buyer can justifiably demonstrate that the seller is liable for qualities of the 
object sold; (4) in case of suffering loss attributable to the fault of neither party, 
liability is determined on the principle of utility, i.e. that ‘the party benefiting from 
the transaction should bear the whole burden of accidental loss’, or on the 
principle of general average, by which to spread the loss among the contributors 
proportionate to the value of their interests; (5) unjustifiable enrichment at 
another’s expense should be nullified; (6) legal rules were not applicable for those 
incapable of safeguarding their own interests, such as minors, lunatics (furiosi), 
spendthrifts (prodigi), and women, unless by the appointment o f a curator120.
These principles were developed into modern civil law and common law 
systems in more details, as Newman121 numerates the 12 principles of equity based 
on moral precepts of good faith, honesty, and generosity: (1) substance over form; 
(2) contracts not in conflict with public or private interests of controlling 
importance; (3) no unscrupulousness; (4) reasonable expectations; (5) good faith; 
(6) mitigating damage; (7) voidable mistakes in contract formation; (8) unforeseen 
emergency; (9) no unjust exercise of right; (10) sharing of burdens; (11) specific 
performance; (12) restitution. An additional principle of adjustment of hardship 
proportionate to the wealth of the parties, originally effected in the USSR and 
Hungary, later spread in Holland, Islamic countries, Argentina and Sweden122.
As far as punishment is concerned, in the canon tradition, the ecclesiastic 
superior might impose a penalty, provided for by law or otherwise, to be paid by 
the guilty party through taking into account the particularities of the case, such as 
gravity of the wrong, torts and slander123; while in modern regime, equity lies in 
the guarantee of protection to the innocent and punishment proportionate to the 
gravity of the offence committed, to the degree of threat to the community, or to 
the menacing state of the offender’s personality and chances of social 
rehabilitation124.
Concerning equity in the process of convicting the suspect, two broad scenes 
can be seen: protection of the innocent and convicting the guilty. In the previous 
category, two further scenes can be discerned: (1) to preclude the possibility of
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convicting an innocent through presumption of innocence and limitations on 
measures that prejudice individual liberty; (2) equitable reparation in case of 
unjustified conviction, such as appeals, plea of nullity in procedure or damages in 
material indemnification. In primitive legislation, the accused was in general 
presumed guilty, with the burden of refutation. The kernel upon which the 
criminal procedure was based lay in private vengeance, substituted later by public 
vengeance. With the increased importance of equity, presumption of innocence 
assumed a particularly important role in common law system, but as a matter of 
fact, it was only in the 18th century that the presumption of innocence was 
invented and received into law. Under this principle, such measures as arrests, 
preventive detentions, judicial control that prejudice individual liberty must be 
limited and applied of only exceptional circumstances. These limitations include (1) 
authorising the accused to demand his provisional liberation; (2) to hold an 
examination periodically in case of preventive detention; (3) producing a limited 
enumeration of cases in which the measures can be applied, with the judge 
burdened with a requirement of concrete reasons125.
In the common law system, there has existed a wider scope and application of 
methods of redress while the civil law system tries to reconcile it with rapidity of 
penal enforcement. Moreover, in the civil law system there was a tradition of 
reviewing institutions of the convictions rendered against innocent persons. In 
ancient time, the unjustified conviction was often repaired by the sovereign 
through exercising his right of grace. The judges might be punished for rendering 
the iniquitous sentence. This tradition gradually evolved into res judiscata, by which 
the sovereign delegated his power of review to his judges to investigate the judicial 
errors126.
Another aspect of growing influence of equity in criminal procedure lies in the 
introduction of individualisation o f punishment, which was inspired by a concern 
for the degree of danger or threat to the society on the one hand, while a 
humanistic inspiration of social rehabilitation of the delinquent on the other. 
Equity both inspired and limited the individualisation of punishment. It provided 
inspiration in the sense that criminal sanction was targeted at social rehabilitation
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rather than vengeance, intimidation or retribution. This was particularly true in 
case of juvenile delinquency. By the same token, it transformed penalties through 
substituting deprivation of liberty for corporal punishment, not to mention the 
abolition of the death penalty in many countries. On the other hand, it limited the 
individualisation in that certain procedures of inhumane treatment, like narco­
analysis were limited. It also preserved the maintenance of such amelioration 
institutions as resjudiscata, pardon, amnesty, period of limitations on infractions127.
qingli va Chinese Law and Its Developm ent
One naturally wonders whether the evolution of qingli in the Chinese legal 
tradition had followed a similar path. It is the historical development of qingli that 
has become a child of problem for historians. How was the development of qingli 
within the Chinese legal tradition? If we can safely regard imperial China as a 
classical period for equity, then in modern time qingli had followed a rather 
unconventional course. Deprived of the chance to develop autonomously, the 
whole nation was plunged into chaos, from which context qingli cannot be readily 
detached. The revolutionary experiences, Maoism and Deng’s reform all made 
their marks on the Chinese history from 1911 onwards. The demise of imperial 
China in 1911 was certainly more than a dynastic change in history, but more 
importandy, a baptism for the whole nation in its embrace of modern ideology as 
much as technology. These periods shall be discussed separately in the following 
three chapters, concerning the evolution of qingli in the Chinese legal tradition.
The first chapter deals with the imperial period. It is the classical period when 
equity had evolved into its most mature form. At the level of official 
representation, equity as embodied in Confucian moral ideals was well 
incorporated into the main body of law. By contrast, in real practice, equity had 
more practical, localised meanings. Compared with the high-flown Confucian 
moralistic principles, equity in practice was more centred on commonsense right 
and wrong, or practical compromise128.1 shall duly look at these two levels to see 
how equity operated on a mature form in imperial China.
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The second chapter is mainly concerned with the revolutionary period during 
which qingli was borne out of the communist ideal of people’s justice. This 
people’s justice was later taken into Mao’s period. It was abused and misused in 
the Cultural Revolution, until the turn of Deng’s reform that turned the people’s 
justice back onto its rationalist course of development. However, the market 
reform in post-Tiananmen era (1992 onwards) unleashed the unrelenting power of 
Marketisation that constantly weakened the people’s justice system as rooted in its 
revolutionary tradition. This chapter shall trace the historical development of 
people’s justice, namely its rise and decline within the revolutionary tradition.
The third chapter will discuss qingli in reformist period (1978 onwards), where 
the state-led integration into global capitalism resulted in ruthless Westernisation 
of the Chinese legal system. During this process, there is a significant proportion 
of the population that has been marginalised. I shall discuss with reference to the 
peasantry, cultural traditions and local customs to see how equity should be 
construed in the context of contemporary China.
Finally, in the conclusion, I shall revisit this concept of qingli. I shall duly 
consider the forces of globalisation in the current age to discuss its development, 
using the past to guide the future.
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Chapter 1 Equity in Imperial China
Introduction
There have been diverse accounts concerning the origin of the Chinese law. The 
Book of Exemplary (shangshu had credited King Mu of Zhou (circa.956-918BC)
with establishing the first systematic legal code, which historians viewed with 
ambivalence. This was due to the reason that not only no archaeological evidence 
was found so far, but also the portrait of his reign as benevolent and virtuous 
rendered a legal code redundant129. Other classics showed that a law code was 
made and inscribed in metal by Zichan of the State of Zheng in 536 BC while 
there was a Jin Code on an iron cauldron in 559 BC130. Such law codes none the 
less still awaited substantial archaeological proof. The bamboo slips unearthed at 
Yunmeng contained a substantial portion of the Qin code dated to 217 BC and 
fragments of the Wei Code, which might attest the existence of fajing the
Classic of Law) compiled by Li Kui sometime around 445 BC as recorded in the 
Book of Han131. Although fajing was credited as the earliest administrative law code, 
no archaeological proof had been found yet despite historical accounts written 
much later such as the Book of Jin that related six divisions of fajing. bandits, 
brigands, prisons, arrests, miscellaneous penalties and special circumstances132. 
Other slips unearthed at Baoshan include certain legal documents by a high 
administrator of law in the State of Chu dated back to 316 BC. Although no legal 
code was found within the Baoshan slips, these legal documents consisted of 
actual case reports and decisions, which strongly suggested, albeit in an indirect 
manner, the existence of a legal code and legal administration. Like their 
predecessors, legal codes prior to the Qin and Han, namely of the Warring States, 
still awaited further archaeological findings. The current archaeological findings, 
together with historical accounts, however, did strongly suggest that prior to the 
Qin and Han, the use of a legal code to regulate the populace and imperial 
bureaucracy was already widespread, which was later carried forward to Qin and 
Han133.
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According to the Book of History (jfeiB shiji), Lord Shang Yang initiated legal 
reforms in the State of Qin in 356 BC. A detailed legal code was promulgated, 
regulating both imperial bureaucracy and populace. Heavy punishments were 
prescribed for minor crimes with an intention to prevent disobedience. 
Households were bonded together to provide mutual surveillance and report 
deviances to local government134. The Yunmeng legal documents also contained a 
large proportion of legal stipulations to regulate officials’ behaviour, such as 
procedure for investigations and interrogations, guidelines for inspection of 
officials, maintenance of official records, to name just a few. These documents 
showed that a legal code was intended for systematic control of officials and 
populace alike135.
The Warring States was a period where institutions developed piecemeal to 
extension of royal power by creation of official posts and appointment of officials 
which abated the power of nobility. Through dependent officials, royal power 
could extend into the remote rural hinterland, maintain effective control and 
ensure the royal writs were implemented throughout the state136.
Establishing the Qin Empire in 221 BC, Qin Shi Huang Di not only centralised 
power, but also unified the diverse legal institutions in different states. The 
institutionalisation achievement in the Warring States periods was carried through 
into the Qin legislation. The law was not only unified but also comprehensive, as 
it attempted to subject a wide range of human affairs under legal control. To 
maintain despotic control, books were burned, people obliterated and literati 
buried alive. Qin Shi Huang Di subscribed to legalism that emphasised severity of 
penal code, which was probably due to the chaos in the periods of Spring and 
Autumn and Warring States that preceded the Qin Empire — a time referred to as 
‘destruction of Propriety and corruption of Music’ in the Analects. Naturally, a 
unified Qin Empire would desire to establish law and order in the still rebellious 
country through severe laws and strict observance.
This rigidity continued into the early period of the successor Han dynasty. The 
Han Code was made in 200BC by Xiao He, which consisted of nine chapters of 
statutes137 and was used through the Han dynasty. Legalism continued its
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dominant influence in the lawmaking processes. Emperor Han Gaodi was reputed 
to have a strong dislike of Confucian scholars, the latter often heavily insulted in 
the royal court. His successor — Emperor Han Wendi had a renowned preference 
of the law, while the next emperor in the line — Han Jingdi discovered the ideas of 
Huanglao particularly attractive. For historians, this was a time referred to as the 
‘Golden Age of Legalism’. For one thing, laws in both Qin and Han were made by 
Legalist scholars. The Classics of Law (fajing) made by Li Li served as a blueprint for 
Lord Shang Yang to make law for the State of Qin, to which Xiao He referred 
during making the Han law.
Henceforth, there was continuity between the laws made by Shang Yang during 
the Qin State and those during the Qin Empire, as well as those by the Han 
successors. This continuity could first be seen from a high level of 
institutionalisation. For instance, in the Qin law, before arrest, it was required that 
ting^hang local policeman) should carry out careful investigations, including
examining footprints138. The suspect was detained and then interrogated, where 
confession was to be obtained through beating, usually through hitting the 
buttocks or thigh by bamboo sticks. But magistrates were warned against abuse or 
misuse of this practice139.
The Han law equally had a complicated system of procedure, punishment and 
checking. This none the less could be hardly credited to the lawmakers in Han 
alone, supposing that sophistication had already reached a high level in the Qin 
Empire. Historical accounts suggest that the first Han emperor — Han Gaozu 
attempted to trim the complexity of laws inherited from the Qin, which 
nonetheless before very long was replaced by re-using the complicated legal 
mechanisms as developed by the Qin, due to socio-economic demands. Thereby, 
in Han, the legal code reached a level of sophistication comparable, if not superior, 
to that of the Qin law140. For instance, in 166 BC, after long debate in the royal 
court, the Han law had a detailed clause on the number of strokes to be inflicted 
upon suspects during interrogation, as well as with the size and weight of the 
bamboo sticks141. Evidence could be submitted by testimony or witness cross- 
examination at formal court sessions142.
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The continuity could also be seen from Legalism that had dominantly shaped 
both Qin and Han laws. For instance, the Legalists emphasised that the right of 
execution rested only with the state. Thus, in both Qin and Han laws, although 
parents had rights to punish family members, they could not injure or kill the 
latter. Even a culpable slave should be handed over to the local magistrate for 
execution143.
Apart from state supremacy, the Legalists stressed the severity of the penal code, 
heavy punishment. To get a full appreciation of this, we need to turn to the debate 
between Confucianism and Legalism in the preceding periods.
This debate was centred on two aspects, moral influence and uniformity144. First 
of all, Confucius maintained that law and punishment were not sufficient to 
induce people to do good, as they ‘will try to avoid the punishment, but have no 
sense of shame*145. Confucius objected to the promulgation of law by Zichan in 
the State of Zheng through inscribing the law on ding a colossal bronze pot), 
not so much because he was a member of the aristocracy as because he was afraid 
of the consequences of promulgating law. This notion was reminiscent of Laozi’s 
argument that once the people struggle against each other, the world would 
become chaotic146. Therefore, to avoid such chaotic order depended upon how far 
the governor could render the people ‘simple and desireless*. The act of 
promulgating law would thus induce people to struggle against each other even 
over the trivia, which was what Confucius feared. Therefore, for Confucius, the 
law was not sufficient, but had to be supplemented by moral influence.
The Legalists were not interested in moral influence, holding that the ultimate 
authority of law was the only reliable source of order. Such sagacious kings and 
exemplary governors of Yao and Shun as depicted in history books and folklores 
were nonetheless difficult to attain, as they lived only once in a thousand 
generations. The majority of the governors were average persons, who could 
maintain good governance by the aid of law even without the sage and virtue of 
Yao and Shun. Self-reflexive examination to live up to certain high standards of 
morals would not in the least affect others, especially the evil members of the 
population. Benevolence and righteousness had as much negative values as their
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capability to jeopardise the society ultimately. The best way of governance was 
through law to pardon no fault and to neglect no good. By the same token, to 
maximise the in terrorum effect of law, heavy punishment was necessary, as a 
punishment proportionate to the severity of its crime would be of no help to 
govern or to prevent crimes147.
The amoralism in strict observance to law undoubtedly drew heavy criticisms 
from the Confucian scholars. The Confucians’ objection lay not in abolishing legal 
sanctions perse, but in replacing moral influence with punishment; for Confucians, 
moral influence should be fundamental while punishment supplementary148. The 
Confucian school advocated ruling by moral influence and by virtue. Such tasks 
should be carried by virtuous persons at the top that would exert moral influence 
and education on the lower orders. For instance, Kongcongzi attacked the law of 
Guanzhong in its severity and lack of kindness, for which reason no sooner than 
he died the law became inoperative149. A similar view was voiced by Jia Yi the 
reformer who maintained that the short-lived Qin Dynasty was due to lack of 
virtue in the governance with pervasive resentment and hatred in the kingdom. 
Even Xunzi a revisionist who neither readily fitted into Confucian nor Legalist 
schools, held that the inherently evil human nature could be suppressed through 
moral cultivation and it would be inadvisable to punish without education. 
Furthermore, severity of punishment should be proportionate to the facts150.
Secondly, Confucius denied uniformity and equality in the society, but rather 
emphasised that ‘differences are in the very nature of things and that only through 
the harmonious operation of these differences could a fair social order be 
achieved’151. Human beings should have their satisfaction of all kinds meted in 
accordance with the differences in their intelligence and virtues, occupation and 
social status, capability and social selection. In addition to these differences, such 
distinctions as proximity of relationship, generation, age and gender that were 
inherent in the kinship system should also be recognised, establishing 
subordination and superordination necessary for social harmony. With this clearly- 
defined status, a body of approved behavioural patterns was prescribed as 
guidance, embodied in the Book of Rites. The main function of li (^L propriety, rite)
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was to achieve differentiation and discrimination between persons in accordance 
with their status. These differentiations would lead to a harmonious society where 
people could behave in accordance with their background. Only through this 
could human society reach its ultimate harmony152.
The Legalists, on the other hand, advocated the ultimate authority of rules in 
maintaining law and order. The distinctions, albeit existent, were irrelevant to 
governance that should depend upon reward and punishment determined by 
objective rules and standards. Differentiation on the basis of personal differences 
was neither necessary nor useful in governance, but rather, might be 
counterproductive. The Legalists refused to allow private affections, private 
deliberations or human relationships to interfere with the running of objective 
standards or rules. ‘Bending the law to suit one’s relatives...[makes] for the great 
failure of a ruler.. .it would lead a country to danger and disorder’153.
The debate between Legalism and Confucianism has profoundly shaped the 
legal development in early China. The political ascendancy of the Legalists in the 
last decade of the Warring States, which culminated in Qin and Han, led to a 
period of rigid law and strict application. In Han, however, the Confucians started 
gaining political currency. The fourth emperor — Han Wudi established 
Confucianism as the sole official orthodoxy while banishing all the other schools 
of thought, hence commencing the process o f Confucianisation of law. Apart 
from abolishing cruel forms of physical penalties and mollifying the severity of 
punishments, he also appointed Confucian scholars to reinterpret law. Dong 
Zhongshu, one of the greatest Confucian scholars, started correcting the rigidity 
of law by means of introducing Confucian classics into legal interpretations. He 
even compiled case references to guide judicial practices154.
Apart from Dong Zhongshu, numerous Confucian scholars also took interest in 
law. As recorded, ‘There appeared tens of such Confucian scholars as Guo 
Lingqin, Ma Rong, Zheng Xuan who wrote over 100,000 commentaries on law. 
All together, 26,272 clauses were suggested to the judiciary, together with over 
7,733,200 commentaries’155. The effort of introducing Confucianism into law by 
Dong Zhongshu, together with behind him the numerous Confucian scholars,
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had exerted a far-reaching influence upon Chinese legal history. The Confucian 
teachings of differentiation according to social stratification and familism were 
incorporated into law: li now operated on the ground of both social and legal 
sanctions. Therefore, Han was the time that started the coalescence of equity and 
law in official representation.
The next period succeeding the Han, namely Wei, Jin, North and South 
Dynasties156, furthered this Confucianisation of law. Wei abolished the clause in 
the Qin law that required a family with two or more male heirs to be divided, 
otherwise the taxation would be doubled. For Confucian scholars, this law was 
inhumane as it disregarded the supremacy of showing one's filial piety by taking 
good care of parents under the same roof157. Confucius even suggested that when 
parents were alive, the children should not travel too far away. In Jin, the 
mourning system was adopted into law; in North Wei, the law started to allow 
criminals to remain so as to tend their parents (cunliuyangqin 'fe ® North Qi
listed unfilialness as one of the ten most severe crimes. All these three efforts to 
supplement law with social obligations culminated in the Tang Code, which was 
copied throughout the successive dynasties until the end of Qingin 1911158.
Thus the coalescence of equity and law started in Chinese legal history, which 
resembled Western legal development in the classical period, namely introducing 
equity into the harsh law and legal practice. Was Chinese legal history, then, a 
mere confirmation of its Western counterpart? If  imperial China stood as a 
different case, where can we discern these differences? To facilitate our 
discussions, I shall use the Confucian moral concepts as headings to organise the 
structure of this chapter rather than in chronological orders as used in the second 
chapter. For one thing, although imperial China might have seemingly followed a 
similar path of integrating equity into law, it is not readily understandable unless 
contextualised in the Confucianism-dominated culture. The Confucianisation of 
law, in both its official representation and legal practice, was first and foremost 
premised on the existence of a set of Confucian moral ideals, which would help us 
to understand the development of Chinese equity and law. These concepts centre 
on differentiation — the core concept in Confucianism based on gender, age,
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ethnicity, literacy level, and class status. Apart from this differentiation that 
addresses mainly human relationships, other moral considerations included 
sympathisability, which means human compassion towards sympathisable 
circumstances based on poverty, adversity, or calamity. At times, such sympathy 
could be residence- or literacy-based. As the traditional Chinese society was largely 
rural and illiterate, the educated, elitist officials stood out ‘like tall swans 
surrounded by a group of chickens’. A sympathy towards the rural masses was 
couched in a rather condescending term ‘rustic dimwittedness’. Apart from these 
two categories of sympathy, forbiddance of sexual indulgence spells another major 
area in which Confucian moral ideals found their way into law.
Having said this, it should not give a wrong impression that after the Tang, the 
legal codes became stagnant and stopped to develop, as if the 1,500 years from the 
Tang to the Qing was nothing but a pool of dead water. The historical, 
chronological development of equity and law will be discussed under each 
headline.
Section 1: D ifferentiation in  Human Relationships
For Confucianism, differentiation in human relationships is of first-rate 
importance in establishing a well-ordered, hierarchical society. Law and order is 
only possible in a society where each and every one of the inhabitants behaves 
according to his/her due, based on a wide range of categories such as occupation, 
gender, ethnicity, age and social status. To facilitate our discussions, I place human 
relationships into three broad categories: family, kin and non-blood relationships, 
as human relationships in imperial China could be contextualised in the tertiary 
structure of family, clan and non-blood layers. Among the family relationships, 
xiao filial piety) stands alone as the primary concern. It is here that our 
discussion begins.
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xiaor. Family Relationships
xiao in Official Representation
It was argued that traditional China was a ‘nurture-returning’ (fanbu ®  Hjf) 
society159. In light of this, the children should return the favours received from 
their parents who give them not only life, but also food and shelter to nurture 
them until they grow up. For this very reason, xiao has been inculcated as the 
preponderant value. The Chinese character of xiao ( ^ )  is an ideograph that 
signifies the very essence of what this word means. It was exegetically explicated 
as an elderly (lao^ OL) being carried on the back of a child (^  " f)160. A filial son 
should not only look after the parents with extreme care when they are alive but 
also, when they pass away, mourn over their death for a certain amount of time 
equitably comparable to the period when they were fed by their parents as an 
infant161. In caring for the parents, reverence and love are required162, even during 
corporal punishment from the parents163.
In the Han when equity was introduced into law, xiao was the value that initiated 
this process. A filial daughter pledged to the Emperor to redeem her father’s 
crime with her slavery in the Palace, which moved the Throne to such an extent 
that he issued a royal writ to abolish cruel physical punishments, hence 
commencing the process of integrating equity and law so as to make the law more 
humane164. In terms of incorporating xiao into law, two scenarios can be 
envisioned here: (1) xiao could win the offenders extralegal favour; while (2) in 
case of unfilialness, the penalty should be aggravated.
That xiao should win the offenders extralegal favours was first expounded by 
Dong Zhongshu. A child in an attempt to rescue his father from a physical fight, 
unintentionally injured his father. By law, he should be punished with xiaoshou 
(exposure of the culprit’s head in the market after execution jjl H O 165 f°r 
wounding a parent. Dong Zhongshu used this case to illustrate that rigidity of law 
can lead to undesirable injustice. Instead, the son should be pardoned, for he did 
not purposely injure his own parent. He further quoted a story recounted in the 
Book of Spring and Autumn, where a son was acquitted for preparing a medicine that 
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failed to cure but killed off his father. With this case, Dong Zhongshu 
demonstrated the importance of correcting the rigidity of law with xiaox66.
Since late Han, xiao was exalted as the supreme value for the society and it was 
not uncommon to hear cases of using xiao as extenuating circumstances 
throughout the dynasties. For instance, it was recounted that a benevolent 
magistrate successfully turned a son filial by diligent personal visits to educate him 
in the ethics of filial piety as well as to peruse the Book of Filial Piety167. In the 
period of the Three States, killing an ox was a crime of qishi (exposure of one’s 
head or body after execution -S-flT). Despite this law, a son who killed an ox as 
sacrifice to pray for his ill father was acquitted168. The Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang 
of Ming pardoned a father who attempted to bribe a local magistrate by buying 
off his convicted son’s punishment169. In another case, a son pleaded to replace 
his convicted father to receive the punishment, for which filial piety the Emperor 
pardoned them both. As he said, ‘I hereby bend the law for a filial son’170.
While such individual cases might seem sporadic and untypical, the law did 
recognise certain aspects of xiao into law, such as cunliuyangqin culprits
retained at home to care their parents) and mnsang aitong culprits
returning home to mourn parent’s decease). If  the culprit sentenced to the death 
penalty or exile was the only son of the family, he could be exempt from 
punishment so that he could remain at home to take care o f his parents. This rule 
was based on a Chinese concept of ‘continuing the family line’ (xu xianghuo 
X ), by which if the only son was executed or exiled, the family line would be 
extinguished or the aging grand/parents would be left without care. Therefore, if 
the culprit were the only son, he should be preserved to continue his family line or 
carry out his duty of filial piety. Similarly, during time in prison, the inconsolable 
loss of grand/parents normally would give criminals a chance to return home for 
mourning.
As early as circa 227 A.D., the Emperor issued a decree that for someone guilty 
of a capital offence, if his grand/parents were aged, he was the only son and had 
no family members to take care of his parents, he could apply to the royal court
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for exemption from penalty171. In  327 A.D., a man sentenced to death who was 
the only son to an elderly father was pardoned172. However, it was not until North 
Wei that cunliujangqin was fully incorporated into law, by which a man sentenced 
to death could pledge to the Emperor for caring septuagenarian grand/parents 
that had no other grown-up child or direct blood relatives to rely upon, while 
someone sentenced to exile, after receiving a penalty of whips, could stay to care 
for grand/parents until their death, after which the convicts had to continue their 
original punishment of exile173. If the parents died, then there would no need for 
cunliujangqin174. This clause was preserved in the later imperial codes such as that 
of Tang and Song175. The culprit could apply for cunliujangqin if he was the only 
reliable son to elderly or severely disabled grand/parents176. The original sentence 
would be restored if the parents died or a male heir was born or adopted into the 
family.
The Ming and Qing codes have similar stipulations but with relaxed severity177. 
Those sentenced to banishment and exile could remain to care for parents after 
exemption or receiving a reduced penalty of 100 strokes (and plus cangue - jiahao 
in Qing). Even after the parents passed away, the convicts could be exempt 
from the punishment rather than have it continued178. For people sentenced to 
death, similar to North Wei, generally approval from the Emperor should be 
sought. In most cases, it was granted as the Emperor would follow the advice 
given by the Board of Justice that prepared the report179. Notably, it was in Qing 
that cunliu jangqin developed its most sophisticated legal forms. More 
circumstances of the human affairs could be taken into consideration by law, such 
as parentis marital status180, the profile of the culprit181, siblings182, relationship of 
the victim to the offender in case of manslaughter183, whether the victim was also 
an only son184, etc.
Legal Practice: xiao and Its Complications
Since xiao was well incorporated into official representation, in legal practice the 
majority of the cases could be decided by law, not to mention the sophisticated 
penalty calculation scheme that allowed the magistrates to adjust punishment to
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the severity and mental state of the culprits. This does not mean, however, that no 
circumstance should arise to challenge the already highly moralistic law. In the 
following, we shall look at two categories, namely revenge and closeness- 
remoteness to see how in legal practice xiao might create complications and 
difficulties.
Revenge
In judicial practice, revenge presented a particularly thorny issue. For one thing, 
traditional China was a largely agrarian society, where local communities were 
closely-knit. Family and clan as backbones of social structure carried with them a 
strong network of blood relationships. In the case of grievances (like a family 
member wrongly convicted and executed by local officials), the family member 
might seek blood revenge. The Book of Bites recognised that the aggrieved child 
had the right to revenge on the enemy who had murdered their parent185. Morally 
the inferiors, bound by this family love, were naturally expected to feel bitter in 
the thought of being bereaved of their loved superiors. The law sided 
unambiguously with morals in condemning the inferior seeking secret 
reconciliation with the enemy without reporting to the officials, which was 
referred to as the crime of sihe ( f ff tP)186. It aimed at punishing the inferior who 
could not care less about the death of grand/parents and thereby was punishable 
for ‘having no heart of love for family’ (wuqin %hi x i n j or ‘a culpable 
mind to forget the Grave Pain’(^/zg datong %hi xin iSzfc S a l 'l l ') .  In case of being 
bought off monetarily by the enemy, the greedy inferior should be subject to 
2,000-li banishment187.
Understandably, the law prohibited children from privately reconciling with the 
enemy without reporting to the officials, which was a sign of no love for one’s 
parents. Here moral principles conflicted in no way with the positive law, as both 
deemed punishable the act of secret reconciliation with the enemy. However, a 
thorny problem arose when the children sought vengeance by themselves in the 
name of filial piety. It was deemed desirable and righteous for the social 
obligations to seek for revenge — yet this created a deadlock for the law: if it
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prohibited the revenge, this would grieve the filial children and hurt the public 
morals; on the other hand, if revenge was allowed, predictably it could create 
generations of feud leading to a never-ending circle of homicide. As Han Yu 
remarked,
‘The child seeks revenge for his father, which can be seen in an endless number 
of classics, such as the Book of Spring and Autumn, the Book of Bites, the Offices of 
Zhou, and the various annals, whereas it is decriminalised without exception. This 
scenario should best be detailed in law.. .For me, if the law forbids revenge, it will 
hurt the heart of the filial child, which is direcdy at odds with the teachings from 
our Sagacious Ancestors; if the law allows revenge, then it will be abused, hence 
no way to stop homicide’.
Then, he proposed a solution here:
‘Optimally, the law should prescribe that: in case of revenge for the father, [the 
son] should detail the reasons beforehand in a report to be submitted for 
collective permission from a plenary session at the Lower Court of the Board of 
Justice, through which way it will not contradict the spirit of the laws and 
legislation’188.
Han Yu’s solution was reminiscent of a legal stipulation in Western Zhou. By law, 
revenge was only permissible on one condition, ‘if the father is not culpable but 
executed wrongly, the children can seek for revenge’189. This is to say, the revenge 
had the precondition that the father should be innocent but mistakenly executed. 
If the father was culpable and should be liable to death penalty, then revenge was 
not allowed190. This solution of registering first and then revenge, however, was not 
adopted by the laws throughout the dynasties. Nor was the law of Western Zhou 
taken as a model by later laws. On the contrary, the laws throughout the dynasties 
had stressed unequivocally the prohibition of revenge, from Han, to Wei, North 
Zhou, Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing191. Unanimously, it was held that as long as the 
murderer had been punished by state law, no vengeance should be allowed, as 
justice had been done.
Auxiliary to this stress to prohibit revenge, a system of ‘moving [the punished 
criminal] to escape potential revenge’ (yixiang bichou was introduced
into the law, and an official post was established as well specifically in charge of 
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dissolving such vengeance disputes, named tiaoren ( A  monitor), whose 
responsibility was to ‘monitor the disputes of all the people and try all out to 
reconcile them’192. More specifically, tiaoren has the responsibility of urging and 
arranging those potential victims to escape from revenge, which is called ‘escaping 
vengeance’ (bichou 3® jfh ). As stipulated, ‘if there is difficulty to reach a 
reconciliation pact, then the victim should be moved overseas for parental 
vengeance; a 1,000-li away from home for fraternal vengeance; and to another 
state for vengeance of uncle or cousins’. The escape was compulsory. If ‘the 
victim did not want to move, then he should be issued ruijie the official
endorsement)’193. This principle was later incorporated into the Tang Code, where 
the murderer of one’s grand/parents, once pardoned, should be moved to another 
place to escape potential revenge from his victim’s children194.
As a matter of fact, despite the institutional effort to curb the act of revenge by 
a punishment as severe as death penalty, in the real practice of law, it often 
aroused controversy about whether to lessen the penalty. A fierce tussle was often 
fought between officials holding either side of the different opinions: those in 
favour of moral inculcation argued that the culprit should receive a lesser penalty 
or pardon as a recognition of filial piety; while the legalists would frequently insist 
that law should be abided by, lest the extralegal favour should impair the integrity 
of legal authority. In the period of Wu Zetian (690-705 AD), Xu Shuang was 
wrongly executed by the local magistrate - Zhao Shiwen. To avenge his father, Xu 
Yuanqing worked as a servant for years at an official stopover hotel. A few years 
later, when Zhao Shiwen, who had been promoted to Chief Justice by that time, 
lodged at this hotel, Xu Yuanqing assassinated him at night and then turned 
himself in. This case won the then ruling Empress — Wu Zetian’s favour and she 
suggested to exempt Xu Yuanqing from decapitation and reduce his punishment 
to exile. Deputy Privy Commissioner (youshiyi A Jn ifl) Chen Zi’an challenged this 
suggestion but proposed an unorthodox idea: to decapitate Xu Yuanqing while at 
the same time, erecting a memorial monumental archway (W tt paifang) in Xu’s 
village to praise his feat195.
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In most cases, those who upheld the moral consideration won, with the culprit’s 
life preserved and capital punishment reduced. Out of the 6 cases of revenge as 
recorded in the New Book of Tang196, 5 were sentenced with a lessened penalty, with 
the culprit’s life spared. In only one case (which was a rare occasion), the emperor 
sided with the legalist view, insisting on the death penalty. As a result, it drew 
outcries of criticism from not only his royal ministers, but also from the 
intellectual community throughout the country. In the period of Tianbao (742-56 
AD), Zhang Sushen the governor of Xizhou was framed for the crime of plotting 
a rebellion, executed and had his whole family exiled by the Attorney General 
Yang Wang who did not conduct a sufficient investigation. Zhang’s two sons — 
Zhang Huang, 13-year-old and Zhang Xiu, 11 were exiled to Lingnan. A few years 
later, Zhang Huang and Zhang Xiu both escaped from prison, returned to Xizhou 
and assassinated Yang Wang. Before killing other officials involved in framing 
their father, they were arrested and prosecuted. At this time, people from different 
walks who lived in the capital appealed to the official for amnesty on these two 
sons for their ‘admirable feat of filial piety’; even many officials in the central 
government echoed this appeal in front of the Emperor. However, Pei Yaoqin the 
Deputy Chief Justice insisted on decapitation by law, which was supported by 
Tang Xuanzong the emperor. Therefore, finally it was decided that these two sons 
be decapitated, despite the numerous protests.
On the day of the execution, there was a huge wave of mourning for these two 
sons in the capital where abounded obituaries in praise of the brothers. Also, a 
donation was initiated at the locale of their execution for a grand funeral for them. 
Simultaneously, complaints and remonstrations (W jian) came in like snowflakes 
to the Central Government in criticising that this case had been decided wrongly. 
A scholar wrote, ‘Vengeance is the supreme form of the social obligations upon 
which the subordinate’s Great Righteousness is established. Forbidding revenge 
will lead to destroying the Way of Human and the demise of the Reason of 
Heaven’197. In this case, the emperor had sided with the legalists to insist on a 
rigid application of law, but he would not be able to shut down the heavy 
criticisms that were aimed at this immoral application. This case as the only
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occasion of the emperor pushing through his preference without taking in the 
majority of views clearly confirmed our impression that in imperial China, usually 
the culprit won certain extralegal favours.
The logic behind such extralegal favour is not difficult to understand. Filial piety 
as the supreme value of the society was supported by both law and morals. In the 
case of hardship arising out of rigorous application of the law, it should give way 
to moral considerations that could be used to mitigate such an undesirable result. 
A complete pardon of the avenger’s crime would be unthinkable, as s/he had 
committed homicide, which should be punished by law. However, the penalty 
should not be so severe as death, as the morality of such an act equally deserved 
attention. Therefore, a total acquittal might be unrealistic while a reduced penalty 
would be reasonable to anticipate. In this way, both law and morals would be 
observed. The culprit was punished but public morals also remained unhurt. As a 
matter of fact, as a shared conviction among the ruling class and the ruled, it did 
not require so dramatic royal debates as witnessed in the previous cases in order 
to convince the ruler. As early as the period of Shundi, East Han (126-45 AD), 
Hou Yu a local girl who avenged her father’s murderer was sentenced to death by 
law by Liang Pei the magistrate. A local student, at only 15 years of age, wrote a 
letter appealing the case to the Imperial Government for amnesty. As he argued, 
‘The nobleness and righteousness in Yu’s feat are [great] enough to move a 
grandson without shame or a son who submits peacefully to indignities. Such 
behaviour is as laudable as to have a tribute inscribed on the tombstone even in a 
corrupted time. How come it is condemned even in [our] time of peaceful glory?’ 
Ashamed, Liang Pei wrote another supporting appeal to overrule his previous 
decision and asked for amnesty for Hou Yu. Finally, the girl received a lessened 
penalty198.
C loseness/rem oteness
To further complicate the xiao's influence upon judiciary practice in traditional 
China, what if the murderer (or the enemy) was also one’s family member? On the 
one hand, one cannot reconcile privately with the murderer as prohibited by law;
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yet on the other, s/he was also supposed to conceal the crime by family members, 
which was encouraged by the law. How could this deadlock be solved?
The solution to this dilemma lies in another concept in Chinese culture — the 
nearness/remoteness of one’s relationships. Among the traditional intellectuals, a 
fivefold concept of human relationships was widely accepted, namely the ruler- 
subordinate officials relationship, father-son and husband-wife bonds, 
brotherhood and friendship199. However, these five relationships were not equally 
weighted, as they were relatively near or remote to the individual as the centre of 
these relationships. The nearer the relationship, the more important it would be. 
This differential weighting of relationships was illustrated in the pioneering work 
by Fei Xiaotong in the 1940s. He visualised these relationships as a centripetal 
group of waves in the water. The individual is situated as the centre of the wave 
and surrounded by circles of waves, one after another and from near to remote. In 
the traditional social structure, the centre of the wave was the male senior within 
the family, by which the nearest and most important relationship would be, for 
instance, father-child from the child’s perspective, while husband-wife from the 
wife’s perspective. Any other relationship should give way to this supreme 
relationship200.
It was not unfamiliar, therefore, for the judges to determine the 
closeness/remoteness of family relationships before meting out a correct penalty. 
In 1820, a father Hu Jinyao raped his daughter-in-law, for which he was beaten to 
death by his son — Hu Chenglin. The mother Hujiang decided not to report to the 
officials as a result of her son’s pledges as well as of her fear that if her son were 
sentenced to death by law, she would have no one to rely upon for care in the 
future. Afterwards, this case was reported and Hu Chenglin was executed while 
the mother Hujiang received 100 strokes and banishment one year away from 
home. In this case, the husband-wife relationship was the most important, by 
which the wife should report the murderer to office, despite the fact that the latter 
was her son, which relationship was close enough but not so close as that of 
husband-wife. A similar theme arose in a case of patricide. In 1823,Yu Junshan’s 
father was murdered by his younger brother Yu Changcai. Yu Junshan was afraid
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that this might involve himself, for which reason he helped to bury the body and 
concealed his brother. After being found out, Yu Changcai was executed while Yu 
Junshan was punished with 100 strokes and 3,000-li exile, for ‘forgetting the 
vengeance and humouring the enemy’ (wangchou yhongxiong&tylIRl^J)201. Similarly, 
here the supreme relationship was the father-son one, by which the son should 
report the murderer to office, despite the fact that the latter was his younger 
brother.
In case of concubinage, the first woman married was normally referred to as the 
only proper wife (%hengqiIE JS), while all other(s) were called concubine(s) (qie^x:), 
subordinate to the proper wife. While concubinage was allowed, a man could only 
have one proper wife, where having more than one wife was condemned both by 
social obligations202 and law203. This restriction had certain legal implications, as 
the superordination of the wife vis-a-vis concubine(s) not only carried the social 
significance of differentiating status within a family, but also legal implications of 
differentiated dues and duties204. In judicial practice, however, this differential 
relationship could give rise to complications. For instance, the offspring of all 
concubines must submit themselves to the proper wife, whose status was only 
second to the husband as the head of the family. From the child’s side, 
theoretically this wife-child relationship was of greater importance than that 
between the child and his/her real mother who was a concubine. However, in 
reality, this child-real mother bond would be stronger than that between wife-child 
due to consanguinity, as children did tend to spend a lot more time with their own 
mothers. If  a lawsuit arose, which side should the judge rule in favour of, by 
recognising the wife’s supreme status, or the blood bond between the child and 
the real mother?
In 988, An Chongxu came to Kaifeng the capital to accuse his stepmother Feng, 
by alleging that Feng was divorced by his father when he was still alive and now 
after his father’s decease, Feng attempted viciously to embezzle all the legacy of 
his father, which resulted in an impoverished state for both An Chongxu and his 
real mother Pu who was a concubine. Upon receiving the accusation, the Board of 
Justice first disregarded An Chongxu’s claim and sentenced him to death by
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strangulation for accusing parents. Song Taizong the emperor questioned this 
decision, for which he convened the royal court. A debate ensued. One of the key 
issues was to ascertain whether Feng had been divorced by An Chongxu’s father 
An Zhiyi. If  so, then the mother-son relationship [between An Chongxu and Feng] 
should be dissolved. Consequently, An Chongxu would not have committed the 
crime of ‘accusing parents’. Feng would be evicted and sent back to her natal 
family and the legacy should be granted to An Chongxu and his mother Pu. Later 
it was ascertained that Feng was not really divorced by An Zhiyi when he was still 
alive. For this reason, the Board of Justice maintained its original decision.
This decision was opposed by a Li Fang-led group of 40-plus higher officials. As 
they reasoned, firstly, although Pu was a concubine (and thereby with lower status 
in the family), she was above all An Chongxu’s real mother, which was an 
undeniable difference between Pu and Feng, despite the fact that Feng occupied a 
higher status within the family. Moreover, An Chongxu accused Feng for no other 
purpose than securing shelter and support for his real mother, which was 
exemplary of filial piety. Secondly, if An Chongxu were sentenced to death, for An 
Zhiyi’s family, the only male heir would be extinct, the family line would be 
discontinued and his real mother Pu would have no one to rely upon for care. 
Therefore, there was a moral imperative that An Chongxu’s life be spared. In the 
end, the opposition won the favour, with An Chongxu exempted from the death 
penalty and pardoned; the legacy was allocated to him while simultaneously he 
should equally care for Feng and Pu205.
The interesting point in this case lies in the weighting of closeness/remoteness 
of An Chongxu respectively to Feng the wife and his real mother Pu the 
concubine. By law, this supreme status of wife must be respected, while morally 
the blood bond between An and his real mother was equally worthy of 
consideration. Although other factors (such as the only male heir and lack of care 
for Pu if An Chongxu were executed) were considered equally, this differential 
weighting was the core of the opposition’s protest. In the end, a compromise was 
reached: An Chongxu was pardoned so as to care for his mother, but equally, he 
should look after Feng as well. Both law and morals were observed.
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This case also touched upon the issue of filial impiety (buxiao as in the act
of accusing parents, which was the other side of the coin where law and morals 
were fused together. Where xiao would win extralegal favours, filial impiety was 
unequivocally condemnable. Listed as one of the Ten Abominations {shVe~h^5), it 
included slander, physical abuse, failure to care for parents, separation of 
household without parent’s consent, marriage or entertainment during the 
mourning period for parents, ignoring the filial duty of mourning by concealing a 
parent’s death to stay in office206. For one thing, in the Analects, Confucius 
stressed various aspects of filial care for the parents, such as ‘no disobedience’, 
‘reverence’, ‘anxiety when the parents fall ill’ and ‘staying around’. In general, the 
parents should be ‘served according to propriety when they are alive and buried 
when they are deceased, as well as worshipped thereafter with proper sacrifices’207. 
By law, failing to observe these cares was called gongyangyouque that
should be punished. For instance, by Confucian teaching, ‘in serving his parents, 
the child may use gentle remonstrance; if he sees that they do not incline to follow 
his advice, he should continue to show reverence without desistence and take 
pains without resentment’208. In the light of this teaching, the child should make 
efforts to please their parents, irrespective of whether the latter agree with him or 
otherwise. In case any harm or damage is caused to the parents, even if it was the 
parent’s own fault, the child must be held liable for it209.
In addition, filial impiety included disobedience, termed as ‘offending against 
status and right principles’ {ganmingfanyi $L) or ‘deliberately disobeying
instructions’ (mifan jiao ling 33t <fE IS ^ ), punishable by two-year banishment in the 
Tang and Song codes, and 100 strokes in the Ming and Qing codes210. Parents, 
though forbidden to kill their unfilial children211, can report the latter to the local 
yamen for punishment of exile, referred to as ‘parental pledge of punishing [unfilial] 
children through exile’ (fumu chengqing faqian S it) . This record will
adversely affect the children, barring their future application for cunliu yangqin, or 
mnsang aitong, as both legal constructs were to console the filial convicts, 
extenuating their punishment to allow them to fulfil their filial duty of caring for
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parents or mourning over their grand/parent’s decease. Filialness, therefore, was a 
necessary condition as required for both stipulations. Convicts with unfilial 
records were thereby in general excluded from applications212.
T he M ourning System: Blood Relationships
Apart from the parent-child relationships that were well received into law, the 
family relative relationships were equally attended by law. Here an important 
concept came into being: the mourning system For one thing, there
were 4 degrees of family relationships in ascending importance: (1) simd £ § 0 , the 
4th degree (and the remotest); (2) xidogong^^tj, the 3rd degree; (3) dagdng’f ^ f } , the 
2nd degree; and (4) qiqin 85 the 1st degree (and the nearest). Based on these 
four-degree intra-relative relationships, there was a fivefold mourning system, 
which varied in the length of term and material of mourning clothing. The closer 
the relationship, the longer the term and the coarser the mourning material213.
This gradation of intra-relative relationships had great legal implications, as it 
was the basis upon which to reach judicial decisions and mete out corresponding 
penalties. The earliest argument of incorporating family relationships into law can 
be traced to the Book of Rites. It was held that the judiciary should consider 
intimacy in the parent-child relationship in whatever suits brought before it214. 
The law of the State of Jin was the earliest to incorporate the mourning system 
into law, which was continued in the Tang and Song215. The Yuan law started 
including the mourning diagram into law. And throughout the successive Ming 
and Qing, the mourning diagram was listed as a preamble to the legal codes216. 
Without this mourning system, it would even be impossible to mete out 
punishment correctly217. Prior to decisions, it was emphasised that the epithets 
and [mutual] mourning relationships should be clarified in any case concerning 
families and clans. Furthermore, the mourning system should be used as a 
benchmark to determine whether the penalty in judicial decisions should be 
lightened or strengthened218. In a word, the mourning system should be consulted 
before a [correct] decision could be reached219.
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In particular, first of all, the differential seniority-inferiority relationship affected 
the penalty. On the one hand, derived from xiao, the importance of respecting the 
senior in the family/clan was also recognised by law. Beijou inferior junior)
were strictiy forbidden from infringing upon %un%hang superior senior).
Causing injury or death to %un%hang was liable for heavier punishment. The closer 
they were related to the senior, the more severe the penalty would be. Homicide 
of the closest grand/parent(s) was regarded as one of the most heinous crimes 
(nilun ^hong'an 8 III) with the culprit subject to an extreme penalty. On the 
other hand, %un%hang was exempt from many offences on beijou and even in the 
case of death, would receive a lessened penalty. The closer they were related to the 
inferior junior, the lesser the penalty would be220.
Secondly, theft from a relative (qinshu xiangdao int) received a lessened
penalty. For one thing, family members had the duty of helping each other out of 
financial stresses, where the better-off were morally bound to help relatives out. 
For this very reason, a way to show legal consideration of moral duty was to 
lessen the penalty imposed on such theft.
Thirdly, blood relatives were allowed to conceal for each other (qinshu rongyin tS 
This doctrine could be dated back to Confucius’ teaching, where it was 
illustrated in the story of a son testifying at court as an eye witness against his 
father for stealing sheep. Confucius argued that this practice of having the son to 
testify against his father was against humanity. The righteous practice, on the 
contrary, should be that the son concealed his father’s crime or vice versa?151. This 
doctrine was further expounded by Mencius. In a parable, Mencius agreed that the 
judge should charge in accordance with law the emperor’s father who committed 
homicide. But Shun the emperor should abandon the kingdom, carry his father on 
his back and escape to the world’s end. In this way, the law was observed as the 
father was charged; while at the same time, Shun’s filial piety would not be 
compromised as he would escape with his father222.
The law recognised this concealment by exempting blood relatives from 
punishment. The Han Code first recognised this principle but limited the scope of
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intra-blood relatives receiving this consideration to only parent-child, grandparent- 
grandchild and husband-wife223, which was gradually expanded in successive 
dynasties with increasingly sophisticated institutionalisation. The Tang Code 
exempted mutual concealment among cohabitant relatives. Relatives of the 4th or 
5th degree of mourning (xiaogong and sima) would be charged with a penalty 
reduced by three degrees. The Ming and Qing codes further expanded this to 
include the wife’s blood relatives like father- and mother-in-law and non­
mourning relatives224.
Since legally relatives were not expected to disclose any information, this gave 
rise to two further legal scenarios. First, relatives were exempt from giving 
testimony at court. This was first proposed during the period of Yuandi (317-22 
AD) in Eastern Jin and incorporated into laws from the Tang225. Even magistrates 
contravening this principle would be subject to a penalty of 80 strokes in the Tang 
and Song codes and 50 strokes in the Ming and Qing codes226.
Secondly, accusation of criminal behaviour by one relative against another at 
court was punishable, especially in the case of children bringing their 
grand/parents to court for criminal charges, which was taken as unfilialness. 
Rendering this act culpable can be dated back to the Han227, but it was not until 
the North Wei that it was written into law, making such an act a capital crime228. 
The legal codes in successive dynasties, namely Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, Qing229, 
all prohibited such an act and further made it a non-pardonable crime230. Apart 
from one’s patrilineal direct relatives, accusing other seniors was also punishable. 
Bringing a false charge was punished with aggravated penalties. On the other hand, 
a family senior accusing an inferior junior was also legally forbidden. Similar to 
other crimes, the senior would receive a lessened penalty231.
However, a seemingly irreconcilable contradiction should be noted here: 
informing the localyamen of the crime committed by one’s relatives was regarded 
as the same as the offender turning himself in, which should elicit leniency232. One 
wonders why the law recognised concealment, forbade intra-relative accusations 
on the one hand, while on the other hand allowed denunciation to the local 
magistrate’s office of a relative’s offences and further regarded it as a form of the
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offender turning himself in. Certainly, first of all, mutual accusation was different 
from reporting the crime to localyarnm. Presumably accusation was an act out of 
enmity, intended to bring punishment and infliction upon one’s relatives. By 
comparison, reporting the crime to officials was regarded as a pledge aimed at 
winning leniency for one’s relatives. Apart from the different purposes behind 
these two acts, there were separate channels for these two acts. Accusation would 
necessarily involve formal legal procedures during which both parties would kneel 
in the courts of law. Being summoned to court attendance, plus kneeling in the 
court attended by public, could easily result in inconvenience, toil and even shame. 
Naturally going through these formal sessions would sow seeds of feud between 
family members. As the law recognised the moral necessity of cultivating 
harmonious family bonds, inimicality should thereby be duly discouraged. It was 
thereby logically natural to forbid mutual accusation that was based on 
disharmony and might fan the flame of bitterness among family members. The 
need to outlaw intra-relative accusation was particularly felt in case of the inferior 
junior accusing the senior, where it contravened the righteousness of respecting 
the senior.
On the other hand, allowing intra-relative reporting crimes to localyamen would 
not only help the government to tackle crimes, but also offer a chance for relatives 
to save offenders from severe penalty, as this reporting would be rewarded with 
leniency. So to speak, the informant was acting out of love, compassion and 
sympathy for his relatives. It was regarded as no different from orally persuading 
or physically escorting the offender to turn himself in to the local yamen. Such 
seemingly contradictory clauses were actually complementary, as they addressed 
the different purposes and channels for the two acts that differed in essence from 
each other. Such an institutional design showed the sophistication of official 
representation that aimed at encompassing as many social respects as possible, 
thereby providing an inclusive guidance for judicial practice. It was hailed as 
perfect examples of incorporating tianli and renqing into positive law233.
Notably, certain family relationships were based on non-blood constructs, such 
as marriage (e.g. father-daughter-in-law, mother-son-in-law). In law, the
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obligations of such relationships were comparable to those based on 
consanguinity. However, there might be circumstances where such moral 
considerations would be unnecessary. What if the crimes committed were so 
heinous that the moral necessity of maintaining family harmony should give way 
to a higher call for justice? Del Vecchio once remarked, ‘Every system...has in 
reality its safety-valves and its natural means of renewal, of transformation and 
increase ... Justice may proclaim itself as valid and effective even against a legal 
system actually in force, when ... the rules of the system in force are in 
irreconcilable conflict with those... elementary requirements of justice which ... 
are the primary reason of its validity’234. Such a safety-valve in the Chinese 
imperial law was referred to as yijue ( ii$ §  severance of non-blood family bond), 
where the non-consanguinity, artificial bond between relatives could be severed. 
This severance in bond had significance for judicial decisions, as it opened the way 
to condemnation without applying the usual rule of pardoning the senior or 
aggravating the punishment of the junior.
Recorded cases can be traced as early as the period of Han Jingdi (156-140 BC). 
A son who avenged his stepmother for killing his father was charged with 
matricide. This decision was questioned by the Emperor in the review process. 
Wudi the Prince remarked, ‘As the saying goes, “a stepmother is just like one’s 
real mother”. Although a stepmother is not comparable one’s real mother, yet it is 
because of the father that stepmother is regarded as comparable to one’s real 
mother. For this case, the unrelenting stepmother murdered the father, by which 
time this mother-son bond had been severed already’. Therefore, the penalty was 
changed to regular homicide, instead of the harsher one for matricide235.
Starting in the Tang, yijue was codified in detail, referring to a husband’s physical 
abuse of wife’s grand/parent(s) or the murder of a wife’s blood relatives, mutual 
killings between husband’s blood relatives and those of the wife, a wife’s physical 
abuse or oral insult of husband’s grand/parent(s) or the murder of a husband’s 
blood relatives, or in the case of an unfaithful mother-in-law attempting to murder 
her son-in-law236. This list in the Ming and Qing codes was expanded to include a 
parent-in-law unreasonably evicting a son-in-law and remarrying their daughter.
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Such unreasonable causes included snobbish discrimination against a poor son-in- 
law237, or a greed for money in terms of dowry238. A mother illegally remarrying 
her daughter in this way would no longer be regarded as a mother-in-law to her 
son-in-law. Any criminal offence committed between them would be charged 
according to the commoner's standard only. In 1880, the Qing code even included 
remote blood relationships (gongfuyixia SJ3R IUT, of the 5th degree mourning or 
non-mourning), where the senior driven by his craving for financial gain to 
murder the junior would be charged with murder according to the commoner 
standard239. It further included such heinous sexual crimes as a father-in-law 
raping a daughter-in-law240, a parent-in-law matchmaking a daughter-in-law with 
her adulterer241. In 1816, a son-in-law who murdered his unfaithful mother-in-law 
that pressed her daughter into sexual intercourse with her adulterer was only given 
a suspended sentence of strangulation for murdering a capital convict, instead of 
immediate decapitation for murdering a mother-in-law242. This applied to remoter 
family relationships. In a 1827 case, an adulterer uncle who murdered his 
nephew’s wife when the latter accidentally discovered his adultery with her 
mother-in-law was charged with murder according the commoner standard 
instead of the lessened penalty of a senior killing a junior243.
N on-b lood  Relationships: Class and Ethnicity
Apart from recognising the differential family relationships, Confucianism 
emphasised the hierarchy between various classes as the basis for the society 
without which harmony could not possibly be maintained. Instead of proposing 
universal equality for all social classes, Confucianism recognised the inequality of 
human beings in terms of their intelligence and capacity. Such inequality should be 
maintained in terms of gratification of their desires, such as apparel, residence, 
transportation, funeral and ancestral worship ceremonies. The legal codes since 
the Han detailed the differentiation of gratification tailored to the social classes244. 
As was remarked, in the Tang Code, status played an important role in 
determining duties and rights, punishments and exemptions245; while ‘one of the 
[Qing] Code’s most interesting features was the inclusion of many explicit
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provisions that required magistrates and their superiors, when determining the 
gravity of various offences and the appropriate degree of punishment, to take 
careful account of the defendant’s individual circumstances such as his social 
status, sex, age, physical condition, and relation to the victim of the offence’246.
Derived from the classical juntf-xiaoren dichotomy247, the first category of class 
differentiation can be seen from the ruling-ruled dichotomy. The ruling class, 
including aristocracy and bureaucrats, enjoy certain privileges unavailable to the 
ruled. Prior to the Qin, the aristocracy was exempt from corporal punishment 
(rouxing such as tattooing, nose-cutting and castration248. For unforgivable
crimes like patricide, regicide, the penalty on aristocrats served more the purpose 
of preserving aristocratic dignity than as a penalty per ser. aristocratic offenders 
might be exiled249, pressed to commit suicide250 or even secretly executed251. In all 
these penalties, they enjoyed extralegal favour of non-exposure to the public 
through being sentenced to the death penalty by the judiciary, which was regarded 
as a way to preserve aristocratic dignity252. These privileges were abolished in the 
Qin, where the Legalists introduced the universal application of law that subjected 
the aristocracy to punishments as commoners253. Such an egalitarian approach 
rarely surprises today’s readers, but over 2,200 years back, this abolition was 
painful for the aristocracy. In a society where social hierarchy was taken for 
granted, an egalitarian approach was nothing but a violation of such a hierarchy in 
which the aristocracy had vested interests. It was not surprising that the 
aristocracy sought their retaliation on the legalists at the end of the two-decade- 
long legal regime of the Qin254. Later in the Han, when the Confucian emphasis 
on hierarchy was seen as a chance to restore aristocratic privileges that had been 
swept ruthlessly away by the Legalists255, this concern was intertwined with the 
moral imperative to undo the harshness of the legalist-made Han law256.
The aristocracy underwent an important change. Prior to the Sui and Tang, the 
aristocracy was mainly maintained through hereditary social status and intra­
aristocrat marriages257, especially since the Wei258. There was even a royal writ in 
the Gaozong period (452-67 A.D.) in North Wei to forbid aristocrat-commoner 
marriage259. Since the Sui and Tang, this old aristocracy was continually weakened
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by increasingly fluid social structures. The path to the ruling class was open to the 
whole society through imperial exams. Aristocracy was now no longer exclusively 
based on one’s hereditary status, but exhibited fluidity where self-made novae riches 
could climb up the social ladder through personal diligence260. Even commoners, 
after a few generations’ effort through imperial exams and imperial officialdom, 
could become a distinguished family (mingmen wang^u ^  H M J^)261.
Recognising the privileges of the ruling class can be seen from the clause 
concerning bayi (JViX 8 considerations)262, referring to the 8 privileged classes that 
could only be tried by the emperor or charged with a lessened penalty. Though 
derived from bapi ( A ®  8 penalties) as early as in the Zhou, bayi was not 
incorporated into law until 229 A.D. in the New Law of Wei263. Prior to this, in the 
Han, to arrest aristocrats required prior approval of the emperor264. This was 
continued in the Tang and Song where a bayi trial at the imperial court could not 
be opened without the emperor’s approval. From thence the imperial court 
submitted a detailed report for the emperor to decide. Similar institutional 
procedures could also be seen in the laws of the Late Jin (936-44 A.D.), Late 
Zhou (951-9 A.D.), Ming and Qing265. Apart from this special favour in terms of 
institutional procedures, bayi persons could get a lessened penalty as well266. Such 
legal privileges also applied to blood relatives such as grand/parents, wife and 
offspring of the bayi class267.
Bureaucrats (%higuan\Rllf) demanded special attention as they far outnumbered 
other groups in the bayi class. The earliest legal record of such bureaucrat-specific 
privilege can be dated back to the Rites of Zhou in West Zhou (1066-771 B.C.)268, 
where bureaucrats were not required to present themselves at court in legal 
disputes269. This was continued in later legal codes270. Similar to bayi, arresting or 
trying bureaucrats of certain ranks had to seek the emperor’s approval in the first 
place271. They might be exempt from chains in jail (juxiffi\~ffc)211 and torture for 
interrogation (xingxun Jfllitl)273. If  charged, the criminal punishment could be 
lessened274, or redeemed through financial means275 and office ranks276.
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In the non-privileged classes, further differentiation was seen from the 
commoner-subordinate dichotomy. The earliest record of this dichotomy can be 
traced back to the Rites of Zhou in West Zhou through household registration (huji 
f*  IS), referred to as ‘the law of differentiation, (bifa b t& )277. Throughout history, 
the imperial government tried to assign different legal status through such 
household registrations278. Among the commoners (liangmin S. K), status could be 
exchanged for privileges, such as intellectuals279, who could redeem whip crimes 
through monetary means or beatings through deregistration of their intellectual 
status280. Other conditions like gender (female), age (both elderly and young), and 
infirmity (like disability and sickness) might also lead to redemption281.
The subordinate categories {jianmin K ) included slaves {nubi ),
entertainers {youling tfc /fv ), government employees {gaoU - ^ ^ ), household 
labourers {gugongren JjSlLA), or certain groups in designated regions282. Due to 
their inferior social status283, subordinates had only restricted rights. They could 
not take imperial exams284 or marry commoners285. In cases of intra-commoner- 
subordinate crimes, such as battery286, illicit sexual intercourse287, an offender of 
the commoner class might receive a lessened penalty, while an offender of the 
subordinate class would receive an aggravated one.
Racial issues were not prominent prior to the Qin, when China remained 
disunited where there existed different states in constant war or coalition288. In a 
united China, however, this issue was brought up, despite the Han nationality 
being the majority. It became even more pressingly felt in the age of minorities as 
the ruling class, such as the Qidan minority in the Liao, the Jin minority in the Jin 
(jfe), the Mongolian in the Yuan, and the Manchurian in the Qing289. In these 
dynasties, different races were given legal treatment, with one or two races 
privileged over the others. The Liao divided society into Qidan and Han 
nationalities, made separate laws290 and crafted a ramified judiciary of North- 
South [Supreme] Courts291. The ruling Qidan nationality was granted certain 
privileges292. In the Jin, the social classes were divided into three groups: (1) the 
proper race Qin); (2) the Han (those registered in Liao); (3) Southerners (residents
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in Shandong, Henan provinces)293. The ruling Jin was granted certain privileges 
against the other races. The Yuan had four ethnic groups: (1) Mongolian; (2) Semu; 
(3) Han (population after conquering Jin); (4) Southerner (population after 
conquering the Song). Mongolian and Semu nationalities were the privileged294. 
The practice of a separate judiciary for different races as in Liao was continued in 
the Yuan, where cases concerning Mongolians and Semu could only be decided at 
the Zongzheng Court while for Han and Southerners, they were to be judged in 
common courts295.
Similarly, the Qing had a separate judiciary for two fundamental ethnic divisions: 
(1) Manchurians; (2) Han, but without such striking discrimination against the 
Han nationality296. The Manchurians (or Gusa, bannermen ft A) had certain legal 
privileges. For instance, in law there is a discipline called ‘penalty exemption’ 
(fan^ui mian faqian <fEff f e S f l l) ,  by which the penalty of banishment, exile and 
military exile could be substituted by cangue punishment (jiahao ftl ^ 7) for a period 
calculated by length or distance of the original sentence. For instance, 1-year 
banishment was substituted with 20-day chain punishment, 4-years with 35-days, 
5-years with 50-daya; while 2,000-li exile with 50-days, military exile in 
neighbourhood by 70-days, etc297. This privilege could be rescinded once the 
Manchurian status was deregistered, when the offender would be punished in the 
same way as the Han nationality298. Apart from this fundamental Manchurian-Han 
ethnic division, the Qing law also had special clauses for other ethnic minorities, 
like Miao, Mongolian, or even people living in certain areas with devious folkways 
(minfeng biaohan KMirM'N?-)299.
Section 2: M oral Consideration o f Specific Circum stances
Apart from the relationships that demanded legal attention, another area for 
equity in the Chinese traditional law was to tailor the punishment to the gravity of 
the crimes committed as well as to the reformability of the offender’s personal 
characteristics. These two factors were generally termed as un/sympathisability, 
which shall be examined first.
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Sympathisability
It was recognised that certain circumstances demanded extenuation, hence 
referred to as sympathisability (qingyoukeyuan tlf W FT J§). For instance, abortion of 
a crime would certainly incur a lesser penalty than an accomplished one. If one 
was compelled by force into becoming an accessory, only played a minor role in a 
group crime, reported oneself in, or assisted the government to crack down on the 
crimes, in all probability he might have his penalty alleviated. Starting in the Tang, 
in the case of organised theft, extenuating circumstances included abortion of 
participation and rejection of the stolen goods. In the case of bandit crimes, the 
accomplices might win favourable consideration if (1) they were compelled to join 
the gang by force; (2) during the commission of the crime, they were only 
watching instead of participating; or (3) they did not profit from the crimes; (4) 
they were underage (younger than 15)300.
Furthermore, the judge needed to consider an overall sense of justice, such as 
culpability of the victim and justifiability of the offender. The Qing Code also 
developed a sophisticated system of analogy to punish crimes not specified in the 
law, with the penalty aggravated or alleviated in accordance with the facts, or 
through several flexible clauses such as the law of should-not-be-severely- 
punished {buying^hong lii ^  S  W  ), of should-not-be-leniently-punished 
(buyingqing lii ^  f i  8  f t  ), of committing-what-should-not-have-been-done 
(buyingmi er wei^hi lii M o f  failure-to-declare-what-should-have-
been-declared {yingshenbushen lii ^  ^  W) 301 •
Rustic D im wittedness
The official representation also saw the necessity to extend sympathy towards 
local mores and manners, couched in a condescending term of ‘rustic 
dimwittedness’ (xiangyu ^  M). For one thing, traditional China was a largely rural 
society with a high level of illiteracy with the majority of the population living in 
the countryside. A shared culture of subjecting rural to urban, illiterate to literate, 
commoner to bureaucrat, spawned this sympathy that was tarnished by a hidden
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sense of contempt. For instance, by the Qing law, a veteran trickster duping the 
rustic widess or extorting for money would be charged under the substatute of 
ruffian inciting tumult and be subject to a penalty of military exile in the extremely 
remote areas in Yunan, Guizhou, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces302. Due to 
the open sexual culture in the countryside, bawdy jokes were common among 
country dwellers. In rare occasions a female might commit suicide. Under such 
circumstance, the dimwitted villager {cunyeyumin W SJ®  K), if there was no rape 
intention, seduction or physical coercion, would still be charged under the 
substatute of aborted rape attempt resulting in the victim’s suicide, but with a 
reduced penalty of 3,000-// exile plus 100 strokes303.
A larger part of this rural sympathy was concerned with the issue of marriage, 
which was prominent in the legal landscape. The imperial legal codes without 
exception forbad marriage during the mourning period of parents or husband, 
with the offenders subject to a penalty of 100 strokes. Invalid marriages, even with 
a penalty waived by royal pardon, should still be dissolved. These two laws 
apparently required that invalid marriages should be dissolved at all cost304. 
However, in the Qing a substatute was laid down that seemingly contradicted 
these two. As it stated, ‘in case of an invalid marriage that should be dissolved, if it 
is too severe to charge [the parties] by law or if it does not contradict that much 
propriety (mingfen ^  the local courts to which the suits are brought can 
exercise provisional discretion’. ‘Provisional discretion’ {linshi %hen%huo llfiEftSfjSj), 
here, normally contained a strong hint of acquittal, or punishment waiver tailored 
to the particularities of varied circumstances. As the Board of Justice reasoned in 
1831,
‘Statutes lay down the consistency of rules, while substatutes side with the social 
obligations. Despite the legal prohibition of marriage during the mourning period 
of parents, there are every so often occasions where the rustic, widess, and small 
people, ignorant of law and propriety, illegally conduct marriage. Invalidation [of 
such marriage(s)] by law may result in loss of reputation (mingjie for the
female party, for which very reason comes this substatute. It serves the purpose 
of bending to the social obligations without sacrificing the maintenance of law
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and propriety. In dealing such cases, [the judges] need not invalidate the marriage 
by rigidly observing the law. [Equally,] if the marriage were in discord, certainly 
the couple should not be compulsorily bound together, where invalidation should 
apply’305.
Such contemporaneous discretion could be seen in a 1816 case where an 
impoverished wife due to her husband’s decease was instructed by her mother to 
remarry during the mourning period. By law, this was unlawful and the remarriage 
should be invalidated. But instead of strictly observing the law, the Board of 
Justice bent to the social obligations:
‘Despite the fact that it is duly unlawful for a wife to remarry in the mourning 
period of her husband, such an act is not comparable to [the heinous] adultery. 
Moreover, the remarriage was conducted by her mother, of which the late 
husband had no knowledge. If this marriage be invalidated, it would result in the 
woman changing husbands for thrice, which is a toilsome loss of reputation. It is 
also a contradiction of Reason to deprive the innocent late husband and return to 
the mother who arranged this [illegal] marriage. ...This case can be set as a 
precedent to rule in favour of late marriage by exercising discretion’306.
The rustic dimwittedness thereby mysteriously fused both sympathy and contempt 
for the country dwellers. The elitist, intellectual self-complacency went hand in 
hand with a sympathy towards mending relationships and specific considerations 
in rural China.
Sexual taboo
Sexual taboo was a prominent issue for imperial China. Although seemingly the 
male was granted greater sexual freedom to have concubines, in reality this sexual 
freedom was subject to a plethora of qualifications and procedures. Without this 
propriety, sexual intercourse would be illicit (fornification, jian ), which 
fundamentally referred to intercourse by consent (including wufujian -
‘between the unmarried’ and adultery, involving at least one party already married) 
and rape, as well as (added in the Qing) coaxed intercourse and male 
homosexuality.
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First of all, pre-marital sex was strictly forbidden. Wufujian would receive a 
penalty of 1-year banishment under the Tang and Song laws, 77 strokes under the 
Yuan law and 80 strokes under the Ming and Qing laws307. In judicial practice, 
however, this illicit intercourse was often solved through formal marriage. For one 
thing, more often than not, the offenders were young couples. Penalty through 
either beating or banishment would not only hurt their feelings, but also cause 
social problems, such as ruining the female’s reputation. It would also make it 
difficult for her to marry someone else if her partner was prohibited from 
marrying her. On the other hand through marriage, not only the young couple’s 
affair and reputation would be protected, but also it would conform to social 
conventions. By proprieties, a female should remain loyal to the one to whom she 
lost her virginity. A marriage in this case would seem a perfect solution. In South 
Song, Ma Guangzu acquitted a local student who had a secret affair with a girl 
living next door. When Zheng Banqiao, a great poet and painter in Qing, was 
appointed as local magistrate, he judged the case of a young Buddhist in illicit 
intercourse with a Taoist female, both living in monasteries. By law, illicit 
intercourse between religious followers would receive an aggravated punishment 
by two degrees. In other words, they could receive a penalty of 2-year banishment 
to military exile for 4,000-li. But they were acquitted and then married308. 
Therefore wufujian, regarded as sexual libertinism, was condemned by law that 
sided with morals. However, the legal stipulation, as much as the morals, served 
mainly as a deterrent force. When it came to real occurrence, a more pragmatic 
concern to preserve the reputation of the female would arise. The penalty was 
normally waived while the offending couple were decriminalised and betrothed.
The punishment of adultery was more severe than wufujiam 2-year banishment in 
Tang and Song laws, 87 strokes in Yuan law and 90 strokes in Ming and Qing 
laws309. Legally a husband and his family relatives were allowed to capture the 
adulterers. If the latter were killed on the spot, the law of ‘unauthorised killing a 
death culprit’ would apply, by which the offender could have a lesser penalty than 
by the law of murder or manslaughter. It was quite obvious that in this matter, the 
law sided with social obligations to prohibit adultery and apply leniency to killers
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who committed homicide in the name of capturing the adulterers. Adultery on the 
part of the wife would not only constitute a valid reason for divorce310, but also 
for the husband the right of punishing the adulteress. Since the Yuan, a husband 
might be acquitted from immediate murdering of both wife and adulterer if the 
latter were caught right on the spot311. In return, if the adulteress killed her 
husband during the latter’s attempt to catch the adulterers, she would be punished 
with the most severe penalty — slicing312. However, if the husband deliberately 
solicited or connived at the adultery for the purpose of material benefits, by law 
this immoral act would also be punished313. If  the wife injured or killed her 
husband for declining the latter’s attempt to sell her sex for money, she could be 
pardoned or leniendy punished314.
To further complicate this issue, incestual sex (qinshuxiangjian ^  £F) faced
even stricter prohibition and more severe punishment315. For one thing, since as 
early as the Han, incestual sex was condemned as a ‘bestial act’316 that contravened 
both humanity and the Way of Heaven. In 127 BC, an aristocrat indecently 
engaged in sexual affairs with one of his father’s concubines, his younger brother’s 
wife and his own children was forced into suicide317. What should be noted here is 
that this prohibition on any sexual contact between a wife/concubine and her 
husband’s blood relatives extended beyond the husband’s decease. In other words, 
upon the husband’s decease, only exogamy was allowed for his wife/concubine. 
Marrying a deceased relative’s widow would be regarded the same as adultery318.
However, despite this legal sanction, due to poverty it was a widespread practice 
to marry the widow of a deceased brother, which was condemned by Lii Kun as a 
corrupted custom of the rustic dimwitted319. As he argued, ‘as for the elder 
brother marrying the wife of his [deceased] younger brother and vice versa, it is 
punishable with strangulation by law while the rural dimwitted unscrupulously 
conducted ceremonies and banquets... [which] is abominable’. A 1814 substatute 
reiterated that ‘in case the rustic dimwitted, ignorant of the legal sanction, 
informed the local baojia (ffi PP tithing) and conducted wedding ceremonies, both 
parties would be subject to a penalty of suspension of strangulation, while the clan 
and local baojia would be punished by 80 strokes for failing to stop the marriage’320.
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In a suggestion to local magistrates, Zheng Duan remarked, I t  is a capital crime to 
marry the wife of one’s [deceased] brother, of which the rustic dimwitted are
ignorant...It could be instructed by parents and celebrated by relatives Under
such circumstance, the magistrate should find out who instructed the marriage, as 
well as corroborate the evidence. First he should let the laws be known among the 
rustic dimwitted, who would be exempt from penalty should they rectify 
immediately’321. Apparently, such suggestions attempted to blend moralism and 
practical concern, which Huang called practical moralism322. It is more like a third 
way to bridge the official representation and legal practice, in that the legally 
forbidden marriage might occur quite often in certain places. Punishing the rustic 
dimwitted by law without taking into consideration their plight, poverty or 
ignorance would surely contravene the higher equitable command of taming the 
law to practical, local needs. We will turn to a real case to see the complexity that 
this issue might pose to judicial practice:
In 1795, Su Dage (Su Congde’s niece) was betrothed to Liu Eight (younger 
brother of Liu Seven). Before the marriage, Liu Eight absconded and disappeared 
into hiding for eight years. As Su Dage was growing up, Su Congde was afraid of 
her being too old for marriage, for which reason through discussion with Liu Mei 
(elder brother of Liu Seven), he asked the latter to instruct the marriage between 
Liu Seven and Su Dage.
This marriage was problematic. For one thing, marriage between relatives was 
strictly forbidden by law, which was regarded as adultery. Su Dage was betrothed 
to Liu Eight, not Liu Seven. If  Su Dage was married to Liu Eight already, 
remarriage with Liu Seven after Liu Eight’s 8-year absconding would be regarded 
as ‘intra-relative adultery’, by which law Liu Seven would be subject to 
strangulation323. In this case, however, the puzzling situation was that this 
marriage was conducted in a legally grey area — Su Dage was betrothed to Liu 
Eight, but not married yet; Liu Seven was Liu Eight’s brother which contravenes 
propriety (mingfen^x^jf), but not so seriously as violating the law of remarrying a 
blood relative’s wife. Therefore, the local court decided this case in analogy to the 
law of ‘punishing only the match-chair (%huhunren K )  in illegal marriage’324,
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by which the match-chairs Su Congde and Liu Mei, respectively as the prime 
offender and the accomplice were sentenced to exile and banishment while Su 
Dage and Liu Seven were exempted, with their marriage invalidated and Su Dage 
free to marry at her wish. This decision won approval from both emperor and the 
Board of Justice. The Board of Justice first commented favourably that ‘this 
decision proportionately balances social obligations and law\ Later in a review, the 
Emperor commented,
The local officer delicately balanced social obligations and the law, which should 
be affirmed... Propriety comes into being the moment a betrothal is entered. 
However, statues lay down the consistency of rules while substatutes side with 
social obligations, for which comes this substatute of allowing the wife to 
remarry after reporting to local magistrate’s office the disappearance of her 
absconding husband for over 3 years. Su was the fiancee of Liu Eight who 
absconded for 8 years, for which it is legal for Su to remarry. It is only illegal to 
remarry Liu Seven. Now the father and the elder brother ignorandy arranged 
their marriage, which is a matter of rustic dimwittedness, neither of [illegal] 
remarrying younger brother’s wife, nor of [lawful] marrying a commoner...This 
case should be set as precedent’325.
As far as rape is concerned, it was less controversial as the rapist would 
normally be condemned and receive a severe punishment. Similar to incestual sex, 
raping a blood relative would be regarded as a horrendous act that deserved severe 
penalties. In the early Han, a stepson who abused his stepmother both physically 
and sexually was condemned to the severest punishment of five archers 
simultaneously shooting him dead on galloping horses326. In the later systemised 
imperial codes, calculation of penalty could be further complicated by whether it 
caused injury, whether the raped was married, or whether the rape was aborted or 
completed327.
In the Qing, two more acts were included in the category of illicit intercourse, 
namely coaxed intercourse and male homosexuality 328. Coaxed intercourse, 
referred to luring the victim into a more convenient location for intercourse either 
by force or deception, followed rape closely in its terms and conditions of 
punishment, while male homosexuality, though outlawed, was only briefly 
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mentioned in law and deliberately ignored in judicial practice, unless involving 
homicide or a heinous act like sexual predation on underage children. It is here we 
find again a gap between official representation and legal practice. For one thing, 
although homosexuality was as much an unspeakable taboo as adultery, it 
occurred much less frequently than adultery. Male homosexual intercourse either 
by consent or otherwise, was rarely reported to the local jamen. Out of the 81 
homosexuality-related cases as recorded in XAHL, invariably they were brought to 
the attention of the Board of Justice only when involving homicide, injury, 
bureaucrats or underage child. No single case of male sexual harassment alone was 
recorded.
Moreover, in case of manslaughter during self-defence from (male homosexual) 
rape, there were more restrictions of evidence that could be admitted than in a 
heterosexual rape scenario329. As a result, many such cases of self-defence that 
would have been upheld should they occur in heterosexual rape scenario were 
turned down by the court simply because the offender was male. As the Board of 
Justice reasoned, presumably the male offender would excuse himself from 
homicide by alleging a (homosexual) rape attempt from the victim. This 
presumption of guilt was apparently discriminatory and gender-specific. A female 
offender was seldom, if ever, questioned of her real intention of self-defence 
during rape-related manslaughter. Admittance of evidence was not so exacting as 
that in the male scenario330. Thereby the only explanation could be that moral 
homophobia in traditional China found its way into law as much as judicial 
practice.
Summary
This chapter is a discussion of equity in imperial China. It originated from the 
strict law that characterised the Qin and Han codes. The Legalist espousal of 
uniform law had an egalitarian impulse as much as ruthless amoralism. Moreover, 
the Legalist stress on severe penalty (even for light crimes) sent chills down 
humanist spines, as it would create as much shame as resentment among the 
inflicted. Starting in the Han, Confucian scholars went further than challenging
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legalism in philosophy, by incorporating a Confucianism-based moral code into 
law. This was done through interpretation, as much as application, of law by 
Confucian scholars in judicial practices. In general, the merger of equity and law in 
China which started with Han Wudi, continued through the Southern and 
Northern Dynasties, and completed in North Wei and North Qi, over three and a 
half centuries. It culminated in the Sui and Tang laws that represented the fullest 
development of this process. The Tang Code was regarded as a prototype that was 
copied and developed by successive dynasties331.
This incorporation of equity into law can be further elucidated on two related 
issues. First, in terms of official representation, it should not be interpreted as 
introducing equitable principles into a law with zero morals. Even in the Qin and 
Han laws where the Legalist influences were strongest, it did not mean that the 
law shunned or deliberately kept at a distance moralistic considerations. Instead, 
certain moral concerns were incorporated into official representation, such as 
leave for a bureaucrat to mourn a parent’s decease, special treatment o f the aged, 
young and female. For instance, the aged and young would receive special care in 
prison, wear no cangue and have their penalty alleviated or waived under certain 
circumstances. As for females, the penal servitude was lighter than that imposed 
upon males332. The Lord of Shang, a versed Legalist, for instance, even argued 
that without incorporating social-moral calls, the law would not be able to operate.
Such incorporation of mores and manners into official representation none the 
less bore little resemblance to the consummate Tang code that represented a 
completed infusion of high-flown Confucian morals into official representation. 
Bureaucrats, though allowed to mourn a parent’s decease, had only 36 days of 
statutory leave, which was significantly shorter than the 3-year mourning period as 
required by the Tang code. Clearly by comparison, this was due to a different level 
of incorporating moral concerns into official representation. Whereas the Tang 
Code attempted to infuse morals into law at its maximum, the Legalist Qin and 
Han mode was clearly no more than necessary, or what we might call ‘minimalist’. 
The gradual process of incorporating Confucian ideals into official 
representation333, thus, should not lead to a misimpression that it started from a
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zero incorporation of morals in the Qin and Han official representation to its 
maximum in the Tang Code. On the contrary, this gradual process was rather a 
shift from the minimalist to the maximalist mode.
Secondly, in terms of judicial practice, equity should be duly distinguished from 
malpractice or corruption. For one thing, the Legalists emphasised uniformity of 
legal practice and vehemently opposed adapting law to particularities such as 
ranks and status. This strong position can give rise to an impression that the 
Legalists were against the judges exercising judicial discretion. Equity in terms of 
adjusting law to exigencies would thus open a Pandora’s box of legal favouritism 
and corruption. In this way, equity was seen almost as equivalent to malpractice or 
corruption.
It is true that allowing the judges to exercise discretion might run the risk of 
corruption, as this discretion could be ill used, misused or abused to cloak 
personal vengeance or sell personal favours. However, discretion is one thing, 
while malpractice is another. The debate between Legalists and Confucians was 
not whether official representation should incorporate morals or not, but the 
extent of such incorporation; and not whether in legal practice moral concerns 
should be heeded or not, but the extent of such attention. The Legalists were thus 
afraid not of local magistrates exercising juridical discretion per se, but of the bad, 
corrupt exercise of such discretion. The legalist concern, therefore, was rather 
how to avoid, curb or cure such malpractice, for which the prescription was a 
draconian code with minimalist morals, coupled with a rigid hierarchy of 
supervision and review and a permanent emphasis on ruling strictly in accordance 
with official representation. Severe penalty statutorily prescribed thus mainly 
served the function of deterrence. The emphasis was rather on the deterrent effect 
of official representation.
Such an emphasis on the deterring effect of official representation can give rise 
to complications in legal practice. First of all, the public was in general impressed 
by the draconian face of the official representation, as seen in cruel corporal 
punishments such as tattoo, limb amputation (nose, hand, knee or foot), 
castration. A heavy hand in inflicting punishment might in all probabilities result
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in a large proportion of the population being criminalised for even light crimes. 
The literary description of ‘roadful packs of criminals’ {gheyi saidao M  HiiU) in 
the Book of Han might be an exaggeration and thus must be taken with a grain of 
salt; and yet it must bear certain elements of truth, pointing to the wide range of 
criminalisation in the Qin. Moreover, a system that placed overwhelming 
emphasis on the strict observance of an official representation with minimalist 
morals might lead to widespread immoralism in legal practice, where in cases that 
required an extra dose of moralistic concerns, local magistrates might be too 
happy to turn down a desperate party, or too afraid to exercise discretion for fear 
of reprimand from superior officials. The legalist precaution against corrupt 
exercise of discretion thus turned official representation into a Procrustean bed in 
legal practice, so as to fit cases of daily vicissitudes into prescribed legal formats — 
the door to let in equitable concerns and morals was thus either shut or tightly 
monitored.
Moreover, corruption did not stop simply because moralistic ideals were kept at 
minimum within official representation and strict application of written law was 
emphasised in legal practice. Maximising the deterrent effect of official 
representation is not a guarantee of corruption-free legal practice. Despite official 
representation that was draconian enough in the legalist sense, corruption in legal 
practice was still a phantom. For this reason, supervision, surveillance and review 
were introduced into the system. As early as 106BC, an institutional check was set 
up, where judicial record of local magistrates was subject to review of the cishi ($!] 
i t  administrative watchdog) who would report directly to the Minister of 
Surveillance (jushi yhongcheng at the royal court. Also, the defendant and
his/her relatives could plead to superior officials334. In legal practice, the royal 
court was well aware of the possibility of collusion between magistrates and local 
bullies to harm the interests of the powerless. Therefore, a paperwork-based 
review might not reveal the reality. Moreover, cishi might be bribed to report no 
problem or a good record of local magistrates. For the purposes of check and 
balance, plainclothes special envoys might be sent by the Minister of Justice
(tingmi S 6 f) or the Throne himself to investigate injustices. No systematic 
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historical record has been available to show how frequent in practice such mutual 
checks were carried out. However, it did show that certain mechanisms of check 
and balance were instituted in official representation as well as practised in reality. 
Corruption thereby as both a form and substance, has less to do with equity than 
with the prevailing power structure and surveillance mechanism.
Having outlined the process of infusing equity into law, the chapter then 
proceeded to discuss what equity meant for imperial China and what the equitable 
principles were. Here, the discussion mainly borrowed the conceptualisation of 
qingti as proposed by Huang335. For him, at the official representation level, qingti 
points to moral ideals, as the official representation not only served to deter and 
discipline deviances, but also the function of educating and instructing the 
populace in terms of propriety and conduct; whereas at the legal practice level, 
qingti is not comprehensible unless concretised in local, practical contexts, where 
commonsense right and wrong, or practical compromise make up the 
overwhelming proportion of equity’s content. Such qingti' as we have seen in the 
introduction, was an articulation of equity in Chinese terms.
Differentiating equity at these two levels none the less should not give rise to a 
misimpression of a clear-cut watershed between these moral ideals and the (more 
practical and local) commonsense right and wrong. For one thing, there is a 
mutual interaction between these highly-articulate, literarily-polished moral ideals 
and the commonsense right and wrong, as the former is a solidly philosophised 
form, and in its turn serves to further refine and instruct the latter. Filial piety, for 
instance, was a practice that dated back to time immemorial and received its 
detailed, solid sophistication in the Book of Rites and high-flown philisophisation in 
the Analects, where daily rituals of greeting parents in both morning and afternoon, 
asking for parental permission before going out and rituals on parent’s funeral, to 
name just a few, were not only prescribed in detail but explained with 
philosophical decency. In real practice, however, one seriously doubts whether 
each and every child would be filially submissive to his/her parents and if not, they 
would be criminalised, punished or jailed unfailingly by local magistrates. 
Anthropological evidence had shown that the problem of old-age care for parent
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was not a rarity in rural areas, where for a common household, due to reduced 
ability of economic autonomy, reliance upon children for care sometimes was at 
the expense of dignity, as not every child could be expected to be filial. Verbal 
altercations (especially between in-laws) broke out most frequendy, whereas 
physical abuse was less frequent and even rarer when resulting in injury or death. 
In terms of official representation with moral ideals, such unfilialness should be 
unfailingly punished with no exception, as it contravened the propriety of xiao. 
However, in real practice, due to the daunting workload faced by local 
magistrates336, only cases of the more or most severe kind were officially attended 
to, adjudicated and reported upward. As long as no severe consequences (such as 
injury or death) resulted, local magistrates would be more than happy to refer 
minor disputes of family discord to local communities for mediation. This was not 
only for purpose of convenience, but also to avoid troubles with the superior that 
supervised local magistrates. While criminal cases were automatically appealed 
from local courts through intermediate appeals courts, civil suits were generally 
summarised and briefly reported to the superior officials. Thus, ‘[a] Chinese 
magistrate who did not wish his superiors to know about his performance in a 
particular dispute could pressure the parties to settle by mediation. A mediated 
settlement could not be appealed’337. Therefore, there was a gap between official 
representation and legal practice in terms of equity. These two were in constant 
interaction which Huang conceptualised as ‘the third realm’338. Such a third realm, 
however is less distinctively Chinese in form than in substance, as interaction 
outside formal legal mechanism could be seen from other legal systems.
This gap between official representation and judicial practice could be seen from 
other aspects such as marriage. Even from the Tang on when in official 
representation only a husband could invoke divorce, in legal practice unhappy 
wives often initiated divorce suits as well. It thus fits into the general picture of 
equity and law in imperial China that we try to outline here in this chapter: official 
representation that had largely fused law and equity was still kept at a certain 
distance from legal practice in which the high-flown Confucian ideals were not 
met with mundane daily routines. Whatever a local magistrate did, he could not
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shun such local realities. Case records suggested that at times a local magistrate 
rejected divorce suits by referring to the local community for mediation, mediated 
by himself or simply ruled in accordance with law. Equity thereby had a double- 
faced appearance here: in official representation, it was the high-flown Confucian 
ideals incorporated into law, while in legal practice, it was commonsense right and 
wrong, practical concerns or local realities that might bend the law toward a 
concrete, particularised decision.
Equity thus discussed contains Confucian principles that differed in many 
aspects from those derived from Roman and canon law traditions. Equity in 
imperial China recognised more differentiation than equality, more 
particularisation than uniformity. Filial obedience was not only celebrated but 
required, with severe consequences for the behaviour otherwise. It went into 
tireless details concerning how the closeness, remoteness between family members 
should affect their due and obligation, right and duty, aggravation and extenuation. 
It not only indefatigably graded satisfaction, ceremony and conduct according to 
social status, but also legalised the forms of favours for the privileged classes. 
Sympathisable circumstances went hand in hand with a nakedly elitist 
condescendence towards rural residents. Sexual taboo was rich in both moral and 
legal sanctions. Seen from every aspect, the coalescence of equity, if defined as 
moral principles, and positive law was completed by the 5th century, a century 
earlier than the Justinian Code. Ever since, it entered a long period of stability and 
fluidity where successive dynasties developed and supplemented the Tang Code.
Thereby, equity if in general interpreted as a process of integrating moral 
principles into law, does not present much difference from the Chinese qingli to its 
Western counterpart. As we can see from the introduction, in classical times, both 
the Roman law and the Canon law had gone through a period of harsh law first, 
then afterwards gradually moralised law. As for the common and civil law systems, 
the introduction of moral principles into rigid law was equally a long process. 
Although the common and civil law systems followed different paths, they arrived 
at similar results in the end, namely an integrated system to administer equity and 
law within the same court. For China, the Legalist Qin and Han codes were
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centred on severe punishment that created immoralism. It was only later that this 
minimalist moral approach was gradually substituted by a maximalist mode. In 
terms of process per se, the Chinese thus did not differ much from its Western vis- 
a-vis in classical periods.
By contrast to this general process, if we look at the miniscule components of 
equitable principles that emerged in this integration process, then a stark contrast 
is manifesting itself from the Chinese qingti to Western equity. The qingti as in 
Chinese context is coloured by Confucian ideals, which first and foremost see the 
importance of relational differentiation in setting up a hierarchical social order, by 
which children should be subject to parents, junior to senior, female to male, 
subordinate to commoner, commoner to bureaucrat, bureaucrat to privileged. The 
closeness/remoteness within the family and kin relationships was used to calculate 
penalty while the non-blood relationships determined by class and ethnicity played 
an influential role in deciding punishment. Ever since the consummate Tang Code, 
in imperial China Confucianisation enjoyed a rather unchallenged supremacy for 
nearly 1,300 years from Tang to Qing.
Certainly, ever since the complete integration of Confucian morals into law in 
the Tang, the law in the following 1,250 years was still subject to changes, fluidity 
and transformations. By comparison, such changes were only a detailed 
adjustment of penalty, structure or clauses within the Tang model o f code. In 
other words, while the Tang established the orthodox model of an imperial code, 
its essentials were preserved throughout the imperial periods where changes were 
rather concentrated in miniscule parts. In other words, these changes operated 
within and were preconditioned by the grand structure set by the Tang Code. It is 
safe, therefore, for us to discuss equity in imperial China by thematic topics, rather 
than a chronological order from Tang to Qing. My discussion in this chapter had 
under each topic outlined the differences concerning penalty or institutional 
designs in each dynasty. It signalled the different approaches adopted by various 
thrones throughout the imperial period. It gives therefore a general idea of how 
the law transformed itself from Tang to Qing which was rather slow and in 
minutiae, compared with the constant and abrupt changes from 140BC to 650AD
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during its formation period. For instance, sexual taboo remained a highlighted 
area within the imperial codes with detailed regulations on punishable acts. While 
a large part of these sexual offences was inherited from one dynasty to another, in 
Qing two more offences were added.
As a matter of fact, during the Qing the imperial codes underwent numerous 
compilations, with the code becoming increasingly sophisticated and detailed. This 
could have been due to the changed socio-economic conditions. Whereas the 
population grew and contact with outside world expanded (especially the residents 
from coastal areas), the economy was increasingly diversified which challenged the 
Confucian order of hierarchy which was most fit for a predominantly agrarian 
economy and peasant society with low mobility. As the swelling body of students 
outnumbered official posts offered by the imperial bureaucracy, many literate 
intellectuals had to seek other employment, taking up clerical posts in businesses 
or law firms. As Huang’s study showed, the increasing participation of intellectuals 
or professional litigationists had increased not only the paperwork but the burden 
of truth-seeking, evidence verification or cross-examination on the part of local 
magistrates339. Such development helped to explain the variations in official 
representation and judicial practice from one dynasty to another.
If equity is defined as judicial discretion to mitigate the rigour of positive law, 
then the institutionalisation in China was equally worthy of attention. Newman 
summarised five ways to incorporate equitable doctrine into the legal codes as 
developed in the Western legal traditions: ‘(1) by incorporating Roman equity and 
later infusions of equitable doctrine into the statutory provisions; (2) by providing 
for the application of specific principles of equity in connection with statutory 
rules dealing with narrowly defined situations; (3) by incorporating some of the 
general principles of equity into general statutory provisions applicable to broad 
areas of law; (4) by resort to equitable doctrine in order to fill gaps in the code; 
and (5) by interpreting statutory provisions as embodying related equitable 
principles’340.
In imperial China, incorporating equity into law was no less institutionalised. To 
prevent corruption and abuse by the local courts, extenuation could not be
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granted unless decided by a royal court convention and discussion, or approved by 
the emperor. The Ming started the tradition of compiling It ($!) substatute) that 
functioned as supplement to lit (W  original statutes) promulgated at the beginning 
of each dynasty. (Lu were considered in theory to be supreme and immutable for 
the duration of the dynasty but in fact were modified wherever necessary, without 
actual repeal by the addition of new substatutes, the $*341. U  were originally 
initiated by either imperial edicts {yu ifiT) or decisions by the Board of Justice. In 
1492, the Director of the Board of Justice, with imperial endorsement, started to 
compile a single collection of completed in 1500 with 297 articles. By 1585, 
these li principles were completely absorbed into the basic code of /#, which later 
become the basis of the first Qing Code of 1646342.
Apart from this legislative channel to guarantee a safety-valve for mitigating the 
rigour of the law in case of hardship, in judicial practice special circumstances 
were allowed to be reported to the Board of Justice. Meting out a lesser or 
aggravated penalty would have to be reported and approved by the emperor. The 
purpose for such institutionalisation was quite obvious: moral consideration was 
allowed into the judicial practice, but only in a controlled manner, so as to prevent 
abuse or misuse of this extralegal channel. When necessary, the Board of Justice 
would suggest a supplementary substatute to be added to the current statute, 
which had to be approved by the emperor and scrutinised by other privy 
commissioners specialising in law.
Therefore, in imperial China, not only was equity integrated into law, but closely 
observed, institutionally channelled and strictly scrutinised in judicial practice. It 
allowed both top-down and bottom-up communications in the judiciary. To strike 
a balance between equity and law was more than an abstract philosophy, but 
concretely institutionalised and politically scrutinised. The relationship between 
equity and law was maturely developed, crafted and guarded in imperial China.
However, this is not to deny the inherent contradictions that this picture 
presents. Hierarchy brought order, but also hidden injustice. Where natural 
differences (such as age, sex, physical state) were accepted as much as social 
stratification, oppression was cloaked in not only orthodoxy, but smothered the 
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rise of alternative channels that could provide new ideas. The Confucian ideal of 
hierarchy concealed its hidden side of oppression that was internalised through 
rote education. When the people were carefully kept in the dark, restricted within 
the limits of an idealised hierarchical (and patriarchical too) order, equity reached 
an arrested state of development.
This closedness might be able to shut down the influx of new ideas, but it could 
not stop the empire’s decline vis-a-vis the rising Western powers. The 
sophisticated legal mechanisms to channel the interactions between morals and 
law had missed its very point of opening up new possibilities for further 
development. After the empire’s defeat in 1840, the nation was increasingly 
pregnant with uprisings, revolts and rebellions. In a (republican) revolutionary 
storm pending in early 1900s, imperial equity would be bound to undergo a 
relentless process of transformations. With the traditional power structure, 
Confucian teaching and family structure at stake, the Chinese qingli was 
unprecedentedly faced with transformation. The once mature imperial legal 
tradition was bound to be dismantled in China. Upon the demise of its imperial 
past, the coming republic would have to build anew not only a political structure, 
but corresponding governmental constructs, including law, to embrace this 
sweeping revolution. Equity and law would have to start from a war-torn nation, 
disheartened intellectuals and a blank piece of paper where both Western learning 
and imperial past were woven. It would be an age of not only transformation, but 
more importantly (reconstruction. Equity and law, once closely knit and 
following each other’s footsteps, would now have to start anew from a 
reconstructed, transformed and revolutionised platform.
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Chapter 2 Socialist Equity: People’s Justice
Introduction
After the demise of the imperial system, the intellectual criticism of the feudal past 
was thorough. Law and equity, official representation and practice, started 
developing in diffuse directions in war-torn China from 1911-49. In terms of 
official representation, both the military governments (1911-27) and the 
Nationalist government (1927-49) followed European models closely while the 
communists copied Soviet laws in seeking their own official representation and 
legal practice. While the Soviet laws were consulted (especially in early periods), 
more attention was placed on developing the Chinese laws out of its practices in 
communist areas. In other words, legal practices came first, with equity assigned a 
new character of heeding popular voices. Then out o f these practices came the 
official representation, with the revolutionary equity embedded within.
To begin our discussion, it should be noted that equity in this chapter departs 
from our definition in the previous sections. Here in a revolutionary tradition of 
placing the people in the centre of political concern, equity as a popular sense of 
justice gradually emerged. In the scholarly tradition, it was argued that equity 
should be connected with common sense or popular calls. Whilst the argument 
that ‘All laws rest on the public feeling for what is right’343 might be going a bit far, 
law does need to reflect the conscience of community life344. As was commented, 
‘the popular sense of justice has a real meaning in law since it represents an 
average element in the community with which it is necessary that law should 
harmonise; and most of the equitable or discretionary ingredients which are 
constandy found in legal systems and which are based on this primary sense of 
justice are inherent in the average moral sense of the community’345. In China, the 
sweeping communist revolution sought relentlessly for an alternative model of 
justice, referred to as ‘people’s justice’ which contains moral significance in its 
own sense. This concept of people’s justice has profoundly modified both equity 
and law, practice and representation in China.
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Section 1 Socialist Equity: Russia and China
China has an imperial cultural tradition of people-centred (minben K; ^ ) 
concerns346, which was as rich as a bureaucratic tradition of heeding public 
discontent347. It also found an echo in the communist emphasis on commonsense 
and general custom, rather than the codified law348. In the revolutionary tradition 
of a distinctive socialist equity, how did the communist effort differ essentially 
from those imperial traditions? To what extent can we argue that this people’s 
justice is a communist invention or breakthrough from its imperial past?
First it should be noted that the imperial philosophies and convictions, 
however humane they might appear, did not fundamentally change the mentality 
of regarding the population as subjects rather than as an independent actor as ‘the 
people’ (renmin It was Heaven, rather than the people, that provided
legitimacy for both rule and justice. Secondly, from powerholders’ view, organised 
public acts were forbidden on the pain of punishment, be it a well-intentioned 
petition or ill-mannered disturbance349. For one thing, for the state, it was 
assumed that grievances could be corrected through the established state- 
apparatus channels. Therefore, it was unreasonable and thereby punishable to 
resort to organised public acts without bringing these grievances through the 
official channel. Organised acts with a crowd exceeding a certain number (40 or 
50) were regarded as a potential threat to state security, especially when they 
thronged into official places like exam buildings, magistrate’s offices350, which in 
due course would be punished. Even between 1840-1911, when there was an 
expansion of participation in local government affairs, it was restricted to the local 
gentry class and the wider masses were absent or conveniently forgotten.
Such an ambiguous attitude of heeding public voices but also fearing organised
masses did not change until the republican revolution. It is true the revolution had
reinvented certain elements from its imperial traditions, like mediation. Compared
with the mediation in imperial China that was plagued by either clan dominance or
localism due to the ill-resourced and unwilling bureaucracy, the communist-led
peasant associations were better organised and managed351, as they were aimed at
both transcending and breaking the traditional power structure.
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The communist legal system also borrowed heavily from the Soviet Union. 
Equitable concepts in Soviet law had followed a dual approach: on the one hand, 
they were absorbed into the main body of law to the maximum extent while on 
the other hand the judge might adjust the written law, if necessary, so as to protect 
the communist revolution. First, in such areas as fraud, duress and mistake, 
frustration, and unjust enrichment, equity was mainly modelled on the European 
legal systems. It was only in 1926 when equity was given a working class quality 
that its socialist characteristic was gradually brought out352. Class status became an 
important element in adjudication. It was presumed that members of the working 
class acted in good faith while hostile class elements were banned from bringing 
suits. Kulaks, for instance, were condemned as exploiting poor and middle-class 
peasants through such unconscionable contracts as usurious loans, for which the 
local soviets were called on to struggle against them. Other hostile class elements 
included merchants, speculators and clergymen as defined in the Russian 
Republic’s 1918 Constitution. This class discrimination reached its peak in the late 
1920s and early 1930s when the policy of eradicating capitalism was carried out. 
Class enemies were denied legal protection, discriminatory taxes were levied 
against private producers and the mercantile practice of resale for profits was 
classified as the crime of ‘speculation’353.
Apart from this class element, another area that bears distinctive socialist 
characteristic lies in the judicial flexibility of adjusting positive laws. For one thing, 
fully aware of the fact that the 1922 Soviet Civil Code borrowed heavily from the 
Imperial Russian Civil Code as well as Germanic-Swiss codes, the soviet 
leadership wanted to make sure that in the application of law, these borrowed 
elements would not obstruct or destroy the fruits of the communist revolution. 
Therefore, Article 1 stipulated that the judge apply the principles in the Imperial 
Russian Code only by exercising his ‘revolutionary consciousness’354. It was 
revealed that although much of the practice did not differ in substance from the 
Western judicial practices of ‘abus de droit or ‘nuisance’, in the minds of the judges 
the Marxist prevalence can be traced, where exercising individual rights must 
accord with the community interest355. Such educational value prevents errant
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members of the working class from exploiting legal institutions to their advantage 
at the expense of ‘socialist communal living’356. This supremacy of state interests 
could also be found in the Polish law, where protection of these interests should 
be the ultimate goal, even if it meant bypassing the positive laws357.
Both class elements and supremacy of state interests had found their influences 
in the Chinese laws358, while in legal practice, flexibility was equally emphasised. 
The communists had for long admonished new cadres against the ‘mechanical and 
inflexible’ application of law. By this principle, each individual situation should be 
examined on its merits, upon which a decision could be reached to accommodate 
such particularities. Flexibility, as a doctrine from Russia, found its echo in both 
Confucian tradition and wartime exigencies. The pre-1949 Communists were well 
aware of the difficult environment they were in, for which flexibility was 
emphasised as a working method ‘to respond to changing revolutionary 
situations’359.
Socialist equity in China, however, did not stop here. Neither was it a simple 
replica of the Russian experiences. The elements inherited from their imperial past 
or learned from the USSR were both fused with Chinese revolutionary 
experiences, which gradually evolved into a legal system called ‘people’s justice’. 
People as both an adjective and a definitive prefix to justice is not simply rhetoric, 
but contains with it rich political meaning, signifying the communist effort to seek 
an alternative to the imperial and Nationalist (guomindang, GMD) bureaucrat- 
comprador justice on the one hand and the capitalist on the other.
Although it was not until the establishment of the PRC in 1949 that people’s 
justice gained its concrete institutionalisation and supremacy in official vocabulary, 
as a legal system it was based on the revolutionary experiences in the preceding 
revolutionary decades, during which the fruition of the mass line policy played no 
small part. For one thing, the mass line signified the culmination of efforts to both 
sinify and ruralise Marxism, an essentially urban European ideology. Essentially, 
the mass line meant that ‘the party takes the scattered ideas of the people, turns 
them into concentrated and systematic ideas, and then returns them to the people 
to use as guide for their actions’360. It is a process of “‘pooling the wisdom of the
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masses” through soliciting views and educating the viewers, of interest articulation 
and aggregation, and of testing and adjusting decisions’, aimed at ‘minimising 
mistakes and maximising [the communist] power base’361. At a glance, this notion 
implies inherent inconsistency in ‘relying upon the masses’ while needing a 
vanguard party. This impression largely disappears if we turn to its very 
assumption of non-separation of interests between political elite and ordinary 
people. However unfeasible this ideal might seem, elitism and populism, guidance 
and spontaneity did join hands in actual experiences in the painstaking communist 
efforts of mobilisation362. Unsurprisingly Chun Lin commented that the mass line 
‘represented one of the most inventive features of Chinese revolution’363.
The mass line policy as in the judiciary dictated that the law be accessible and 
responsive to the people. Law should be simple, free of [bourgeois-bureaucratic] 
technicalities and complexities and easy to access for the masses. The benefit of 
this working style was that it ushered in the masses’ participation, rendered the law 
more responsive to popular calls and systemised the input of public voices364. It 
aimed to correct the court’s isolation in the capitalist system by bringing it closer 
to the masses. A close relationship between the leaders and the led could ensure 
that the governments at different levels were accountable to the masses. It would 
help to combat the ‘subjectivism’ and ‘bureaucratism’ as in the feudal-capitalist 
models365.
Moreover, book learning of law was duly denounced, as judicial experiences of 
dealing with the masses were emphasised. This mass line not only institutionalised 
the process of producing collective knowledge, but also localised this channel 
through folk media and indigenous vernaculars. It localised the party, permitting it 
to flexibly handle problems specific to local areas and thereby generating loyalty 
and creativity of individuals366. The communist legal service differed from its 
feudal past and contemporaneous capitalist counterpart in that it was supervised 
by the masses. Participation of the masses in the legal process will not only 
provide ‘laws’ and facts but render the decision most approximate to justice367.
It was argued that such a mass line policy was compelled by exigency and 
survival consideration, where the border regions had neither complete legal codes,
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nor trained legal personnel to administer justice. For this very reason, they had to 
rely upon the masses for support and opinions368. This argument neglects the 
moral significance underlying these practices. For one thing, the mass line policy 
was not a mere sham. On the contrary, the communists aimed to apply it in 
concrete practice. The judiciary, as part of the state apparatus, should therefore be 
open to mass participation. In this case, incorporation of the masses’ opinions 
into court proceedings had less to do with material, infrastructural deficiency than 
with the moral commitment to the people. The mass line policy, so to speak, was 
more a moral issue than a practical compromise forced upon the CCP by exigency. 
This moral significance underlined the continuity o f mass-based practice and 
representation from pre- to post-1949 periods, where exigency was significantly 
reduced in the post-1949 era. Therefore, it was necessary to heed the moral root 
of this policy and practice.
Section 2  P eople’s Justice: Its Evolution and Transformation
For Leng, people’s justice includes two aspects: (1) formal judicial structure and (2) 
extrajudicial machinery consisting of administrative agencies and social 
organisations369. Such a categorisation can be misleading as it overlooks that 
formal and informal mechanisms were symbiotically intertwined with each other. 
Making formalities informal goes hand in hand with formalisation of the informal 
mechanisms. The complexity of the people’s justice cannot be readily captured by 
Leng’s binary analysis.
The complexity was even more pressing when we turn to the question of 
historical evolution and transformation of people’s justice. The birth, growing-up 
and maturation of people’s justice had not been smooth considering the chaotic, 
difficult and perilous revolutionary milieu. In spite of the war-torn environment, 
the communists developed highly complex techniques that aimed to incorporate 
mass participation in judiciary. These techniques included mass trials370, people’s 
jurors, circuit courts and on-the-spot investigations, special tribunals, and 
comrades’ courts, of which a full, mature form did not come until a much later 
date. Despite their difficult delivery, one thing is certain: ‘through trial and error,
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the Communists deliberately sought to create their own political culture’, while 
many pre-1949 problem-solving techniques were institutionalised in the post­
liberation era371. To get a full appreciation of this, we shall start our journey from 
the moment when communism was conceived in China.
Revolutionary Period (1921-49)
The development of people’s justice was drawn from the experiences of early
1920-40. The CCP worked on every front to cultivate national consciousness 
among both urban elites and rural masses; it went on to organise workers and 
peasants, after the split with the GMD in 1927, so as to establish an armed force 
in the countryside 372. The synchronic maturation of people’s justice and 
communist revolution was more than a mere coincidence, as they mutually 
derived inspiration and nutrition from each other. People’s justice, as part and 
parcel of the communist revolution, thus could be envisioned from a chronic 
review of different revolutionary periods.
1921-7 Spontaneity
The people’s justice derived its inspiration from two sources: labour unrest in the 
urban areas as well as peasant movements. To evolve into a systematised people’s 
justice as seen later either in the Soviet or Yan’an periods, there was undoubtedly 
a long way to go. The first and foremost step, however, was to organise these 
unrests into systematic units that could provide sustainability and organisational 
support.
What was drawn from the urban labour unrest lay in the introduction of a jury 
into court proceedings. Although the jury as a concept was already written in law 
dated as early as the 1909 Imperial Organic Law on Courts as a gesture to bring 
justice closer to the populace, it was not until October 1925, when Guangdong 
and Hong Kong Strike Committee (shenggang baigong weiyuanhui 
was established that a jury was institutionally implemented373. This practice was 
taken up by the National Government formed of a United Front between the 
GMD and the CCP, as seen in its legislation for its controlled territories374.
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Following the GMD-CCP split in mid-1927, this jury practice followed a dual­
track course of development under separate jurisdictions of the GMD and the 
CCP. As the GMD became increasingly militant and reliant upon commercial 
corporations and capitalist manufacturing industry for financial extraction, the 
arrested development of a jury was coupled with a deliberate suppression of 
labour unrest. The jury practice was continued indeed, as part of the GMD’s 
gesture to introduce Anglo-American justice into its territory. Nonetheless jury 
participation was restricted to the privileged class. By comparison, the 
communists went further to institutionalise and implement juries. For instance, it 
was required that cases involving rural disputes should be attended by delegates 
from peasant’s associations. Thereby at the communist bases the jury practice was 
essentially ruralised, combined with a redefined focus on the revolutionary 
potential of the Chinese peasantry.
For the Chinese revolution that was essentially a peasant affair, the peasant 
movements were overwhelmingly the main source for the people’s justice, 
compared with labour unrest in urban areas. Although the fact of an 
overwhelming majority of rural residents375 played no small part, another factor 
that is worthy of our attention would be that the urban areas were mainly under 
the GMD control. The communist experience of people’s justice was thus largely 
based on their experiences in the rural bases. We shall thereby examine the role 
played by the peasant movements in the development of people’s justice.
For a China that had a long history of dynastic changes pushed through by 
peasant uprisings, rural unrest was nothing new. Bianco compared the traditional 
modes of spontaneous peasant movements with those organised by the 
communists, pointing out the important leap forward from the former to the 
latter376. Traditional peasant uprisings were mainly instigated over land rent, 
interest and taxation. They were rarely intended to overthrow the current political 
order, or the hierarchical system in the countryside. This was attributed to ‘a weak 
class consciousness’ in the place of which there was a strong localism — the feeling 
of belonging to certain local community substituted for the poor class 
consciousness but also fuelled the locally-charged vindictiveness, as in the
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common traditional armed fights (xiedou M -4*) between two or more local 
communities. Peasant uprisings were rarely aimed to eradicate the current 
exploitation or raise their political standing. Unrests did not occur until the 
situation deteriorated, while some of them were even aimed at restoring personal 
or local-communal privileges to a previous state. Narrow-mindednesss and self- 
defence went hand in hand. Despite their abundance, such uprisings were in 
general poorly-organised, slackly-disciplined and primitively-equipped, for which 
reason almost without fail they were quashed in no time by the local governments 
with ease377.
The coming of communist force profoundly changed the dire outlook of such 
spontaneous peasant unrests. As early as 1922, Peng Pai established a peasant 
association in Haifeng County, Guangdong. He was among the first few 
communists who seriously treated the peasant issue. This establishment was 
certainly not without difficulty in the first place, as his unpeasant demeanour easily 
aroused suspicions among the peasants. Stories were recounted how his warm 
personal visits were turned down coldly at the doors he knocked upon. For this, 
he changed his apparel, talked and looked like a peasant and lived among the rural 
residents. His new image was well received by the peasants who at the same time 
were also ready for Peng’s political prescription. In the next four years, his peasant 
association steadily gained authority and respect among the peasants. For the 
purposes of propaganda class relationship was denigrated, with peasant sufferings 
rhetorically amplified. Even the smallest dispute could be used to fan flames of 
bitterness and hatred. Pamphlets of the cruelty perpetrated by landlords were 
widely disseminated to constantly stir up the peasantry378.
The two uprisings in April and September of 1927 paved the way for the 
establishment of a Peng Pai-led Soviet government at Haifeng and Lufeng 
counties (Hailufeng). Although this Hailufeng government existed for only 4 
months379, as a part of the communist revolution to bring about people’s justice, 
certain practices of it deserved attention. Mass mobilisation was carried out 
through terror, extremism and excesses, such as killing, arson or robbery. As 
Bianco remarked, the peasant needed not only encouragement to dismantle the
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mental shackles, but also participation in killing and destruction to cut off paths of 
retreat380.
This mass mobilisation undoubtedly carried with it a certain element of coercion. 
The slogan Vhoever does not stand with us is against us!’ carried with it not only 
a revolutionary enthusiasm, but a hidden oppressive message to divide the masses. 
Join us, or be our enemy! Such a black and white dichotomy suppressed the need 
for persuasion but more importantly, removed the freedom of choice. 
Emancipation, as assumed in such mobilisations, took such a totality that it 
allowed no alternative to challenge itself. The participants were more than 
spectators, but also involved in open, dramatic execution of the 
antirevolutionaries, where the masses shouted ‘kill, kill, kill* until their throats were 
sore and voices hoarse. Such extremism was further fuelled by vindictiveness from 
the peasantry. The cruel local tyrants were now avenged by the peasants through 
the same technique of the ‘human flesh banquet’, by which the victim was sliced, 
cooked and forced upon his family members. Such a revengeful bloody 
atmosphere was not much different from the traditional narrow-minded peasant 
vengeance, especially couched in local communities or clan patriotism. In general, 
such spontaneous cruelty augmented rather than defeated the communist 
revolutionary zest381.
Concurrently with the peasant movements in Guangdong, a tide of peasant 
movement also appeared in Hunan. The Hunan Committee of the CCP started 
peasant mobilisation in 1923. By summer 1926, the peasant associations claimed 
to have recruited 200,000 members, which suddenly surged when in July-August 
1926 the peasant associations became openly active with the aid of the North 
Expedition Army. From September 1926 to March 1927, the Mao Zedong-led 
Rural Movement Study Institute dispatched around 400 commissars to Hunan to 
organise peasant movements. By November 1926, 28 counties established peasant 
associations with a membership of more than 1.3 million. By April 1927, the 
membership of peasant associations surged to over 2 million in number.
These peasant associations were of great legal significance, as they soon became 
the solid institutional constructs to support mass trials of local tyrants and evil
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gentry. The thunderstorm of class struggle was imminent. From October 1 to 13, 
1926, the VI Congress of the CCP Hunan Committee passed a decision to punish 
corrupt officials, local tyrants and evil gentry, which was later confirmed by the I 
Peasant Congress of Hunan, held from December 1 to 28, 1926 in Changsha. 
Mass participation in justice was bound to encounter initial chaos and terror 
before its maturation, rationalisation and formalisation. A few months prior to the 
GMD-CCP split, on January 19, 1927, the GMD Party Branch of Hunan 
promulgated a Provisional Regulations on Punishment of ljocal Tyrants and Evil Gentiy in 
Hunan, by which eradication committees and special tribunals on local tyrants and 
evil gentry were set up throughout Hunan. In Hanshou County, eradication of 
local tyrants and evil gentry started with an accusation meeting of a local tyrant 
who was executed at a mass trial attended by more than 10,000 locals as early as 
November 1926. On April 10, 1927, a Declaration to All-Hunan Peasants was issued 
to call on the peasants to crack down on local tyrants and evil gentry382. The 
methods included auditing, fines, parading throughout the township, arrest, and 
bullet execution. Similar techniques were used, such as accusation, mass trials, 
with the audience roused to shout ‘kill* and demand immediate execution383.
Later, these peasant movements declined, as both Hailufeng and Hunan lost to 
the GMD suppression. Despite this, the peasant movements shed far-reaching 
influence upon the communist revolution, as these techniques were preserved and 
re-used in later periods. Although among historians it had always been a moot 
point as to whether the peasantry whole-heartedly participated in these 
movements they were mobilised into, above all these communist efforts to 
dismantle the old political order were genuine. Mass trial was an important 
technique for class struggle. It was part of a cultural revolution that the 
communists agitated in the countryside to transform the rural mentality, so as to 
allow the conviction to take root that the peasants were now ‘the masters of 
society’384. Moreover, it was also a process where national liberation combined 
with women’s liberation, as female members were encouraged to participate in the 
class struggle. It is uncommon, but certainly not impossible, to hear the story of a
88
‘brave* (albeit terrifying) female resident killing a condemned landlord with spears 
before an applauding audience385.
In short, this period saw surging mass participation in the countryside that 
sought to equitably challenge the closed system in imperial, warlord and 
Nationalist laws. Official representation, in terms of laws, regulations or policies, 
was at most scarce and at best vague. Furthermore, revolutionary situations might 
make it difficult to apply the law in real practice. This period, thus, was the time 
when judicial practice surged to overtake official representation in taking the lead 
to develop a mass-based sense of equity and law. The spontaneity in inviting 
common workers to sit on a collegiate bench as jurors as well as mass trial of local 
bullies did address a robust development of mass participation in this period. In 
addition to this spontaneity, it should be noted that both equity and law, official 
representation and judicial practice, were in their infancy during this period, as 
more often than not either law or trial in practice were hijacked by the excesses 
and atrocity of mobilised masses. The extreme human flesh banquet signified 
unleashed cruelty in collective form, as well as a distorted picture of mass 
mobilisation that created terror, resentment and systematic coercion.
1927-34 Soviet Period
The Hailufeng Soviet, though defeated, spawned different Chinese soviets in 
varied provinces, which were unified in 1931. Until its defeat by the GMD efforts 
of encirclement and eradication in 1934, this Soviet period underwent a mingled 
process of Russian influence as well as autonomous, indigenous development. 
Violence and radicalism continued in the early days of this period. The Hailufeng 
Soviet led by Peng Pai executed 1,822 landlords within a month. Similar harsh 
treatment of landlord and counterrevolutionaries occurred in other soviet bases 
such as Jinggangshan, Jiangxi, Hunan and Fujian386. The bloody path of mass 
struggle was conveniently borrowed in fierce political struggles, either within the 
Party or without. For instance, between May and July, 1931, struggle took a heavy 
toll in the crackdown on the Anti-Bolshevik (A-B) League members387. Some 
4,000 were arrested and later tried through mass trials, where the rebels’
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confessions usually aroused the masses into shouting for their execution; the trial 
went on tour around the Soviet areas388.
Despite these continued excesses, 1931 marked a regularisation of these 
experiments, as the founding of a central Chinese Soviet Republic (CSR) in Jiangxi 
now had the means, both physical and intellectual, to build a judicial system. A 
series of important laws were promulgated389. Judicial infrastructure was also 
under construction, where by law civil, criminal and circuit courts should be set up. 
For practical concerns, before these courts were set up, the judicial departments 
temporarily handled the cases390.
Mass trials also moved towards regularisation, with stress upon their educative 
purposes. In Luoan County, for instance, over 700 landlords and rich peasants 
were arrested by the cadre-led masses. Instead of killing them all, only 30 were 
shot as counterrevolutionaries and the rest forcibly removed, with their property 
confiscated and redistributed among the masses. Mass trials were also used for 
deserters and runaways from the Red Army. The ringleader was shot in front of 
the rallied local masses; while most deserters and runaways were encouraged or 
pressured to return to the Red Army through mass meetings. Hand in hand with 
these mass trials came extensive propaganda that was conducted to glorify the Red 
Army through newspapers, operas, plays and posters391. Compared with the 
previous period of massive killings, mass trials in this period meant not only 
significantly reduced executions, but an ideological reorientation of its educative 
functions, where class consciousness was still the aim, but no longer required the 
cruel, bloodthirsty form of human flesh banquet. It was a process that aimed not 
only to educate and reform the struggled, but also the struggler alike. It was part 
and parcel of the cultural revolution waged by the communists to transform the 
countryside.
It would be a mistake to assume that all the communist attempts of mobilisation 
were met with success in this period. Under-attendance and low percentage of 
rural participants who voiced their opinions 392 hardly covered the fact that 
mobilisation carried with it a definite sense of terror that might not only scare the 
punished group, but also (counterproductively) the attending masses. But in
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general, the organised mass trials were well-attended, with their purpose of 
‘political education’ or ‘morality show’393 fulfilled. Such a way of top-down 
mobilisation of popular mandate (minyt) usually went hand in hand with careful 
planning and organisation: initially, it was extensively publicised through such 
popular means as billboards, wall posters, banners, parades and slogans; on the 
day, the trial was normally held outdoors or in big halls that could accommodate 
large masses of population394.
Despite these regularisation efforts, radicalism was still a prominent character. 
This was mainly due to two reasons: class struggle was incorporated into the 
law395, adjusting criminal penalties to one’s class origin, with a lesser penalty for 
workers, peasants and individuals contributing to the Soviet while the bourgeoisie, 
landlords, evil gentry would receive aggravated punishment396. Class background 
was also an important factor in determining counterrevolutionaries, which 
included (1) socioeconomic origin, such as bourgeoisie, landlords, rich peasants; (2) 
political background — those who were considered as opposing the CCP, such as 
‘rightist-opportunists’, ‘liquidationists’ within the CCP, the GMD after the 1927 
GMD-CCP split, other parties such as Social Democratic Party, or the Third Party; 
(3) military enemies, such as A-B League (Anti-Bolshevik) within the 
GMD397 .This was reminiscent of Russian practice in the 1920s398. Failure to 
attend to these class politics was called ‘lack of a firm class consciousness’ and 
reprimanded by superior officials399.
Secondly, in judicial practice, due to such pressing constraints as understaffing, 
poor qualifications and incomplete legal infrastructure, regularisation could be 
easily swept away by populist spontaneity. For instance, despite the legal 
separation of power between Public Security Bureau (investigation) and judicial 
bureaus (sentencing), at provincial and county levels, the PSB became an all- 
encompassing judicial organ, assuming both powers where the judicial 
departments were either weak or non-existent. The Committee for the 
Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries (sufanhm) performed the function of 
arresting and accusing the counterrevolutionaries, was participated by the masses 
and led by the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Committee. Despite
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regulatory guidance400, such massive organisation at times slipped out of control 
where movements became indistinguishable from mob actions and the masses, or 
sometimes the judicial cadre redistributed or kept the confiscated property 
without authorisation401.
The regularisation was gradually reversed in the face of the GMD Fifth 
Encirclement, launched in November 1933. To counter the GMD economic and 
military blockades, the CCP launched a Land Investigation Movement targeting 
the mistakes in previous land redistribution and counterrevolutionary elements, an 
Accusation Movement aimed at the party ranks, an Enlargement of Red Army 
Movement, a Production Movement and a Collecting Supplies Movement. Excess 
and terror in these movements increased as the GMD military threat became 
more imminent. The Land Investigation Movement which was launched in June 
1933 with the aim of constantly stirring up the peasantry in class struggle against 
their former exploiters, took a new course in the Spring of 1934, when Zhang 
Wentian (a.k.a Luo Fu), the newly-elected Chairman of the Council of People’s 
Commissars took control: red terror became so widespread that violence was 
pursued for the sake of violence402. Zhang delivered in March 1934 a speech to 
the judicial cadres that would nowadays send chills down legalist spines, ‘To the 
point where if the masses demand a criminal shot, [you should] take your gun and 
shoot him, even if you can find no law so specifying’403.
Concurrently, judicial infrastructure gave way to excesses. Obtaining approval of 
the superior official for a death sentence gave way to direct execution at mass 
trials; the limitation for appeal was truncated by half, reduced from 14 to 7 days; 
the judicial department at district level could mete out a penalty in accordance 
with the suspect’s class background without the necessity of recourse to law; 
review processes foundered in many cases; landlords and rich peasants were 
treated more severely now to satisfy both the toiling masses’ desire for land as well 
as the necessary resources to finance military operations404.
During this period, the first wave of regularisation had helped the development 
of equity and law. In the official representation, Russian laws were closely 
followed, in such important legislations as Labour Law, Constitution and Marriage
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Law. Class status as Russian style of equity was introduced into the Chinese laws. 
In judicial practice, equity was mainly focused on mass mobilisation like in the 
previous period, albeit in a more regularised manner. Excesses were still a 
problem that plagued judicial processes. The communists, in their effort to seek 
an alternative model of justice, would still have to discover further judicial 
techniques that could bring justice to the masses without running the risk of 
excesses or fomentation of mass anger.
1935-45 Yan’an Period
The defeat of the CSR by the better-off GMD resulted in the Long March. Until 
the Red Army reached Yan’an in 1935, the communist battalions suffered 
significant losses405. Weak and impoverished, the CCP now saw it fit to revise the 
radical policy so as to extend its support base as far as possible into the social 
walks. It reduced the category of ‘counterrevolutionary’ to include mainly Japanese 
invaders, traitors and spies; the radical policy against rich peasants, landlords and 
bourgeoisie was dropped and replaced by a more moderate land policy. 
Simultaneously, towards the counterrevolutionaries and criminals, the policy of 
magnanimity prevailed over suppression. Not only chances for self-reform (jgxin 
§  0f) were given, but also the emphasis was placed on reform rather than 
suppression/humiliation. The logic behind such a shift of policy was ostensibly 
conspicuous: the Soviets were understaffed and poorly equipped to keep prisoners, 
while the reformed could supplement the meagre productive force in the base 
areas406. This imperative became even more prominent in the United Front with 
the GMD in 1937407, where every walk of society was called to unite in fighting 
off the Japanese invaders. The Reduce Rents and Interest Movement was launched in 
the early 1940s to encourage landlords to reduce rents and interest; this was 
followed by a Settlement Movement in which the peasant associations formed a 
settlement committee to calculate all the past debts of the traitors, war criminals, 
landlords and local despots. Then a Production Movement was also launched, to 
educate the masses that redistribution of the confiscated property would not be 
sufficient without production.
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Hand in hand with this revised, deradicalised policy, regularisation went further, 
where the border regions not only promulgated a series of important laws408, but 
carried out further construction of legal infrastructure. High Courts were 
established at the border regions, with their branch courts, local courts or county 
justice bureaus; legal safeguards of civil rights against arbitrary arrest and detention 
were set up; a two-trial system was established, with the higher level court to 
review capital sentences from lower courts409.
People’s justice at this period mainly developed towards a mature form, along 
the matured mass line policy410. The notoriously radical mass trials now acquired a 
more regulated formula, as they were more carefully planned and guided: first, the 
masses were encouraged to voice their opinions and accusations; in return, the 
accused was allowed self-defence; finally it was up to the judge to announce the 
sentence. The passing of sentence should also explicitly quote laws and regulations 
rather than succumbing to the popular cry for execution411.
In this period, jail policy underwent similar transformation. Creating red terror 
by mass execution of criminals in the Jiangxi period counterproducdvely turned 
many people against the CCP. Partly for this reason and partly out of the necessity 
to turn prisoners into a productive force, a lenient jail policy was adopted. A 
programme of releasing prisoners to augment the productive labour force was 
initiated, where the prisoners were released into villages, where the local 
community was responsible for supervision and control. Political socialisation was 
emphasised, with prison policy reformulated. However, it was admitted officially 
that this policy was not implemented in most prisons until 1944 and 1945412.
During the Production Movement, democracy was introduced into prison 
management. According to a SGN High Court Prison, all aspects of within-prison 
production were to be discussed by prisoners; they were allowed to organise a 
prison association and elect officers responsible for different aspects of 
extracurricular activities, such as entertainment, wall-posters, hygiene; they could 
report problems to the prison representatives who would then channel complaints 
or suggestions to the prison officers; they could publish wall newspapers to air
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their suggestions, criticisms or views on the institutions of the detention 
facilities413.
Thought reform was carried out on the prisoners, usually a self-examination 
after establishing rapport between the criminal and the prison cadre; if this self- 
examination was superficial or evasive, the cadre would then call a discussion 
meeting with participation by other prisoners. This thought reform could be 
traced back to group meetings, where the tradition of criticism and self-criticism 
within the CCP were born and developed by the Red Army during guerrilla 
warfare in Jiangxi period and Yan’an. The Army lived among the locals for 
subsistence, support and information, which would not be possible without a 
policy and attitude to win popular support. More often than not, the communist 
soldiers would form a group, sit around a campfire and discuss standards of 
conduct and methods of winning popular support. In the post-1949 era, group 
meetings involving other prisoners were more frequently used, where struggles by 
cellmates were sought to influence the prisoner’s confession and change of 
attitude414.
M a X iw u Style
From 1943 on, Ma Xiwu rose to prominence in adapting the mature mass line 
policy to judicial practice, where he tirelessly went to the masses for information, 
opinions and evidence, all of which were then systemised into the final decision, 
together with observance of the law, which was referred to as the Ma Xiwu Style 
(ma xiwu shenpan fangshi ^  fII 2 l  ^  5^ 1). We shall see from the following case
for details:
In Huachi County, Feng Peng’er the daughter of Feng Yangui was engaged in her 
childhood to Zhang Bo, the second son of Zhang Jincai. In May 1942, in order 
to get more money out of marrying his daughter, Feng Yangui requested to 
cancel the engagement and re-betroth Feng Peng to a Zhang from another village. 
When Zhang Jincai complained to the local court, the betrothal with Zhang was 
initiated. In February, 1943, Feng Peng had a meeting with Zhang Bo, upon 
which she agreed to marry him. However, without Feng Peng’er’s consent, Feng 
Yangui re-betrothed her to Zhu Shouchang at a higher price. Upon learning the
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news, Zhang Jincai led a horde of over 20 fellow villagers to break into Feng 
Yangui’s home in early morning on March 13, seized Feng Peng and conducted a 
wedding ritual with Zhang Bo. Upon this, Feng Yangui brought a suit to the local 
court. The local Justice Bureau found Zhang Jincai guilty of abducting a female 
for marriage {qiangqin with a penalty of 6 months of imprisonment. Also
the marriage between Zhang Bo and Feng Peng’er was invalidated. Both the 
Zhangs and the Fengs were grieved by this decision and they appealed to 
superior government bureaus. Feng Peng’er even travelled a long distance on 
foot to a district where she stopped Ma Xiwu under a tree, who promised her 
that he would deal with it within 72 hours.
Then Ma Xiwu came to Huachi, where he conducted investigations by himself, 
talked with a number of cadres and locals and attended to their opinions on how 
to decide this case. It was widely held that ‘Feng [Yangui] should be punished, as 
he spoiled the order regulated by the Family Law for his several attempts to sell 
daughter Feng Peng’er. The Zhangs’ shocking abduction of the daughter for 
marriage corroded the public decency and impaired the social security within the 
community. This behaviour was no different from bandits, which sent chills 
down the spines of the neighbourhood. Therefore, the Zhangs should be 
punished as well’. Moreover, the marriage should not be invalidated. Finally, he 
held a mass trial of the case and decided that marriage between Zhang Bo and 
Feng Peng’er should be recognised legally as it was based on mutual consent and 
free choice, while Feng Yangui who tried a few times to sell his daughter for 
material interests should be punished with labour education415.
Picture 1 Ma Xiwu Mediating a Family Dispute416
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This case was characteristic of the Ma Xiwu Style that listened the public opinions 
in every aspect of the trial, and then systemised the latter so as to reach a balance 
with the law. The mass line policy contained two processes, namely input and 
output. In the input process, Ma Xiwu first talked to the general public, including 
the cadres and masses to collect facts as well as their general opinions. In the 
following, he consulted the parties involved - Feng Peng’er and Zhang Bo who 
firmly wanted to marry. The general public also held that this young couple should 
not be separated again. When this initial phase of input was completed, he opened 
the court trial right on the spot, which was attended by the masses and in an 
informal atmosphere by standing, or sitting casually nearby. Such a gesture had 
implications far beyond a mere attempt to show friendliness to the rural masses, 
but more importandy, iconoclastically dismanded such authoritative symbols that 
connoted formalism and bureaucratism, like wearing a wig or formal apparel. To 
bring justice to the masses, as a way to implement the mass line policy, required 
not only informalisation of the judicial practice, but more importantly, a moral 
commitment to provide convenience to the impoverished local community and to 
encourage expression and involvement from the not-so-well-educated rural
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masses. Law therefore ceased to be an authoritative entity that is exclusive and 
only accessible to those well-educated or who can afford it. Banishing the 
sancrosanctity of the law went hand in hand with building anew a political culture 
that aimed to bring law to the widest masses.
It should be noted that the dichotomy of input/output is merely a matter of 
convenience for our analysis, as in reality, these two processes could be 
intertwined and mutually embedded. For instance, in the output process (i.e. 
opening the court trial), Ma Xiwu still did not forget to consult the attendant 
masses about how the case should be handled. When the masses voiced their 
general opinion that the young couple should stay together, he then proceeded to 
stress that this was equally in accord with the new Family Law, according to which 
marriage should be voluntary and by consent. Expectedly, such a people-centred, 
audience-oriented way would be received much better than stern announcement 
with a cold, detached countenance.
Ma Xiwu’s way of trial was praised, supported and promoted by the SGN 
Border Region government. On January 6, 1944, in a government report, Lin 
Boqu the government chairman emphasised that ‘Comrade Ma Xiwu’s way of trial 
should be promoted so as to educate the masses'. Two months later, Yan’an Daily 
the official mouthpiece published a long report on the Ma Xiwu Style, thus 
signifying the start of a campaign throughout the Border Region to study this way 
of trial. A central government resolution asked local cadres in the county 
government, judicial bureaus and subcourts, to study this Ma Xiwu Style417. It was 
used as a benchmark to assess the judicial cadre’s performance. Eight judicial 
employees received the honour of ‘model employees’. Shi Jingshan, a judge at 
Longdong Subcourt, had implemented this Ma Xiwu Style in his judicial work and 
achieved satisfactory results, as can be seen from the following two land disputes: 
When alive, Wang Zhikuan’s father purchased from Gao a piece of land of 5 mu. 
In the contract it was written that this land was next to the land of Wang Tongyi 
on the east, south and north sides, and in the west to a cave dwelling (yaodong fir 
M). In order to embezzle a 1-mu square owned by Wang Tongyi for house 
building, Wang Zhikuan deliberately tampered with the contract by altering the
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south side to the west side, thereby generating a land dispute. At that time, the 
town cadre and many of the locals came to investigate and agreed that Wang 
Zhikuan’s claim was not sustainable. Dissatisfied, Wang Zhikuan filed a suit to 
the Justice Bureau of Heshui County, which ruled without investigation in favour 
of Wang Zhikuan’s claim, that the land be transferred to Wang Zhikuan. This 
decision grieved Wang Tongyi so much that he appealed. When Ma Xiwu 
received this dispute, he sent one of his assistants — Shi to the village for 
investigations. Following the Ma Xiwu Style, Shi convened a 20-plus panel that 
consisted of cadres at all levels, the guarantors and relatives as written on the 
contract, as well as the seniors living in the village. According to the contract, Shi 
carefully measured the land. At the same time, he consulted the seniors’ and 
neighbours’ opinions. The masses first voiced their opinions, then the cadres. By 
this time, Wang Zhikuan was unanimously found in the wrong. He thereby 
acknowledged his own mistake and pleaded for a penalty. The masses burst into 
laughter. With mediation and explanations, the land was returned to Wang 
Tongyi. Both parties held a banquet to celebrate the resolution and Wang 
Zhikuan, by local customs, offered cigarettes to Wang Tongyi. The land dispute 
was resolved in peace and harmony418.
Another land dispute was more complicated:
Chou Huairong, a resident in Choujiaxianzi Village, Heshui County, owned a hilly 
field called Choujialiang; Ding Wanfii from Dingjiabeibaozi Village, owned 
Chuanzi River and its surrounding hilly fields. Later, both Ding and Chou 
attempted to extend their lands. So, Ding stretched his plot of land northward 
along the Chuanzi River Mountain while Chou stretched southward along the 
Choujialiang field until they met and collided. A dispute was generated. In 1938, 
it was petitioned to the government of Ning County where Chou Huairong had a 
family member working as the Head of Police. With this connection, Chou was 
issued a supplementary land certificate, by which not only Chou’s original land 
but also all Ding’s land at over 240-mu were transferred to Chou Huairong. 
Dissatisfied, Ding appealed to Pingliang High Court. This time Ding bribed the 
local gentry and the judges who in due course ruled that all the lands should 
belong to Ding. This aroused public criticism locally where the masses 
commented, ‘Both parties were greedily unjustifiable, only relying on guanxi and 
money’.
In 1940, the Communist government was established, to which Chou 
complained again. At first it was adjourned due to understaffing. Then Shi was 
sent to the villages for investigations. In the first two days, he consulted seven to 
eight members of the local community and four from the seniors and local gentry, 
who told Shi in detail about the dispute. On the third day, a 20-plus panel that 
consisted of cadres and masses was convened to measure the land. After this, Shi 
first consulted the cadres and then the masses for their opinions. Finally, Shi, 
together with the head of the district, convened a group from the local cadres 
and masses that set out to mediate both families. With full consideration for both 
parties, it was suggested that Ding own the Chuanzi River and the adjacent land 
and mountain; while Chou own the Choujialiang land and mountain. This 
suggestion was happily accepted by both parties. With a clear contract entered, 
this land dispute that had been dragging on for years was resolved in four days419. 
In both cases, we can see clearly that the Ma Xiwu Style was put into practice. 
During investigations, Shi consulted the locals and cadres to learn the underlying 
facts. This attention to public opinions continued into the trial during which he 
constantly relied upon the masses for opinions and suggestions which were then 
formed into the final decisions. Right on the spot, the mistakes were 
acknowledged, the disputing parties happily accepted the mediation proposals and 
the general public was satisfied. The laws might not be stricdy observed, or even 
mentioned at all, but through this way, upon elucidating the facts and 
circumstances, the rights of property were protected. This was even more so in 
the second case, where the litigants used connections or bribery to win favours 
from the Nationalist court. By comparison, this was an additional advantage of 
this Ma Xiwu Style, namely to prevent corruption. The masses, when attended to, 
mobilised to participate and democratised to voice their opinions, played an 
important role in supervising, monitoring and controlling the judicial processes. 
The Ma Xiwu Style thereby was not simply an attempt at antiformalism or 
antibureaucratism, but essentially a way to democratise the judicial process. It was 
part and parcel of the communist effort to democratise government, place cadres 
under the masses’ direct supervision and contain the vices of both imperial and 
capitalist bureaucracy. It was a genuine effort that developed out of the
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revolutionary tradition to seek alternatives of governance and justice alike by 
empowering the masses and making the people the real masters of society.
As a matter of fact, Liberation Daily summarised the remarkably outstanding 
characteristics of the Ma Xiwu Style, ‘(1) the investigation was done in depth; (2) 
the trial is for and by the masses. The judge sticks to the general principle of both 
enforcing government ordinances and injunctions and considering the masses’ 
customs and norms; (3) the litigation procedures were easy and convenient. The 
trial was more informally-discussional {guotanshi rather than formally-
authoritative {guotangshi Ma Xiwu neither brushed off nor procrastinated.
Whenever and wherever possible, whether it be morning, night, mountains, or 
riverside, the masses could stop him for a conversation or ask for 
trial. ...Comrade Ma Xiwu travelled around different counties to inspect, during 
which he would inspect the prisons, talk to the prisoners and release the reformed 
upon bail so as to supplement the labour force at the border region for the 
purpose of [agricultural] production’. For one thing, Ma Xiwu has always stressed 
the importance of public opinion, which can even be ‘more powerful than law’. 
Most significantly, the judge should ‘carefully listen to the masses’ opinions and 
criticisms’ and ‘learn the facts from the masses’. After this, ‘adjudication should 
depend upon the masses, from which it will gain endless momentum and by 
which, however complicated a case or dispute will be resolved with ease’420.
At a later stage, Ma Xiwu Style was further codified into a 12-character principle 
— ‘investigative examinations, mainly mediation, solve on-the-spot’ (diaocbayanjiu, 
tiaojie wei^ hu, j i u d i j i e j u e ^ k $:). In 1964, it was expanded 
to a 16-character principle, with ‘depend upon the masses’ (yikao qun^hong f t  Si- 
fy )  added to this slogan421. In both the revolutionary period and early Mao’s era, 
the Ma Xiwu Style was extolled as the model experience to be learned throughout 
the judiciary422.
With the Ma Xiwu Style, new judicial techniques were developed, such as circuit 
courts and on-the-spot trials. Circuit courts (xunhuifating 0  were inspired 
by Ma Xiwu’s tireless travelling around the Border Regions to bring justice to the
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people. Closely related, on-the-spot trials (jiudi shenpan Sft ) were twin
brothers to the circuit court, where the judges frequendy visited the village of the 
litigants for investigation, adjudication and education. Developed out of the Ma 
Xiwu Style, this on-the-spot trial has three features, namely: in-depth 
investigations; substance over form {buju xingshi ffrj ®  Si ); and direct 
participation of the masses. Moreover, previous techniques such as mass trials and 
people’s jurors (as from the jury practice) were regularised, where the judicial 
worker carefully pooled opinions from the local people, settled disputes through 
the aid of the latter and educated the masses without sacrificing the law. Group 
pressure was used in supervising and controlling returned prisoners423
In addition, mediation was revitalised. With a clarification of the facts, the cases 
could be either chaired by the judge or left completely up to the masses 
themselves for mediation. As it was remarked, when the masses’ wisdom was 
brainstormed, the solution could be much better and more reasonable than that 
offered by the court424. In Xiangtan, there was a debt dispute that had been tried 
both in the Nationalist and Communist courts, but still remained unsettled. The 
proposals suggested by courts were one after another rejected by the litigants. 
Later through convening the masses, another suggestion made through 
brainstorming public opinions was accepted by both sides. In another case, the 
public was mobilised to mediate a family dispute. In Wu Town, a wife was 
suspected by her husband of having an extramarital affair. For this, she felt deeply 
affronted. Simultaneously, her husband claimed that he would restrain her during 
pregnancy. Henceforth, she filed for divorce at the local government that tried 
with a few failed attempts to dissuade her. When the judge came to the local 
village for mediation, the masses confirmed that she had been a good woman and 
it was wrong for her husband to hurt her. At this moment, the woman felt that 
though she had earned back her face, she was still afraid to be mistreated by her 
husband during pregnancy. The masses then promised her that her husband 
would treat her well in the future. Hence the family dispute was solved425.
The revitalised mediation that developed in the same vein with the Ma Xiwu 
Style stood in stark contrast with mediation in imperial China, where the unwilling
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and ill-resourced imperial bureaucracy deliberately turned down a lot of disputes, 
and forced the litigants to resort to clan, family or local tithing leaders (baojia®.^) 
for mediation426. The communist practice of mediation, instead, was based on a 
proactive role played by judicial cadres in mobilising the local masses into dispute 
resolution, overriding the traditional power structures of family, clan or local 
communities. This mediation, when proactively mobilised, led and supervised, 
could positively pool the masses’ wisdom while avoiding the traditional impasse of 
disputes escalating into armed fights between families, clans or local communities. 
Prim a facie, the mediation was mainly to provide convenience to the masses, 
consult the locals and attend to their opinions. At a deeper layer, the court 
through this way created a congenial atmosphere for consolidation and 
enforcement. A case did not end with the judge’s announcement o f verdict, but 
rather depended upon its execution. Involving the public in mediation would not 
only help to mediate the dispute in the process, but also, through suggesting a 
resolution more acceptable to both parties, create group pressure for 
enforcement427.
To sum up, in the Yan’an period, the development of equity, defined as mass 
participation, can be seen from a series of new judicial techniques that were 
devised, such as the Ma Xiwu Style, circuit courts, on-the-spot trials and prison 
management. At the same time, the communists sought to institutionalise these 
innovations in legal practice. Laws were promulgated, while legal policies were 
made, announced and propagated. Equity developed in a balanced manner in both 
legal practice and official representation without sacrificing one for the other. Red 
terror as a phantom still plagued this course of development; nevertheless it would 
be difficult to deny that equity was marching towards maturity. This peasant- 
centred, masses-oriented approach had a markedly distinctive Chinese 
characteristic that sought to transcend not only imperial traditions, GMD 
bureaucrat-comprador and capitalist justice, but also the borrowed Soviet 
concepts of legality and equity.
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1945-9 Civil War Period
Regularisation met with difficulty in the early period of civil war where the 
imperative again turned to security. Counterrevolution as a concept was revised to 
include the GMD, war criminals and enemy agents. Mass accusations took certain 
new forms, such as th z Anti-Traitor Accusation Movement (fanjian suku Izff i/flS), or 
the Revenge and Complaint Movement (fuchou kongsu MfASVf). The masses were 
more actively involved than in the Jiangxi period. In the Spring of 1946, in North 
Jiangsu, over 12,000 anti-traitor and anti-despot meetings were organised, 
attended by over 2 million people. Temporary, one-off special tribunals were 
established for mass trials of the main criminals. The masses were probably more 
actively involved, as they sometimes jumped on to the stage and threatened to kill 
or beat the criminal. Mostly execution followed in these mass trials without 
superior approval. On October 10, 1947, Zhu De ordered the arrest, trial and 
punishment of the GMD ‘war criminals’, and confiscated their property and 
‘bourgeois capital’. A special Chinese Commission of Inquiry Concerning War Criminals 
was formed with 22 representatives from various areas in Yan’an to deal with 
Japanese war criminals. These criminal elements had to go through confession, 
humiliation and compensation at a mass accusation meeting. The traitors, special 
agents and local despots were deprived of their right to appeal428.
Furthermore, a new Land Law re-waged class struggle warfare, to confiscate the 
landlords’ and rich peasants’ property429, in replacement of the mild Rent and 
Interest Reduction Movement. As the phase for a united front had been elapsed, 
the CCP now saw it fit to win the majority of poor peasants’ support whilst the 
better-off urban dwellers, merchants and business classes were regarded as an 
alliance with the GMD. Moreover, the experiment of special tribunals was now 
incorporated into law430, where the one-off people’s tribunals for mass trials, 
struggle meetings and accusation rallies, aimed at punishing anyone that stood 
against the land policy, were organised to denounce the landlords431.
With this re-emphasis on class struggle, mass trials reversed to their previous ad 
hoc style, which could easily turn into mob action or personal revenge. For 
instance, in west Zhejiang, villagers and tithing leaders were physically assaulted or 
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even killed, together with their property burnt or taken away. At one place, judicial 
cadres were seizing and secretiy detaining people. In a speech delivered on April 1, 
1948 at the Cadres’ Conference of Shanxi-Ruiyuan Liberated Area, Mao Zedong 
admitted the mistakes of unnecessarily executing many landlords and rich peasants 
in the land reform campaign, but also some workers were killed due to personal 
revenge432.
This does not mean, however, that rationalisation was completely swept away in 
this new wave of red terror. As the civil war progressed and the CCP gradually 
took control, the excessive practices ebbed, giving rise to a regain of regularisation, 
as can be seen in the construction of a two-trial, three-level court system from the 
beginning of 1948. Moreover, as the CCP progressed in their power, it was 
necessary to broaden their support rather than restricting it to the poor peasants 
in rural areas. The United Front slightly regained favour, although it was not until 
after 1949 that it was officially re-emphasised. For instance, in many of the cities 
within the GMD territory that now fell under CCP control, a lot o f the GMD 
judicial officials were retained to run the legal system. The Central Executive 
Committee’s decrees during 1948-9 turned to a mild policy on agrarian reform. 
Regularisation peaked in the course of 1949 when the CCP, regaining power, 
gestured to allay many people’s fears by stressing protection of life and property 
of every individual433, and ruling according to law434. On August 11, 1949, the 
Shanghai Municipal People’s Court promulgated provisional civil and criminal 
procedure laws435.
Despite these gestures which might sound more political than legal, within the 
CCP ranks there was never a shortage of real advocates of rule of law. As early as 
October, 1941, the Border Region Judicial Conference stressed that ‘our past 
guerrilla methods cannot be applied to the present situation because everything 
needs to be formalised; the laws also need to be formalised’436. In April 1946, Lin 
Boqu of the SGN Border Region even suggested judicial independence to try 
cases according to nothing but law, with private citizens and civil servants 
prosecuted alike for illegal acts437. Such a proposition with a rule of law tone 
hardly surprises readers nowadays, but half a century ago, when the revolutionary
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practices o f overriding law with public opinions, discarding procedural 
requirements for mass trials were still resilient, such a legalist suggestion would 
have seemed outstandingly avant-garde.
Meanwhile, in both the Yan’an and Civil War periods, mediation continued to 
play an important role in settling disputes: court-led mediation as well as out-of- 
court conciliation by people themselves were regularised438. In the SGN Border 
Region, in 1942, 18 percent of civil cases and 0.4 percent of minor criminal cases 
were settled by mediation while in 1944, the figures increased to 48 and 12 percent 
respectively; in 1949 in North China, 70 per cent of the civil cases were reportedly 
resolved by mediation439.
M ao’s Era (1949-65)
In Mao’s time, this regularisation took a heavy toll in the first period, with the 
state deliberately seeking to institutionalise the mass participation techniques it 
introduced in the revolutionary era. This regularisation, however, was 
counteracted by the imperatives of various political movements. Towards the end 
of the 1960s, Mao’s increased awareness (and hence worry) of the Khrushchev’s 
revisionist review of Stalin made him increasingly intolerant of this trend of 
regularisation by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. It escalated until its culmination 
in the Cultural Revolution. This development shall be duly examined in the 
following.
1949-54 the Period of Common Programme
The 1949 Common Programme authorised the Central Government to ‘suppress 
all counterrevolutionary activities and severely punish all GMD war criminals and 
other leading incorrigible counterrevolutionary elements who colluded with 
imperialism, betrayed the motherland, and opposed the cause of the people’s 
democracy’440, with which a massive counter-counterrevolutionary movement was 
carried out upon the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, culminating 
in the 1951 promulgation of the Regulation for Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries. In 
an age of no comprehensive criminal legal code, this Regulation served as a quasi­
criminal code 441 . The scale and brutality of the suppression of 
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counterrevolutionaries escalated with the passage of time, where in the first half of 
1951, 800,000 counterrevolutionaries cases were reportedly dealt with by people’s 
courts. The CCP’s attitude towards counterrevolutionaries became again 
unrelenting, which was seen as a necessity for strengthening the newly-established 
regime. Moreover, now that the CCP had defeated the GMD, magnanimity 
became unnecessary. The forms of mass trials, accusation rallies and struggle 
meetings resurfaced as the main way, albeit this time with emphasis on severe 
punishment. The enormity of such movements could be astonishing: in 1951 
alone, 29,600 mass trials were held in Beijing, in which 3,379,000 people 
participated while in Tianjin from March to July, the numbers were respectively 
21,400 and 2,200,000442.
Apart from this strong antirevolutionary emphasis, political movements were 
waged one after another, such as the Land Reform443, Three Antis, Five Antis, 
which were mainly conducted through the ad hoc, one-off people’s tribunals. 
During the winter of 1950 and the spring of 1951, 977 people’s tribunals and 
3,693 branch tribunals were set up throughout the country. In central-southern 
China, the people’s tribunals in 120 counties alone had reportedly tried 143,761 
cases of counterrevolutionaries and landlords. Such tribunals were placed under 
direct leadership of the county or municipal government that appointed the 
presiding judge and deputy judge; sitting on the bench also included those elected 
by the local people’s congress or by mass organisations444. In this period, the 
judicial personnel thus elected included local active CCP members from among 
the peasants, whose engagement in the work of the tribunals ‘consolidated the ties 
between the legal organs and the masses and served as a safe guarantee of the 
justness and soundness of a legal decision made by a tribunal of such 
composition’445. At these tribunals, traditional tactics of circuit courts, mass trials 
and struggle meetings were used. These tribunals, however, were ad hoc and one- 
off, as they ceased to exist the moment these movements were concluded446.
In a review of judicial work delivered in September 1952 by the Minister of 
Justice Shi Liang, people’s tribunals were praised to ‘mobilise and educate the 
masses to denounce the reactionaries and law-breakers’. The masses were relied
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upon for investigation, hearing and disposing of cases, to struggle against the 
enemy and mediate the internal disputes447. In April 1953, the Second National 
Judicial Work Conference adopted a resolution that the people’s courts at 
grassroots level should organise in rural areas circuit courts which were designed 
to ‘economise time, facilitate the people’s lawsuits, settle cases with high efficiency, 
and protect and promote agricultural production’. By September 1954, 3,795 
circuit courts were established. The mobility of such courts, however, could be its 
shortcoming, as on the move, it could be inaccessible to certain parties. On this 
issue, the 1954 Organic Law required that new ‘people’s tribunals’ be established 
at fixed localities, to which the masses could bring lawsuits at any time. These 
‘people’s tribunals’ are no longer ad hoc, one-off courts like their predecessors, 
but rather permanent components of the people’s courts at the grassroots level448. 
They performed the functions of conducting propaganda on laws and policies, 
guiding the mediation committee, handling letters and visits. It was an important 
device to carry out the mass line in judicial work, with a good combination of 
stability (regular court hearings) and mobility (on-the-spot trials)449.
Apart from the people’s tribunal’s task to bring justice closer to the masses, it 
shouldered another responsibility of recruiting new legal cadres. For one thing, 
during the first 5 years of the People’s Republic, a national shortage of qualified 
legal personnel resulted in retaining many of the legal specialists that had worked 
for the GMD. They had their positions kept at courts, law faculties, editorial 
boards of legal journals, or law codification commissions. Ideology also paved the 
way to keep the GMD legal working force, as it was argued that ‘at the present 
stage of the democratic revolution, all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal elements 
may join in building the New China as long as they are willing to reform their 
thinking along communist lines’450.
This honeymoon period between the legal specialists and the CCP government, 
however, was short-lived. Keeping the GMD legal personnel proved to be at best 
half-hearted. Apart from purging some ex-GMD officials, post-liberation 
witnessed an influx of new cadres to take up many newly-created positions in the 
expansion of legal services in the national bureaucracy. Comparatively, these new
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cadres were politically favoured due to their ideological purity. They might not 
have received extensive legal training or had a shiny legal education on their CV, 
but they were moulded out of the communist services. By comparison, the legal 
specialists were regarded as politically unreliable and ideologically bourgeois or 
bureaucratic. On August 13,1952, Shi Liang reported to the State Council that out 
of the 28,000 judicial cadres in the country, approximately 6,000 (or 22%) were 
old judicial personnel who worked under the GMD regime who still had 
‘reactionary outlooks, outdated judicial concepts and work-styles\
Consequently, a Judicial Reform was launched from August 1952 to April 1953, 
aimed at purging the ex-GMD judicial cadres. During this campaign, all judicial 
personnel and their records were subject to public scrutiny at struggle meetings or 
mass trials, with all walks of the society mobilised to participate; traditional 
methods of ‘criticism and self-criticism’, ‘accusation and redress meetings’ were re­
used. As a result, only 20% (i.e. roughly 1,200) of the ex-GMD judicial personnel 
were retained.
The vacancies thus created were swiftly filled by cadres who served in people’s 
tribunals during the campaigns, veteran members of PLA, and active members 
from mass organisations such as peasants’, workers’ and women associations. In a 
directive on August 23, 1952, the Guangdong Provincial Government demanded 
that the leadership at county and district levels must select a group of cadres from 
among the workers and peasants who were determined in their class stand, active 
in their work, and correct in their working style to work in the people’s tribunals; 
this was regarded as a way to recruit future judges to work in the people’s courts. 
In September, a review by Shi Liang reiterated that people’s tribunals were an 
important way to recruit new legal cadres. By early 1953, reportedly 6,500 new 
personnel were brought into judicial work, with 70 percent with CCP or New 
Democratic League membership451.
Despite the populist extremism that accompanied these events, regularisation 
was carried further, with a series of important laws promulgated452. Mediation 
continued to be emphasised in the new People’s Republic. In a directive to judicial 
officials, Premier Zhou Enlai stressed the significance of mediation in reducing
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disputes as well as implementing the mass line policy in judicial work453. The 
Second National Judicial Work Conference held in Beijing in April 1953 discussed 
the institutionalisation of ‘people’s jurors’, the establishment of circuit courts, 
mediation committees, and people’s reception offices. By 1953, 45,960 mediation 
committees were established or reorganised; over 302,000 people actively 
participated in the administration of justice454. With these laws and regularisation 
efforts, a stabilisation period steadily emerged.
1954-7 Move towards Legal Stability
Although it was not until the VIII Party Congress (September 19,1956) that class- 
based, large-scale political movements were officially replaced by a focus on 
economic construction. Normalisation of law and order had already started two 
years earlier, in the promulgation of the Constitution in 1954 that signalled a move 
towards legal stability. Observance of the law was not only instituted in the 1954 
Constitution (Art.78) and Organic Law of People’s Courts (Art.4), but constantly 
emphasised, from the Legal Education Campaign (December 1954) to the official 
vocabulary during 1954-7. Ma Xiwu pointed out in 1956 the problem of ignoring 
the legal rights of the accused, which was a violation of the Constitution and the 
Organic Law of the People’s Courts; Dong Biwu admitted to the VIII Party 
Congress that the legal system was not observed. One main reason for this 
contempt lay in the hatred of the old legal system, which was increased by the 
mass revolutionary movements as they seldom relied upon the law. By the same 
token, the mass movements were no longer suitable for the current age of 
economic construction, for which they should give way to regularisation, as Liu 
Shaoqi emphasised in a 1956 political report455.
On its own, the Constitution not only established the people’s tribunals as a
permanent feature of the people’s justice as aforementioned, but also regulated
people’s jurors456, which was further detailed in the Organic Law of the People’s
Court457 and a 1956 Ministry of Justice directive concerning its number, selection
and term of office458. By 1957, 246,500 jurors were selected: workers, peasants,
clerks, industrialists, business persons etc. The merits o f the people’s jurors
included mass participation, improvement of the quality of judicial work and 
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spread of legal discipline. While simultaneously, the problems included a 
contemptuous attitude by some judicial officers, reluctance of certain state organs 
or enterprises to allow their employees to serve as people’s jurors, passivity of 
certain jurors who regarded participation as an extra burden or who were 
subservient to judges459.
People’s mediation committees were further regularised in the Provisional Organic 
Regulations of People’s Mediation Committees as issued by the State Council in March 
1954. By mid-1955, 157,966 such committees were established at the grassroots 
level. Members included residents of the local communities, with pure political 
backgrounds, an incorruptible personality and enthusiasm for mediation work. It 
gained momentum after Mao’s famous speech on people’s internal 
contradictions460, as they were widely set up in the neighbourhood street offices, 
schools, enterprises, work units, factories in the cities and production brigades and 
teams of the people’s communes in the countryside. Their task was ‘to settle the 
people’s disputes, to strengthen internal solidarity, to preserve social order, to 
promote production, and to conduct propaganda and education in law and 
discipline’. The ‘judiciousness and the commonsense conduct’ of these 
committees were impressive461.
Here, the communists redefined the identity and role of mediators and 
transformed the process and function of mediation, where absolute criteria of 
right and wrong, informed by the communist ideology, experience and practice, 
were infused into the mediation process, with emphasis on its political functions 
and political involvement that replaced passivity. As Lubman commented, ‘[w]hile 
there may be “resonance” between traditional and Communist dispute resolution, 
the meditational devices used by the Communists seem more directly traceable to 
their own development as Communists than to the tradition they so resolutely 
oppose. The Communist Party has had considerable success in altering the nature 
of courts, unifying judicial and extrajudicial methods of resolving disputes 
politicising the mediation process, and, in general, changing and redistributing the 
function s of mediation. Examination of official Communist objective sand actual 
practice indicates frequent and substantial correlation between the two’462.
I l l
The Comrades’ Adjudication Committee, though regulated in the Jiangxi 
period463, was not seen on a wide scale until 1953. Organised in factories and 
mines, the committees had their members elected by the workers and employees, 
subject to general supervision of the people’s courts as well as guidance from the 
CCP and local government. Strictly, they were not courts of law without any 
authority to pass a sentence. They mainly dealt with industrial accidents, breaches 
o f labour discipline, negligence, delinquency or minor thefts in the factories or 
industrial units. They quickly disappeared after 1957 as little was reported about 
their activities464.
These regularisation efforts did not come easily, but after a lengthy period of 
‘brainstorming’ (yunniang He@6) by pooling wisdom. A law in China was first 
drafted through a court-led summarisation of past experiences465; then, the CCP 
would solicit and instil into the drafts the opinions from the masses and state 
organs’ discussion and revision. Some drafts were disseminated down to county 
and township for extensive mass discussion466.
People’s reception offices were established following the resolution of the 
Second National Judicial Work Conference in 1953, with four functions: (1) 
handling letters, visits and phone calls; (2) settling minor disputes; (3) answering 
law and litigation matters; (4) helping to write litigation statements and recording 
agreement467. Since 1955, the last two functions were mainly performed by the 
Legal Advisory Offices of the people’s lawyer system. This people’s lawyer system 
was equally part of the communist effort to seek an alternative to both imperial 
and capitalist practices. In imperial China, no lawyer system existed, where the 
defence business was taken by the litigation tricksters (songgun which
derogatory designation testified to their unpopularity468. In the republican period, 
the old-style litigation trickster was banned by the 1926 First Peasant Congress of 
Hunan, and it was replaced by the Peasant Associations to represent their 
members in litigation, which was continued in the Jiangxi, Yan’an and civil war 
periods. The Common Programme (1949) abolished all GMD laws, courts and 
legal systems. Consequently, law offices were closed and private lawyers 
prohibited from practicing. New emphasis was now laid on the accessibility of the
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court to the masses, the simplicity of the procedure and disappearance of old-style 
lawyers. Despite these communist efforts, many of the old-style lawyers still held 
close ties with the judges who worked under the GMD regime. The 1952-3 
Judicial Reform Movement was aimed at purging these prohibited but still active 
‘underground lawyers’. They were required to register and confess their errors at 
the local ‘people’s courts’; then mass accusation and struggle meetings were 
organised to struggle against these lawyers469.
Despite the abolition of old-style lawyers, the right to defence was recognised in 
a series of laws and regulations dated as early as the Yan’an period and up to 
1951470. In these regulations, the defence counsel could be a public defender, a 
representative from mass organisations, a friend or a relative. The role of the 
public defender was developed from 1949-51 and they helped to gather evidence, 
examine the circumstances of the cases and study information. From thence the 
CCP was already consciously engaged in constructing a people’s lawyer system. 
The 1954 Constitution farther recognised the right to defence471 and the people’s 
lawyer was first mentioned in the 1954 Organic law of the People’s Courts472.
The first activity of such ‘people’s lawyers’ could be traced to November 23, 
1954, when two law professors from China People’s University were enlisted as 
defence attorneys for 13 accused Americans in an espionage case. From 1955, 33 
people’s courts reportedly started experimenting with the introduction of lawyers. 
Early in 1956, a meeting was held in Beijing to discuss the drafts of Regulation on 
People’s Lawyers and of the Provisional Rule on People’s Lawyers Charging Fee. Also 
during the year, there were some 3,000 lawyers and 670 Legal Advisory Offices. 
By 1957, Shi Liang reported that most cities now had lawyers to act as people’s 
legal advisors. In 1956, 5 Legal Advisory Offices in Shanghai answered 3,584 legal 
inquiries, prepared 879 legal documents for callers and participated in 281 cases. 
Early in 1957, Legal Advisory Offices in certain places began to assign lawyers for 
agencies, enterprises, organisations and co-operatives. When the Great Leap 
Forward (GLF for short) was initiated in 1958, people’s lawyers also went to 
factories and farms to live and eat with the masses, participate in production and
113
labour, carry out propaganda and education, and conduct on-the-spot 
investigations and examinations473.
Different from the imperial and capitalist practices, these people’s lawyers were 
regarded as public servants, not private practitioners, as their task was to 
‘safeguard the socialist legal system and consolidate the proletarian dictatorship’; 
all were working in the Legal Advisory Offices and should follow the mass line 
and submit to Party leadership. Fees were to be paid to the Legal Advisory Offices 
rather than to individual lawyers; they could be waived when the client was too 
poor to pay, involved in pension or alimony claims or other justifiable reasons. 
The people’s lawyer performed the functions of (1) answering enquiries from the 
people; (2) helping to write legal documents, contracts, agreements; (3) acting as 
defenders in criminal and civil suits during which lie  must carry out his tasks 
within a legal framework and under no circumstances should he fabricate evidence, 
distort facts or use deceptions to help his client’474. Quoting Huang Yuan, Leng 
listed five benefits of this people’s lawyer system: (1) implementation of the right 
to defence; (2) the Legal Advisory Offices provide convenience to the masses and 
help develop the judicial work of the people’s courts; (3) people’s lawyers provide 
assistance, support and protection to the masses; (4) people’s lawyers help to 
propagate policies, laws and regulations to the masses in their routine job of 
answering inquiries and participating in lawsuits; (5) they can check the judiciary’s 
power and help to raise the quality of judicial work475.
With a people’s lawyer system to concretise the right to defence, efforts were 
also made to curb police power during the 1954-7 regularisation. Following the 
regulation issued by the Ministry of Public Security on August 10, 1952 aimed at 
mass participation and supervision in the police work, mass security organisations 
were set up within factories, enterprises, schools, offices, streets in the cities and 
villages, communes and production brigades in the rural areas. The police were 
granted power to punish counterrevolutionaries, landlords and reactionary 
elements without a court trial. In a 1956 NPC resolution, this power of 
punishment was transferred to the court while leaving the police to merely execute 
the court orders.
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However, this regularisation effort was soon met with the currents o f reversal in 
mid-1957. According to a State Council Resolution on Re-education and Rehabilitation 
through 'Labour on August 3, 1957, the police, civil administrative organs and social 
groups (e.g. parents, guardians or any organisations) were granted power to 
confine bad elements to labour camps without court trial. The mediation 
committees also now had the power to impose sanctions such as warnings, 
criticism, self-criticism, struggle, demotion and dismissal476. The 3-year-long 
regularisation again faced a resurging of unrestrained populism.
1957-66 Reversal of Regularisation
On February 27, 1957, Mao made a speech concerning people’s non-antagonistic 
contradictions and the Hundred Flowers Campaign, during which he encouraged 
criticisms from the intellectuals. Starting cautiously, the intellectual criticism 
quickly escalated to a massive scale of vehemence on the leadership of the CCP. 
Such an enormity of criticism as lasted for more than 5 weeks was apparently 
beyond Mao’s expectations, for on June 08, 1957, he dictated a Directive on 
Organising Counterattacks on Rightist. On the same day, the People’s Daily published 
a frontpage column to criticise the rightist attack on the communist state. 11 days 
later, a revised edition of Mao’s February speech was published by the People’s 
Daily, in which two antithetical, heavily class-insinuating concepts, namely flower 
{xianghua and weed (ducaol^^f-) were added. The People’s Daily responded 
angrily to the ‘bourgeois’ criticisms on the current legal system, such as 
‘inadequacy of legal systems’, ‘law should be apolitically classless’, ‘defective 
administration of justice’, ‘oppressive suppression of counterrevolutionaries’, 
‘independence of the judiciary’, ‘the benefit of doubt for the accused’ {yi^ui congwu 
‘presumption of innocence’, ‘free conscientious judgment of evidence’ 
(gryou xin^heng §  tiplMIE). Even the mild June weather could not have failed to 
forebode a pressingly imminent thunderstorm477. By August, 550,000 Chinese, 
including many legal experts, were labelled as ‘rightist’ and subject to class 
struggles478.
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The ‘class struggle’ feature of the criminal laws479 now turned prominent. 
Starting with the GLF in 1958, the class struggle against counterrevolutionaries 
regained momentum. Within six months, in Shanxi alone 11,352 
counterrevolutionaries and 12,898 criminals were uncovered and punished. It was 
particularly stressed that the anti-counterrevolutionaries judicial activity 
strengthened people’s justice. For one thing, it was convinced that the regime now 
faced imminent threat by the mushrooming infiltration of GMD spies and special 
agents, as between October 1962 and October 1963, 24 groups of saboteurs and 
enemy agents were tried in the coastal provinces480.
In general, class struggle regained favour in the official vocabulary481 , 
culminating in Mao’s 1962 speech to call on a national campaign of ‘class struggle 
for ever’. The Supreme Court’s cautious rhetorical reference to class struggle in 
I960482 now turned to a naked emphasis on the people’s court as ‘an instrument 
for proletarian autocracy, with a fundamental task to struggle against enemies’ in 
1962, which was reiterated in various reports and talks from 1963 to 1965483, for 
‘currently the class struggle in China was still seriously prominent’. Clan activities 
like repairing the ancestral hall, compiling the family lineage annals and asking the 
seniors to be in charge of clan affairs were regarded as ‘villainous attacks and class 
vengeance from the landlords and rich peasants’. Economic transactions were 
regarded as ‘opportunist speculation’ (toujidaoba and the corrupted
officials were labelled as ‘urban illegal bourgeoisie’ in a derogatory sense. Local 
attempts to cultivate crops individually instead of collectively were denounced as 
‘a capitalist force’484.
Apart from the brutality and chaos that accompanied the re-emphasised class 
struggle, the other side of this populist thrust was the reinvigoration of mass line 
policy. To bring justice closer to the masses was stressed as a supreme value in 
guiding the judicial work. During the GLF campaign, judicial personnel at the 
people’s reception office went out to factories and streets directly to help settle 
disputes among industrial workers and local residents, under such slogans as Five 
Goes (go to factories, mines, communes, streets, and markets) and Three On-the- 
spots (investigation, mediation and trial-and-sentence on the spot). The
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integration of judicial work with productive labour, with judicial cadres to live, eat 
and labour with the masses and take a direct part in production, was believed to 
‘combat the influence of bourgeois ideology, strengthen their class consciousness 
and mass viewpoints and solidify their relations with the working people’485. A 
visiting Japanese jurist recorded what he saw in 1959 in an exchange programme, 
‘The judge, upon receiving a complaint, always makes an on-the-spot 
investigation. If necessary he brings his own sleeping mats and continues the 
investigation for many days. He first meets people related to the case. Then he 
walks around to see people not related to the case to elicit their judgments and 
opinions. He does this in such a way and at such a time that the production 
activities of those interviewed are not disturbed. In [a]...divorce case the judge 
stayed for a considerable period first in the factory where the husband worked 
and then in the people’s commune of which the wife was a member. During 
working hours he was engaged in labour in order to experience the living 
conditions of both parties and in his leisure time he elicited facts and opinions 
from many persons. ...[in order that] he could thus grasp the accurate facts of 
the case’486.
Included in this campaign were not only the court personnel but also the 
procuracy. The IV National Procuratorial Work Conference in 1958 decided that 
the procuratorates be brought directly to the masses to conduct on-the-spot 
investigations and prosecutions. Under such slogans as ‘Link with the Masses’, 
‘Safeguard Production’, the procuratorates’ personnel went to the countryside, or 
factories, to live, eat and participate in production with them. In the first half of 
1964, 83 work teams were dispatched by the total of 24 procuratorates in the 
country to investigate, summarise experiences and guide procuratorial activity487. 
Mediation was emphasised as the main method of resolving disputes and 
‘integrating court trial with mass debate’. Letters and visits were encouraged to 
report suggestions, complaints and wrongdoings. Between January and October 
1961, in Gansu alone there were 29,000 letters and visits while in 1962, in Jiangsu 
the number was 500,000488.
Apart from the growing personal cult of Mao, with its stresses on class struggle 
and mass line that produced mixed results, even since 1958, the rationalist faction
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within the Party, though sinking to its lowest, was not completely wiped out. Liu 
Shaoqi pardoned war criminals, first on September 17, 1959 and in successive 
years from 1960 to 1964. On September 16, 1959, the Central Committee and the 
State Council issued a statement to show leniency to reformed ‘Rightists’. 142 
persons were released in December 1959, 260 in November 1960, 370 in 
December 1961 and over 100 by 1962 at central organs while locally, 26,000 
Rightists were released in 1959. Slowly but persistentiy legal discussions in juridical 
circles reappeared, with legal forums held in 1962 and textbooks and journal 
articles written from 1962. The retained judicial cadres were now more careful 
with their opinions, with unanimous advocating of absolute Party leadership and 
class nature of the law. Following the Sino-Soviet split in early 1960s, more 
attention was paid to China’s own legal tradition and other Western legal 
theories489. It was not long, however, for the rationalists to realise that they could 
no longer hold law and order from falling apart. The coming revolutionary 
tempest quickly escalated from a test of their rationalism to the extent they could 
ensure their personal safety, as before very soon many rank-and-file people would 
be swept off ruthlessly.
Cultural Revolution (1966-76)
Starting in Shanghai’s 1966 January Revolution ( ^  Wifk-yiyuefengbao), the courts 
around the country were abolished one by one. In January 1966, Zhang Chunqiao 
and Yao Wenyuan were sent to Shanghai by Mao Zedong. On January 06, with 
planning and directions from Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, Wang 
Hongwen chaired a mass rally to attack Cao Diqiu, the Shanghai Mayor and Chen 
Peixian, the Party Secretary of Shanghai. At this rally, both were dismissed from 
their posts, while Chen Peixian was tortured to extract counterrevolutionary 
confessions. Also, the meeting called on the Central Government in Beijing to 
reshuffle the political bureaucracy at Shanghai. Two days later, Mao Zedong made 
a speech to support the January Revolution. On January 22, an editorial in the 
People’s Daily called for a mass seizure of power from ‘the capitalist-roaders 
within the Party’, which was confirmed one day later in a formal Central
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Committee directive. With this, Zhang Chunqiao founded a Shanghai Frontier 
Headquarters for Promoting Revolution and Production, to replace the Shanghai People’s 
Congress. Then a Committee for Protecting the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was 
founded to replace the court, procuratorate and courts in Shanghai490.
This practice was then progressed by the Gang of Four. In December, 1966, 
Jiang Qin announced in a meeting, ‘the Ministry of Police, the Procuracy and the 
Supreme Court are all replicated from capitalist countries and placed on top of the 
Party. How dare anyone inspect us [the communists]? These are all bureaucracies 
against Chairman Mao’. On August 07, 1967, Xie Fuzhi, Deputy Prime Minister 
of the State Department and the Minister of Police, on a plenary meeting, called 
for ‘completely smashing the bad eggs of politics, theory and organisation’, and 
‘smashing the police, court and procuracy’. Xie Fuzhi announced that the court 
had inherited a name from the Nationalist period while the procuracy was 
completely a replica from Soviet revisionism. Then, Smash the Police, Procuratorate 
and Court (galan gongjianfa B  £-4* t& ft) as a slogan for campaigns came into being. 
In December 1968, the Central Government in Beijing permitted the abolition of 
the Supreme Procuracy, Military Procuracy and the procuracy at all levels, and 
they were replaced completely by the cultural revolutionary committees491.
Laws were set aside as the personal cult of Mao soared. What Chairman Mao 
said became the ‘supreme directives’ and used as laws, to be ‘firmly applied and 
enforced’. Mao’s obita dicta were used to try cases. At that time, ‘there was no 
legalist modus operandi for the national politics, which on the contrary evolved 
around Mao’s articles, obita dicta and speeches on contemporary politics. 
Behaviour and conduct were regulated and tried by Mao’s authorship and 
speeches’492. For instance, Mao’s instructions that ‘we must proceed from reality, 
depend upon the masses, conduct investigations and study, find truth from facts, 
rely more on evidence than statements, and verify both the evidence and 
statements’ was frequently cited as a guiding legal principle493.
Mass trials superseded the court proceedings to persecute ‘class enemies’. The 
year of 1967 witnessed Liu Shaoqi the PRC Chairman holding up a copy of the 
1954 Constitution for self-defence that met in vain with the red rebels during the
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class struggles494. At the end of December 1966, Kang Sheng and Zhang 
Chunqiao organised a Mass Pledge Convention to Thoroughly Strike Down the U u Shaoqi, 
Deng Xiaoping-led Capitalist Traders at Tiananmen Square which was attended by 
over 5,000 students from Tsinghua University. In January 1967, Liu Shaoqi was 
tortured at a struggle meeting, where he was made to stand on a broken chair. 
When Liu tried to defend himself against each and every one of the fabricated 
offences, he was hit and slapped in the face. In August 1967, a second struggle 
meeting was held, where Liu Shaoqi and his wife Wang Guangmei were forced to 
kneel on the floor, hands twisted on their backs and heads pressed down. Liu had 
his white hair seized back so as to raise his face for photography. In the two-hour- 
long struggle meeting, Liu was constantly abused, insulted and tortured. Every 
time he tried to defend himself, it was swamped by the slogans shouted by the red 
rebels. Shortly afterwards Liu died of diabetes and poor living conditions.
Liu Shaoqi’s fate was shared by many, Party rank-and-file and incognito alike. 
Zhang Wentian, a research assistant at the Institute of Economics, China 
Academy of Social Sciences, was once dragged by red guards from the Beijing 
Astronaut and Astronomy University as a companion (peidou Pn-^) for attacking 
Peng Dehuai. At the entrance to the struggle meeting, when Peng Dehuai and 
Zhang Wentian passed by, they were slapped by each and every one of the red 
rebels lined up on both sides. Black and blue, Zhang Wentian collapsed 
immediately on the spot 495. In January 1967, just before the nationwide 
abolishment of police, procuracy and court, the Politburo and State Council issued 
a Six Articles on the Police {gong'an liutiao that required the police to assist
the masses to struggle against enemies and any effort to curb the ‘revolutionary 
masses’ class struggle’ was outlawed 496 . Mass trials turned into violent, 
bloodthirsty class struggles. As many as 34,400 police officers were persecuted, 
1,200 dead and over 3,600 crippled497. Serious public humiliation was commonly 
seen. In the misdeeds listed by the prosecutor submitted to the trial of the Gang 
of Four, almost 730,000 people were framed and persecuted, 35,000 of them 
dead498. Its impact upon scholars, writers and intellectuals was enormous. Among 
the falsely charged and persecuted were 2,600 workers in literary and art circles,
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142,000 cadres and teachers, 53,000 scientists and technicians from research 
institutes, and 500 (associate) professors in the medical colleges and institutes 
under the Ministry of Public Health499. Through great purge trials and mass 
executions, 3 million cadres within the Chinese bureaucracy were sent to May 7 
Cadre Schools {wuqi ganxiao 5 E l  "b “ P  R ) for physical labour reform, intense 
ideological study and ties with the peasants500.
The Cultural Revolution as a political movement, in both scale and strength, was 
unmatched by any of its predecessors in revolutionary history. Class struggle took 
overwhelming supremacy — as Mao’s idealism gradually devoured even the most 
devoted Marxists and his truly dedicated followers, the rationalist component of 
the mass line was now subject to suppression by an unruling thrust. This was an 
age where populism joined anarchism that defeats law and order. People’s justice, 
much of which was derived from Maoist commitment to mass movements, was 
defeated by Mao’s idealism hungry for mobilisation and participation that quickly 
derailed. One naturally wonders why the fruitful revolutionary tradition of 
balancing law and popular voice, populism and rationalism, informalisation and 
regularisation, collapsed and gave way to unruly extremism. Devouring the 
revolutionary children was in no way intended by this Cultural Revolution that 
aimed at continuing the communist revolution. Why, then, should a revolution 
gain a result contrary to its intention? To get a full appreciation of this, it will be 
necessary to a brief mention of the historical development of Maoism.
The Maoist focus of mass movements (qun^hongyundong not only
provided an important intellectual source for a mature mass line policy, but also 
was the backbone of the communist revolution in the first half of the 20th century. 
It did not, however, come with a snap, but rather with piecemeal development. 
During the 1917-9 period, Mao’s articles mainly illustrated his concern of 
patriotism and militarism, which were later continued. At this period of time, his 
indisposition towards the western or national resources was at best unclear. He 
was mildly anti-traditionalist and a Western-liberalist (not yet a Marxist), mixed 
with influences from Hu Shi. Also, neither proletariat nor peasantry was his focus 
of attention, let alone the core of revolutionary leadership for China (which still
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had to wait nearly another decade to come); rather, his concern was on young 
intellectuals and students, which was reminiscent of the New Left Movement in 
the US or the UK in the 1960s501.
From 1920 to 1921, he developed a dialectics on the masses and political 
movements, holding that a political movement would not be sustainable unless it 
originated from the masses, which further required a strong leadership from a 
political party. Internal spontaneity and external leadership were thereby 
dialectically intertwined and fused. At this period, his admiration for the Russian 
revolution was unequivocal, during which the Leninist inclination to hold on to 
political power had a particular important influence. Although he saw the Russian 
revolution as a forerunner for a successful Chinese revolution, his understanding 
of the proletariat as a concept remained ambiguous and vague.
From the summer of 1921 on, he spent the following two years organising 
workers’ movements in Hunan; the next two years (1923-4) were spent in 
Shanghai in the CCP-GMD United Front; and it was not until 1925-7 that the 
revolutionary potential of the peasant masses was fully realised and became Mao’s 
central focus, in the formation of which his experiences of organising peasants 
movements in Hunan played no small part. His leadership of the Peasant 
Movements Study Institute in Guangzhou from May to September 1926 also 
coincided with massive sending off commissar to assist peasant movements 
nationwide, especially in Hunan. With this transfer of focus from the urban area 
to the countryside, Mao unequivocally asserted that peasant mobilisation was the 
central issue should the Chinese revolution wish to succeed in overthrowing 
traditional feudalism and imperialism.
While it was nothing new to assert that the peasantry must be led by the 
proletariat (asserted by Marx himself), Mao’s contribution lies in mixing the 
proletarian leadership with the overwhelming potentiality of the peasantry. This was 
not only a continuation, but even more, a transformation of his previous dialectics 
on mass movement with an avant-garde leadership, in that both the mass 
movement and the leadership now had already assumed their concrete forms and 
bases in the Chinese context, namely the peasantry and the CCP, while previously
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they were at most ambiguous, unsubstantiated theoretical propositions. Although 
arguably his conviction in proletarian leadership was temporarily shaken during 
1926-7, his unequivocal confidence in the peasantry as the revolutionary backbone 
nonetheless remained as strong as when they were first formulated. Theoretically 
Mao did not challenge the Marxist bias on the proletariat; however, it was not 
until post-1949 period that this bias was truly implemented. In the preceding 
period, it would be difficult not to see where Mao’s true passion lay; his argument 
of proletarian leadership was at most a half-hearted, compromise gesture to quiet 
the orthodox within the Party should they wish to challenge his theory502.
In early 1927, Mao conducted a month-long investigation of peasant 
movements in Hunan, which further reinforced his confidence in the peasantry. 
Just before the CCP-GMD split in summer 1927, Mao had already changed his 
attitude from hope for a pro-peasantry GMD to disappointment. He now 
unambiguously asserted the independent and firm role to be played by the CC He 
should be credited as among the first few who advocated an independent role to 
be played by the CCP in rural areas and the Chinese revolution503.
Still, our central question remains intact so far: with the peasant priority 
determined by 1927, what influence did this priority shed on the judiciary? More 
specifically, how did these influences develop, evolve and transform in the 
following decades?
Mass participation in justice during this period was distinctively marked by a 
sign of terror, which Mao hailed as a necessary price to pay for arousing the 
revolutionary awareness in the countryside. In his 1927 Hunan report, Mao 
recorded ‘big demonstrations’ by which rural masses thronged into local gentry’s 
residence, with pigs slaughtered, grain seized or fines charged. ‘The peasants could 
also now roll themselves over in the exotic bed that belonged to the concubine of 
local bullies’. Parading local bullies with high hats was frequent. The Special 
Tribunal on Ijocal Bullies and Corrupted Gentry was normally a mass rally to execute 
the local bullies. Even Mao acknowledged that the Peasant Associations doing 
whatever they liked created terror (or ‘excesses’ guofen in the countryside.
However, at the same time, Mao argued for such ‘excesses’ as they were inevitably
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violent for one class to overthrow another. They were the energy unleashed by the 
great revolutionary ferment in the countryside, for which ‘there is bound to be a 
short period of terror in every village’. As for executions of local bullies, Mao 
went even further to argue that ‘executing one typical local bully or member of 
evil gentry will shake up the whole county, which will be extremely effective to 
eradicate the feudal remnants’. Moreover, compared with the white terror of 
massive homicide committed by anti-revolutionaries, such a terror of suppressing 
anti-revolutionaries was but normal504.
From this it can be seen that before the mature mass line policy, Mao saw the 
importance of mass mobilisation but went no further. Quoting a Mencius saying 
of an archer teaching archery by fully drawing an arrow powerfully suspended on 
a bow, he argued that the CCP should mobilise the masses but then leave the rest 
to be done completely by the masses alone. This set the undertone for people’s 
justice (and in wider context, the revolutionary policies) during this period: terror 
would be an unmasked and even celebrated birthmark, while the CCP still had a 
long way to go before regularisation of such spontaneities in mass movements, 
which did not arrive until a ripened mass line policy.
It might be convenient for us nowadays to express our regret for Mao’s 
celebration of this spontaneity that led not only to red terror during the 
revolutionary period and a reversal of normalisation in his early reign, but also ten 
years of chaos in the Cultural Revolution and consequently defeat of his idealism 
by Deng’s pragmatism. In its own days, nonetheless, this celebration was equally 
understandable. For Mao, whose subscription to militarism since his early years 
continued throughout his life, it would not be unusual to call for a militaristic 
‘using violence to suppress violence’ (yibao %hibao lU|ji$j!jJ§l)505.
Actually it would be a mistake to assert that Mao’s celebration of this 
spontaneity single-handedly accounted for the chaotic situations in the mass 
mobilisations, as if it enjoyed unchecked freedom without any challenges. As a 
matter of fact, criticism of this celebration was incessant, taking forms ranging 
from open criticism by the GMD in 1921-7, or Li Lisanism and later the 28 
Bolsheviks in the Soviet period, to cloaked revisionism by Ma Xiwu and Liu
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Shaoqi in Yan’an and the early Mao era. Even Mao himself acknowledged such 
mistakes in 1933 and 1940506 and his contempt for law still had to wait another 
three decades to come507. In fact, Mao had always made a threefold separation of 
the classes in China: (1) revolutionary; (2) middle and (3) antirevolutionary. 
Therefore, for him, the policy of magnanimity-harshness {kuanmeng 
§F) was a natural response to treat these different elements. Provided that Mao 
had already foreseen the necessity of differential treatment towards various 
components of the society, how come that unbridled radicalism was still 
commonly seen? One plausible explanation would be the high probability of 
distorted practice when this policy was transferred from central to local 
governments. In its dilution to wider scale for policy implementation, it is not 
unlikely that a dialectical, magnanimity-harshness policy could go awry in its 
downward movement into leaning-to-one-side excesses or even worse, misused 
for the sake of personal vengeance, especially for a government that was 
constandy beset by the problems of understaffing, poor qualifications and 
insufficient resources.
Following Mao’s consolidated power and supremacy within the Party (first 
through the 1934-5 Long March, then through the 1942-3 Great Rectification 
Movement), regularisation in this period had a distinct birthmark of introducing 
Mao’s focus of mass mobilisation into judicial practice. The mature, rationalist 
mass line policy underpinned such regularisation efforts, although this protective 
power still had to wait another quarter of a century for a full manifestation when 
its war with the class struggle imperatives became increasingly fierce. This 
rationalist undertone of a mature mass line policy played no small part in securing 
the rationalists rhetorical power and room for manoeuvre during the post-1949 
political movements.
The mass line as a consummate theory of the revolutionary experiences was 
excellent in its antiformalism, antibureaucratism that sought an alternative to the 
traditional paternal bureaucrats on the one hand while capitalist on the other. 
Attributing the coming of disaster to Mao’s dislike of intellectuals508 lacks not only 
academic sophistication, but also is blind to the fact that Mao himself was an
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intellectual. One naturally wonders why Mao would dislike his own kind and if so, 
how it happened. As a matter of fact, Mao emphasised a reform on intellectuals, 
for which he disliked the unreformed, bourgeois intellectuals rather than the 
whole group of intellectuals per se. As we can see from his following argument,
‘If you want the masses to understand you, you should go into the masses, 
determined to go through a long, even painful training process. Here, I can speak 
of my own experience of changed emotions. I used to be a student and had a 
student habit in the school. I would feel embarrassed to do a little manual labour, 
such as shouldering my own luggage, in front of my fellow students who could 
neither carry weights on their shoulders nor with their hands. At that time, I felt 
that intellectuals were the only clean people in the whole world while workers 
and peasants were dirty. I would wear other intellectuals’ clothes, because I felt 
they were clean; but I wouldn’t wear workers or peasants’ clothes, because I felt 
they were dirty. During the revolution, when I was with the soldiers from 
workers, peasants or revolutionary backgrounds, I came to know them well and 
they, too, came to know me well. It was not until this time and only this time that 
I fundamentally changed my bourgeois and petit bourgeois emotions that I’d 
been taught at bourgeois schools. This time, when I compared again the 
unreformed intellectuals with workers and peasants, I began to feel that the 
[unreformed] intellectuals were not clean. The cleanest were workers and 
peasants. Their hands might be dirty; they might have bull dung on their feet, but 
they are still much cleaner than bourgeois or petit bourgeois intellectuals. I call 
this ‘a change in emotions and perceptions from one class to another’. For art 
workers from intellectual backgrounds, if we want our works to be popular with 
the masses, then we will need to change and reform our emotions and 
perceptions. Without this change, without this reform, nothing can be done and 
nothing can be accepted’509.
This speech clearly shows that Mao was not inimical to the intellectuals as a whole 
group per se, but rather to the self-complacent, unreformed intellectuals with an 
elitist contempt for the masses. This belief in the process of reforming oneself 
through living among the masses also spelt Mao’s dislike of procedural legality. 
Spontaneity of the masses should be not only tolerated, but celebrated. It relied 
less on intellectual-based procedural formalism than on mass-based spontaneity. It 
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accorded with Mao’s antiformalist, antibureaucratist undertone of his mass line 
policy.
Such unrelenting pursuit of getting closer to the masses certainly carried with it a 
hidden tendency of unruly populism and romanticist idealism. For one thing, mass 
participation needed to be structured within a bureaucratic framework so as to 
hold spontaneity in check. Without this balancing force, mass mobilisation could 
easily be hijacked by personal vengeance or slip into mob actions. The unleashed 
energy and revolutionary zealot, if unbridled, could become a self-destructive 
volcano. It was precisely because of this unruly populism that so many devoted 
Marxists became disillusioned. However, for Mao, his revolutionary idealism was 
so overriding that starting from the late 1950s, he found Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping’s pragmatism increasingly irritable. In the 1960s, Mao’s alarm about 
Khrushchev’s revisionist de-Stalinisation in the USSR, as well uprisings in Poland 
and Hungary, started to take a heavy toll. His message of ‘the struggle for ever’ 
became a national slogan. Social class now had to be defined without an actual 
basis in economic relations. As a result, ‘the actual taking of class struggle as the 
“key link” in China without a ground in the economic relations...undermined 
equality as a culture and policy principle of socialism’510.
Reformist Era (1978 onwards)
The death of Mao witnessed a return to pragmatism, formalisation and 
Legalism511. The legal reform assumed almost immediately after Mao’s death, with 
the arrest of the Gang of Four. It culminated in the 1978 Constitution, which was 
further amended significantly in 1982 to restore formal legality. The post-reform 
era stressed pragmatism that presupposes rationality and efficiency, together with 
routinisation and depoliticisation. Mao’s subscription to class struggle was 
substituted by Deng’s exhortation of regularity and institutionalisation. It seemed 
like a 22-year-long detour to return to the rationalisation announced at the 1956 
VIII Party Congress512. However, the spiritual outlook was no longer the same. It 
was argued that ‘the mass base... in the Cultural Revolution became disillusioned
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with the violence and chaos it engendered’513. Mao ‘brought to the surface deep 
cleavages and grievances within Chinese society without creating any mechanisms 
for organising or directing the social forces he unleashed’514. The Cultural 
Revolution taught the Chinese government an important lesson concerning mass 
mobilisation515. Uncontrolled mobilisation can cause disasters and groundless 
persecutions. Therefore, in the reform era, when legal reconstruction was carried 
out, repudiation of Mao’s extremism went hand in hand with a revival of 
rationalism in the revolutionary tradition. Together the reform of people’s justice 
also traced new paths in its course of development. It was not until 1989 and 1992 
that this course started to go off track. We shall look at this development in the 
following discussion.
1978-89 Trial and Error
The decade of 1978-89 was a trial-and-error period, distinctively marked by a 
sense of cautiousness that characterised both the effort to rescue Maoism from 
Mao’s personal errors, as well as to seek a reinvention of the rationalist 
revolutionary tradition while shedding its excesses and extremities. The CCP saw 
it as important to observe the law. A debate in 1979 on this issue was followed by 
a resolution of the Party Central Committee to abolish the pre-1979 practice of 
approval and review of all public prosecutions, as the CCP was determined to 
disengage itself from involvement in routine judicial work516.
Class struggle was dropped, with mass trials now significantly reduced. Gone 
were such extreme practices as staging violent public humiliation, mass accusation 
and the aroused masses shouting for execution. As Bennett remarked, ‘Almost 
everyone in China is regularly involved in one campaign or another...Familiar 
campaign rituals include the study of leading articles in the official press, small 
group discussions of how those articles’ messages apply in local reality, 
specialisation of deviance, criticism and self-criticism of deviant persons and 
public struggle to oppose them and reform them’517. These campaigns in Mao’s 
era often involved terror, violence, public attack and humiliation518, while in 
Deng’s time, although tactics were similar, such as mobilising the mass media in
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disseminating public policies and organising small discussion groups at local levels, 
mass rallies and staged public events were considerably reduced519.
Moreover, the mass trial was limited to public trials or the verdicts 
pronouncement. The court was now in firm control, which was regarded as 
indispensable to contain the vices that such mass trials could easily slip into. The 
focus was shifted to maximising the educative role and group pressures of mass 
trials. In a 1979 real estate dispute that dragged on due to the defendant’s refusal 
to abide by the court’s decision, after consulting the local danrni and urban street 
organisation, a mass trial was held and attended by over 350. At this trial, the 
court decisions were announced, with Fan the defendant criticised for refusing to 
abide by the verdict. It was also announced that Fan would be detained for 15 
days at the local police station. When punished, Fan acknowledged his mistake 
and wrote to his family to arrange moving out. The audience voiced their 
satisfaction, arguing that the law’s confidence had been enhanced and the people’s 
interest better protected. This mass trial also ‘educated’ other recalcitrants. One by 
one, four more parties accepted the court’s decisions that they had refused. Li 
Shuming who similarly occupied a workmate’s room by force, moved out 
immediately. As he remarked, ‘Originally I thought that it did not matter to 
occupy a room. Now I have been educated by the court. I will abide by the law’. 
Han Zhengying a local worker commented, ‘It is good to enhance the law’s 
confidence. Justice has been done and the masses’ interest protected520.
The rationalist mass line retained its significance, as Article 3 of the 1982 
Constitution of the CCP read, ‘the Party... [should] maintain close ties with the 
masses, propagate the Party’s views among them...help raise their political 
consciousness, and defend their legitimate rights and interests’. In the early 1980s, 
the mass line called for the police to work closely with nationwide institutions, 
such as the government, factories, enterprises, schools, neighbourhoods, in order 
to maintain public order and ‘prevent, reduce and forestall crimes’ 521 . 
Regurgitating Mao’s metaphor of fish and water522, the training institution taught 
that ‘the people’s police are the servants of the people’ and that ‘they must listen 
to the people and accept their supervision’523. Lei Feng as a national model was
129
reinstated, together with the re-emerging ‘Love the People Month’524, during 
which the police went out to do good deeds, attending to the aged, infirm and 
single residents. An exceptional performer may be rewarded with the honour of 
‘Lei Feng People’s Policeman’525.
The practices of people’s lawyer, people’s jurors, on-the-spot investigations and 
persuasions were all reinstated. After the Cultural Revolution, state-owned and — 
run legal advice offices were re-established under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Justice and its affiliates. The 1980 Provisional Regulation on People’s Lanyers 
regarded lawyers as state legal workers with obligations to protect socialism and 
state interests. From 1979, the Ministry of Justice established legal service offices 
(faliifuwuchu f t i n  rural areas staffed by ‘barefoot lawyers’, who actively 
promoted the village mediation committees526.
As usual, the people’s jurors could be elected, selected or invited from the 
masses527. In a report just after the Cultural Revolution, it was reiterated that in 
varying circumstances, a civil trial at the court of first instance could be attended 
by either the jury elected by the masses at the grassroots level or through 
temporarily inviting the masses’ delegates from the danmi of both plaintiff and 
defendant, which was mainly done by means of consulting the danmi. Also, the 
criteria for recruiting such masses’ jurors were also stressed, as they should be 
‘incorruptible, impartially righteous, no relative to the litigants, have a close 
contact with the masses, and abide by the Constitution and laws’528.
In Guangxi Province, the jurors were elected by local congresses. The 12 
communes of Zhongshan County had elected 96 jurors, 42 female. On average, 
each commune had elected 4 to 8 jurors. Among these jurors, 25 were 
government employees, 13 village cadres, and 19 commoners from the masses. In 
terms of age, there were 36 jurors at an age between 23 and 35, 57 at an age 
between 36 and 50 and 3 at an age over 50. Educationwise, 48 were educated to 
the level of secondary school, 31 to the level of senior primary school and 17 to 
the level of junior primary school. Apart from these 12 communes, the 
government agencies, Pinggui Mine and populous mines and factories had also 
elected their people’s jurors. In real practice, the election might have been
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different from one commune to another. For instance, at Wanggao Commune, 14 
juror candidates were first proposed to the chair committee. After checking the 
election criteria, 8 candidates were finalised for the election and they were all 
elected. At Shilong Commune, the election was more competitive, as there was no 
pre-election screening as at the Wanggao Commune. The juror candidates were 
directly put to the vote through secret ballots and the candidates outnumbered the 
posts available529. Despite these differences, it could be seen that the people’s jury 
had been revived and the government was determined to systemise the public 
voice through taking the people’s jury on board, through either invitation or 
election.
In Jiangsu, as the local congress was not opened, the jurors were not elected but 
invited temporarily. In the 6 trials, 8 jurors were invited, including a worker, a 
peasant, a retired teacher, cadres from village, urban streets and entrepreneurial 
danwei. The popularity of the people’s juror not only came from their personal 
character, but also from their hard work. For instance, Yuan Yixi was a retired 
teacher from Dongtai Town. Despite his age of 70, he showed no sign of decay of 
vitality and was working hard. He was examining the documents, inspecting the 
scene, raising questions, taking notes, questioning the litigants, and commenting in 
a fair manner. Thereby he was quite welcome amongst the masses. Normally 
during investigations, the jurors were accompanying the judges to collect 
evidences, attend various discussions, investigate with litigants, insiders, relatives 
and witnesses, and canvass opinions and information from the masses. For 
instance, in a real estate inheritance dispute, the jurors, together with the judges, 
visited 12 darnvei, travelled over 180km, collected information from the witnesses 
and insiders 41 times and prepared 35 supporting materials. This hard work 
enabled the judges and jurors to elucidate the history of the ownership change of 
the house as well as opinions from every aspect, including the masses. It thus laid 
a solid basis for satisfactorily solving the dispute530.
Similarly, in Tianjin, the participation of people’s jurors in a divorce case had 
helped to solve the case effectively. During the trial, Wang Shurong the people’s 
juror first remarked, ‘Through my investigations in the past few days, the
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relationship between Liu Yibin and Qi Heping was truly broken and there was no 
chance of recovering this marriage. According to the Family Law, I agree that they 
divorce’. Wang Xiuzhen, the other juror, concurred in this opinion, adding that a 
watch should be returned to the husband. This case was thus solved satisfactorily 
and effectively. In a later report, the court commented that the people’s jury had 
gready helped to effectively solve several cases simultaneously531.
Concurrently, on-the-spot investigations and persuasions were revitalised. It was 
not uncommon to read in newspapers about how judges (with people’s jurors or 
judicial assistants, if any) tirelessly went to local communities, rural and urban alike, 
to collect evidence, learn facts, investigate on the spot and carry out patient, 
punctilious investigations. The Ma Xiwu Style continued to be a state of art for 
judicial work in the reform’s era, as we can see from the following case:
There was an appealed divorce case of Guo Yulian vs. Zhao Laixi. As their 
marriage was arranged by parents, they were not emotionally attached to each 
other. The marriage was no more than a registration, for which the wife insisted 
upon divorce. Her claim was supported by the court of first instance, to which 
the husband appealed. Through investigations, the appellate court learned that 
apart from the husband who was dissatisfied with a divorce verdict, more 
importantly, he gained support from the commune and village cadres who held in 
consensus that they not divorce. The appellate court came to the village and 
mobilised the commune and village cadres to mediate between the couple. After 
many repeated but aborted attempts at mediation, the local cadres and masses 
realised that their marriage was truly broken. Henceforth, they turned to support 
the court’s verdict of divorce and helped to dissuade the husband from further 
appeals, making the latter realise that marriage would be impossible unless 
voluntarily532.
In this case, it was interesting to see that instead of forcing the verdict upon the 
husband, the court at first tried to persuade local cadres, to make the latter realise 
that it was impossible to mediate between the two. For one thing, with the 
support from the local cadres, the husband, even if he lost the case for a second 
time at the appellate court, might still have refused to abide by the verdict. He 
might even have started complaining to higher authorities by letters or visits. This
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would certainly have rendered the situation difficult and made the case drag on. 
Therefore, the court, instead of forcing the verdict upon the plaintiff, first 
cultivated public opinion to become favourable to the court’s verdict. When the 
public realised the impossibility of mediation, the time was ripe, as the court’s 
verdict had gained local public support. In the end, it was not the court, but the 
local cadres and masses who talked the husband into abiding by the verdict. This 
result was much better than, say, if the court had forced the husband to accept the 
verdict.
Moreover, this Ma Xiwu Style of making full contact with the masses for their 
opinions so as to facilitate judicial work not only applied in the countryside, but 
also in urban areas.
In the appealed divorce case of Tian Jingxia vs. Cao Yunhu, the appellate court 
successfully mediated a dispute that had been dragging on for 3 years. Cao 
Yunhu was a worker at a metallurgy factory, while Tian Jingxia was a teacher at 
an adult education school. In January, 1975, they met upon introduction and later 
married voluntarily. At first they got along with each other fairly well. The wife 
always took good care of her husband. No matter how late he got back from 
work, the wife would always get up to prepare some food that he liked. Though 
they had quarrels sometimes, this did not negatively influence their relationship. 
In 1975, when the wife was having a C-operation, she complained that Cao did 
not take good care of her which sowed seeds for further disputes. In 1976, when 
Tangshan experienced a terrible earthquake, Cao was working on a night shift 
and after the earthquake, instead of coming home to see his wife and child first, 
he went instead to see his sister. This severely affected his wife emotionally and 
their relationship deteriorated. After this they lived separately. Cao gave Tian ¥20 
every month to raise their child. Later, he stopped giving Tian the money after a 
quarrel with his mother-in-law. For this, Tian brought Cao to court for divorce. 
The court’s mediation effort resulted in vain. So it ruled in support of divorce. 
When it was appealed, the appellate court not only carefully examined the files 
and documentations, but investigated among the masses and consulted the danwei 
of both parties. It was found that the officers in both danwei were critical of the 
other as they only listened to partial information told by their employees.
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For this reason, the court invited both danwets officers together. Apart from 
briefing the case details, the court arranged for them to listen in full to the 
presentations of both parties and then invited them to examine the relationship 
and the possibility of mediating the couple. The wife was a teacher, highly 
educated and well treated by her natal family; while the husband was a worker 
poorly-educated and handling family issues simplistically. There was a gap 
between the two in terms of their education, living habits, character and 
personality. All the same, the couple had certain good points to be said in favour 
of their relationship. As they voluntarily entered into the marriage and they got 
along well for a time, this had laid a solid basis for their relationship. The real 
cause of the dispute lay mainly in the husband’s simplistic handling of family 
issues, which made the wife feel that she did not have support, love and 
assistance from the husband. Therefore, the appellate court reflected that there 
was still a high chance of recovering the couple’s relationship, as long as they 
appreciated more the merits of each other, corrected their mistakes, stood 
together and made efforts. With the assistance from the masses and both danwei, 
the court had conversations with both parties during which their merits and 
demerits were all pointed out. The parties also self-criticised - the husband 
admitted wrong on his unreasonable ways of handling family issues, while the 
wife confirmed that she would forget what had happened and re-build their 
relationship. Through revisits (huifang\!]#/), the mediation achieved a satisfactory 
effect where the family relationship was enhanced. They were deeply grateful, 
‘Our small family would not have been reunited without the comrades’ help. We 
can describe no more! In return we will work hard...to pay back everybody’s 
kindness’533.
In this case, the public opinions at first were divided, as the leaders from both 
danwei only listened partially to what was told to them by their employees. For this, 
no consensus existed in the public towards maintaining the relationship between 
the couple. Partially for this reason, the case dragged on for 3 years, as can be seen 
from the futile attempts at mediation by the court of first instance. When it came 
to the appellate court, instead of focusing only on the litigants, it set out to 
cultivate public opinion. Therefore, the leaders from both danwei were invited for 
presentations from both husband and wife. Then the court chaired a discussion to
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analyse both strengths and shortcomings in the relationship. After this discussion, 
a public consensus slowly emerged: that there was a high chance to recover the 
relationship. By this, the couple should be mediated. Although the court took a 
low profile in remarking that ‘with the assistance from the masses and both danrnf, 
in reality the court must have consulted the relatives, friends and supervisors of 
both litigants so as to mobilise them into carrying out persuasion on both parties. 
As the court analysed, W e have to trust and rely upon the masses.. .and the danwei 
of both plaintiff and defendant. They should be duly informed in detail of the 
cases. The leaders of grassroots danwei know their employees much better, 
regarding their living conditions and how they feel. In return, the cadres and 
employees also quite respect their leaders’ opinions’534.
This case also shows that in addition to on-the-spot investigations and 
persuasions, a new practice of revisit was written into the law. The court could 
select certain cases for revisit, so as to assure the quality of adjudication, especially 
those complex, high-profile cases. After a period of time, the court would revisit 
to collect feedback from the litigants, grassroots organisations and the masses. By 
this, the quality of adjudication, enforcement and handling could be assured535.
The experience of legal education campaigns as in Mao’s early era was reinstated 
as well. Well aware of the GMD mistake of promulgating laws that failed to 
achieve public acceptance, the CCP made tremendous efforts to disseminate legal 
knowledge536. In 1949-66, a large number of small pamphlets in simple, colloquial 
terms were published, distributed and designed to familiarise the masses with the 
new laws, decrees and other legal policies. Among the published and distributed 
were 200,000 copies of a Handbook of Haws and Regulations Applicable to Villages and
30,000 copies of a Handbook of Haws and Regulations Applicable to Commerce™. In 
1953 alone, 3 million cadres were mobilised to mount a mass movement to study 
the Marriage Law; dissemination was wider than the Constitution in 1954, as 
millions of pamphlets were distributed; the Law avoided legal jargon as much as 
possible for a direct appeal to the lay masses538.
In the reformist age, Zhu Jianming the Deputy Minister of Justice reiterated the 
role of legal campaigns as ‘educating the people so that they will know and
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enforce the law’539. Reinstated in 1979, the Ministry of Justice established a Legal 
Education and Publicity Department. In Jiangsu, 302,000 pamphlets were 
distributed, together with 600,000 hig character posters’ prepared by the Ministry 
of Justice. Within the bureaucracy of the people’s courts a legal information office 
was established. Legal personnel, such as judges, prosecutors and police were sent 
to give speeches, disseminate legal materials and make public appearances in local 
communities, reformatories and prisons to explain the law and legal system. Legal 
education was incorporated in public schools, factories and other work units540. 
Legal exhibits, operas, children’s songs and group discussions were used to spread 
knowledge of the law541. In June 1985, the Ministry announced a new five-year 
plan of a legal education campaign, which was later recognised by the NPC 
Standing Committee542. The implementation of this programme has involved 
massive participation from every area of the society since 1986543.
Also, starting in the 1980s, the Chinese leadership was now determined to create 
‘a more systematic, professional, and comprehensive approach in extra-judicial 
mediation work’544. The emphases were placed upon the following elements: (1) 
protecting basic principles of legal equality and linkage of rights and duties; (2) 
disseminating legal knowledge; (3) improving social morality by strengthening 
‘spiritual civilisation’; (4) promoting local pacts; (5) acting as a democratic 
institution. By ‘democratic’, it means that mediator could be elected, the process 
was voluntary and much reliance was placed upon persuasion rather than force 
and coercion545. Following these objectives, systematic efforts were made to 
revitalise the mediation system by improving the standards of mediation work, 
raising the status of mediators, expanding their number and introducing systems 
of payment for mediators. More emphases were placed on mediators’ educational 
background and personality. As a result, people with a lot o f experiences (retired 
teachers, workers, cadres), or from relatively better-off family background 
(wealthier, having a stable family life and considerably prestigious among the 
locals), or professionals (lawyers). There was a concern to upgrade ‘the quality of 
professional work’ (yewu suzhi) and ‘mediation abilities’ (tiaojie nengli), as shown 
in the training of a Lanzhou case: ‘...the local Department of Justice conducts
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monthly professional work meetings for those personas hold positions of 
responsibility on mediation committees. The meetings enable mediators to 
broaden their knowledge of the law. The Department also regularly organises 
visits to court for mediators in order that they may observe and learn from the 
proceedings. This improves their understanding of policy and law as well as the 
quality of their professional work’546.
The development towards of the end of the 1980s took the whole nation on to a 
derailed track. Corruption went hand in hand with the withdrawal of (central) state 
commitment to many public services. Consequendy, social conditions deteriorated, 
which was further acerbated by soaring inflation. It led to the 1989 student protest, 
joined by workers, urban residents, teachers and bureaucrats547. In terms of the 
legal development, legal protection of civil liberty was increasingly restricted. The 
1978 Constitution was seen as a compromise between the liberal 1954 
Constitution and the Maoist 1975 Constitution548. In 1982, amendments to the 
Constitution removed the ‘four big freedoms’, as lessons learned from the 
destructive ‘campaign politics’. However, that meant the task of instituting free 
thinking, political criticism and popular participation were thrown out together 
with the revolutionary legacy549 .For instance, the right to demonstration and 
assembly in the 1982 Constitution was restricted further by a series of laws and 
regulations550, following the 1989 demonstrations in Lhasa and Beijing551.
1992 onwards: Derailed Marketisation, Further Formalisation and 
the Rise of Modern Media
1989 is an important year in the course of the Chinese reform, which was 
temporarily called to a halt, with an emerged second nationwide debate on 
reform552. This could have been a perfect chance to address the social problems 
brought about by the reform; unfortunately, the state turned to further 
liberalisation and an even stronger single-minded Developmentalism in 1992. 
Necessarily, Deng’s famous metaphor of a black and white cat sent chills down
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humanist spines as it denoted a nearly-authoritarian, indisputable emphasis on 
development.
Thus the reform was resumed, this time with an increasingly inhumane footing 
that turned impatient and insatiable for development. Law, regarded as a 
safeguard of market economy, was pushed ahead with single-minded legalisation 
without taking into consideration much of the social reality. People’s justice 
moved towards formalisation without rescuing the genuine revolutionary efforts 
to bring justice to the people. Between 1992 and 1999, this single-minded 
formalisation gained its strongest momentum.
First, the people’s lawyer system gradually fell asunder, where the state 
encouraged privatisation of the practice of law. This brought a mixed result: the 
newly gained independence spurred incentives to professional qualifications while 
lack of supervision led to rampant corruption. In the beginning of the 1990s, over
40.000 individuals were licensed to practise law in 4,000 law offices, with 15,000 
working in 5,000 notary offices, and 100,000 para-professionals working in the
32.000 legal service centres throughout the countryside. These were largely state- 
owned and —operated. Since 1992, the Ministry of Justice redefined its role as 
‘macro-administrative’ rather than for daily routines, which was then delegated to 
provincial bureaus and the All-China Lawyers Associations. The state started 
encouraging departure from government, consequently resulting in co-operative 
law firms mushrooming in China. Amid this newly-gained independence, the 
worrying concern over professional responsibility surfaced, as seen in lawyers 
blatandy bribing officials and judges and the spawning cronyism in the judge- 
turned-lawyer phenomenon. This problem was evident in the series of Ministry of 
Justice resolutions calling for professional ethic standards in legal service, which 
would otherwise be unnecessary should there be no such problems of 
‘professional decay’553.
Law-making was greatly spurred in this period. From the following table, it can 
be seen that the laws made at various levels in the 5-year period alone between 
1993 and March 1998, accounted for nearly 40% of all the laws made in the two 
decades from 1978 to 1998. Such a ‘fast track’ of legal development may be
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welcomed by commentators 554. However, it should not belie the problems 
associated with this process: with formalisation stressed as the supreme value, the 
people, as an adjective to define justice’s essence, now became increasingly obsolete. 
The people’s justice was discredited together with the repudiation of Mao’s 
idealism, while simultaneously an unbounded admiration for the Euro-American 
legal system gained popular currency among jurists and lawmakers, scholars and 
bureaucrats alike.
Table 1: Lawmaking during 1993-8555
1978-March 1,1998 1993-March 1,1998
NPC, NPCSC 233 laws, 94 law- 
related directives
85 laws, 32 law- 
related directives
Local People’s Congresses n /a 8,000
SC-proposed acts at NPC, 
NPCSC
170 66
SC-made 795 198
Ministries, commissions of the 
SC; local governments
26,000 5,000
While the state continually withdrew its commitment to many public services, 
and a judiciary increasingly aloof from the populace under the slogan of 
formalisation and ‘relink with international standards’, the mass media, as a fourth 
power, arose to channel public voices and mass participation. Bringing justice to 
the masses, irrespective of the judiciary’s will, had taken up new channels provided 
by the mass media. We shall have a brief review of the role played by the mass 
media in the history of people’s justice.
Before the popularity of TV and the Internet, newspapers as a means of mass 
participation played an important role in channelling public voices in the people’s 
justice, for the communist revolution had a long tradition of pooling opinions in 
the lawmaking process. A law in China was first drafted through summarisation of 
past experiences; then, the CCP would solicit and instil into the drafts the 
opinions from the masses and state organs’ discussion and revision. Some drafts
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were disseminated down to county and township for extensive mass discussion556. 
The 1934 CSR Draft Statute on Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries, for 
instance, was drafted by the Central People’s Commissar of Justice and circulated 
to governmental departments at various levels and mass groups for their 
opinions557. In the spring of 1950, the Law Codification Committee of the Central 
Government was preparing a fundamental law on the organisation of a judicial 
system; a few months later, it was submitted to the First National Judicial 
Conference for discussion; then it was reported by official newspapers (especially 
the "People's Daily) for wider circulation and solicitation of opinions; finally it was 
adopted in 195 1 558.
The 1954 Constitution was nationally debated and newspapers played an 
important role in channelling opinions in both upward and downward directions. 
About 8,000 experts and individuals made over 50,000 proposals, of which more 
than 100 were adopted. The draft was published in the People’s Daily, attracted 
national attention and open discussion for three months. Over 150 million 
participants at grassroots level were involved, with 1.18 million suggestions 
submitted. The whole process took a year and a half559. In 1954-62, this frequent 
resort to nationwide discussions of major legislation even received special 
attention in the Soviet legal literature that eulogised certain aspects of ‘Chinese 
accomplishments ’56°.
Apart from channelling mass participation in lawmaking, the newspapers were 
also channelling public discussions on a series of legal matters. For instance, the 
People's Daily played an active role in the discussion of defacto marriage in China in 
1951-3561. They also published complaints and wrong decisions that could press 
the courts to redress. A rape victim in Shanghai wrote her appeal directly to the 
Uberation Daily. Upon publication, this case solicited public criticism, under which 
pressure the court sentenced the accused to jail and conducted a self-criticism of 
‘bureaucratism’. In another case a father was forced to commit suicide by local 
cadres in a village in Hubei. After years of futile efforts of complaining in the 
court system, the son reported to the Hubei Daily. Upon this exposure, the 
provincial CCP Committee intervened and had it properly dealt with. The
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People’s Daily published a case of a peasant woman wrongfully imprisoned three 
times that put the court in Sichuan under heavy public criticism562.
During the Cultural Revolution, the newspaper ceased to channel public voices, 
as it was reduced to a loudspeaker for the Gang of Four. In the overwhelming 
imperative of class struggle, genuine critical discussions were replaced by leaning- 
to-one-side revolutionary comments that masked personal gains and celebrated 
public violence. In general, the Chinese media were effective in conveying political 
information 563 , albeit with decreased trust due to the chaotic and violent 
conditions564. Liberalisation starting in 1978 gave rise to a regained trust of media 
amongst the audience, although the latter still remain guarded565. In 1978-80, 
newspapers played an important role in channelling a nationwide open discussion 
of democracy, abundant with self-criticism for past wrongdoings and proposals 
for ‘building a highly civilised and highly democratic China’566. In 1986, the mass 
media, such as newspapers, magazines, films, television, played an active role in 
the legal education campaign. The autumn of 1987, for instance, witnessed the 
beginning of a series of law programmes on television567.
The development of mass media since 1978, however, followed a dual course 
that demonstrated contradictory complexities, as liberalisation and restriction went 
hand in hand. The 1978-80 ‘Democracy Wall’ represented a short period when the 
offices joined forces with the streets, ‘as if two groups were calling to each other 
across an alpine valley’568. However, the CCP shifted policy and banned the 
Democracy Wall in 1980, due to a conviction of self-transformation rather than 
being pushed by external challenges, which was reminiscent of Mao’s retreat from 
the Hundred Flowers campaign in the autumn of 1957. This conviction was 
reinforced in the 1989 student protest, as well as in the 1991 collapse of the 
former USSR, for which the CCP now sought legitimacy through market reform, 
nationalism, patriotism, cultural civilisation instead of democratisation and 
political renovation569. As a matter of fact, the ethnocentric and essentialist 
fallacies of such civilisational substitution are easily detectable and ‘nothing is 
sufficient [for democratic stability] but sound public policies arrived at through 
extensive participation and rational deliberation’570.
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The setback of media freedom culminated during 1989-92 and gradually relaxed 
from 1993, following Deng’s Southern Tour that encouraged further liberalisation. 
The setback from mid-1980s to 1992 also taught the Chinese news media a lesson: 
certain sensitive topics (such as the Party dictatorship) would better be left 
unprovoked. Recovering from this setback, the Chinese media now shifted their 
focus to channelling public voices concentrated on social problems brought about 
by derailed Marketisation and they paid special attention to vulnerable, 
underprivileged social groups, such as layoffs and migrant workers. From 1993-9, 
the newspaper and TV mainly pegged their attention to social injustice and 
miscarriages of justice as a result of corruption, localism or abuses of power. For 
cases that caused sensation throughout the nation, the court would have to bend 
the law to answer public indignation. In 1993, national newspapers uncovered the 
death of a peasant who was tortured by local police due to his complaint to 
superior officials about over-taxation, which triggered a series of reactions from 
the Party Central Committee and State Council to issue regulations forbidding 
over-taxation571. Seven years later, national newspapers uncovered the unhappy 
fate of a grieved policeman who sentenced to death after he was tortured to 
extract a murder confession. This grievance was not cleared until the real 
murderer was found two years later. This news coverage received national 
attention, fanning a national call for protection of civil rights while condemning 
the ill practice of torture for extracting confessions. The PRC Supreme 
Procuratorate quickly responded by circulating nationwide a resolution to caution 
the procuratorate against admitting extracted confessions as evidence572. Focus, a 
famous CCTV programme, often reported wrong decisions by local courts that 
triggered corrective reactions from the local judiciary and government. In this 
period, TV and newspapers reinforced each other to bring public voices into the 
judicial process. We will turn to a case below to see how newspapers channelled 
public voices in judicial processes.
On August 24, 1997, Zhang Jinzhu a drunken local policeman committed an 
appalling traffic accident when driving a police patrol car, killing a father and son. 
The Great Henan Daily, a local newspaper, reported this accident consecutively
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on August 25, 26 and then on August 28 and September 2, which immediately 
triggered a public call for severely punishing Zhang Jinzhu. By 10 o’clock on the 
morning of August 26, there were more than 600 calls to the newspaper hotline, 
and the angry readers all expressed their indignation and criticism of Zhang Jinzhu. 
From the different walks interviewed by the newspaper, such as the Women’s 
Association, the Municipal Government of Zhengzhou, the Provincial Party 
School and individuals, a uniform voice was heard, ‘Zhang Jinzhu, as a police 
officer, is a law-enforcer who is supposed to observe the law. He should be 
severely punished’. ‘How cruelly malicious it is to cause a traffic accident and then 
drag the victim off non-stop for more than 1,000 metres!’ At the same time, other 
local news media, like Zhengzhou Evening, Zhengzhou Radio and Zhengzhou 
TV Station also joined to cover the accident.
The report by South Weekend, a well-respected national journal, altered the course 
of development, as this accident now was exposed as a national scandal. On the 
afternoon of publishing the news report, the office of South Weekend received 
numerous phone calls and mails from angry readers demanding Zhang Jinzhu be 
executed. On October 13, Focus also made a full coverage of this accident. By this 
time, public anger reached its peak on national scale.
A series of actions were taken to appease the hurt public morals in this national 
disaster. On October 16, Wang Minyi, the head of Police Department, Henan 
Province condemned Zhang Jinzhu within an internal meeting and he pointed out 
that ‘the notorious case of Zhang Jinzhu’s traffic accident had been an 
extraordinary crime committed by a police officer, who was guilty by both the 
State Law and the Reason of Heaven’. In this meeting, Zhang Jinzhu had his 
membership and job revoked by the Provincial Police Department, which was 
later confirmed by a decision report of the Municipal Police Department of 
Zhengzhou City. On December 3, the trial was opened at the Zhengzhou 
Intermediate Court. The court was full. In addition, a few hundred people were 
standing outside. By 8 a.m., the number had reached a thousand. Protest slogans 
like ‘Execute the Corrupted Police Officer’ were shown by the crowd, who were 
joined by hundreds of journalists and news reporters.
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On January 12, 1998, a decision was reached. As the court wrote, ‘Zhang 
Jinzhu’s cruelty has led to grave social effect, for which very reason the public 
indignation would not be appeased unless he was executed...Zhang Jinzhu is 
thereby sentenced to death...’ This sentence was later confirmed by the Provincial 
High Court on February 26, 1998. On the same day, he was executed573.
In this case, apparently Zhang Jinzhu had committed the crime of traffic 
disturbance (jiaotong %haoshi %ui ■(-!?), with a maximum penalty of 7-year
imprisonment574. Such a penalty expectedly would not appease the public anger 
that had unanimously condemned the offender, as he drove the victim 1.5km 
along under the car. Even at a glimpse this case would arouse great public agony. 
Moreover, it was committed by a policeman, drunken and driving a police car. He 
had accorded to the image of a corrupted, abusive public officer that was bitterly 
‘popular* in the media memory. It occurred at a time when public discontent of 
the government was continuously on the rise due to the enormity of social 
problems that this derailed Marketisation had engendered. Zhang Jinzhu, above all, 
became the tip o f a volcano that could erupt fires, criticisms and even violence at 
any moment. Within a society pregnant with a large, swelling class of the 
disillusioned, impoverished and marginalised, Zhang Jinzhu’s case provided a 
chance for the pent-up public discontent to be unleashed. The avalanche of 
criticism of a drunken police officer committing a terrible accident accorded to 
the public anger over the arrogant, bureaucratic, corrupted public officers, who 
were increasingly negligent of attending to public good. In the midst of all these 
miseries, frustrations and anger, a public call for execution became terrifyingly 
understandable. A 7-year imprisonment would have aroused a new round of 
condemnation of a weak, inhumane government turning a deaf ear to public 
voices. It would be a cost that no public propaganda could afford, especially in the 
CCP’s efforts to reconstruct confidence among the populace about its governance 
capacity.
Therefore, the court sought additional circumstances that could lead to the 
death penalty, on which chessboard intentional injuring was ushered in, as Zhang 
Jinzhu dragged the victim under the wheel for a distance more than 1.5km.
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Although he defended himself that in a drunken state he could by no means 
detect a victim under the wheel, this was not admitted by the court that insisted 
on intentional injuring, as he should have been aware of the victim screaming and 
shouting under the wheel when being dragged along575. Combining these two 
crimes together, Zhang Jinzhu was sentenced to the death penalty. Upon hearing 
the decision, the victim’s family shouted at the court in tears ‘Long Live the Law!’ 
Also, the attendants gave an ovation for this decision576. Finally, public anger was 
appeased, with the confidence in law restored. A public relations crisis was 
resolved with peace and accord.
Now, we will turn to another case where TV played a major role:
In January, 1999, when I was an undergraduate in Chongqing, Rainbow Bridge, 
a recently-constructed local bridge, suddenly collapsed, claiming 40 lives and 
injuring 14. When reported, this case immediately attracted national attention. Full 
investigation was swiftly followed and Lin Shiyuan — the party secretary of local 
county was uncovered as the major cause of the disaster. During the two and a 
half years from 1994 to 1996, Lin Shiyuan accepted a bribe of ¥110,000 and 
contracted the bridge project to a construction company without qualifications. 
The company, in return, substituted quality materials with low-quality ones and 
even counterfeits, which resulted in a large fissure once the bridge was put to use. 
Even with this fissure, government officials did not carry out the duty of quality 
inspection but insisted that the bridge was safe enough until in the end, the bridge 
collapsed.
Such a grave disaster attracted national attention immediately, with TV and 
newspapers joining hands to report the progress. A series of central government 
agencies, such as the Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Transport, the State 
Council swiftly issued regulations on construction quality assurance, while the 
local government set out to detain the involved officials. CCTV, the official TV 
station with national authority, decided to broadcast the whole trial process. When 
it opened on March 26, 1999, the 17-hour trial was fully under TV cameras, and 
transmitted instantly throughout the nation. On campus, students thronged in 
front of TV screens displayed publicly; while outside in the city, many local
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citizens gathered around TV screens to watch this trial. Popular TV programmes, 
like talk shows, interviews, together with numerous hotlines, followed to channel 
public opinions. In a week’s time, a death sentence was reached577.
Picture 2 the TV Camera and the court of Rainbow Bridge Trial on March 
26, 1999578
Again, this case, when under the spotlight nationwide, ceased to be an individual 
case of the so-called ‘beancurd-gross’ projects {douju^ha gongcheng^L^XfiZLjM). It 
gained legal and political significance the moment it was put into the media 
spotlight. It became, in other words, a showcase where even a tiny error would 
lead to a political or legal thunderstorm.
The coming of TV cameras had undoubtedly exerted enormous pressures on 
the judges within the collegiate panel, who were ridiculed, criticised or commented 
even by a smallest fraction in their chairmanship o f the court. This pressure, both 
from the public and the top officials, had bound the judges to balance both legal 
sanction and moral imperative. As a matter of fact, if judged by the amount of 
bribery alone, Lin Shiyuan should under no circumstance receive a death 
penalty579 , as ¥110,000 was at most trivial when compared with the death 
sentences of corrupted officials involving tens or hundreds (and even thousands 
in some extreme case) of millions580. It was indeed one of the defence points 
raised by Lin Shiyuan’s defence counsel, but admitting it would have been 
regarded as scandalous for the court, as the court could not have been blind to the 
hurt public morals in the death and injuries caused. The bribe was insignificant
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numerically, but the value of 40 lives was priceless. A moral imperative of death 
sentence thus worked its way into the judicial considerations of facts and penalty 
in this case. In the end, he received a death penalty, which again received applause 
from the audience, both within the court and without.
It would be romantic idealism to imagine that the media had successfully 
channelled public voices in all cases. The abovementioned cases only testified that 
upon continuous withdrawal of state commitment to the public good and people’s 
wellbeing, where the revolutionary tradition of bringing justice closer to the 
masses faded in derailed Marketisation and single-minded Developmentalism, the 
modern media arose to fill some of the vacuum left by the state’s withdrawal. For 
a country where illiteracy remained high and channels of voices constantly 
restricted, media freedom was also placed under tight control. Although it would 
be unrealistic to imagine the mass media had always been successful, nonetheless 
their role to provide a space for vox pop is not readily dismissible. The heavy 
censorship and party scrutiny had indeed to a certain extent dampened the media 
enthusiasm. This situation, however, has been profoundly modified with the 
coming age of the Internet.
2003: Rise of the Internet
Like the year of 1989, 1999 was also a year to be marked in the history of China. 
The crackdown on Falungong geared the state towards a tighter control of society, 
on a path that further diverted it away from its tradition of being close to the 
masses. When Hu Jintao of the fourth generation of leadership came to power in 
2003, there were also efforts to tighten the control over the Internet, coupled with 
the purge of a few editor-in-chiefs of Icepoint and South Weekend, two liberal, 
vociferous weekly journals.
Similarly, contradictory complexity manifested itself, as the Internet rose to
prominence in channelling public opinions from 1999. By 2003, there were 86
million registered email users; by 2004, the number exceeded 100 million. A
swelling class of netizens (Internet users) had created a space with greater freedom
than the traditional mass media could afford. Literally, the passive receiving roles
played by readers or viewers in the paper- or TV-based mass media passed off to 
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an active function, where literally every individual could become an information 
provider. The Internet could also be a space to mobilise appeals to the 
government for protection, correction or participation, as in the case of the laid- 
off workers in Daqing and Liaoyang who went online to mobilise support581. This 
does not mean that traditional media such as TV and newspapers became 
completely outdated and obsolete in the current age of the Internet, but rather the 
Internet joined hands with TV and newspapers as a means of modern 
communication to channel public opinions and enlist mass participations. For 
instance, selling the SOEs in the 1990s quickly became problematic in that many 
state firms, including those profitable and well-managed, were sold out through 
‘insider deals’, resulting in a large proportion of the state assets flowing to 
corrupted officials and guanxi (cronyism) dealers582. The central state took actions 
to stop this trend583, but it was not until Harry Xianping Lang, a Hong Kong 
economist revealed these details that heated public debates in newspapers and 
Internet discussions were aroused. This media protest pressured the State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission to halt the process at the end of 
2004584.
The Party had realised its weakness in censoring the Internet in a way that it had 
done with the traditional mass media. Finding it increasingly impossible to shut 
down the Internet, the Party, either willingly or otherwise, turned its attention to 
Internet discussions (wangluo minji For instance, during 2003 that was
a year of battling against SARS, in a visit to Guangzhou, Hu Jintao said to a 
doctor in charge, ‘I’ve read your comments online. They are very good’. Wen 
Jiabao in his visit to the student dorm at Peking University, remarked similarly that 
he was greatly moved by their anti-SARS resolution posted online 585 . On 
November 4, 2004, Wen Jiabao, upon seeing a Selection of Internet Information 
compiled by the Secretariat of State Council, immediately instructed local 
governments to help migrant workers get their delayed salaries586. On March 14, 
2005, in the press conference of the Third Session of 10th NPC, Wen Jiabao 
remarked that online discussions and opinions were well worthy of the 
government’s attention587. In the communique of the Fourth Plenum of the 16th
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Party Congress on September 16, 2004, the Central Party specifically mentioned 
that ‘[the Party] should pay high-level attention to the Internet impact on vox pop 
(public voices), accelerate the establishment of a management system based on the 
combination of legal rules, administrative supervision, media self-discipline and 
technical guarantees, and strengthen the Internet propaganda, so as to empower 
the healthy voices online’. There was an effort at Zhongnanhai to systemise these 
online discussions and use them as a reference in making public policy588.
This attention to online discussions spread rapidly downward. In 2006, blogs 
became popular among representatives to the NPC and NPPCC, who expressed 
their ideas on governance and public policy, followed by netizens leaving their 
feedback or lobbying through online discussions about local problems and issues. 
On March 8, 2006, Fu Yong the head of Lingao County, Hainan, began to post 
messages with his real name at www.tianva.cn. a popular online forum. He 
welcomed netizens making suggestions or critically reviewing his government and 
public policy. Although he was sharply criticised as a ‘show-off, the general 
response was honest, rational and magnanimous. On November 23, 2006, Zhang 
Xinshi the party secretary of Suqian City, Jiangsu, led the leaders of 12 more 
government departments to open their own blogs online, which was regarded as a 
way to gain better understanding about the grassroots589.
Contextualised in this general milieu of a reoriented attention to the Internet, 
the judiciary also found it impossible to ignore Internet discussions. The triumph 
of Internet discussions to bring about justice in the cases of Sun Zhigang and Liu 
Yong in 2003 was telling.
1) The Case of Sun Zhigang
On March 17, 2003, Sun Zhigang, a university graduate who worked for a fashion 
company in Guangzhou, was stopped in the street by the police and later sent to a 
transient rehabilitation centre as he failed to produce either his ID card or a 
temporary residential permit. At the rehabilitation centre, he was tormented 
physically. In early morning of March 18, he was sent to the casualty department 
at hospital and on March 20, he died in hospital.
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Reasonably Sun Zhigang’s family were dubious about his sudden death, as Sun 
Zhigang had never had any heart disease. Throughout the following days, Sun 
Zhigang’s family went to numerous departments in the government, in the hope 
of seeking an answer to why their son had suddenly died without any explicit 
causes, and also to have justice done to punish the offenders. The police, 
procuratorate and judiciary all brushed off the Suns and denied responsibility for 
this case. All their efforts were in vain, except that an official from the Civil 
Administration Bureau of the government expressed his regret. On April 18, a 
forensic medical examination report testified that Sun Zhigang died of injury 
caused by physical battery. Who, then, were the offenders, and how and why?
On April 25, 2003, South Metropolitan Daily (nanfang doushi bao ^377 a
local newspaper in Guangzhou, exposed this case, which immediately attracted 
national attention. Many newspapers, local and national, followed to uncover the 
facts of this case. At the same time, the online forum was also stirred. At 
www.sina.com. for instance, on April 25, 2003, more than 3,000 messages were 
posted on its news section, not to mention the over 10,000 furious messages that 
had already been removed by the web manager. Other websites also covered this 
news and equally elicited many messages that were posted to criticise the 
Guangzhou police. Slowly but steadfastly, a uniform voice emerged to call for 
severe punishment on the offenders. As a netizen wrote on www.sina.com. ‘Sun 
Zhigang’s death was not only the result of savageness and violence of certain 
individuals at the Guangzhou rehabilitation centre, but also more of the evil 
rehabilitation law. If  not abolished, this rehabilitation institution will continue to 
claim lives of tens of thousands of Sun Zhigangs in the future’.
The Internet continued to peg their attention to this case. On May 13, 
www.xinhua.org. the national official news website, posted a message that the 
workers involved in this case had all been arrested and it disclosed that from 1.13 
to 1.30 a.m. on March 20, Sun Zhigang was beaten up by 8 inmates and died at 
10.20 a.m. at hospital. The news was then fully quoted on the major websites, like 
NetEase, Sohu, Xinlang, Renminwang, Zhongguowang, dayangwang, Guangdong 
news, and Northeast news.
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On May 14, 2003, a Three-PhD Petition (san boshi shangshu ^ d r  _ t  ^ ) , signed by 
Yu Jiang, Teng Biao, Xu Zhiyong, all three with PhD degrees, was sent to the 
NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC), with an appeal for the constitutional review 
of the Legislation on Rehabilitation and Repatriation of Beggars and Vagabonds in Urban 
Areas. On May 23, a Five-Scholar Proposal signed by five academics - He Weifang, 
Sheng Hong, Shen Gui, Xiao Han, He Haibo, was sent to the NPCSC to support 
the previous petition. At the same time, officials at the higher echelon in Beijing, 
such as Luo Gan, Standing Committee Member of the Central Politburo and 
Zhou Yongkang, the Minister of Police, pressured the local government to 
investigate this case.
With these attentions and pressures, this case started to be investigated. The 
Party Committee of Guangdong Province as well as that of Guangzhou City 
pressured other government departments to carry out investigations. An Allied 
Investigation Team, formed of the Party Watchdog Committee, the Political and 
Legal Committee, Procuratorate, Police, Public Health Department, started 
investigations. Before the trial, certain officials had already received administrative 
penalties.
The difficulty, however, did not vanish as the case was investigated by the police. 
Many lawyers, for instance, were deterred from assisting in this case. On June 5, 
2003, the trial was opened at Guangzhou Intermediate Court. Early in the 
morning, in front of the court gathered a horde of journalists from different news 
medias. Although this was a ‘public trial’, only a small minority were actually 
admitted. Only 5 journalists were invited, all of them were forbidden from taking 
in any recording equipment such as a pen, camera, recorder etc. All journalists 
were security-checked twice. Two journalists from CCTV who were not admitted 
had to comment disappointedly in front of the camera, *We are not admitted to 
this court. So we can only film from here...’. Apart from the news media, the 
students from Zhongshan Law School had been waiting in queues for the court 
since 7 o’clock in the morning but were still refused admission.
On June 9, 2003, Guangzhou Intermediate Court tried the 18 suspects of this 
case, with the prime suspect Qiao Yanqin sentenced to the death penalty. It was
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not until then that the suspicions over Sun Zhigang’s death were cleared. It was 
ascertained in the verdict that at around 10 o’clock on March 18, 2003, Sun 
Zhigang was stopped by the police and taken back to the station afterwards. As 
Sun Zhigang claimed to have a heart disease, he was then sent to the 
Rehabilitation Centre where he was put in Room 201. At the Rehabilitation 
Centre, Sun Zhigang cried for help to the nurses, which irritated Qiao Yanqin, one 
of the nurses so much that she transferred Sun Zhigang to Room 206 and incited 
the inmates to beat him. Sun Zhigang was seriously injured in the physical battery 
which directly resulted in his death afterwards. This verdict was later upheld by 
the Supreme Court of Guangdong Province on June 27, 2003 and Qiao Yanqin 
was executed.
This powerful public call not only influenced the course of the adjudication, but 
also directly resulted in heated academic discussions and abolition of the 
rehabilitation law. On June 20, 2003, the State Department issued a No.381 
Resolution to abolish the legislation on Rehabilitation and Repatriation of Beggars and 
Vagabonds in Urban Areas (1982) and to bring into force the new Regulation and 
legislation on Assisting Unsustained Beggars and Vagabonds in Urban Areas590.
2) The Case ofU u Yong
Liu Yong, a local in Shenyang City, capital of Liaoning Province, was a successful 
businessman who was also a notorious gang leader having committed tens of 
crimes in local areas, including bullying locals and using violence to purge business 
competitors. Moreover, he bribed local government officials, which in turn helped 
him to gain political status, such as People’s Representative of Shenyang City and 
Member of the Political Conciliation Committee. The local police he had 
nepotism with offered protection for his gang in case of violence. Up to 2001 
when Liu Yong was prosecuted, it was ascertained that Liu Yong led his gang to 
commit 31 crimes, 13 of which were intentional injuring with 1 victim dead, 5 
seriously injured and 4 seriously disabled, 8 slightly injured; while 4 crimes 
concerned premeditated property damages; 1 crime of illegal merchandise conduct 
at a value of ¥75 million, 6 crimes of bribery at ¥1.2 million and 1 crime of illegal 
ownership of weaponry.
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When Liu Yong and his gang were uncovered by the news media, this 
immediately aroused a nationwide public exclamation for severe punishment. On 
April 17, 2003, Tieling Intermediate Court sentenced Liu Yong to capital 
punishment, with a penalty fine of ¥15 million. Upon this decision, Liu Yong 
immediately appealed. Prior to this, Tian Wenchang, Liu Yong’s defence lawyer, 
also organised a Legal Experts Conference in Beijing where 14 prominent criminal 
law professors in Beijing, like Wang Zuofu and Chen Xingliang from Peking 
University, Chen Guangzhong from People’s University reached a unanimous 
opinion in a 6-page-long statement that the evidence in Liu Yong’s case was 
questionable as it might in all probability have been illegally extracted through 
torture. On August 15, 2003, the High Court of Liaoning Province overruled the 
original verdict on the ground that ‘the doubt of police torturing Liu Yong for 
confessions during investigations cannot be reasonably ruled out’. Hence Liu 
Yong’s death penalty was reduced to a 2-year probation while the original penalty 
fine of ¥15 million was upheld.
Different from the academic applause of this decision as signifying ‘a progress 
towards due process of law in China’, it immediately spawned criticism in the 
news media, as it had a few irreconcilable logical inconsistencies. First, why was 
Liu Yong only charged with a fine of ¥15 million? Traditionally, for a gang, the 
whole property should be confiscated591. In Liu Yong’s case, he had personal 
property worth more than ¥700 million and why had only 2.1% been confiscated? 
Secondly, Liu Yong was the ringleader while Song Jianfei was only a member 
(albeit prominent) of his gang. In this decision, Liu Yong had his punishment 
reduced but Song Jianfei had his upheld. Normally, the ringleader should be 
subject to more severe punishment. It would certainly be suspicious to punish an 
accomplice more severely than the ringleader. Thirdly, the final decision did not 
clarify the reason why the original verdict was changed, although the facts and 
laws to apply remained exactly the same as in the original verdict.
On August 20, Bund Entertainment published an article to question the verdict by 
the High Court of Liaoning Province. In the early morning of August 21, 
www.sina.com fully copied this article on its online news frontpage. By 10 o’clock,
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there were more than 1 million clicks on this article, with more than 3,000 
comments. By night, the number of comments and messages had reached more 
than 10,000. In the Internet discussions, it was widely held that Liu Yong’s family 
had bribed the judges or higher officials in Beijing so that this improper exercise 
of political power gained Liu Yong lenient treatment.
The Legal Experts Panel Statement was also widely criticised. It was uniformly 
held that these legal experts were manipulated by Liu Yong through money, as 
they did not voice their opinions in other cases that involved only commoners, or 
the impoverished and disadvantaged. As a netizen wrote,
‘When Sun Zhigang was beaten to death in the Rehabilitation Centre in 
Guangzhou, I did not see any of the 14 legal experts write a statement in the 
name of human rights; when in this June the 3-year-old girl Li Siyi was starved to 
death at home as her mother was illegally detained in the police station, neither 
have I seen any such statement. Sun Zhigang is only a poor worker, who has 
neither property of ¥700 million, nor any nepotism of government officials; as 
for the 3-year-old girl, her case was even more desperate as her mother had to 
sneak bread and milk for her nutrition from the supermarket. I was closely 
examining the two words of human rights (renquan written by the legal
expert panel and I can clearly see that these two words are nothing but human 
money (renqian Their standard of human rights is how much the litigant
can afford to pay!’
At a conference at Peking University later, Professor Chen Xingliang admitted 
that Tian Wenchang the lawyer gave him an untaxed reward of ¥10,000. To this, 
students at Peking Law School even organised a strike of Chen Xingliang’s 
lectures. In the online forum, hundreds of thousands of messages were posted to 
criticise the judiciary and the government.
For this reason, the PRC Supreme Court decided to retry Liu Yong and 
informed the High Court of Liaoning Province of this decision. On September 3, 
2003, www.sina.com quoted a news release from www.legaldaily.com on this 
decision. This was extremely unusual for the Supreme Court to decide that it 
would re-try a criminal case, as there was no such precedent since 1949. On 
October 28, 2003, the Supreme Court issued a formal announcement to overrule 
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the verdict on the ground of inappropriateness and to re-try this case. Two 
months later, the re-trial was opened at the Jingzhou Intermediate Court, where 
the Supreme Court reached a decisive final verdict that Liu Yong should be 
sentenced to the death penalty. Afterwards he was executed592.
These two cases have had far-reaching influences on people’s justice in an age of 
formalisation at the expense of democratisation. Where the constant fluidity 
brought about by rapid legal reforms has left the society ill-adapted, with a legal 
system increasingly estranging the general public, there arose safety-valves that 
would allow justice to be done visibly in a way that approached nearer to public 
expectations, thereby supplementing, superseding or bypassing the rigidity of the 
law. This was of particular importance for China in an age where the rampancy of 
corruption had significantly reduced the credibility of the government in general 
among the public. For one thing, to the public’s dismay the level of corruption 
skyrocketed with a rapidly developing economy, resulting in exacerbating the 
already-disappointing social realities. Therefore, when a case was brought to the 
public’s attention, when a decision was reached far outside of what the public had 
expected, it would arouse a public anger on an enormous scale. The safety-valve 
of the legal system at this moment was mysteriously wedded to the populist 
revolutionary tradition by means of taking public opinion into decision. The law 
was not necessarily bypassed, or discarded. But the decision-making process might 
have been accelerated; certain bureaucratic mumble-jumble might be avoided; 
another law or legal clause might be adopted so as to pass a lenient or aggravated 
penalty. Superficially the law was still observed, but the mass line as an ideological 
undercurrent powerfully gearing the legal process towards making a decision 
favourable to popular calls. Justice had to be done, not secretively where the 
judges could play with unclean hands, but rather visibly in a way that 
approximated to public expectations.
These two cases also had ample implications for democratisation both of the 
judiciary in particular and of governance in general. The coming of the Internet 
had refuted the realist commentators who drew comfort from the 
neoauthoritarian experiences of East Asian Newly-Industrialised Countries by
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arguing that a period of authoritarianism was a necessary price to pay for 
modernisation. This conviction of a trade-off between development and freedom, 
economic well-being and democratisation, could no longer hold its own in the 
face of booming Internet discussions. Considering the size and scale of China, the 
escalating social problems could no longer be comfortably dealt with by tightening 
the control over the media, especially when the coming of the Internet had 
profoundly modified the interaction between media (as a means of both 
expression and communication) and individuals (as both a receiver and a 
broadcaster of information). The interaction between the government and the 
Internet-channelled public voices had been so unprecedentedly modified that it 
would be hard to ignore its influence during the policy-making process. This is 
even more so considering the Communists, commitment and tradition of the 
mass line
The Internet, however, is a two-edged weapon where there lurks an inherent 
mob tendency. In China, its charm quickly faded, as starting in 2004, this approval 
for the Internet’s impact on justice was overshadowed by an increased tendency to 
abuse. In a homicide case still under investigation, the netizens were not satisfied 
with merely expressing their dismay, but took actions of sending hate messages to 
the defendant, whose family received not only anonymous phone calls but 
threatening letters. This incident however was not comparable to the new 
development of spontaneous cyber-mobilisation that was witnessed two years 
later. For the first time, two new terms - Cyber Wanted (wangluo tongjiling N 
^ )  and Cyber Hunt and Kill Order (wangluo ^huishaling N iE ^  ^ ) , which carried 
strongly violent and mafia undertones, came into being. In early March, 2006, a 
photo was posted online in which a young female abused a little cat, which 
aroused widespread anger. A Galaxy Class-A Wanted Order appeared, with 
hundreds of thousands of netizens involved in investigating the time, location and 
identity of the ‘offender’. Within less than 10 days, the offenders were found out, 
for which they apologised on the website. Also, they were dismissed from work by 
their danmi.
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A month later, a husband avenged his ‘unfaithful’ wife who indulged in 
cyberspace love (by chatting) with another game-player by posting their chat 
records online. Again, numerous netizens were involved to uncover the real 
identity of the ‘adulterer’, who was a university student. This time, a Hunt and Kill 
Order was issued. As one netizen wrote, Txt’s use our keyboard and mouse in our 
hands as weapons to chop off the heads of these adulterers, to pay for the 
sacrifice of the husband’. This order went further by calling for a rejection on this 
‘adulterer’. As it read, *We call on every company, every establishment, every 
office, school, hospital, shopping mall and public street to reject him. Don’t 
accept him, don’t admit him, don’t identify with him until he makes a satisfying 
and convincing repentance’. Strangers in cyberspace teamed up to expose his 
personal details, such as name, address, phone number, and family members. Hate 
messages started pouring in from online to the real world. The ‘offender’ and his 
family began receiving anonymous phone threats; hate mail kept arriving at the 
door. Eager denouncers even personally visited his university and his parent’s 
house. For a short period, it created terror for this student and his family. As a 
result, he dropped out of school and barricaded himself with his family at home593.
The honeymoon between Internet discussion and the judiciary thus ended, with 
the former developing increasingly out of the range of rationalism. The power of 
the Internet over the real world went awry onto a track that gradually led to its 
own destruction. China Youth Daily started a new round of discussions on Cyber 
Ethics. Icepoint commented that in the cyber-age, a unique phenomenon is 
manifesting itself: ‘as a collective group we have grown stronger and more 
powerful, capable of exerting immeasurable influences; yet the other side of the 
coin is weakened individual immunity from encroachment’. New York Times 
labelled this new trend as an Internet mob comparable to those in the Cultural 
Revolution.
The derailment of the Internet has shown the willingness and strength of 
government to interact with the public. The mob tendency as manifested among 
Internet users could be construed as much as an increasing public challenge to the 
central censorship as uncontained anarchism brought about by the Internet. The
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derailed development of the Internet has signalled the continuously amounting 
social problems at the cost of democratisation, for which public concerns could 
be expressed in extreme forms where available. The very solution to contain this 
vice does not lie in the wishful thinking of a so-called ‘cyber-ethic education’ of 
the Chinese netizens, as if the old tradition of inculcating tenets could transform 
the Chinese netizens into obedient subjects overnight. Instead, it points to the 
need for further democratisation of the polity where public voices could be 
properly expressed, heard and heeded. The revolutionary tradition of the mass line 
has ample experience to democratise the public policy-making process, attend to 
public opinion while containing it in rationalist tracks. This tradition is still of 
great significance in the contemporary Internet age, where traditional methods of 
censorship have gradually diminished influences. Systemised participation in the 
policy-making process entails not only democratisation of the polity, but a 
citizen’s sense of responsibility on the part of the individuals. Thereby the very 
solution to contain the Internet mob tendency lies in further democratisation of 
the whole polity perse. As far as law and order is concerned, this is an age that calls 
for reinventing the tradition of mass line and mass participation in the judiciary. It 
would not only contain the vices of bureaucratism and ameliorate the pains of 
rapid formalisation, but more importantly, help to remould anew a politico-legal 
culture that stresses rationality, responsibility and accountability. Only a combined, 
balanced approach will be able to guide legal modernisation in China to a 
promising destination.
Summary
Equity and law, after the demise of the imperial system, underwent a relentless 
process of rebirth and transformation. With Confucian orthodoxy challenged and 
intellectual ambition extending far beyond bureaucracy, ideology was subject to 
merciless scrutiny with the collapse of imperial constructs, as much politico-legal 
as socio-economic. Hierarchy was condemned, women’s liberation emphasised, 
family structure dismantled — the republican revolution carried with it a mission as 
much to dismantle the past as to construct anew the present. Both equity and law
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would have to be redrawn on a piece of new, blank paper where influences were 
derived not only from the imperial legacy, but also from the capitalist West and 
socialist Russia.
Equity, defined as democratising the judiciary by enlisting public participation in 
the judicial decision-making processes, manifested itself in the communist effort 
of the mass line to bring justice closer to the masses. From the very beginning, 
equity and law were closely tied together in the communist effort to seek an 
alternative to the top-down manipulation in the imperial model. The 
condescending, self-complacent imperial bureaucracy carried heavily a hidden 
contempt for the lower order. For a modern revolution that aimed to agitate the 
lower orders to unshackle themselves, imperial bureaucratism was the first and 
foremost to be unremittingly denounced. The outlook of a capitalist revolution 
was dampened by the plight of the GMD style that not only encouraged 
bureaucrat-comprador exploitation, but deliberately suppressed a foaming 
underclass of the society. The communist revolution was thus commissioned to 
avoid such capitalist vices. No wonder once the CCP took power, it abolished 
immediately all the GMD-made laws.
The communists were not daunted by this dual task of seeking an alternative as 
well as constructing its own style. The communist faith in the masses had largely 
compensated for the material constraints of understaffing, inadequate training, or 
poor infrastructure. It equally had demonstrated complex qualities, as the excesses 
that plagued its early development were never fully contained throughout its 
development until 1976. Where populism carried with it a celebrated cause of 
mass participation, it soon presented the problem of supervision and monitoring, 
so as to make sure that such mass events would not simply turn into mob 
anarchism. This inherent contradiction of populism and elitism, formalisation and 
antiformalism, formal training and going to the masses, spelt the development of 
both equity and law in the revolutionary period.
Despite the complexity and inherent contradictions, equity and law closely 
followed each other, developed in the same vein and coalesced in the culmination 
of people’s justice. The imperial and Western path of strict law first, equity later
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was defied, reversed and falsified. In its replacement, a non-separation of equity 
and law, formalism and informalisation, particularisation and universalisation 
could be seen. Popular justice, according to Mao, was part and parcel of the mass 
line mechanism to combat bureaucratism in the judiciary as a component o f the 
state institutions. It can check the ‘bureaupathic tendencies of formal control 
institutions manned by professionals’. For one thing, it was believed that 
bureaucratic legalism would undermine political order and hinder progressive 
social changes594. Drawing on the Chinese experience, a sympathetic observer 
even called for popular justice as a dose to cure the ineffective and repressive 
‘bureaucratic justice’ as in the US595 .
Such movement opens the legal system to welcome the participation of the 
masses into the process of formulating, implementing and finally evaluating 
policies. A more responsive government thereby anticipates needs rather than 
responding passively to demands596. It is not devoid of problems — Pepinsky597 
rightly pointed out the disposition of mass line to slide into disorder and chaos. 
Such anti-legalism and anti-professionalism could even turn the non-antagonistic 
contradictions within the people into brutal and bloody struggles598. A Japanese 
attorney in a visitor group in 1959 commented that ‘the participation of the 
masses in settling disputes makes these decisions susceptible to various irrational 
factors such as time, place, circumstances, emotion, chance and deliberate 
action’599.
For the problems it carried, people’s justice was received uneasily in the Western 
academia. Mass trial was equated with irregularity600. It is true that mass trials, with 
emphasis on class struggles, had at times displayed dramatic violence and 
irregularity. As was commented, ‘an assertive and participatory population may 
not acquire civic consciousness but can be prejudicial and fanatic, sustaining 
autocracy rather than democracy. Communist populism in China failed.. .to lift up 
the masses and arm them with weapons of criticism. “Scientific” progress and 
voluntarist impulses were both incorporated into idealist devotion as much as 
fundamentalism’601.
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With this in mind, the other side of the coin was equally not dismissible. 
Throughout the process, mass mobilisation was fused with an effort to maximise 
the realisation of social justice. Even for the much more controversial class 
struggle, although without institutional mechanisms to guarantee civil rights 
protection, it was capable of destruction as well as construction on a massive scale, 
historically it functioned to dismantle the traditional shackles imposed on the 
peasantry. Alongside with class struggle and mass trials, other techniques, such as 
persuasion, people’s assessors, on-the-spot investigations, were part and parcel of 
the people’s justice that sought to combat bureaucratism, corruption and self- 
complacent elitism. These techniques were genuine efforts to build a socialist legal 
system602.
Commenting upon the development of a lawyer system in China, Alford 
credited the strong state control up to the mid-1980s 603 to so-called ‘state 
intolerance’ to mass organisations604. This observation was not in accordance with 
the ample historical evidence that testified the otherwise, as the CCP was a party 
born out of as much war, violence and blood as its close ties with the masses. 
Alford, in other words, failed to see the ideological underpinnings. He was right in 
pointing out the seemingly contradictory, but actually symbiotic relationship 
between the interests of the state and that of the people, which was rooted in the 
notion of reconciling collective interest and individual interest in the Chinese 
philosophy. Nonetheless, such effort must be credited to a more important source 
of inspiration: the communist determination to seek an alternative to the 
traditional lawyer system on the one hand and the capitalist on the other. 
Moreover, his remark seemed to imply that current problems besetting the legal 
profession in China were a necessary price to pay for a late industrialising state 
catching up with its industrialised forerunners605. It confirmed, therefore, nothing 
but a Eurocentric self-complacency.
Moreover, there had been a liberalist criticism of the court’s responsiveness to 
social obligations. These self-labelled liberal jurists might comfort themselves in 
holding the belief that they were truly defending the spirit of the rule of law. For 
them, judicial aloofness was not only tolerable but also desirable, especially when
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it was blindly equated with justice and impartiality. In other words, keeping the 
masses at a distance is the first step towards judicial independence, which has two 
layers of meanings: (1) the judiciary should have an independent salary and tenure 
system which assures economic interest and appointment, demotion or promotion 
to be free from political encroachment; (2) the judiciary should make decisions 
independent of any external influences, such as interest groups, mass media and 
political parties.
This argument does have a valid point concerning the current undesirable 
situation of legal development in China that is being plagued by rampant 
corruption. Party guidance might be used as a cloak for twisting justice to satisfy 
vested personal interests. Moreover, as the judiciary depends upon local 
government for salary and promotion, local party officials might exploit this 
dependency for cooperation and even submission of local courts to evade the law. 
This advocacy of judicial independence does point to certain aspects that could 
improve the legal system.
However, before wholeheartedly subscribing to this argument, we should ask 
ourselves whether the current practice in the developed West (both the common 
law and civil law systems) has exhausted the totality of judicial independence. 
Does it necessarily mean that following the Western model equals doing the right 
thing while bypassing it is wrong? Are there any positive advantages that we could 
revive out of the Chinese traditions for current reinventions?
Critics of judicial independence pointed out that not only absolute 
independence is virtually non-existent, but also that it has brought about 
undesirable side effects of the so-called independence. First of all, complete 
independence from powerful political influences has proven unrealistic. Cases 
were recorded where political influences were waved to twist justice in the 
American judiciary which is supposed to be one of the perfect systems of due 
process and civil rights protection. Powerful patrons, through money politics or 
personal connections, might exert certain influences that are not easily detectable 
to the public. Why should such an underhand encroachment be more desirable
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than an open policy of advocating the leadership of a vanguard party that is 
dedicated to furthering the people’s wellbeing in its inspiration and visionary?
In the Chinese case, it should be noted that the Party and bureaucracy, state and 
society are mutually embedded. Therefore, judicial independence and the guidance 
from the Party are not mutually incompatible. The judges should be independent 
in reaching decisions where the Party could provide general guidance about 
judicial work style. Party ideological guidance and independent judicial power of 
both observance and discretion could offer mutual support to each other. It cures 
the problem of judicial aloofness where the poor or the grieved were often turned 
down by the justice, as if law, as presumed by this judiciary independence, can 
operate alone without the necessity of invoking support from the masses for 
legitimacy. When a revolution of China’s scale sought to overthrow the oppressive 
bureaucratic machines in both its imperial past and the current colonial powers, it 
achieved this goal through empowering the people in judicial processes. Judicial 
independence could be used to cloak the real injustice of law being hijacked by 
elites, legal professionals and intellectuals. It was precisely for this reason that 
judicial independence was regarded as ‘bourgeois exploitative ideology’ and 
discarded ruthlessly away. The judiciary, thus interpreted, only gained its truthful 
independence when the power of decision had been handed over to the masses, as 
decisions were not based solely on money, [elitist] education, intellectual contempt 
or extensive training. Spontaneity might lack refinement or jargon-imbued 
decorum, but it is certainly the most truthful form of self-governance and a people 
that has ‘stood up’. Shackles, in terms of elitism, formalism and bureaucratism, 
had to be smashed unrelentingly so as to give the people a chance for real 
emancipation. This antiformalist and antibureaucratic undertone is the key to 
understanding the relationship between the judiciary and the Party guidance.
In short, Independence is one thing, while justice is another, especially when it 
comes to the necessity of enlisting the masses, attending to the public and 
rendering decisions socially acceptable. In the face of continuous withdrawal of 
state commitment to public services, judicial independence can do little to cure 
such acute social problems as seen in massive layoffs and rampant privatisation606.
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Independence can do even less when coupled with derailed Marketisation that is 
pregnant with corruption and deteriorated cadre-masses relationships.
Turk rightly pointed out Mao’s worry that ‘material advances without 
corresponding progress in the raising of social consciousness...[are] dangerous 
because they encourage selfish individualism and egoism which would eventually 
destroy the collective gains’607. This worry, which drove Mao to fan one campaign 
after another in the post-1949 era, ridiculously turned into reality in the post-1992 
era when critical assessment of Maoist legacy was gradually overridden by 
materialist concerns. Mao’s idealism was discarded completely without rescuing its 
moral commitment to the masses by means of presciently anticipating the needs 
of, responsively communicating with and actively soliciting feedback from the 
masses. Deng’s Developmentalism gained momentum to such an extent that it 
overrode any moral consideration for the population that run the machines. Law 
enters an era of overarching formalisation and Westernisation, while equity is 
bound to repeat its imperial and Western path of slow integration into positive 
law. The revolutionary tradition that once celebrated its genuine efforts to seek an 
alternative to the imperial and capitalist traditions now faces a retreat, which might 
be irreversible.
The coming of an Internet age fundamentally modified the way the state 
interacted with the populace. The judiciary, either willingly or otherwise, had 
realised the power of Internet discussions. Both equity and law could not shut 
themselves down from the penetrating influence of the Internet. However, the 
equitable demand to render justice more responsive to the Internet discussions 
could equally become susceptible to the very problem of anarchism brought about 
by netizens, which had defeated both an unbound faith in and an unrealistic 
contempt of the Internet. A neoauthoritarian control could no longer hold the 
nation from falling asunder in an age of information flow that had been 
unprecedentedly mobile, volatile and inherently anarchic. To regurgitate the mass 
line tradition could not only empower the populace in the state-led integration 
with global capitalism, but more importantly, contain the irrationalism, anarchism 
and self-destruction of the Internet usage.
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This conviction in the capacity of people’s justice to transform the current legal 
landscape in China lies in its ability to strike a balance between flexibility and 
regularity, stability and rupture, formality and participation. This is rooted in the 
revolutionary tradition of pursuing both formalism and antiformalism. Notably, 
there is a tension between revolution and law or revolutionary rupture and legal 
stability, where revolution was conditioned by flexibility, violence, might and 
absolute command in sharp contrast with law’s procedures, civil rights protection, 
evidence collection, verification and cross-examination. The clashes between 
revolutionary expediency and legal formalism seemed inevitable. This led to 
Leng’s conviction that class struggle and the techniques developed during the 
system of people’s justice, were no more than what was forced upon the 
revolutionaries by such material constraints as exigencies and understaffing.
Plausible as it may sound, such an overwhelmingly materialist interpretation falls 
short of sophistication if we ask further why there was a policy continuation 
between pre- and post-1949 eras, or even until today’s reformist period. It 
overlooks the moral significance of people’s justice that is more in accordance 
with revolution than with bureaucratic formalism. Moreover, speaking of 
revolution, it should be duly distinguished from class struggle in the tradition of 
socialist equity as discussed in the introduction, or the friend-enemy binary as 
proposed by Dutton608. For Dutton, from 1921 to 1976, the binary of friend- 
enemy was central in interpreting revolutionary politics in China. It was the 
dominant cause of red terrors in early revolutionary period. Even though later it 
was restrained by Mao’s rectification campaign, as an ideology it remained as a 
phantom lurking in Mao’s idea on class struggle, which led to numerous 
movements and finally to the calamitous Cultural Revolution.
This compelling account, though helpful to construe the revolutionary politics, 
nevertheless is far from the only prism through which Chinese revolution could 
be examined. In fact, it overlooks other moral grounds on which the Chinese 
revolution rested. Legitimacy does not come automatically from institutional 
coercions, as if ‘killing a chicken to scare the monkey crowd’ alone could make the 
communists popular. This red terror by bloody purge of the enemy on a massive
165
scale could in practice institutionalise coercion to deter withdrawal as much as 
maintain loyalty. However, the communist popularity among the masses, 
especially during the Yan’an period, must come from a higher moral ground. It is 
precisely here that we see the Maoist influence. Mao, apparently, had realised this 
problem of violence or excesses during the revolution, as he acknowledged on 
different occasions throughout the revolutionary era and into the post-liberation 
period609. However, for him, class struggle was only the means, or the vehicle to 
turn history ahead. In the course of this process, violence and anarchism were a 
tiny price to pay for the good of the whole. In other words, people’s justice was 
neither a naked power dominance to be perpetuated by institutionalised coercion, 
nor a tension between meagre material support and law’s formalistic demands610, 
but rather a deeply moral tension between bringing justice to the masses and legal 
bureaucratism. Class struggle (and the friend-enemy binary) is not the end in and 
of itself, but only a means to achieve this goal of antiformalism.
For Mao, law was only a masked tool exploited by the exploiting classes to 
suppress the masses. In imperial China, the exploiting class was the feudal 
landlords, privileged classes and imperial bureaucrats; in late Qing, this class joined 
hands with the foreign oppressors, national petit bourgeoisie, while in Nationalist 
China, the components of exploiting class changed again to foreign oppressors, 
national (petit) bourgeoisie and military warlords. Having defined the components 
of the exploiting class, our central question is: how is the law under the regimes 
supposed to be a mask for the exploitative relationship between the oppressor and 
the oppressed? For instance, Mao acknowledged equally that prima facie the 
capitalist legal system had to a certain extent freed the toiling masses from the 
cruel exploitation and autocracy under feudalism. Then our concern will be: if 
Mao was well aware of this capitalist advance, how did he succeed in combining 
or dialectically analysing this advance with its remaining problems? Or to put it 
another way, how can we be sure that the socialist legal system, as Mao 
understood it, will be much better than the capitalist mode which has already 
liberated the masses to a certain extent? What were the grounds for Mao to
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compare the de/merits of both systems, based upon which to reach his 
conclusion that the socialist law will be much better than the capitalist counterpart?
Mao’s answer largely lies in two analyses: (1) according to Marx, social 
superstructure was determined by an economic basis, especially the mode of 
production. The capitalist mode of production does not alter the exploiting- 
exploited relationship per se, but rather substitutes the previous feudal exploiter 
with new capitalist oppressors. Therefore, this change in oppressor and the 
oppressing scheme, instead of dismantling the shackles and oppressing 
mechanism per se, has pre-determined that the capitalist law could serve only the 
newly-arisen exploiting class of the bourgeoisie. This theoretical exposition was 
well testified by the Nationalist experience in GMD areas where the bourgeoisie, 
in the early phase of industrialisation, put the modern proletariat in appalling 
conditions under the axiom of maximum production at lowest cost. (2) if 
substantially this law is predetermined to serve only the exploiting bourgeois class, 
then in form the law also works against the toiling masses, such as the expenses of 
counselling, the exorbitant lawyer’s fees, authoritative legal procedures, super- 
imposingly intimidating court layouts and unblushingly authoritarian judges in the 
courts. All these superficial formulas, befuddling procedures and a reliance upon a 
specifically-trained lawyer class as go-between to channel the law and the masses, 
not only fends off the masses, but essentially turns the law into a game 
concentrated and played within a few hands only, and for those privileged who 
can afford it.
Formalism, therefore, for Mao, not only masks the essential exploiting 
relationship, but also was reduced to be a game manipulated by the privileged few. 
The socialist law, which aims at dismantling the traditional shackles, wanted to 
return law to the masses, empowering the latter to decide what they want by 
themselves, rather than being superimposed by an exploiting class perched atop.
A moral high ground clearly cannot be readily transferred into concrete legal 
practices. The very issue centres on whether the alternative model of justice is 
attractive in practice and overall more advantageous than the bureaucratism it 
seeks to replace. In this aspect of legal practice, the Chinese experience has a
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mixed record. The early days of excesses, terror and violence apparendy had 
discounted its attractiveness. Moreover, Mao’s contempt for bureaucratism, 
formalism and legal procedures resulted in the collective abuse of individual rights, 
security and protection. His famous phase of ‘no law, no heaven’ addresses the 
core of his deep disregard of formalism. Civil rights and civil liberties, together 
with legal proceduralism, formalism and bureaucratism were condemned as 
bourgeois ideologies. Mao was right in pointing out his cynicism towards the 
Western model of justice which seemed to position the powerful against the 
powerless and bureaucrats fending the masses off through legal barriers. However, 
he clearly failed to see the significance of such legal mechanisms in the protection 
of civil rights and civil liberties, especially in an individual sense. For Mao, 
individual rights, liberty and liberation make no sense unless contextualised in a 
collective environment, which is a wonderful critique of Western individualism 
imbued with religious aura. However, the other side of the coin, namely that an 
overemphasis on collectivity runs the risk of overriding individual or minority’s 
voices, is also forgotten. Superimposition of collective actions over individual 
defence became not only inevitable but absolute. It opened a Pandora’s Box of 
inflamed public hatred, factional fights and bloody street gunfire as seen in the 
Cultural Revolution. A revolutionary cause of seeking a perfect combination of 
individual-collective liberation thus falls asunder in its own pursuit of progress and 
reform. Without proper mechanisms and a certain minimalist legal mechanism for 
protection, the revolutionary cause of liberation can easily fall victim to personal 
vengeance, malpractice and collective abuse. Mao’s dialectical critique of history 
thus was thus devoured by its own fire: its occupation of the moral high ground 
was ruthlessly consumed by its romanticism that fell short o f practical (even 
minimum) concerns.
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Chapter 3 Reformist Equity: Transformed qingli
Introduction
Following Mao’s death, politics underwent a course of swift normalisation. The 
conviction to put a halt to the turbulence and chaos generated by the Cultural 
Revolution was shared by many. If  the period of 1978-89 marked a distinctive 
trial-and-error cautiousness on the Party to take off from a revolutionary ground, 
the period of 1992 onwards witnessed a formalisation that turned insatiably to the 
West for inspiration. The lustre of the revolutionary cause was not only worn out 
in the reformist minds, but regarded as an obstacle to China’s modernisation.
In the midst of this state-led integration with the global capitalist legal system, 
equity surfaces out of the need as much for further democratisation as for 
revitalising the local context. Such local context not only signifies the current 
socio-economic environment in China, but also the cultural specificity in which 
the adopted laws operate. For the Chinese equity in the reformist era, it points to 
the local context of socio-economic environment on the one hand and cultural 
specificity on the other. Our discussion of equity in the reform era can be 
captured by the notion of transformed qingli, which can be illuminated by 
revisiting the concept of Earthbound China as proposed by the pioneering 
anthropologist Fei Xiaotong in the 1940s. I shall first examine this concept.
Section 1 Earthbound China and Transform ed qingli
The concept of earthbound China {xiangtu h^ongguo i .  ’-f-1 H) was first proposed 
by Fei Xiaotong in the 1940s. For Fei, a fundamental characteristic of China is its 
earthboundness, which means that ‘the population in the rural areas seem attached 
to the earth, without much change from one generation to another’. Certainly this 
is not to suggest that the population in the rural areas is fixed and unchanged. On 
the contrary, when the accretion of the population reached a certain scale, 
movement would certainly follow. What is essential to the concept of 
‘earthboundness’ is its ‘unshaken old roots’. Low mobility and infrequent intra-
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community interaction have made it necessary for life within this earthbound 
society to be localised. Within the local boundaries is contained the circle o f life, 
for which with a high level of mutual familiarity this is a society ‘without strangers’. 
Here, positive state law ceases to be the only legitimate source for maintaining law 
and order; on the contrary, its jurisdiction is shared by the authority of seniors, 
social education, and local mores and customs611.
At a first glance, this concept seems to suggest that Fei was discussing rural 
China alone. As a matter of fact, Fei’s conceptualisation was critiqued for its 
inherent urban or pre-modern assumption612. For instance, he emphasises the 
dense familiarity within the rural areas that obliterates the need for resorting to the 
written word for communication. He compared this to an urban environment 
with high mobility, where verbal communication such as voice recognition ceases 
to become an effective means. As a matter of fact, situating rural against urban 
China diminishes the integrity of his argument that earthbound China refers to 
cultural-psychological idiosyncrasies specific to the Chinese. For one thing, such 
an urban-rural contrast would naturally induce readers to wonder: is urbanisation a 
cure for such rural-based phenomena? If urban China stood out as a ready 
comparison to rural China, then to which extent can we be certain that these 
earthbound traditions could survive through time and space, supposing that 
modernisation in China carries with it rapid urbanisation which is happening 
today? Certain parts of Fei’s arguments do point to cultural specificity, such as the 
differential mode of relationship {chaxu geju which is by no means
applicable to rural areas only. Certain cultural traits that span across time and space 
can truly amaze students of Chinese history with its continuity.
As far as I can see, Fei’s conceptualisation of earthbound China addresses 
various levels of analysis which he did not differentiate. At one level, it refers to 
certain socio-economic restraints in rural areas. For instance, in a largely peasant 
society with low mobility and high level of illiteracy, certain traits stand out 
sharply, such as paternalistic rule by seniority (%hanglao tong^hi" K ^ V p ), reliance 
upon verbal rather than written communication, high density of familiarity, to 
name just a few. Expectantly, the influence of these traits can wear off
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significantly when situated within an urban, industrialised environment 
characterised by high mobility, where authority based on age, gender, class or 
status relegated to a position secondary to such meritocratic qualities as education 
or literacy. These influences might not be eradicated completely in an urbanised 
environment, but it did point to the local context within which the traits operated.
At another level, Fei is pointing out cultural idiosyncrasies that are more 
moralistic than practical. The differential mode of relationship, for instance, was 
derived from the Confucian ideal of hierarchical differentiation so as to build a 
harmonious and ordered society. It spells the continual influence of Confucian 
ideals after the demise of old imperial power and family structures. Using the 
West to compare and contrast this Chinese cultural specific is still worthy of our 
attention even today. Also, there are certain customs, mores and manners that are 
locally- or ethnically-specific. These cultural aspects still deserve our attention as 
they point to the need to reorient both official representation and legal practice to 
accommodate these specificities.
As long as these two levels of analysis are specified, Fei’s conceptualisation of 
earthbound China stands out as a useful framework that could illuminate my 
discussions of equity and law. At one level, earthbound China can be used to 
discuss the current socio-economic development in China, as it is situated as a 
local context within which the globalised law operates. For one thing, law cannot 
be readily detached from the current socio-economic development within a given 
country and it is only through this prism that law could gain concrete meanings. 
At another level, this local context also points to the cultural specificity of China 
within which equity and law is construed, applied and administered. Such cultural 
specificity includes ethnically- or locally-specific customs, mores and manners.
For a closely-knit, localised community, traditions and customs could be 
expected for a better preservation. It can also be the case where the newly- 
established state fought a fierce tussle with these traditions, as seen in both 
communist and GMD efforts to build a modern nation-state. The communist-led 
peasant movements were as much iconoclastic as locally-oriented. The traditional 
paternalistic power as enshrined in the family structure of male over female,
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husband over wife, parent over children, senior over junior, were constantly 
shaken up, with local superstitions ruthlessly swept away by the revolutionary tide. 
Outdated customs were publicly denounced. The communists aimed to rebuild 
the rural areas in their effort to seek an alternative to both traditional structure and 
the GMD capitalist-comprador model.
In the post-1949 era, this construction was furthered by land reforms and the 
establishment of people’s communes throughout the country. The state 
penetration into society was arguably the deepest in this period. With the imperial 
land system dismantled, lands were nationalised, with agricultural production and 
trade under complete state control through a policy called State PurchaseState Sale 
(tonggou tongxiao The seemingly antithetical, but actually symbiotic
state-society relationship reached its peak in the highly-collectivised people’s 
communes in the late 1950s, generating a state highly responsive to society as well 
as a society enthusiastically participatory in state affairs. Instilling communist 
ideology went hand in hand with opinion gathering and further iconoclasm to 
shed traditional ideology, superstitions, customs and rites. Clan genealogy, village 
temple, and clan ancestral shrines were prohibited and dismantled, culminating in 
the decade-long Cultural Revolution that relendessly fused the state and society 
together613.
Such an unprecedented level of state penetration into the countryside, or rural 
penetration into the state largely masked the need for a distinctive justice in the 
countryside. In a people’s republic where the state was open to every walk of 
society for participation, the distinction between total control and autonomy was 
blurred. The state had provided unprecedented opportunities for participation; 
but at the same time, this was the only legitimate mode of participation for the 
citizenry. Autonomy, under the dominant ideology of holding communism as the 
only truth, became unnecessary, as communism had provided, presupposed and 
totalised the means of participation available to the populace.
This complexity in the state-society relationship, embodied in the people’s 
justice system, had temporarily masked the need for a rurally-oriented justice, as 
local traditions and customs were at most suppressed and at best subdued under
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this sweeping revolution. Before very long, experiences would testify against any 
self-complacent conviction that local traditions and customs had by now been 
completely eradicated and uprooted. Such withdrawal o f state penetration from 
the countryside as initiated by Deng’s reform led to mushrooming reinstatement, 
resurgence and revitalisation of local traditions and customs. This was due in no 
small part to such factors as the majority of the population being concentrated in 
the countryside, as well as the continuation of the rigid hukou (household 
registration) system in Deng’s reform. The communist tradition of respecting local 
knowledge, languages and customs equally contributed to the revival of such 
traditions.
Having said that, it should noted that this revival of traditions was by no means 
even across different regions or a wholesale resubscription to past practices. It was 
also incremental, with alterations ranging from small additions to subtractions and 
reinterpretations614. This process bore imprints of both imperial and revolutionary 
pasts. Yan’s study of gift exchange rituals in the Xiajia village revealed that local 
customs followed a zigzag course: in Mao’s China, gift exchange was condemned 
as feudal practice, where the rituals were considered superstitious, supporting 
patriarchal power of local elite and lineage elders and money- as well as time- 
consuming615. The land reform contributed to decline of parental and traditional 
clan powers. However, it created new socialist restratification, where cadres were 
now placed in a privileged position to access or control scarce resources and 
peasants’ life chances. Therefore, a new form of gift giving from villager 
unilaterally and upwardly to cadres, was created. Later, in the reform era, although 
decollectivisation reduced villagers’ dependence, it also ‘forced individual villagers 
to cultivate networks on a larger scale and to interact with state agents who 
control redistributive resources outside the village boundary’ 616. Therefore, 
although tradition of gift exchange was revived, ritual performance remained 
simple, as ‘the younger generations lack an interest in the old proprieties and 
complain that current practice has increasingly placed emphasis on the material 
rather than the spiritual value of gifts’617. New rituals were also created, for 
instance, for abortion and female sterilisation. Ceremonies were also developed on
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private rituals, such as childbirth, house construction, or engagement celebrations. 
Therefore, Yan concluded that the Xiajia experiences testified a process of 
recycling tradition (i.e. selective revival of tradition) rather than a wholesale 
revitalisation of tradition618.
The faded state control, coupled with the resurgence of local traditions and 
customs, also pointed to the strength of Earthbound China, both as a concept and 
as an ideal type in the analysis of current China619. Earthbound China contains 
within its meanings a layer of Village culture’ (cunluo wenhua /ffc), which by
definition is centred upon sharing the information among village members within 
a closed, low-mobility boundary that fostered mutual familiarity. Among village 
members, competition goes hand in hand with homogenisation in various aspects 
of human affairs, such as child birth, education, marriage, funeral, and house 
buildings. Conforming to the accepted rules generates pressures for 
homogenisation, within which framework also arises the attempt to outperform 
each other. Failing in either homogenisation or competition risks the loss of 
reputation or face, which would be avoided to the maximum620.
Moreover, local customs join hand in hand with economic underdevelopment. 
As a matter of fact, due to financial restraints, lawyers or highly specialised, 
professionalised judges are either unaffordable or hard to find in rural courts. The 
focus is rather on lowering litigation fees and improving litigation efficiency than 
due process of law. Unfamiliarity with legal procedures and law, not to mention 
high levels of illiteracy, not only requires the judge to speak the local vernacular, 
but to proactively investigate, adjudicate or execute the decisions, rather than 
passively follow rigid legal formulas621. This socio-economic restraint became an 
increasingly menacing issue when an urban bias turned overwhelmingly dominant, 
reinforced by the continual state withdrawal of commitment to rural development.
Apart from this cultural layer, the second layer addresses the current socio­
economic development in China, as law and order will not be readily intelligible 
unless we take into account local situations. The market reform since 1978 has 
resulted in a large portion of the population becoming marginalised, especially 
from 1992 onward. For one thing, the first decade (1978-87) of the Reform Age
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was marked by a distinctively meticulous calculation. Although ‘crossing the river 
by groping the stones’ still had to wait another decade to be officially formulated 
by Deng, in 1978 it would be hard to imagine that the CCP failed to see the 
importance of a careful approach of the trial-and-error reform622. The first major 
breakthrough came in the introduction of Household Contract 'Responsibility System as 
the replacement for collective cooperative623. In this period, the disparity between 
male and female, urban and rural, coastal and inland, ethnic minority and Han 
majority, was carefully monitored. The state, for instance, paid enormous 
attention to rural development, reduced the urban-rural income disparity from 1 : 
2.38 in 1978 to 1 : 1.85 in 1985 and greatly boosted rural consumption624. From 
1978 to 1984, average rural income increase rate was as high as 15%. The state 
paid enormous attention to rural issues, as seen in the Central No.l Directive early 
every year from 1982 to 1986. Apart from the enormous scale of rural 
industrialisation, the post-reform government made efforts to reduce 
discrimination as embedded in the hukou system. As a result, restriction on rural- 
to-urban migration was eased; sectoral and occupational discrimination against the 
peasants was reduced; the class enemy labels of ‘landlords’ and ‘rich peasants’ 
were removed (with a de-ideologicalisation of the reform); village elections were 
further legalised (as a containment of spontaneity). In legal practice, revolutionary 
techniques with a proven record were revived, aimed at preserving the rationalist 
elements in the mass line policy. As can be seen from the previous chapter, on- 
the-spot techniques of investigation, adjudication and enforcement were revived, 
as witnessed in the ample stories of how local courts visited tirelessly local 
communities, in remote rural areas and urban street residence alike, for 
information, adjudication or mediation.
On October 20,1984, the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress passed a 
resolution on urban reform, which signalled the start of a process to gradually 
orient towards urban priorities. From 1987 on, no more Central No.l Directives 
were issued. Simultaneously, the rural income increase rate declined sharply, to 
only 2% in 1989 and even minus in 1991. A few years later, this rate dropped 
dramatically again, from 9% in 1996 to 4.6 % in 1997 and 4% in 1998625. In urban
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areas, corruption soared, mainly due to the two-tier price system, by which the 
contracted amount was sold at the state procurement price while the surplus 
above the quota as retained by peasants was sold at the market price (this was later 
adopted into industrial sectors as well)626. Social disparity increased, which was 
exacerbated by the withdrawal of state commitment to many public services. 
Consequently, it led to the 1989 Democracy Movement that was led by students, 
but joined by workers, urban residents, teachers and bureaucrats alike, calling not 
for regime change but a restoration of state commitment to social welfare627. The 
reform that ‘initially altered the typical course of capital accumulation through 
rural deprivation in classical capitalism as well as state socialism’, ceased to be so 
at the turn of the late 1980s, where ‘the positive trend slowed to a halt and living 
standards and local governance deteriorated in many regions’628.
If  1989 was mainly a culmination of urban unrest, the absence of peasantry in 
this movement was not so much because of apathy from the countryside as that 
the peasant unrest had yet to come at a later stage. The following decades 
witnessed another wave of unrest, this time from the countryside, induced mainly 
by the rather naked urban bias as a result of the 1992 further liberalisation. Rural 
commitment was discarded ruthlessly, as the urban-bias industrialisation took 
strongest hold in the reformists’ mind.
The rise of rural unrest was first due to withdrawal of state commitment to 
many local public services, which was now done through increased taxation that 
spawned rural corruption. For one thing, the Household Contract Responsibility System 
is a double-edged sword. Although initially it greatly freed production forces as 
well as reduced the tensions between top-down instructions and bottom-up pleas, 
towards the end of the 1980s its demerits were increasingly felt: the commune- 
turned-township level lost many of its functions, and the village, which now 
covers several natural villages together629, faced the predicament of drained 
resources and lack of sufficient funds for running local welfare, healthcare and 
education. Consequently, it led to a deterioration of public services in the rural 
areas630. Since 1992, the central state commitment was completely withdrawn 
from local public services under the slogan ‘slice [lands] into pieces to be
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contracted [to rural households], split the kitchen to eat separately’ (<qiekuai baogan, 
fen^ao chifan W  f t ^ t S ) .
Consequently, local public services were mainly financed through taxation from 
rural residents, in the midst of which corruption surged, with rural burdens 
increased to unbearable levels. Peasant unrest started on a massive scale, from late 
1992 on, to become a not uncommon scene throughout the nation in the next 10 
years631. In the period 1992-2001, peasant unrest was concentrated on rural taxes 
that spawned wanton charges and corruption, as from 1990 to 2000, rural taxation 
increased over fivefold from 8.7 to 46.5 billionyuarfi61. This problem was gradually 
ameliorated by the introduction of rural taxation reform633. Through rural 
taxation reform, the wanton charges were reduced, but the problem of financing 
local public services was still as acute.
After 2002, with the source of rural taxation drained, this problem of local 
finances was gradually reoriented towards land seizures634 from the peasantry and 
resale to real estate developers. The rural population had been grossly deprived of 
their lands. From 1990 to 2002, 47 million mu o f land were expropriated, resulting 
in 66 million landless peasants, deprived of their basic means of living. It was 
estimated that by 2020, another 40 million peasants will become landless635. Since 
then, rural unrest shifted to concern mainly over land issues. From January to 
August 2004, 87 out of 130 cases of massive rural unrest (67%) were concerning 
land; while 469,000 unlawful land expropriations were reported636.
Side by side with this discarded rural attention and withdrawal of state 
commitment to the countryside, the judiciary also went on an unrelenting process 
of formalisation that not only divorced itself continually from the masses, but 
more importantly, looked to legalism for inspiration. Gone were the revolutionary 
techniques of bringing justice to the countryside which underscored a distinctively 
equitable resolution to mitigate the hardship of a formal, bureaucratic legal system. 
Simultaneously, judicial corruption soared with rampant local corruption, as the 
judiciary and local government were now literally ‘the two locusts tied to the same 
rope’, as the former not only depended on the latter for policy guidance, but also 
for financial support. In an ill-financed local bureaucracy, the judiciary was forced
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to side with the local government in a symbiotic opposition to the peasantry. The 
massive scale of rural unrest attested to the incapacity of a weakened, localised 
judiciary to offer legal protection.
Both the resurgence of local customs and the socio-economic constraints, as 
mutually feeding each other, address the need to revitalise a commitment to rural 
underdevelopment and cultural specificities, upon which the reformist equity is 
based. Here the need for equity mainly points to a legal system that has been 
increasingly formalised, urbanised and bureaucratised. Hardship arises where the 
countryside, due to either custom or socio-economic underdevelopment, finds 
itself ill-adapted to a legal system that has been increasingly aloof from the 
populace in general and the countryside in particular. Equity is called in to mitigate 
hardship as arises out of such ill-adaptations. It is against this general background 
that we start our journey in this chapter.
Section 2  Local M ores and M anners
It would be a mistake to assume that within earthbound China, local mores and 
manners are only or largely unspoken, as the written indigenous village or clan 
rules can be as much, if not more than, unwritten customs637. It is not uncommon 
to see such written rules, often couched in informal terms, as that ‘the owner of a 
field should not be liable for killing any intruding domestic livestock" (shengchu 
xiatian, dasi bupei ‘the inherited buildings can be traded
freely [by the descendants]" (%uye %haiji, maimai %iyou Jfe §  S ) , ‘the
daughter married out into another family is disenfranchised from inheritance" 
(chujia %hinu, %uye wufen ‘the thief committing petty crimes
[within the village], when caught red-handed, may be hung up and whipped on the 
buttocks" {touji mogou, diaoda pigu jT/i5l|§). Certain village rules can
expound in detail the forms of public humiliation such as street parades, pouring 
excrement, stripping nude, or writing words in paint on the back, as proportionate 
to offences. These rules, at a glance, can be quite sophisticated638. Such rules may 
elicit criticism from human rights observers as these punishments are meted out 
without a due process of law and court trial. Whatever these observers might 
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protest cannot belie the wide existence of such autonomous village rules, or 
reduce their politico-legal currency among local residents, as they are not only 
based on local knowledge, but rich in their content of local experiences639.
This might raise certain problems for the judiciary, as it causes vexation not only 
for human rights observers, but for state legal workers. The movie Master Shangan 
the Defendant (1994) provided a vivid account of the legal scenario arising out of 
clashes between local customs and state laws. The unfilial daughter-in-law was far 
out o f the reach of state punishment, due to the long distance to the county centre 
where the local court was based, enclosure of the community by high mountains, 
and the mother-in-law’s infirmity, illiteracy and unwillingness to bring her 
daughter-in-law to court. The upright village head Master Shangan punished the 
daughter-in-law by the local custom of village parade, resulting in the latter’s 
suicide. Now the state intervened, charged Master Shangan with the crime of illicit 
detention and put him in jail. This end is far from equitable, as the state’s 
weakness in righting the wrong and its mistake to punish the right have hurt local 
morals.
This case presents the tussle between local customs and state laws. The unfilial 
daughter-in-law’s inhumane treatment of her mother-in-law is condemnable by 
both law and local mores, but punishable only by legal mechanism as the law 
allows no individual or organisation other than a legitimate state organ (e.g. court, 
police and procutorate) to mete out penalty640. Moreover, instead of public 
prosecution by the procuracy, such unfilialness can only be punished after the 
victim has brought the offender to court through private indictment. And it is 
here that a grave difficulty arises. What if the parents are unwilling to bring to 
court their unfilial children (-in-laws) ? Many parents might choose not to sue their 
children for various reasons, as accusing children for being unfilial might be 
regarded as causing a loss of face, and the parents will be ‘ridiculed’ (rangren 
xiaohua ih A. T§) • A n  interview of the elderly in Huashugou Village, for instance, 
revealed that the parents were unwilling to admit even to their neighbours that 
their children had been unfilial, which is a loss of face. The common excuse was 
that ‘my children are just too busy and we are all fine’641. It was argued that the
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rapid urbanisation has weakened the traditional Way of Filial Piety (xiaodao 
among the younger generation in rural China, especially during the massive 
exodus of young rural labour into the cities. Hence in the countryside social 
welfare became an acute issue642. According to a demographic survey in 2000, 
compared with 65% of the urban residents that live on their pension, 86.1% of 
the rural residents still have to rely upon their offspring for old-age care. This 
dependency brought security but equally counterproductively weakened respect. 
This parasitic feeling of having to depend upon their children for care and security 
not only brought about an inherent reduced self-esteem, but opened up 
possibilities of abuse from the children. In many cases, the parents would be 
unwilling to admit these abuses for fear of losing their children’s support as well 
as scandalously ruining the family’s reputation.
Furthermore, even if parents bring their children to court for successful 
conviction, the issue of enforcement remains prominent. Although there is an 
enforcement chamber {fixing tingjM TlS) of every local court, they are in general 
poorly equipped and ill-resourced. In an increasingly marketised China, the 
judiciary’s attention has been geared towards economic cases where more 
litigation fees could be charged. As a result, the enforcement chamber’s attention 
has been reoriented towards major cases. For such petty family issues as old-age 
care, the enforcement chamber had neither willingness nor resources to commit 
itself on a daily basis to ensuring the unfilial daughter-in-law dutifully 
implemented the court order of filial treatment. By the same token, it would be 
unrealistic to count on the equally ill-resourced local police to enforce the 
decisions. In the midst of this ill-resourced situation exacerbated by the market- 
driven initiative, it will be highly unlikely for either the enforcement chamber or 
the local police to see to its enforcement. Therefore, the legal mechanism presents 
a menacingly unfriendly face to such family abuses, as on the one hand the parents 
might be unwilling to sue their children, while on the other, a decision, if any, 
would be difficult to enforce. In other words, the formal, state legal system can be 
quite powerless and thereby hardly an effective resort for the abused mother-in- 
law. In all probabilities, the unfilial children(-in-law) might go unpunished.
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The state’s weakness to punish such unfilialness would no doubt hurt local 
morals. Within a closely-knit community, any deviance would draw criticism from 
neighbours, let alone a continuous, defiant and bold mistreatment of one’s 
mother-in-law. This would have certainly agonised the upright locals as well as 
wounded local mores. Minor and insignificant as it might be from the state’s 
perspective, this family issue can be prominently sensitive in the local 
environment. For one thing, it would certainly anger many locals to witness 
unfilialness going unnoticed, unpunished and continuing on daily basis. By local 
custom as much, if not more than, as by law, such unfilialness should be duly 
terminated and punished. Where the state law fails to offer effective protection, it 
would seemingly leave the locals with no option but to resort to self-help for 
redress. In this case, Master Shangan as the village head felt both morally and 
pragmatically bound to take action. He turned to the local custom of parade for 
both admonition and punishment.
For the locals, Master Shangan has done nothing wrong, but instead, 
praiseworthily redressed a family injury that had dragged on for too long. The 
daughter-in-law’s suicide had less to do with Master Shangan’s action than with 
her own shame that he should have admonished her with unfilial mistreatment. 
Even if he should be held partially responsible for her suicide, a penalty as light as 
reprimand from government officials would suffice, as his moral uprightness and 
incorruptible personality deserve more politico-legal currency than his action to 
parade the unfilial daughter-in-law. From the state’s perspective, however, this is 
not the case at all. A human life claimed by following the local custom of 
punishment should be answered for, as by law, Master Shangan has illicitly 
restricted another’s freedom, which led to a serious consequence (suicide), for 
which he should be prosecuted and imprisoned643.
This punishment of Master Shangan led to another public anger: that the state 
has punished the wrong person. The unfilial daughter-in-law went unpunished 
while the upright Master Shangan who took actions to redress the irritation was 
now detained. The discrepancy between legal expectation and that from local 
customs and mores led to not only conflict, but a shattered law and order within
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the local community. For one thing, for the local community, there existed a large 
number of local customs and mores by which the balance, peace and order were 
kept644. Yet when the formal laws were introduced, these local ‘folk laws’ became 
problematically obsolete. On the one hand, the formal legal institution is not 
capable of providing legal services to the villagers’ needs; on the other, informal 
legal practices were forbidden. Therefore, it created a dilemma for the villagers: 
due to the ill-resourced formal legal system, the punishable abuse of one’s mother- 
in-law goes unpunished; whilst simultaneously the local residents were forbidden 
to mete out penalties in their own ways. Although Master Shangan can be easily 
blamed for having no knowledge of law, yet a remote formal state law had barely 
benefited local residents. For the rural community bound by un-legal or extra-legal 
rules, the formal legal institution fails to a certain extent to provide appropriate 
‘legal service to maintain the law and order’645. The gap between positive law and 
popular expectations can give rise to grave situations of hardship where equitable 
considerations should be called in to mitigate the vice unintended by legal 
bureaucracies.
The case of Master Shangan points to the lingering effects of moral ideas (filial 
piety in this case) among the Chinese when these moral ideals were no longer 
deemed punishable by law. Filial impiety, for instance, is now regarded as a civil 
duty that involves economic sanction only, while physical abuse of one’s parents is 
placed under the category of ‘bodily harm’ within the Criminal Law. A modern 
departure in official representation from its imperial past is to decriminalise filial 
piety, the contravention of which is no longer regarded as criminal. Despite this 
changed official representation and Westernised legal ideology, among local 
inhabitants neglect of filial piety is still abominable and deserves certain 
punishment. Local customs may vary (such as parading in the village in case of 
Master Shangan), but unanimously neglect of filial piety is held as condemnable.
Civil D isputes Turn into Criminal Offences
In rural areas, there is a tendency for civil disputes to escalate into criminal 
offences, where in places what was rooted in local customs while in others it is
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fuelled by a narrow-minded local patriotism that requires blind, unconditional 
personal loyalty to a local community, either clan- or village-based. This can give 
rise to organised riots where a dispute can lead to mobilisation of support through 
either clan or village-oriented communal bonds. The frequent armed fight (xiedou 
tt-4*) is thereby another vexation for the judiciary, as there was a long tradition 
for local villages or clans to engage in armed fights should disputes arise, triggered 
by the clash of village/clan rules, competition for natural resources or sexual 
scandals. Instead of resorting to a formal legal mechanism for resolution, groups 
are organised, based on village or clan as a unit and engage in violence against 
each other. Such a situation of civil-dispute-tuming-into-criminal-offences 
(min^huangxing is also a basis that calls for equitable considerations to deal
with rural cases. For one thing, criminalisation of such criminal offences, such as 
sentencing all the participants in an armed fight to prison would not solve the 
issue, but rather exacerbate the situation. Resorting to violence is not so much 
because of malevolence as of local tradition. Therefore, the social harmfulness of 
armed fight cannot be readily comparable to such heinous crimes as gang activities 
or mafia riots. However, condoning such armed fights might lead to serious 
consequences of breeding feuds between local clans or communities, spawning 
further conflicts on a larger scale. Therefore, the state would have to opt for a 
stick-and-carrot policy that would equitably address the local issues without 
exacerbating the conflicts.
This equitable practice lies in the judiciary’s resort to mediation rather than 
criminalisation. On this issue, the Supreme Court ordered in no uncertain terms 
that the court, before making decisions, should make efforts at patient, 
painstaking persuasion. Penalties should be minimised, while social education 
maximised. The emphasis should be on the organiser and planner of armed fights 
while leniency should apply to those who are either accessories to facts or 
accomplices. Probation should be meted out where appropriate, while discharge 
from criminal offence may be applicable for those who are first incited, deceived 
or forced to participate in armed fight, only with minor consequences, and later 
show signs of repentance after education. Dispute resolution should be combined
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with solving the fundamental root of the armed fight, so as to prevent further 
contradictions646.
To get a full appreciation of this, we shall turn to a case to see how the judiciary 
could equitably channel such civil-turned-criminal offences. A copper drum 
dispute in 1985 escalated into an organised trespass into the disputant’s house, as 
well as property seizure and blackmailing. Despite criminalising the offenders by 
the legal prohibition on organised trespass647, the local court recognised the local 
custom of attaching great importance to playing a copper drum at funerals and 
chaired a mediation, which led to an apology from the head of the intruding 
village as well as the restoration of property. In another case, angered by his 
fiancee’s elopement, a young man organised an intrusion and property seizure 
from the houses that belonged to his fiancee and to the middleman who made the 
match between his fiancee and a third party. The criminal charges of illegal 
trespass and property seizure were dropped, an application for arrest warrant 
denied, as the prosecutor argued that there is a local custom for the aggrieved 
party to lead his clan into a private residence. In the end, the local court chaired a 
mediation to restore the property648.
These two decisions might sound appalling to legal idealists who can 
conveniendy argue that all public violence should be prohibited and punished by 
the state law. However ardendy we might admire legalism, local realities are 
looming large and there are certain boundaries on how far positive law can travel. 
If  the organiser of the trespass was punished by law, with participants jailed or 
fined, such decisions would surely agonise the locals, as it did not address the 
central issue that caused the stir. In the previous case, it was because of the 
symbolic importance of the copper drum in the local community, without which it 
would be difficult to understand the anger among the locals, where the slightly 
worn copper drum was regarded as a profane blasphemy. The intertwined local 
custom and religious concern were the main cause of the stir. In the other case, 
the trespass was equally based on the local tradition of organising an intrusion into 
the family that withdrew from the betrothal. Both cases, thereby, were based on 
local customs. The state, if not seeking to understand these customs and their
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cause in underlying the local disturbances, would again (like in Master Shangan’s 
case) make a wrong decision by punishing the wrong person. Mediation is the 
ideal solution where both parties were invited with local customs observed, 
emotional wounds patched up and local mores respected. Such an equitable 
consideration would eradicate the root of the conflict and ensure that law and 
order be kept without further or renewed unrest.
If  armed fight refers to civil disputes being converted into criminal offences on 
a massive scale, then criminal offences on an individual basis, such as a physical 
fight, intentional injury or murder, as triggered by civil disputes, are much more 
frequent. The Supreme Court warned against blindly following the legal 
application of capital punishment to serious crimes such as intentional injuring 
resulting in death or premeditated murder. Firstly, the nature and substance of the 
offender’s motivation should be duly considered, especially in separating 
premeditated murder from intentional injuring resulting in death. In the case of 
intentional injuring resulting in death or serious disability, the capital sentence is 
not applicable unless in case of extreme cruelty and with extremely severe 
consequences. Secondly, to apply capital sentence to the offender in premeditated 
murder, the factors to be considered should include whether it leads to the 
victim’s death as well as the overall facts of the case. The capital sentence should 
be meted out with extreme care apropos of the cases of family-, neighbour-related 
civil disputes escalating to premeditated murder. It should be duly separated from 
the premeditated murder of other kinds that seriously harm social security. Thirdly, 
capital sentence with immediate execution should not be applied when the victim 
was mainly responsible for intensifying the dispute. Finally, more stress is put on 
the educational role of the penalty for peasant offenders. If convicted, the court 
should use more non-jail criminal charges, such as probation, detention through 
cooperation with local government, grassroots mass organisations or the 
offenders’ family and friends649.
And it is not only upon these serious offences that local courts should exercise 
equitable considerations. In the cases involving either minor physical battery and 
assault or personal injury, the local court would equally find it necessary to resort
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to equitable methods. Such minor criminal offences are often triggered by 
competition for natural resources, or sexual scandals, for which reason an 
urbanised court would find it difficult to turn a blind eye to adultery in 
earthbound China. For one thing, adultery which was regarded as a crime in 
imperial codes has been decriminalised since the republican revolution. Regarded 
as a private issue, the law no longer regarded it as a punishable criminal offence. 
In the urban areas, the local court would find it either unwilling or troublesome to 
accept such cases. For instance, in 1999, a local court in Sichuan invalidated a 
husband’s will to bequeath a legacy to his adulteress, which was greeted with 
applause from the local masses but vehemently criticised by academia. Such a 
controversial case, however, was rare, as most of the time, local courts in urban 
areas would not accept such cases. The news of a daughter visiting the Central 
Party Disciplinary Unit to report her father who was suspected of adultery had her 
application rejected by the local court first. Moreover, surveys revealed that in 
urban areas there was no unanimously negative appraisal o f adultery. A survey of 
university students in Jilin revealed that only 43.7% opposed adultery, 21.2% 
respondents regarded it as normal, 33.7% regarded it as trivial but would not do it, 
while 1% expressed their admiration of adultery with the wealthy. Another online 
survey showed similar result: out of 7,458 respondents, 36.98% regarded it as ‘a 
product of decadent social morals’, 29.58% regarded it as ‘a modern way of life’, 
23.91% could accept it but would never do it, while only 9.53% regarded it as 
unacceptably condemnable 650 . Therefore, similar to the positive law that 
discharged adultery from criminalisation, among the urban residents there was no 
longer a unanimous negative appraisal of adultery. On the contrary, quite a 
proportion of the respondents either regards it as normal or even cherishes the 
hope of engaging in adultery with the wealthy.
This, however, should not be interpreted as meaning that adultery-related 
conflict would only occur in rural rather than urban China. Such confrontations 
did occur in urban areas as well, albeit on a lesser level. How to deal with a rapidly 
urbanised China and a divided urban community over adultery will equally be an 
issue of equity that requires further research. For one thing, the lingering influence
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of adultery might arguably have significandy abated in urban areas, as shown in 
the previous surveys which indicate a divided attitude towards this issue. However, 
this should not be interpreted as meaning that adultery would cease to be a source 
of conflict in urban China. On the contrary, in places it could give rise to serious 
social confrontations. The case of Internet-based mobilisation as discussed in the 
previous chapter651 was in fact mobilised by a unanimous call to condemn adultery. 
Although the offenders (the wife and the student) committed no adultery in real 
life but were simply engaged in cyber love by chatting, this was interpreted as 
infidelity by netizens who answered the call of ‘condemning the adulterers’. This 
attested to the lingering effect of adultery in China that is being rapidly 
modernised and urbanised. For one thing, a unanimous negative appraisal of 
adultery might cease to exist in the society. None the less, division is one thing 
while eradication of such condemnation is another. The Internet could provide a 
chance for the divided views to be unified. The unanimous call for condemning 
adultery by the netizens involved in the Internet mob action did have their own 
moral justification. In reality, an urbanised China might make it difficult for these 
moralists to be organised. Nevertheless, in daily routine, adultery could still 
become a grave social issue. The previous case of invalidating a formally-valid will 
is one example, while in another, the scenario was even more dramatic. A teenage 
daughter suspected that her father was having an extramarital affair and 
complained to local courts and governments. As all these efforts resulted in vain, 
she sued all the way up to the Central Party Disciplinary Unit in Beijing. She also 
sought media exposure through newspapers, TV and Internet, which negatively 
impacted all the parties involved, including her own family, her family and the 
alleged adulteress. Becoming a national scandal, this has posed a serious issue for 
the formal legal mechanism. It also raises the question of how to deal with the 
lingering effect of adultery in modern China: how it should be solved and through 
what mechanisms are the issues to be studied.
Arguably it would be difficult for a mature legal mechanism to account for 
everything, for even in such a country as the US or UK where law is reputed to be 
the last resort, there have been numerous rejections. For China, however, as the
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current age is a transitional period, adultery-related issues could give rise to serious 
social conflicts. Rather than passively waiting for a bedroom affair to turn into 
serious bodily harm or brawl, the legal mechanism could be activated to prevent 
such transformations. One way that is recommendable would be to revitalise the 
neighbourhood committees that serve to mediate and detect possible uprising of 
civil disputes. The very existence of such grassroots-level organisations could help 
to detect the occurrence of civil disputes and try to resolve the problem in its 
infancy. For this case, the neighbourhood committee, upon hearing the daughter’s 
complaints, could convene meetings between the daughter and father, as well as 
inviting the suspected adulteress to the occasion for clarification, cross- 
examination and mediation. The daughter’s resolution to bring this case to the top 
level authority as well as media exposure lay in the very failure of these grassroots 
organisation to exercise enough initiatives to help solve the disputes. As a matter 
of fact, in a rapidly developing China, when the daughter complained to her 
father’s danwei, or to the local court, she was not attended at all, as no one was 
willing to step in to deal with the affair and occasion a meeting between the 
disputed parties. This failure led to the dejected but even toughened up daughter 
to take it to the top level.
If in an urban area, the authority could comfortably reject the daughter’s 
complaint, then in a rural area it would be more a matter of exigency as inaction 
on the part of the authority might result in serious injury and fights. In 
earthbound China, it is more frequent and much easier for the emotional anger 
and loss of face caused by adultery to escalate to disputes and serious conflicts. 
Even whereas armed fight did not occur, it is less likely that such an affair could 
enjoy a quiet death, acquiescence or indifference. For one thing, in a closely-knit 
community, the husband of the adulteress would in all probability feel violently 
angered by the adultery, which is first and foremost a grave loss of face. He might 
seek violence on the adulterer through physical battery, organised trespass or 
personal injury. Adultery in a rural community, thereby, can easily lead to criminal 
offences. This can create certain difficulty for local courts, where the morally 
wrong victim (the adulterer) is legally protected while the morally right and hurt
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husband is actually culpable for his violent actions. The departure of positive law 
from morals creates a vacuum to deal with adultery-related offences in rural areas. 
Under such circumstance, the local court could devise certain equitable judicial 
techniques to ‘muddle through’, as can be seen from a recent case.
In 1996, W the adulterer brought a suit against M who was Q ’s husband. From 
the very beginning, as M was working in the city away from home, his wife Q 
began a secretive affair with W. Upon coming back, M was infuriated by what he 
found out, claiming that T have no more face to live on in this village’. For this, he 
beat W up a few times, also threatening to kill his family, especially W’s son. The 
village committee tried to mediate the dispute, during which W suggested paying 
M ¥7,000 as one-off compensation for his mental and reputational damage, while 
as a return, M should guarantee to refrain from any further hassle to W and his 
family. This proposal was rejected by M who continued to hassle and threaten W. 
Helpless and intimidated, W sued M in the local court, demanding that M stop the 
tort immediately. This further infuriated M who without any ground filed a 
counterclaim, arguing that the plaintiff had caused damage to his mentality and 
reputation and demanding ¥10,000 in compensation.
The court, upon receiving both claims, did not support or reject either side, but 
tried to mediate between both litigants. First, the court persuaded W to accept a 
week-long detention in the local police station. It was more a temporary lodging 
than a punishment of deprivation of freedom. This detention had certain 
implications, for it was locally perceived as no different from prison service. As 
symbols of state power, authority and punishment mechanisms, both prison and 
the temporary detention centre (normally attached to the local police station) were 
awe-inspiring deterrents. The local court was well aware of this ignorance of the 
legal difference between these two institutions, which was tactfully used during 
bargaining in the mediation process. For instance, the court turned heel on M, 
stressing that W now had received punishment by ‘being jailed behind bars’ 
uolao^i ^  ^  ), which was then used to persuade and pressure M to
compromise.
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In this process of bargaining, the court played an active role of middleman, so as 
to persuade W to cooperate and M to compromise. On W’s side, at least he did 
not contravene the law, as adultery is not a crime and is not outlawed652, while M’s 
fury, though understandable, was unlawful, with his claim hard to substantiate by 
law653. The judge, fully aware of the gap between law and moral expectation, did 
not follow strictly the legal text to solve the dispute, but said, the whole case was 
like a ‘boat floating on a beaconless sea’654. On the one hand, he stressed that W 
had asked for the trouble and thereby deserved some form of punishment. In the 
conversation with W, the judge remarked, ‘Don’t blame M for it...fundamentally 
you are accountable for this. Your illegal behaviour has destroyed their 
relationship and marriage; also it has corrupted public decency. You should see 
yourself liable for these results. All in all, your unlawful conduct was more serious 
[than M’s]’. Here the judge tactfully transferred a moral issue into a legal 
obligation by equivocally stressing that W’s adultery was culpable. He conveniendy 
forgot to mention the exact legal terms by which to penalise W while the 
conversation couched in colloquial terms and styles ensured that his intention was 
well conveyed to W. This culpability was then translated into pressing W to accept 
the judge’s proposal of a short detention in the local police station. The judge 
made it quite clear to W that this detention was not only what he deserved, but 
more importantly, a necessary price to pay to help him out o f the hot water. For 
this, M obediently, happily and appreciatively accepted this proposal.
On the other hand, persuading M to drop his claim and refrain from further 
hassle seemed to be more troublesome, as M, feeling morally upright and 
emotionally hurt, did not submit easily to the judge’s blandishments. As a result, 
the judge had to resort to both legal terms and moral rhetoric to pressure M into 
compromise. At first, he attempted to convince M that his hassle was legally 
punishable, as we can see from their conversations:
The judge: whether W raped your wife is an issue to be investigated by the police 
but what is the reason for you to hassle and ask W for money?
M: I cannot stand it any more. I have no face to live on in this world.
The judge: in terms of law...there is no ground for you to ask him for money 
while by law you should refrain from further tort to the plaintiff.
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Then, in another conversation, the judge turned on a rather humane, moralistic 
face,
‘I can understand how you feel now and your angry behaviour.. .you are hurt 
mentally and in your reputation....now that it has happened, let it be and think 
about it: it will be unreasonable to demand too much or overreact to it. In fact, it 
will be too high to ask him to pay ¥10,000. Think about it: your wife also has 
done something wrong...you should refrain from hassling W any longer, 
otherwise you will be punished by law\
Apart from this legal sanction and moral unreasonableness to demand too high a 
compensation, the judge equally mentioned that W had by now been punished by 
being ‘behind bars’. The difference between a detention centre and a jail, a short 
detention and a prison term, was again conveniendy equivocated. This stress on 
W having received a penalty significandy reduced M’s anger and morally pressured 
him to see to his reason. He started feeling the unreasonableness both in his claim 
and his behaviour, from where he was ready to accept the judge’s mediation 
prescription. In the end a mediation was reached: (1) W paid a lump sum of 
¥8,000 to M; (2) M refrained from any further hassle to W and his family while W 
stopped his adultery with Q; (3) for the litigation fee of ¥600 on this case, W 
would incur ¥400 while M would incur the remaining ¥200. When this mediation 
was reached, W was released from the detention centre. W, instead of complaining 
about this, was grateful to the judge in charge while W brought his wife Q 
together to work in the city655.
What was interesting in this case was not so much the unlawfulness of the
judicial techniques as the judge’s ability to reach a decision acceptable to both
sides. Certainly, the judicial techniques, such as censoring and detaining W,
pressing and reprimanding M, were unlawful. Detention is only applicable for
serious offenders, or police investigation upon arrest656. For W, adultery, though
morally wrong, is not a crime. Deprivation of an innocent individual’s freedom, by
all standards, is unlawful. On the other hand, the judge did not punish M, despite
the fact that he had committed the crime of physical assault and infringing civil
liberty657. One wonders how a judge, knowledgeable of state laws and well versed
in legal practices, could have so boldly relinquished his duty to observe the law, 
191
which could amount to delinquency. However, the judge was well aware that a 
strict observance of law would not solve the dispute, but rather exacerbate the 
conflict. Protecting W while punishing M would not only hurt public morals, but 
would do nothing to eradicate the fundamental root that caused the conflict. 
Consequently, M could be further angered by this blind decision and take extreme 
actions under certain circumstances. A minor physical assault, in all probabilities, 
would escalate to a serious homicide, premeditated murder or serious injury 
resulting in death. Such a consequence would certainly be undesirable.
By comparison, when opting for a colloquial, informal style by alternating 
between legality and morality, legal liability and moral obligation, the judge could 
smoothly pressure, persuade or even coerce both sides into cooperation and 
compromise. With W, the judge stressed that adultery is morally wrong, for which 
W *had asked for trouble* and deserved some punishment. The distinction 
between a moral obligation and legal liability was conveniently unmentioned. As 
for M, he stressed that his behaviour was illegal, unlawful and punishable, while 
simultaneously he emotionally sided with M by emphasising that ‘I can fully 
understand your anger*. This stick-and-carrot persuasive skill had induced M to 
realise that his morally right but legally culpable behaviour could earn him nothing 
but trouble. Moreover, W*s detention also convinced him that he had regained his 
lost face by subjecting W to some punishment by the state authority. With anger 
appeased, he was ready for the mediation proposal by the judge. Both sides were 
grateful to the judge who had convinced both parties that he had done a great 
favour and personally made great efforts. The judicial techniques of taking moral 
obligations into concern, or flexibly switching between moral and legal terms to 
elicit understanding and cooperation, speak a lot for an equitable character that 
the local court should consider in legal practice.
Local Customs: Marriage, Minority and Mores
Minority-specific customs are a big issue in the Chinese legal regime. Therefore, 
earthbound China carries with it a certain element of minority issues. Certain 
ethnic communities had their distinctive traditions, such as the Buyi, Dai
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minorities in Yunnan, or Tibetans in Tibet658. By law, there are five Minority 
Autonomous Provinces (MAPs) in China, namely Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, 
Xinjiang, Tibet and Guangxi, and also autonomous counties/cities as in Guizhou, 
Yunnan, Qinghai Provinces659. These regions enjoy certain legal autonomy, such 
as exemption from the state policy of population control, separate legislation 
concerning marriage or family issues. For instance, the legal age for marriage is 
lower than the national age of 21 and they have their own family laws concerning 
marriage issues660.
Apart from legislative autonomy, in judicial practice, there has been a long 
tradition to offer special treatment to the minorities in the remote border areas 
(bianjiang ft IS) and indigenous habitat (jujudi J^ j^ ilil)661. Since the mid-1980s, a 
state policy called ‘Tm  Less; One Leniency' applied to the minority habitats: ‘Two 
Less’ refers to less arrest and less execution of criminals from minorities while ‘one 
lenieny' refers to the lenient punishment for offenders in general662.
In non-autonomous regions but with a large concentration of minority groups, 
the local judiciary might have an indigenous policy for the minority. The people’s 
procuracy in Guizhou, for instance, had a general principle of ‘preferential 
consideration of the minority customs’ {ghaogu tninyu tedian to
decriminalisation, penalty waiver or leniency despite the state criminal law. For 
instance, among the Miao minority, it is customary for males to carry homemade 
guns and for females to be heavily adorned with silver jewellery. This led to the 
common practice of weaponry possession and silver trading, both allowed by the 
local government despite the criminalisation by the 1979 Criminal Law663. This 
policy continues till today, although silver trading has been dropped from the 
illegal practices while weaponry possession is still outlawed by the 1997 Criminal 
Law.
Bigamy can be common in certain places, where for the Miao, Shui and Buyi 
traditions o f regarding multi-progeny as a blessing by Heaven, whilst sterility is 
condemned as a ‘loss of virtue’ (shide Mi), which will result in disgrace for the 
whole family. In the Buyi community, if the wife fails to conceive a boy or any 
child at all, with or without her consent, it is perceived reasonable for the husband 
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to have a concubine. At times, this may be even initiated by the wife as well as 
encouraged by relatives from one’s clan. Bigamy is not only free from blame, but 
publicly advocated, which at times is celebrated with banquets. In the Shui 
community, from 1978 to 1982,143 bigamies were reported, due to the sterility of 
the wife or her failure to conceive a male heir. Under certain circumstances, the 
concubine was suggested and selected by the wife for the husband. In judicial 
practice, this might be discharged from criminalisation while mediation was 
sought664. In Qinghai, there is a tradition of using kouhuan (verbal calling P  Pfe) to 
conduct divorce instead of legal procedure. This power rests with the husband, 
without whose kouhuan, even if by legal procedures divorce will remain invalid and 
the wife not able to remarry. Otherwise she would be regarded as bigamous and 
the husband she gets remarried to will be publicly despised. With kouhuan, divorce 
could be achieved even without going to court665.
And it is not restricted only to minorities where we find marriage an issue of 
vexation. In fact, throughout the countryside, marriages are conducted ‘by 
preferring customs to law’ (congsu bu congfa For instance, many
marriages in earthbound China are not registered despite legal requirements, 
because for long a banquet is the only legitimate way to announce marriage666. 
Engagement, though not legally required, is customary in many villages, during 
which the male party commonly deposits a trousseau. This can give rise to 
complications when one side decides on withdrawal. Should the dowry be 
returned? If  so, how much? Judicial practice generally requires no return if the 
dowry was given as a gift, unless the dowry were costly and made the sender 
experience difficulty after giving. If requested, the dowry should be returned in 
whole, or in part should the party experience difficulty and unaffordability667.
Moreover, intra-cousin marriage {yibianqin lianyin persisted despite
communist efforts to curb this from the 1940s668. After marriage, more often than 
not, the wife moves into the husband’s family (congfuju h X j§ ) . A son-in-law who 
moves into the female family is negatively referred to as ^huixu redundant
son-in-law) and commonly despised by fellow villagers. The issue related concerns
about the village arrangement of welfare distribution, where a daughter after being 
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married out, is excluded from inheritance, as she is no longer considered as a 
member of the natal family and village669.
Further complications can arise when it comes to the traditional practices that 
have been oudawed, such as pre-age marriage aohun^\®), bigamy (chonghunUL 
$S), incest marriage (Jinqin jiehun S ^ $ j | ) , arranged marriage (baoban hutiyin^Lfy 
$§$0), mercenary marriage {maimai hunyin 5clfe$li$0), marriage of kids (ivawa hun 
child bride (tongyangxi i£ exchange marriage (huanqin Jfe^ )670.
These practices have been outlawed since as early as the revolutionary base 
period671. However, they still persist in a lot of places. According to a news 
coverage out of the 1,388 divorce and cohabitation dissolution cases at the 12 
prefecture courts in Shangrao, Jiangxi Province, 842 marriages had been illegally 
conducted, like pre-age marriage, bigamy and incest marriage672.
The persistence of such traditions, with its ability to resurface in the face of 
withdrawn state control, can be attributed to the retained clan influence in rural 
areas. For one thing, in earthbound China, family relationships were organised by 
patriarchal rules centred on %ongqin ( t k  ^  relatives from patrilineal blood 
relationships) and supplemented by yinqin ($0^1 relatives from the matrilineal 
blood relationships). This bifurcation plays an important role in deciding the 
organisation of family as well as the remoteness/nearness between relatives, but 
also the mode of marriage and the distribution of family properties. Arguably the 
influence of clans persisted in the village elections, dispute resolutions and 
factional fights, even during the peak development of people’s communes in the 
1950s673.
A direct influence of such patriarchal rules is the emphasis on reproduction of 
male offspring with a strong motive of ‘continuing the family line’ (chuan^ongjiedai 
A family without a son might be subject to belittlement from fellow 
villagers. No wonder traditionally there existed a notion of %hongnan qingnii ( f i
preferring male to female offspring). Also, ‘duan^ijuesur? may
you be the last of your line) is still the most malicious curse in rural areas, for 
which the village head’s anger became understandable in the movie Qiujii674.
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This notion led to the persistent rural custom of abandoning female infants or 
adopting children from one family to another, with the receiving family 
reimbursing the natal family with goods or money. At times, a middleman may be 
involved in helping the contact between two families. At a glance, such adoption 
slides into the resemblance of children trafficking, as money is involved in this 
process and it is true that in certain places, adoption became a disguise for naked 
sales and spurred human trafficking, upon which the Supreme Court issued a 
determined resolution in 1999. However, this resolution was not blind to an 
equitable flexibility in guiding judicial practice, as it duly points out that those who 
sell or adopt children due to pressing economic odds or the traditional notion of 
%hongnan qingnii may be discharged from criminal penalty, while only those selling 
children with abominable facts (qingjie elie% s h o u l d  be charged with the 
crime of abandonment In case of adoption-making with consent
of the adopting family, the middleman receiving a certain amount of goods or 
money should also be exempted from criminal penalty675.
And it was not only upon the children issue that clan influence is felt. The 
patriarchical rules in the local traditions can work against the female and impair 
their rights. A remarried widow is forbidden to take any property from her 
husband’s family. In some cases, they might not be able to remarry freely to their 
will unless seeking approval first. For instance, in Sanjiang Village, Jiangxi 
Province, the local custom requires that before remarriage, the widow should seek 
approval from children, household or clan seniors. By remarriage she will be 
automatically disenfranchised from inheritance of her husband’s property. A 
survey revealed that out of the 21 widows in the village, 13 were willing to remarry, 
but only two finally succeeded in gaining consent676. Also, according to the same 
survey, the clan relatives have a top priority in purchasing inheritance as a local 
custom. From 1984 to 1989, there were 41 civil disputes in relation with this local 
custom in the village. Out of the 41 disputes, only 12 were mediated by the local 
court while the remaining 29 were resolved by local customs. Moreover, 146 out 
of the 200 respondents to a survey advocated this local customs, as ‘it is beneficial 
to strengthening the bond of fraternity and clans’677.
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To sum up, local customs, mores and manners point to the categories where 
equitable judicial resolutions can be seen. This largely resulted from the rapidly 
formalised and westernised law that has been disjointed from local contexts. 
Cultural specificities such as filial piety, adultery, civil-turn-criminal offences and 
customs on marriages can be areas where equity is introduced to mitigate the 
rigidity of laws. The next section shall discuss socio-economic conditions — 
another area of importance for us to study equity in today’s China.
Section 3  Local Socio-Econom ic Conditions: A Proactive 
R ole b y  the Court
Apart from the local customs, mores and manners, another prominent factor lies 
in the current socio-economic underdevelopment of the countryside. As a group 
increasingly marginalised and least benefited in the decades long reform, the rural 
residents’ dire situations have demanded that justice be tailored to the current 
needs of rural dwellers. From 1978 to 1985, the state was committed to a balanced 
approach to develop both rural and urban areas. The introduction of Household 
Responsibility System greatly freed economic productivity. With the state’s attention 
pegged to the countryside, a rise in rural income was achieved at an average 
annual rate of 15% in this period. After 1986, with the state’s attention shifted to 
an unequivocal urban bias, rural development was gradually dropped from the 
priority of state concerns. The rural-urban divide became increasingly steep.
Traditionally, a mass line-based people’s justice required the court to play a 
proactive role in going to the masses for investigation, collection of evidence, 
adjudication, mediation and enforcement of decisions. This proactive role played 
by the court, was not only based on the revolutionary tradition of the Party’s 
commitment to the people’s liberation, but also on the very fact of the lack of 
channels for peasant’s voices in China. Where the illiteracy rate was high, peasant 
voices were (and are still) among the least heard in China. Towards the end of 
1990s when local cadre-masses relationship deteriorated, with abundant local 
corruption and rampant suppression of peasant unrests to create a ‘congenial 
environment for investment’, it was not uncommon for peasants to genuflect
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before local or central officials or even stop a running car of the governors to 
express their grievances, which is reminiscent of intercepting the official sedan 
chair in imperial times678.
Illiteracy is only one of the issues, while unfamiliarity with legal procedures is 
another. The revolutionary tradition of the legal education campaign to bring 
justice closer to the masses was resilient. We shall first look at the rise of rural 
contract disputes in early 1980s to see how this proactive role is a necessary 
prescription for the socioeconomic restraints in current earthbound China.
The court did not start adjudication over rural contracts immediately after the 
Economic Contract Law (1981). It was not until 1984 when the First National 
Economic Adjudication Work Conference was held that rural contract disputes 
were officially included into the court’s jurisdiction, with an emphasis to not only 
resolve disputes but assist the CCP and local governments in governing the 
countryside. Prior to that, accepting rural contract disputes depended upon the 
local court’s willingness and resources. In 1986, the Supreme Court delegated to 
local courts the power of adjustment and modification of contract through 
conciliation679. In Shandong, only 19 cases (0.9% of the total cases) were received 
in 1983, which number surged to 12,711 in 1985 and further doubled to 24,557 in 
1986. Such a high turnout rate might seem to be only an isolated case, as by 
comparison in Shaanxi 436 cases on average were received by local courts in the 
1985-9 period. In general, it did underline the increasing acceptance of rural 
contract disputes by local courts in early reformist era680.
In this period, the mass line working style from the revolutionary tradition was 
revived after the Cultural Revolution. The court played an active role in regulating 
the rural contract disputes, without necessarily a plaintiff bringing a suit to court 
as the start of the judicial proceedings. The local courts may conduct ‘investigation 
and examination’, contact the masses, investigate and examine the rural contracts 
and make judicial suggestions to the local Party and government. In 1986, the 
People’s Court of Zhaoyuan County, Shandong, during a local campaign to 
prolong the contract duration for fruit trees, proactively went to the masses for 
investigations, uncovered certain problems and included these and their
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suggestions in a report to the local government, which in due course helped the 
latter to take corresponding measures.
The circuit court was reused in Shandong. First, upon entering the villages, the 
circuit court first contacted the town Party committee681 for: (1) investigation so 
as to find out the quantity, nature, characteristics and cause of economic disputes 
in the village in issue; (2) a legal education campaign: propagating laws and policies 
according to the particularities of each village; (3) assisting the parties to mediate 
with each other; (4) on-the-spot acceptance, investigation and trial of certain cases; 
(5) helping to improve the terms and conditions of contracts in accordance with 
law; (6) helping to institutionalise the management of rural contracts, such as 
training contract management staff, establishing contract management teams in 
the village to supervise contract formation, urging the carrying out of contract 
obligations or mediating in contract disputes682.
The circuit court paid special attention to two types of case: one that involves 
unjust town cadres or their relatives and the other local recalcitrants. Adjudication 
of both types helped to raise the court’s authority, achieving the effect of 
‘adjudicating one case leads to resolution of the whole series’683. The bad effect of 
local recalcitrants could be enormous: as local residents might look to these 
recalcitrants for example, deliberately delaying or defaulting on their contract 
obligations. In 1986, the People’s Court of Lishu County, Jilin compulsorily 
executed a contract where the contractor refused to pay fees and taxes for 3 years. 
The court director, realising that similar cases must exist in other villages, led over 
50 judicial workers into 22 villages, investigating and campaigning for contract 
performance. Within 20 days, local governments received delayed or defaulted 
taxes of over 13 millionyuatfiu .
Apart from on-the-spot investigation and trial, the court emphasised persuasion 
skills such as ‘mainly through legal education’, ‘reasoning, propagating policies and 
disseminating laws’, ‘carrying out mental-political persuasion’685. In Zhangjiakou, 
Hebei, the local courts conducted similar legal education campaigns, with which 
most defaulted residents performed contract duties or made plans for 
performance. The minority recalcitrance were sued by village committees in the
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court and resolved through on-the-spot investigation and trial. Within 2 weeks, 62 
cases were received and resolved686. In Huaide County, Jiangsu, out of the 310 
rural contract disputes, only two were tried: one tort case, the other concerning 
compensation. Most of the cases were solved through persuasion and mediation687.
Such persuasion skills are still widely used nowadays by grassroots courts688. By 
law, the parties are allowed to use their dialects at courts689. In judicial practice, 
speaking the local language not only covers the local tongue, but a persistent 
effort to reason with the parties in a language plain and understandable to them. A 
young university graduate who became a judge in a grassroots court was rudely 
greeted by a rural resident in his house when he used hard legal jargon to threaten 
the latter into paying tax. He was thrown out, with his pair of glasses shattered. 
Such stories may be amusing to read, but it did attest to the necessity o f using 
plain language to reason with the rural residents. In the following, we shall first 
examine the necessity of speaking the local language in dealing with mral cases.
Speaking the Local Language
As aforementioned in Chapter 2, part of the revolutionary tradition of people’s 
justice lies in its antiformalism and antibureaucratism, for which the laws were 
made not only accessible but also intelligible in plain, local languages. This means 
more than just linguistically speaking the local dialects, but also communicating 
with the locals in plain ways, rather than using the formal, hard legal jargon. This 
plain way of communication is of great significance in judicial practice in the 
countryside, where the increasingly complicated legal procedures and law terms 
could be intimidating to the rural residents who are less likely to afford or have 
access to regular, state-sponsored legal aid. Therefore, between the judiciary and 
the rural residents, using plain, local language becomes of first-rate importance. 
Judicial techniques include ‘following local customs, saving face’ (jiang renqing gei 
mian^i ffi~P), ‘clarifying the facts, speaking a tongue of reason’ (bai shishi,
jiang daoli to name just a few. In the following case, we will see
how the judges deal with the locals in plain ways rather than the formal legal 
procedures:
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In 1987 a peasant in North Shaanxi province, close to the desert, borrowed a 
short-term loan of ¥200 from the Town Credit Bank (TCB, xinyongshe {ff^ ^ i) 
with a term of three months. The TCB had tried different means to contact him 
for the loan but all availed no result. In 1997, with the propaganda of ‘recovering 
bank loans by law’ (yifa shoudai flSc'Sfe®) by the local government, the TCB 
applied to the local court for a loan recovery claim. A chamber leader (CL, 
ting%hang$k^ C) from the local court led the employees from the TCB to recover 
the loan. They rented a car from the Agricultural and Industrial Department from 
the local government, but also asked a local police officer to come with them, so 
as to strengthen their authority {^ huang shengsbi ^ . Also, three investigators 
from Beijing universities also got the chance to accompany this ‘team’.
Upon arriving at the village, the chief justice first of all went to find the village 
head (VH, cun^ hang ^  ix:) who led them to the house of the debtor (D). 
Unfortunately D was out foraging, so VH went to fetch him. When D returned 
home, he ushered everybody to sit down on his bed without taking their shoes 
off (as a local courtesy to visitors). Then he made tea and offered cigarettes. 
When learning that the three investigators were from Beijing, he said that he had 
‘gravely lost face’ (dadie mian i^ ^ M “J1).
Then, the court was opened on the bed. The TCB and CL first claimed that D 
had another defaulted loan, which D denied and named the witness. Putting this 
loan aside, CL questioned why he had failed to pay off the current debt of ¥200. 
To this, D responded that he had no money, together with other excuses of 
financial destitution. Also, he mentioned a rumour popular among his folks: by 
1997, the local government would write off all the debts loaned to peasants.
CL denounced this rumour straightway and asserted that this was a case of 
‘debt recovery by law’, where D should repay ¥700 for the loan and interest in 
the past 10 years, as well as incur the recovery fee of ¥200 for transportation, 
litigation etc. For this amount of money, D claimed that he was unable to repay 
so much.
At this moment, VH stepped in. First he reprimanded D for defaulting the loan. 
Then without consulting CL and TCB first, he proposed that as long as D could 
pay off the ¥700 of loan plus interest, then the recovery cost of transportation
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and litigation would be ‘waived’, as VH himself would use his face to win this 
favour (ding renqing TPl A  tit) for D.
To this proposal, CL did not object. Instead, he supported VH’s proposal. He 
asserted that this was a case of mediation, therefore the 15% fine was not 
counted in. Moreover, if D would not accept this, then he would be summoned 
in front of the local government, at which time he would be dealt with by the 
state law and the fines would be imposed. Then he would lose more face with a 
graver consequence. With all of the ‘threats’ and intimidating information, CL 
added, ‘The reason we are doing this now is for your own sake’. Finally D agreed 
and repaid the loan690.
What was interesting in this case was that not a single legal procedure was 
followed, although it was claimed to be a case of ‘recovering bank loans by law’. 
The judge dealt with the debtor in obviously informal, plain ways, whereas law 
and procedures were at best mentioned and used as a ‘threatening’ bargaining chip. 
Instead of speaking the formal language of legal duty and right, the judge was 
rather using colloquial terms to emphasise the moral obligation to repay the 
loan691. Personal favour was stressed, making the debtor morally and emotionally 
pressured to cooperate, which judicial technique was equally used in the 
abovementioned case of adultery where the judge persuaded W into accepting 
detention and pressured M into compromise. For one thing, in a closely-knit 
community, emphasising personal relationships is more effective in soliciting 
cooperation than stressing due process of law or strict observance of legal 
procedures. Abstract legal constructs or jargon hardly make sense in an enclosed 
rural space while by comparison, right and obligation can gain concrete forms in 
the personalised, colloquial terms. This is the same reason why the chamber leader 
also threateningly mentioned the possibility of ‘losing face’ among local residents 
by summoning the debtor in front of the local government, for losing face to 
certain extent is a penalty of significance understandable in local languages.
Certainly the judge does not need to follow local customs all the time, as more 
often than not, using plain language to make the parties see reason will suffice to 
solicit their cooperation. The judge would analyse the case and hold on to the core 
to reason with the parties. Persuasion skills and tactics would then be meticulously 
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carried out to pressure the parties into compromise or cooperation, which can be 
seen from a recent case:
In Village B, Lian entrusted to Hu a builder the construction work of his house. 
When the house was nearly completed, Lian heard that a broken bricklayer’s 
cleaver was left in the walls. This, according to local superstition, is an ill omen 
that will lead to catastrophes. By accident at that time the Lians were experiencing 
a chain of calamities: the elder son’s family was afflicted with a traffic accident, 
during which both the parents died, leaving their 3-year-old daughter as an orphan; 
while simultaneously the younger son fell ill and was being hospitalised. For Lian, 
all of these unfortunate events were linked with the broken cleaver that allegedly 
was left in the walls. For this reason, he demanded that Hu remove it, without 
which he wouldn’t pay the construction fees. From Hu’s side, he denied having 
left a broken cleaver in the wall. Instead, he took it that Lian’s real intention was 
to default on the payment. With the dispute unresolved, Hu brought Lian to the 
local court. At the court, Lian did not deny the fact that he had failed to pay Hu 
the fee, but he nonetheless was very resolved that Hu remove the broken cleaver 
first. Otherwise he would even die rather than pay.
When the court was adjourned, the judge found a chance to have a private word 
with Lian, ‘First, [as the saying goes], to pay off the debt is what you must do. He 
built the house for you. Now that you have already moved in, then what’s the 
reason not to pay? Secondly, you need to prove that Hu had left a broken cleaver 
in the wall. If you don’t have the evidence, how can we make sure? Thirdly, the 
hearsay of a broken cleaver in the wall as an evil foreboding is nothing but 
superstition. It is not scientific at all’692.
It is not difficult to tell, even at a glance, that this is a simple contract dispute. 
Duty and right for both sides were clear: Lian was bound to pay Hu the 
construction fee, which Lian did not deny; nor did he deny the fact that he had 
defaulted on the due payment. It is a non-contestable dispute case where the basic 
facts were crystal clear. At a modern court, this case could be solved within five 
minutes in all probability. However, the judge still spent a lot of time and effort 
on persuasion. Instead of comfortably sitting in a chair to give orders, the judge
203
stepped down, spoke a language understandable to the defendant and tried his 
best, not so much to make the latter accept the court decision as to implore him 
to see reason. First he pointed out that the defendant’s excuse was indefensible, as 
it is commonsense that one should pay off the debt he owes, ‘to pay off the debt 
is what you should do’. This proverb gives an intelligible footnote in a plain 
manner. In the following, colloquial terms like ‘show the evidence’, ‘not scientific 
at all’ had a certain effect upon shaking the defendant’s false belief and make him 
feel that his conduct had been unreasonable. From this it followed naturally that 
the defaulter should duly make the payment693.
Now suppose the judge had used formal terminologies and legal jargon. 
Concerning the evidence, the judge could have authoritatively addressed Lian, ‘By 
law the debtor has the duty to pay off the creditor. I hereby command you to pay 
off the plaintiff for his construction work. Secondly, by legal principle of burden 
of proof, I demand that you produce sufficient evidence to support your claim.’ 
These words might in all probabilities produce nothing but bewilderment and 
confusion on the villager Lian. Emotionally wounded and intellectually befuddled, 
he might go further down his extremist path, as he had already threatened to 
commit suicide rather than pay the fee from the very beginning. Formal, legal 
language would apparendy do no better than plain, local and colloquial terms to 
press Lian to see his rationality. As soon as this sense of rationality, responsibility 
and reasonableness was restored, Lian could be expected to fulfil his duty of 
payment. The judge’s attention to the core issue in dissuading Lian from his 
superstitious belief, rather than stressing his legal duty of payment, accorded with 
the tradition of speaking local languages.
Informality, Formality and Legal Format
The 1997 debt recovery case as analysed in the previous section has another issue 
of interest for mention: despite all the informal negotiations, bargaining, 
threatening and following local customs, all such informality disappeared when 
this case was later filed in documents. Termed as ‘mediation’, the documents filed 
were formatted and legalised. From the file, it seemed that everything had been
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conducted very much in accordance with the legal requirements and procedures694. 
Processing the documents into required legal formats is understandably necessary 
for archiving purposes as much as to stand up to performance assessment by 
superior officials. This necessity, however, is not the point where our attention 
stops, but rather beyond it, points to the thorny issue of a constant battle between 
rustic informality and the requirement of legal format in the rural 
operationalisation of justice. For one thing, within a rural community with low 
mobility, formality through literate record is of relatively low importance due to 
tighter personal ties, better acquaintance and closer contact. The transactions, 
interactions and negotiations are done in a rather informal way. For instance, 
verbal promise plays a far greater role than written contract in employment or 
business in the countryside. The legal significance of such informality is not 
discernible until a dispute arises, where the verbal promise can be difficult to 
verify through written record. It leads to an inevitable clash with the requirement 
of legal format by law, which stresses formality, written evidence and logic 
inference. We shall turn to a case695 for illustration.
In 1984, a villager A, due to financial austerity, borrowed RMB¥300 from B, who 
is from another section of the village. Together with his own ¥300, he used the 
total ¥600 to buy a buffalo. In 1987, B lost his own farm catde, which he co­
raised with others. For this reason, he asked to co-use A’s catde. A claimed that 
at that time, A and B reached a gendeman’s agreement, that A had no need to 
repay the loan of ¥300, which was then regarded as B’s joining fee to be taken on 
board in co-raising the catde (dahuo while A ensured B’s use of the farm
catde every year whenever he wanted to and the ownership of the catde rested 
with A. On B’s side, he claimed that when entering this agreement, the catde was 
estimated to be worth ¥600. A also added later that he got ¥1,100 for selling this 
catde the next year.
In the following nine years, both parties acknowledged that A had always 
ensured that B have catde to use whenever he wanted to, although there had 
been quarrels many times over the time arrangement, while B did not invest one 
more penny into the catde. In addition, B claimed that for two years he did not
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use the cattle at all when he had contracted his land to someone else, which A 
neither denied nor acknowledged.
In these nine years, A renewed the catde by selling the old and buying a younger 
one three times on his own. For A, the main purpose of renewing the catde was 
to ensure the workability of the catde. Otherwise after more than 10 years, the 
original catde would become too old to work. B knew of these renewals 
afterwards, but he never raised an objection. In June, 1995, the female buffalo A 
bought gave birth to a calf and after being raised by A for nearly a year, the calf 
was sold at ¥1,000. Similarly, A neither informed nor shared the income with B. 
A month later, B came to A’s home, asking to use the catde, upon which he took 
it away. A few days later, A learned that B had sold the catde at ¥1,400.
For this, A brought a suit against B to local court, claiming the ownership of 
the catde and that B only had the usage of the catde. For A, this is a case of dabuo 
(co-raising the catde), for which B was only entided to use the catde, but the 
ownership rests with A. For this reason, B should return the catde and reimburse 
the economic damage. For B, he claimed that the oral agreement in 1987 was a 
hehuo (partnership iiitk) agreement instead, with which he should be entided to a 
share of the income.
The problem with this case, however was that neither A or B could fully 
substantiate their claims. For A, his claim of exclusive ownership was 
unsubstantiated by evidence, but B acknowledged that ‘I can’t raise cattle. 
Whenever I raise one, it dies. So I rather let A do it [raise the cattle]’; while for B, 
his claim of entering the partnership by providing ¥300 half the investment could 
not be incontrovertibly corroborated by evidence. The witness who testified this 
claim was B’s relative and did not get along with A. Plus, the witness could only 
remember that both parties talked about the estimated price of the cattle, while 
the details he could not remember.
After investigation, the judge of the first instance court ruled that this case is of 
partnership, for which reason the benefit generated during this period should be 
shared equally. However, as B failed to fulfil his duty of raising the cattle, in 
principle he should have his share proportionately reduced. By this decision, B not 
only claimed back the ¥300 he invested in the cattle, but also had a share of ¥360
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of the income. The reason for such division, according to the judge, was that out 
of the total income of ¥1,800, B should first of all pay for A’s labour in raising the 
catde, which is (120 annually x 9 years =)¥1,080. The remaining (1,800 — 1,080=) 
¥720 should be divided evenly, namely ¥360 each.
Unsatisfied, B appealed against the decision. The appellate court overruled the 
original verdict for ‘failing to ascertain the facts and without sufficient proof 
(shishi buqingf %hengju Therefore, the trial should be re­
opened. Also, the intermediate court issued a letter of opinion asking: (1) whether 
B’s investment gained him only usage right of the cattle or was rather a common 
joint ownership (gongtong gongyou ^nI^I^nW)696? (2) Upon investment, how much 
was its market value at that time?
Upon reopening the trial, a new collegiate court was formed to hear the case, 
where neither party produced any new evidence. The re-trial judge ruled that the 
original buffalo was a property of common joint ownership. The original 
investment should be divided evenly while the benefit generated during the joint 
ownership period should be divided reasonably. As B failed to fulfil his duty of 
co-raising the cattle, he was entitled to only a proportionately reduced share. By 
this, besides the ¥300 B invested, he should get ¥650 of the income. A was not 
satisfied with this decision but did not appeal697.
As a matter of fact, this case is far from complicated. Although many facts in 
this case are hard to ascertain or supported by proofs, this did not prevent the 
dispute from being resolved. For instance, whether it was hehuo or dahuo from the 
beginning, whether it was common joint ownership or only right to usage, these 
factors might, but not necessarily, influence the final outcome of distribution of 
benefits. For Su, in the light of this, there is no fact which is not ascertained in 
terms of solving the dispute. Two facts that played a decisive role in influencing 
the decision were acknowledged by both litigants: 1) in the very beginning, both 
parties invested; 2) for the past nine years, A had been making efforts to raise the 
farm cattle, while B did not invest either labour or financial resources. Therefore, 
whether it be a common citizen with an impartial, just conscience, a well-trained 
jurist or a professional judge that preside over ascertaining the facts, it will be
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difficult to deny that by either intuition or the social obligations, both investments 
should be respected while A should have more share in the distribution of benefit. 
Or to put it simply, A should proportionately have more of the benefit. As a 
matter o f fact, whether it was the judge of the first instance, or of the re-trial 
collegiate court, these two points were reiterated while ‘A should proportionately 
have more share of the benefit’ was emphasised under both circumstances. 
Therefore, whether it be the original judgement or the retrial, this is the real 
foundation that serves as guidance for the judicial decision, which did not require 
complicated logical analysis or legal reasoning. Even laws needed not to be 
consulted much. For one thing, the detailed distribution of benefits was neither 
regulated in laws nor could possibly be deduced from principle or jurisprudential 
concepts. The rationale for this decision has less to do with law than to do with 
commonsense698.
Despite this commonsensical underpinning, this case had certainly 
demonstrated a gap between the local practice, namely dabuo, and the legal 
concept, i.e. hehuo between the two litigants. Although the two trials did not differ 
much in terms of the final decision, it did capture the judge’s effort to strike a 
balance between these two concepts, or to legally format a locally informal 
concept.
First of all, dahuo is only a term used by locals while not recognised by law. The 
law regulates not dahuo, but only hehuo in its formality, terms, conditions, operation 
and benefit distribution699. Su defined dahuo as ‘vaguely means that B is only 
entitled to usage, not ownership of the cattle’, [in which sense] B does not enjoy 
the entitlement comparable to A’. By local customs, dahuo means ‘if the catde dies, 
the loss should be born by the party who is in ownership of the catde. He should 
even return the dahuo fees back to the dahuo party who is free from risks o f any 
kind. If it is a hehuo, then both parties should bear the risk of losing the catde’700.
However, a thorny question remains, as in the difficulty of incorporating the 
concept of dahuo into a legal language that refuses to recognise it. The cattle was 
not properly valued by market price from the very beginning. Therefore, whether 
B’s investment (¥300) is an equal investment (pingdeng c h u fg ^^ f tijSt) or dahuo
208
fee (dahuo feiyong SH^C ) is hard to determine. If the cattle were worth ¥600,
then it was an equal investment and this should be regarded as a hehuo. If the cattle 
were worth more than ¥600, then that meant A had invested more into the catde 
than B and at best B can only be said to have dahuo. This was actually shown in 
the court debate:
The judge (asking A): In 1987, when (you and B were] dahuo, how much was the 
value of the catde that you were raising?
A: ¥1,000.
The judge'. On what grounds?
A \ The market value at that time
The judge-. Is there anyone that could corroborate that your catde would be worth 
¥1,000 at that time?
A: C from D village.
The Judge: Is he capable of valuing your catde in 1987? ...in 1987, when you were 
dahuo, B invested ¥300. Did you two have a third party to value your catde?
A;. No, we did not. Only B, his wife and I were there at that time.
The judge: When B joined, you two did not have the catde valued. Then now you 
claim that the catde was worth ¥1,000. Any evidence?...now you have problems 
with each other while you are not able to produce any proof to support the 
¥1,000 value of your catde. How are you going to deal with it?
A: It is up to you [the Court] to decide it.
The judge:. Since you have no evidence for valuing the catde at ¥1,000, we can only 
estimate it at ¥600, as you did not have it valued at that time. Now can you 
produce any proof? Objectively, the investment for hehuo should be of equal 
amount. If you have objections, produce evidence to our court within 48 hours. 
If no evidence is produced within 48 hours, we will decide it in accordance with 
law.
The judge started from the concept of dahuo and ended by adopting hehuo instead.
Su attributed this to an imperative of legally formatting the dispute701. For one
thing, dahuo, as a concept not recognised by law will become troublesome for the
judge, for it lacks the legality necessary for judiciary support, especially in the
current age that stresses ‘dealing in accordance with law’ (yifa banshi
and an appellate system emphasising legal formality and legality over moral 
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considerations. For the judge, if he wants to have his decision sustained when 
appealed, he must seek to find legality for the concepts used in his decision. He 
should, first o f all, fit this case into the nomenclature of state law and attribute as 
much legality as possible into his decision. Therefore, it means that from the very 
beginning he should avoid this concept of dahuo which is not recognised by law. 
In summary, the reason why the judge opted for hehuo was not so much because 
hehuo can better define the A-B relationship than dahuo (in reality it is the other 
way around), as because dahuo as a concept is not recognised by the current laws 
and requirements of legal formality. Therefore, through defining the facts in legal 
language as hehuo from the very beginning, this thorny issue of ‘legal 
recognisability of dahuo’ immediately vanishes. He can then smoothly apply the 
law to this case without difficulties and make his decisions as sound and 
unchallengeable as possible even when it was appealed or reviewed by the 
appellate court.
On the appellate court’s side, faced with this thorny question of fitting dahuo 
into law, it resorted to another legal concept for guidance, namely the joint 
ownership. By law, there are two kinds: co-ownership by shares {anfengongyouj$lft 
;W*W) and common joint ownership. Co-ownership by shares means that the 
parties involved share the income and debt of the ownership proportionately by 
shares, while for the common joint ownership, the parties share the income and 
debt evenly. Therefore, this legal concept may help to solve this case in better legal 
language, as it does not need to distinguish dahuo or hehuo, but just implicitly regard 
dahuo as a form of joint ownership. Under this concept, the judge then further 
seeks to ascertain whether it is a co-ownership by share or a common joint 
ownership, depending on whether B’s investment was an equal investment or only 
dahuo fee.
Therefore, although the appellate court overruled the original decision with 
reasons of ‘failing to ascertain the facts and without sufficient proof, it did not 
differ in essence from the Court of First Instance, namely both of them having 
tried to fit the facts into legal language. Their only difference is the different legal 
concepts that they tried to fit the facts into. For this very reason, Su rightly
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observed that the two issues raised in both the court o f first instance and the 
Intermediate Courts reply, i.e. ‘whether this dispute is dahuo or hehuo’ and whether 
the cattle is common joint ownership or only right to usage’, did not concern the 
facts per se, but rather how the facts could be translated into legal language. It does 
not change the underlying belief that A should proportionately have more share of 
the benefits. The decision can be made to look more lawful, but did not alter this 
underlining belief. Therefore, this is rather an issue of ‘formatting the facts in legal 
languages’, or ‘scissoring the facts so as to assign legality to the facts’702.
Qiujii: Patching Up Emotions and Relationships
So far, our discussion of informality that is distinctive o f the operationalisation of 
justice within rural areas might give a wrong impression that as long as paperwork 
is provided, the difficulty of this tug of war between rustic informality and legal 
format could largely disappear. Therefore, the solution to prevent such difficulty, 
one might argue, is to conduct a legal campaign to call on using paperwork for 
transactions or employment in the countryside, or to improve the literacy level so 
that everybody would be armed with the ability to read and write.
Such a view of the informality is at best reductionist. To a certain extent, the 
argument as outlined above stands a chance of ameliorating the current legal 
tussle with informality in earthbound China. For instance, in the farming cattle 
case, if written evidence could be produced to verify the market value of cattle in 
1987, then the local court would find it relatively easy to determine the 
relationship between A and B as either dahuo or hehuo, ownership by share or 
common joint ownership, from where the local court’s decision would be able to 
sustain reviews and appeals, instead of re-trial. It would be unnecessary thereby 
for the judge to have a lengthy conversation with A over the original market value 
of the farming catde. Form does to a certain extent speak of what, how and why 
informality vexes the local court.
However, informality does not stop here, as it contains another layer of meaning
that points to the substance (or content) of the claim. As we can see from this
farming catde case, despite the form, the equitable belief that A should
proportionately have a greater share of the benefit was the true and de jure reason 
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for the judicial decision. Above all, subscription to this intuitive belief was 
understandable and acceptable, as the appellate court did not challenge this 
equitable discretion from the judge. However, we might further ask: what if the 
claim by the plaintiff were different from what could be legally supported? How 
can the judge deal with informality that is in substance rather than in form? What 
if the popular demand of justice is beyond what the law can afford? We shall first 
turn to the movie Qiujii for illustration.
The movie was set in a countryside of Northwest China, where a trifling quarrel 
broke out between a villager and the village head, the former cursing the latter 
‘May you die without sons and be the last of your line* (duan^ijuesun ®T 
This was a serious verbal abuse of the village head who had no son but four 
daughters703. It immediately infuriated the latter so much that he started a tussle 
with the villager, during which he kicked the latter’s private parts and injured him. 
This fight, however, did not end here. The victim’s wife — Qiujii argued that 
although it was reasonable for the village head to kick during a fight, he should 
not have kicked her husband’s ‘important [private] part’, started on an ardent 
journey to seek shuofa (admission of culpability iftyi;704), which means that she 
wanted the village head to be reprimanded by the superior officials and also the 
latter should apologetically admit wrongdoing, thereby restoring her lost face in 
the village705.
This trifling incident failed to receive enough attention from the judicial 
assistant in the countryside, who tried to mediate between both sides. This effort 
failed as the village head, though agreeing to pay a medication fee for Qiujii’s 
husband, refused to admit wrong. His adamant arrogance hurt Qiujii so much that 
she brought the case upward through the judicial bureaucracy until it reached the 
municipal level. After painstaking efforts as well as with assistance of a lawyer, the 
government ordered the police to investigate. In the end, by law the village head 
was charged with a misdemeanour penalty (%hian chufa and punished
with a 15-day detention in the police station (xing^hengjuliu J@). At the end
of the movie, when told of this decision, Qiujii was, instead of pleased, quite
perplexed, ‘Why did you guys arrest him [the village head]? I only want a shuofa.’ 
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She ran after the police vehicle until the border of the village with puzzlement 
upon her face. She did not understand why the operation of law was so different 
from her expectation.
This movie points to the other level of informality, namely a request for justice 
to be done in a way that could only be understandable in a local context. This 
localised, ruralised sense of justice can depart from the formal state legal system 
that is not only essentially urbanised, but with an indisputable emphasis on 
uniformity. First of all, it concerns the concept of harm. The curse was perceived 
to have done serious insult and harm in local context, where the village head’s 
outburst of anger was understandable as he had no male heir but only four 
daughters. By comparison, the verbal abuse was not deemed harmful by the state 
law, as it was only a remark and no more than an evanescent verbal expression. 
Therefore, Qiujii’s husband was not even in the least considered wrong or liable 
by law706. On the other hand, physical battery and assault is strictly forbidden by 
law, as it infringes upon the legally protected civil rights and liberty707. But for 
Qiujii, it was justifiable for the village head to kick her husband due to the 
venomous abuse. This relates to the second issue of justifiability, where the law 
departs again from Qiujii’s expectation. Qiujii did not question the justifiability of 
kicking per se, but rather she only retorted where the village head could kick. In 
other words, it is not the act of kicking, but where to kick that mattered. For the 
law, it is the other way around, concerned rather with forbidding kicking per se 
than with which part was kicked.
Consequently, in terms of punishment, there is a gap between the law and 
Qiujii’s expectation. Since the law only forbids physical injury in general and does 
not specify which part of the body is justifiably kickable or otherwise, it does not 
exempt, extenuate or aggravate punishment as to the particular parts being injured 
during the fight. Therefore, in the end, the village head was found to cause only 
slight injury, irrespective of whether the injury was on the private part or 
otherwise. He did not have the punishment aggravated simply because he kicked 
the ‘wrong’ part on Qiujii’s husband and even if he had not kicked the ‘wrong’ 
part, he would not have been exempt from punishment. More essentially, the legal
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punishment of 15-day administrative attachment differs from Qiuju’s demand for 
shuofa. The law does not incorporate shuofa as a corrective mechanism to solve a 
rising dispute. A modernised legal system can at most restrict the latter’s freedom 
as a form of punishment for such minor injury; while, for Qiujii, what she desired 
was a reprimand from the superior officials and an apology from the village head. 
She did not desire the latter to be jailed. Her request for shuofa, thereby, was 
completely ignored708.
Therefore, in terms of the concept of harm, there is a gap between the law and 
Qiuju’s expectations. Partly the reason lies in the fact that a modernised legal 
system rarely, if ever, serves the purpose of restoring harmony and balance in 
interpersonal relationships within the countryside. The contemporary Chinese 
legal system is increasingly modelled on the Western, individualist forms, for 
which it seeks to operate on a system of right and wrong strictly bound in legal 
terminologies. Such a legal system cannot accommodate the requests by the 
villagers and it will not take into account the detailed balances of human 
relationship in the local environment. Qiuju’s shuofa undeniably had carried a rich 
sense of repairing emotional hurt, unbalanced relationships and loss of face. Such 
an emotionally-oriented request differs in every respect from what an urbanised 
legal system can afford. For instance, in the case of Qiujii, although the village 
head kicked her husband, he sent Qiujii when she was in labour to a hospital far 
away through the snow-blocked mountains. Such favour can also partly be the 
reason why Qiujii did not desire the village head to be jailed. In another instance, a 
lawyer suggested that Qiujii sue the police bureau with an administrative claim. 
Qiujii declined this suggestion as the director of the police bureau had kindly 
offered help to her before. Therefore, Qiuju’s shuofa does not seek so much to 
avenge the village head by severe punishment as to restore the balance of 
relationships within the village. It was not even concerned with material interests 
but only a patch-up of her emotions and face709.
Finally, when the village head went with all pains to carry Qiujii to hospital 
before delivery, the latter felt that her emotional creases were largely ironed flat. 
This kind act, according to Qiujii, could offset the past emotional hurt caused by
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the village head’s arrogance. Therefore, in the banquet, Qiujii was whole-heartedly 
preparing for the village head’s visit. This would be a perfect chance for her to 
repair this emotional break between the two. The shuofa quietly evaporated. 
However, the coming of a medical examination report changed the whole 
situation, as breaking a rib is regarded by law as a personal injury. For law, it 
changed the nature of the case from a commonplace brawl into that of personal 
injury (renshen shanghai), by which the village head should be jailed for 15 days due 
to his act. For Qiujii, the case did not change in nature or substance at all. For her, 
what was done could not be undone and her point of petition was not upon injury 
from which her husband suffered, but rather pressing the village head to apologise 
for his arrogance. Her seeking of justice was thus concentrated on an emotional 
request, which the modern Chinese law could not afford. This is the reason why 
in the end, she was so perplexed. As she ran after the police car in which the 
village head was sitting, being arrested, she yelled, ‘Why? I was only seeking a 
shuofct. However, for Qiujii, justice was not done and only later when the whole 
case was settled, injustice was suddenly brought about.
At this point, we might ask: then, what should the law be expected to do? 
Modernisation is certainly required as China is developing so fast that the nation 
could not afford to sticking with an outdated legal system. A modernised law did 
fill the legal vacuum of a much capitalised economy and increasing interactions 
with the outside world. Rapid urbanisation also rendered it necessary to have an 
upgraded legal system that could deal with increasingly complex day-to-day 
transactions, be it social, economic or political. If  the law could not provide what 
Qiujii was after, could we safely suggest that the law just left it alone? As we can 
see in Qiuju’s case, several options from the law did not satisfy Qiujii at all, for 
which she petitioned all the way up to the municipal level. Then, despite this 
unsatisfactory result from the legal system, eventually her shuofa disappeared, not 
because it was granted or solved, but because it was written off on the balance 
sheet of her emotions. One might argue, from this point, that the law should do 
nothing and let such emotion-based shuofa to work out by itself.
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Such a suggestion might exonerate judges currently working in local courts from 
the tiresome, tedious and low-(or non-)profit mediation in local areas. However, it 
would not satisfy the legal needs of rural residents. For another thing, if left 
unattended, the dispute could escalate to altercation, physical brawl, or even 
armed fight between the two families or clans. For one thing, although leaving the 
dispute alone outside formal legal mechanism might leave it a chance to work out 
by itself, under opportune and fortunate circumstance as in the movie, the 
possibility of a deterioration in the relationship also exists. Where the law leaves it 
unattended, it opens up the opportunities towards both amelioration and 
deterioration. We could not imagine that when the dispute was left alone, it would 
somehow always find an opportune chance to work itself out.
Now, another scenario we might consider was: what if such shuofa was included 
in the legal system? For instance, when complaining to the county court, if the 
judge came along to investigate and pressed the village head to apologise to Qiujii 
for his arrogance, with Qiujii winning her face within the village, would the case 
be solved? When the shuofa was satisfied, Qiujii would stop petitioning upward in 
the legal system.
This expectation, however, is at best academic wishful thinking, as a rapidly 
modernised legal system has departed from not only a moral commitment to local 
specificities, but also a masses-based approach to examine both fact and 
emotional aspects of local disputes. Moulded on the individualist Western models, 
the Chinese law nowadays can at best ‘examine the head where there is headache 
and check up on the foot where there is a footache’. It only aims to solve the 
disputes per se as filed in the court and thereby is quite incapable of a grander 
objective of restoring the balance within the local environment. However, for the 
countryside, to argue meticulously over one’s right is not the major goal, but a 
restoration of relational balances. In the closely-knit rural community with low 
mobility, the mutual interdependence between the villagers was of greater human 
import than formally defined rights and duties. This explains why, despite 
dissatisfaction of all sorts, Qiujii never attempted to have the village head 
imprisoned710.
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In Qiuju’s case, failing to attend to this informality resulted in an undesirable 
result brought afore by the intervention of law. Qiuju’s confusion and frustration 
at the final result were only part of the larger picture where ‘the intervention of 
the formal legal institution destroyed...the tacit understanding and expectation in 
the rural community’. It had put Qiujii ‘in a state of embarrassment’. Although 
Qiujii never attempted to, yet de facto it was because of her that the village head 
was imprisoned. In the eyes of her village fellows as well as her family, Qiujii had 
overreacted and her conduct was regarded as against the unspoken code of 
conduct. Since her behaviour contravened ‘social solidarity’ and harmed the 
communal conscience, she would be subject to an informal social sanction and in 
certain periods she would be somehow ‘exiled’, as the villagers would be unwilling 
to befriend her and the tension between her and her family might also increase711.
The movie Qiujii points to the legal scenario where judicial blindness to the 
emotion-centred informality can lead to unintended adversity. In judicial practice, 
such informality thereby requires an equitable consideration that will be hardly 
negligible. We will turn to another case to see how equity might arise to mitigate 
the hardship as arises out of the rigour of law:
A mother was physically abused many times by her son who kept asking her for 
money. For this reason, she came to the local court, with a claim to ‘sever the 
mother-son bond’ {duanjue m u % i g u a n x i ^ i .This case was simple, as it 
was illegal for the son to physically abuse his mother. However, it was difficult to 
deal with it satisfactorily. First by law there is no law that supports the principle 
of ‘severing the mother-son bond’. Secondly, it would be difficult to prosecute 
the son for committing the crime of abusing a family member. For one thing, this 
crime will not be dealt with unless initiated by a family member712. It is a crime of 
private indictment. For the woman, she only wanted to ‘sever the mother-son 
bond’, not to prosecute her son. Therefore, by law, her claim should be turned 
down.
The court did not simplistically discharge the case by alleging that the plaintiffs 
claim was legally groundless. Instead, the court tried to suggest solutions so as to 
help this poor mother out. The court came up with three potential solutions as 
follow:
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(a) to charge this case as a criminal case and prosecute the son for ‘abusing family 
members*. This solution, however, was not satisfactory enough. First, the mother 
might not be willing to send her son to prison, which can be seen from her claim 
that she only wanted to ‘sever the mother-son bondage*, instead of ‘prosecuting 
my son*. Plus, even if the son were successfully prosecuted and served a prison 
term for a maximum of two years, it would be difficult to prevent him from 
abusing his mother again in the future when he was released;
(b) to charge this case as a civil tort and decide that the son pay damage. This 
solution was far from practical as well, as the son would be unable to pay damage 
at all — he was already financially destitute, which was the very reason that he kept 
asking her mother for money. If he were well-off enough, there would be no 
physical abuse of the mother at all from the very beginning;
(c) to bar the son from physically abusing his mother713. Due to the insufficient 
police force to enforce such a bar in rural areas714, the bar would in all probability 
become no more than a piece of paper.
Therefore, after comparing the possible resorts, the judge suggested the mother 
should file for divorce from her missing husband who had left home more than 
20 years previously and had never been heard of since. By nullifying this marriage, 
she could remarry and seek security and shelter from her new partner. This might 
be the best way to resolve the problems715. In the end, the court waived the 
litigation fee of ¥50 for the woman and even offered to pay the required amount 
of ¥200 for a newspaper announcement about her missing husband716.
This case shows an equitable effort by the local court to attend to the informality 
as aforementioned. The mother went to the local court with a claim that was not 
supported by law at all. It was rich in emotional content but problematic in legal 
perspective. The mother was not willing to prosecute her own son, although she 
was constantly physically abused. Instead, she was only asking for a severance of 
mother-son bond. The law, though capable of nullifying relational bond artificially 
constructed (such as marriage), is apparently powerless in severing the natural, 
blood-based bond between parent and child.
218
The local court, instead of discharging the case at its own convenience, was 
rather sympathetic to the mother’s informal request. For a claim that was not 
supported by law, it would be justifiable for the judge to discharge the case from 
the very beginning. Moreover, even if they accepted this case, it would be much 
easier for them to just pick any suggestion from the potential three solutions 
which were all in accordance with the law. In modern practice, the judge should 
not worry over whether his decision would be enforced or otherwise — his duty by 
law is to make, not enforce, decisions. However, in the abovementioned case, the 
judge did not do what was expected by the positive law. Instead, the judge 
ventured to take initiatives in suggesting solutions, comparing the solutions and 
even helping the solution to be enforced. From informality to formality, the judge 
took a rather winding detour and landed in offering the best possible solution for 
the miserable mother. This equitable consideration deserves credit for its effort to 
mitigate the hardship that might arise out of rigorous observance of law. It duly 
considered the informality as in the mother’s request, but instead of being 
confined by this consideration, ventured proactively to suggest, compare and 
choose a best possible solution for the mother. Such an effort would reach a result 
much more desirable than simply following the law.
Such an attempt to patch up emotions occurred most frequently in pre-divorce 
court sessions. For long the Chinese local courts had a tradition of mediation first 
for a couple suing for divorce. For one thing, a disputed couple might find it 
difficult to be reconciled with each other, while the elders from the village, clan or 
urban street office might be felt to have less authority in mediating family issues. 
Li’s interview in the 1960s demonstrated that at times conciliation as mediated by 
grassroots organisation might be ineffective as the parties felt a lack of authority, 
so they would resort instead to the local court or government for mediation. This 
court’s effort to mediate between a couple seems reminiscent of the stereotyped 
image of a ‘father-mother’ magistrate in imperial China with an eye for ‘didactic 
conciliation’717. Also, the emphasis on maintaining marriage stability was nostalgic 
about revolutionary tradition. It is widespread that the local courts, upon receiving 
divorce disputes, should attempt a reconciliation first and examine the chances of
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patching up the couple’s emotions. It is only upon failed mediation or an 
impossibility to recover the relationship that the court would proceed to court 
sessions and annul the marriage.
The divorce case (Tian Jingxia vs. Cao Yunhu) cited in the previous chapter was 
telling718. When it was first received by local court, they set out immediately to 
mediate between the couple, but failed many times, after which the court 
proceeded to annul the marriage. The appellate court could sit in comfort to 
review all the files and records submitted by the court of first instance. Instead, 
they set out to examine the facts and double check the possibility o f mediation. 
Through such meticulous efforts, it was found that (1) the possibility to mediate 
between this couple was high, as they were married voluntarily and for a period of 
time they got along well with each other. It was fundamentally the husband’s way 
of handling family affairs that hurt the wife’s emotions; (2) both were emotionally 
backed up by their danmi that listened partially to their complaints only. It was for 
this reason that the case had dragged on for three years. Emotions played an 
important part both within the family and without. The whole case was embedded 
in a complicated web of emotional ties in diverse directions, between husband and 
wife, husband and his danmi, wife and her danmi, husband and mother-in-law, 
wife and child, to name just a few. The court of first instance did painstakingly 
carry out efforts to patch up emotions in this case. As long as these emotional 
creases could be ironed flat, both parties would accept conciliation and the case 
would be closed. However, the court of first instance failed to see the emotional 
support that both parties received from their danwei respectively, which resulted in 
an unsuspected enmity between the two camps. To secure a high chance of 
mediation, the court needed to ease or dissolve these divided, confrontational 
public feelings first. For this reason, the appellate court summoned the heads 
from the two danmi for a talk. When these divided public feelings were dissolved 
where the danmi heads realised the whole picture, their changed attitude in its turn 
started to transform the attitude of the disputed parties as well. Behind the scenes, 
the head of each danmi might in all probability find a chance to have a ‘heart-to- 
heart’ talk with his employee and dissuade him/her from divorce. Where a general
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public consensus was formed, the court’s mediation would surely produce a better 
result, as the couple would find it unreasonable to cling on to their requests. 
Moreover, with mutual hatred reduced and affection recovered, it would be rather 
easy to dissolve the divorce attempt. It helped to maintain marriage stability, but 
more importandy, eradicate seeds for further dispute.
Now imagine if the court did not go to such lengths to mediate between the 
couple, but rather followed the law to announce nullification of their marriage. 
First of all, it might result in further complaints. Then it would give rise to a series 
of complications, such as alimony, child guardianship, property division etc. The 
divorce-related issues will not be much different from China to the West, but the 
difference in the Chinese approach is to patch up emotions in divorce cases, 
especially when it is contested rather than non-contested divorce, where it can be 
heart-rending to compete for property and child guardianship. Therefore, rather 
than allowing the creation of enemies and hatred, the Chinese court would resort 
to repairing emotions first while nullification of marriage is the last resort when all 
other alternative possibilities have been exhausted. This is a distinctive Chinese 
approach which has nothing to do with economic development or extent of 
modernisation, but rather a traditional moral commitment to family stability and 
relationship maintenance. It is applicable to family disputes as much as to disputes 
between inhabitants from closely-knit local communities.
Enforceability: A  Proactive Role by the Court
The case of a mother requesting to sever the blood bond with her son as outlined 
above also points to another issue to be discussed in this chapter, namely 
enforceability of the decision. It is difficult to deny that the local court had 
actually played a proactive role in assisting the mother to find a best solution. In 
the current age with an emphasis on formalisation and judicial aloofness, the court 
could have simply rejected the case, or applied any of the first three legal options 
at their convenience and comfort.
The court’s choice of a proactive role accords less with an impression of upright 
judge than with the revolutionary tradition of proactively bringing justice to the
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masses. It is nothing new, for instance, for the local court to seek close contact 
with other government agencies for better enforcement of decisions. For one 
thing, to achieve a satisfactory resolution, the court can seek cooperation from 
different parties, such as the local government, mass organisations, local 
enterprises, village cadres and local party committees. In 1984, the Economic 
Chamber of the People’s Court of Xifeng County, Liaoning accepted a rural 
contract dispute. During investigation, they found that the terms and conditions 
of the contract were not complete while after the dispute, without mediation, one 
party broke the contract and signed another with a third party. The court 
attributed these problems to local cadres’ ignorance of economic contracts and 
the law, which, if not resolved in time, would jeopardise implementation of the 
household contract system. Therefore, the court reported to the town government 
and with the latter’s attention, conducted a joint investigation. For Zhao Xiaoli719, 
such a ‘cooperation of many parties in common seeking for a resolution’ not only 
facilitates the resolution of the disputes, but fundamentally helps to reduce 
disputes of a similar kind. With the local Party and government by its side, the 
court can easily implement its decisions or suggestions. Such non-judicial activities 
are complementary rather than antithetic to its primary function of adjudication.
This proactive role of the court, as part and parcel of the socialist equity to 
democratise the judiciary as well as to bring justice to the masses, needs to be 
reinvented as part of the reformist equity in current China, where the 
underdeveloped countryside was faced with pressing economic odds and local 
government financially incapable of providing state compensation. In a semi­
segregated China, the rural dwellers were materially inferior to their urban 
compatriots who have access to far more public resources and welfare provisions 
by the state. Under such circumstances, the local court would have to seek 
cooperation from as many parties as possible to secure resources for rural dwellers. 
The case from below can be telling:
A secretary who worked for a ranch hired a tractor. On his way home, he asked 
two fellow peasants from the same town for assistance. In between, they had to 
cross the river Hanshui by ship. After they got on the other side of the river, the 
tractor was sliding downward due to the steep bank. The three tried to hold the
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tractor by their shoulders. At the same time, the secretary yelled to the ship for 
help. The ship captain, due to his blocked view, drove the ship forward without 
realising that the front steel plate, as it reached the bank, cut off a leg of one of 
the peasants. Afterwards, the peasant sued the secretary for a compensation of 
¥150,000. The secretary, financially destitute, claimed the he had no money at all 
but his own life. For this the peasant was crying on the floor in the court {guntang 
Both sides threatened to commit suicide. For this reason, the judge could 
not reach a decision at all.
The problem at this case was not that it was exceptionally-difficult, or weighty, 
but after decision, the secretary would have no money to pay the damage. 
Moreover, unless the judgment were acceptable to both sides, it might result in 
suicide on either or both sides. For this very reason, this case was reported to the 
Adjudication Committee within the court for discussions and co-decision.
Finally, the director of the court invited six parties along for co-operation, by 
‘manoeuvring all sorts of social resources available for resolving the problem’. 
The mediation was detailed as follows: (1) as the ranch-owned secondary school 
wanted to hire an entrance security guard, the court asked the County Education 
Committee which was in charge of the secondary school to appoint the injured 
peasant as their guard, at a salary of ¥250 per month, which was adjustable with 
years; (2) the court asked the town government that had jurisdiction over the 
peasant’s village to waive all the taxation for his land until his children reached 
the age of 18; (3) the court asked the County Agricultural Bank to loan the 
secretary ¥20,000, to be used as compensation for the peasant, ¥6,000 out of 
which would be spent on an artificial leg while the remaining ¥14,000 as damages; 
(4) the court also pressed the ranch to pay a one-off sum of ¥10,000 as social 
welfare subsidy to the peasant. Moreover, as the ship was contracted to an 
employee to the ranch, the employee was asked to pay the peasant ¥5,000 as well. 
Through this six-party mediation, the case was solved satisfactorily for both sides. 
The tearful secretary apologised to the peasant for his previous remarks720.
This case is neither complicated nor difficult. In terms of law, apparently both the 
secretary and the ship owner should be liable for certain compensation721. 
However, if the decision were made by law only, then it might have the severe 
social consequences of causing either or both parties to commit suicide. In the
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Director’s words, ‘[the court] attended to whether the decision was enforceable 
and whether it would be deemed socially acceptable’722. The court, if without 
emphasising such enforceability, would even be criticised as ill governance723.
This proactive role defies the legalist comfort of a passive role for the judge, 
under the modern principle of No Plaint, No Judgment {bugao which
means that the judge can only make decisions on what has been brought up in the 
plaintiffs claims. He cannot decide on what is not initiated by the parties involved. 
This passive role is believed to guarantee judicial impartiality.
Certainly, ample support could be found in either academic works or daily 
routines on how well this passive role has functioned in Western legal systems. 
China’s aspiration to catch up with the developed world has engendered an 
unbounded admiration for the passive role that is equated with judicial impartiality. 
Such aspiration, however, forgets that the passive role does not exhaust the 
totality of justice or impartiality. Moreover, neither does it pay attention to the fact 
that justice is not intelligible until concretised and contested in a local context. It 
might be easy to hold up the Western legal system to mirror the reflection of an 
‘ugly, outdated or pre-modern* Chinese judiciary. However, the moral 
commitment, not to mention the rich historical legacy, of such a proactive role 
cannot be readily dismissed. Such a proactive role, as part and parcel of the 
revolutionary equity of people’s justice, still has ample implications for 
contemporary China where the countryside is increasingly marginalised and 
peripheralised during the fast pace of industrialisation and urbanisation724.
For instance, in this case, both the secretary and the peasant chose extreme 
remarks due to financial destitution. The secretary had no money to compensate 
while the peasant, if receiving no compensation, would not be able to earn a living 
for his family. Both, as it seems, were ‘the two locusts tied to the same rope’. 
Moreover, the state, at both central and local levels, had no compensation scheme 
to offer financial assistance under such circumstances. It seemed to be a deadlock, 
an impasse that was insurmountable.
The court after deliberation decided to proactively seek help from every possible 
government agency and social organisation that could be involved in the
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mediation. It pressed the school to offer the peasant an employment so that he 
would have a stable, albeit meagre salary to support his family, further aided by 
taxation waiver in his village. The secretary, though without any savings, was 
granted a bank loan as damages to the peasant. Both the ranch and the ship-owner 
were pressed to subsidise the peasant. Through such a painstaking and nearly all- 
encompassing role, the court finally secured enough financial resources for the 
peasant. This equitable concern of mobilising every possible resource will certainly 
arrive at a decision much more acceptable than rigorous application of law.
The proactive role in the abovementioned case is certainly of the most dramatic 
kinds. In the court routines, the proactive role could assume a rather plain manner 
where the judge’s ability to see to enforceability of his decisions is no less 
admirable:
In Village B, Yao and Qi were neighbours. Historically, they did not get along 
with each other. In an argument, Qi’s aged wife died suddenly of anger, for 
which Qi accused Yao of infuriating his wife to death. Outraged, Qi broke the 
gate of Yao’s house with a plough. Yao filed a suit against Qi, demanding that Qi 
paid the damage.
As the two families were deep in feud, there was no mediation reached. For the 
judge, the difficulty lay in how to ascertain whether the plaintiff — Yao abused 
verbally Qi and whether Qi’s wife died of the verbal abuse from Yao. For these 
two dubious points, Yao could not produce proof. The judge reasoned that were 
he not to take these elements into account while simply ruling that Qi had 
infringed Yao’s tight, then it might exacerbate the dispute and the parties might 
complain all the way to the higher level of government. After careful 
consideration the judge ruled: first, Yao shared 20 percent of the liability, for the 
reason that she verbally insulted Qi’s family and triggered Qi’s outrageous 
behaviour; secondly, Qi should be liable for the cost of repairing the gate.
For this decision, both parties did not appeal. After the decision took effect, the 
judge paid a visit to the village to preside over the compensation. As Yao had 
already purchased the timber for reparation, with consent from both parties, the 
judge invited a carpenter who lived in the village to roughly estimate the cost of 
reparation. From this estimate, the judge made both parties agree upon an 
acceptable amount and then sign a contract to repair the gate, with special
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reference that ‘this case is thereby concluded and no more dispute’. Both the 
parties signed and held a copy. In this process, both the Yaos and the Qis were 
quite satisfied. Although in the process of mediation they threw some unkind 
remarks at each other, in general they were quite grateful to the judge and both 
apologised for having troubled the judge with this trivia725.
In this case, by law the judge had no obligation to pay a personal visit to see to the 
enforcement of his decision. Even if the decision was not abided by after taking 
effect, the parties could apply to the enforcement chamber for compulsory 
performance. In this case, however, the judge decided to take further action to see 
to its enforcement. Considering the vague standard of repairing the door and also 
the possibility that the enforcer had no idea of the situation, which would 
exacerbate the dispute, the judge decided that he himself would take the resolution 
in hand until it had been consolidated completely. He had an eye on details, such 
as the type and price of timber, the cost of labour for repairing, the type and price 
of the lock etc. For the judge, he completely offered to do this voluntarily as he 
would not get paid. On the adversaries’ side, the judge not only gave them a shuofa, 
but unexpectedly paid a personal visit to see to the repairing. For a humble 
commoner, this was a face ‘as great as heaven’ {tianda de mian^ £Kj ®  “f 1)726. 
Therefore, the judge’s proactive approach helped to solve the dispute completely, 
achieving a result satisfactory to both law and social obligations.
The proactive role, at times, does not even require the judge to make such 
exertion as personal visits and travels. Sitting in the courtroom might suffice for 
the judge to exercise an equitable consideration. A case of parental maintenance 
dispute where an elderly couple sued their four sons for failing to support them 
was solved by mediation, during which the judge had an eye for such details as 
with which son the couple was going to live, food provision, medical care in case 
of illness, cost of funeral and coffin in case of death etc. The judge was even 
concerned with whether the old couple preferred lard or vegetable oil, whether 
vegetables should be included in the provisions, such as green or yellow beans and 
how much of the beans should be included. For these details, the judge 
proactively initiated the discussions. Later, for some of the issues, like beans and
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vegetable oil, it was agreed that the sons would pay in cash. These details had 
nothing to do with legal rules and nor were they included in the legal claim. 
Arguably the judge contravened the principle of No Plaint, No Judgment. However, 
his attention to details as well as patience to the ‘mundane’ daily life led to a 
satisfactory resolution to this case. If  these problems were not initiated by the 
judge, it might sow seeds for further disputes727.
This proactive role is not confined to civil disputes only, as the cases cited above 
might give such a wrong impression. In a 1999 Supreme Court resolution, this 
proactive role was emphasised in dealing with crimes. For instance, in the case of 
deception on peasants, such as selling fake seeds, fertilisers or credit fraud, the 
emphasis was on recovering the peasants’ loss as much as possible, under which 
circumstance leniency may be applied if the defendant proactively compensated 
for the loss. For private suits, different measures should apply to the particularities 
of individual cases: in the case of a large number of victims, the court should deal 
with it through dependence on the local party committee and cooperation with 
local government politico-legal agencies {ghengfa bumen fl). Moreover, for
the victims who are injured during an armed fight, the court should admonish 
them while at the same time, for those with production or living difficulties as a 
result o f injuries, the court should cooperate with relevant government agencies, 
carefully plan solutions, ease hatred and fundamentally eradicate any potential 
threats of revenge728.
The economic side of such mediation or judicial resolutions is not readily 
dismissible, as it addresses the current economic plight that plagued the 
countryside. The court had recognised the necessity and significance of such 
monetary or material compensation in restoring social justice in the impoverished 
rural areas. For the first or occasional offender or accomplice, a property penalty 
alone might apply where appropriate. For crimes with a joint penalty of property 
and freedom deprivation, the defendant who proactively pays a relatively large fine 
with penitance (ren^ui taiduhao S tiff) can have penalty reduced or be put
on probation. For civil litigation annexed to criminal arraignment (xingshi fudai 
minshi susong JPJ ^  Pft'S? K ^  Wi^ -), the Supreme Court instructed the local courts 
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to fully mobilise the law to recover as much as possible the victim’s loss resulting 
from the defendant’s offences. Affordability of the defendant (or his guardian in 
case of juvenile offender) should be considered or used as facts for discretion to 
mete out punishment729.
Such a proactive role played by the court was important to restoring social 
justice within a semi-segregated China, with rural areas inferior to urban areas in 
terms of development, investment, public infrastructure, welfare, healthcare and 
education. This is even more so, when as a result of the 1992 formalisation, 
economic development in the rural areas lagged far behind their urban 
counterparts. Underdevelopment does not connote under-need of justice per se, 
but rather a need to tailor justice to the rural conditions. As a matter of fact, 
within rural areas, there had always existed a huge demand for justice. From the 
following table, we can see that despite a slight decline in 1996, there had been an 
annual growth of rural contract disputes. Although the percentage of such rural 
contract disputes declined sharply from 1985 to 1989 and slightly ascended from 
1993 to 1995, the total number of such disputes was unambiguously on the rise, 
which had significant implications for the local courts, as the rural areas were not 
simply an ideal place. Moreover, according to national statistics in 2003, there was 
one civil lawsuit per 285 residents, while in a rural court in Dongjing, the number 
is one civil lawsuit per 340 rural residents730.
Table 2 Accepted and Adjudicated Rural Contract Disputes731
Year Accepted Rural
Contract
Disputes
Adjudicated Rural 
Contract Disputes
Total cases of 
economic contract 
disputes
Percentage
(%)
1985 n/a 20,612 184,693 11.2
1986 n/a 33,663 280,105 12.0
1987 n/a 19,910 331,797 6.0
1988 n/a 20,698 443,571 4.7
1989 n/a 19,810 615,778 3.2
1990 31,217 n /a n /a n /a
1991 n/a 44,562 n /a n /a
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1992 n /a 51,036 n /a n /a
1993 47,040 47,452* 824,448 5.4
1994 67,067 66,995* 971,432 6.9
1995 87,503 87,694* 1,184,377 7.4
1996 81,368 n/a 1,404,921 n /a
* including cases dragging on from previous years.
The rural request for justice and law is not a neglectable issue considering the 
size of China despite the rapid urbanisation and greater mobility of the peasantry 
in the current age. Since 1989, the massive tide of migrant workers occurred, with 
urban areas absorbing the influx of rural labour surplus. In 1993-6, the rate of 
rural labour exodus reached as high as 12.6%. However, due to the massive urban 
layoff from 1996, increased unemployment and slow income rise for migrant 
workers, the rate o f rural labour exodus declined sharply afterwards. From 1997 to 
2003, the exodus rate was reduced to merely 2.2% on annual average. Even 
among the rural exodus, they had still maintained close ties with their family 
members that are still living in the countryside732. Moreover, the rural-urban 
segregation still indirectly shapes urban policy towards rural migrants, as shown in 
the system of temporary residence permits (%an%hu %heng^fH. lIE) in major cities733. 
Many migrant workers left the countryside only nominally and temporarily, 
referred to ‘departing from soil but not their home’ {litu bu lixiang ®  i  'P  rSi )734. 
The implication of all these data and statistics is crystal clear: China is still largely a 
rural society, with the majority of its population still concentrated in the 
countryside. Such a massive scale of rural residence, as well as the menacing 
economic plight that plagues most of the areas, still calls for an equitable 
consideration, or a rural commitment from the judiciary.
Despite this strong hunger for state commitment to justice and equity within the 
rural areas, it is indisputable that such a proactive role by the court is fading in the 
teeth of an increasingly imperative globalisation, where relinking with the 
international standard became not only a frenzied slogan, but a ferocious 
ideological hegemony where China was step by step forced into the track of 
legalisation after the Western models. Legal reforms since 1992 had emphasised 
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formalisation and professionalisation, with increasing stress on legal formality. 
This led to the court retreating from its proactive role as seen in the revolutionary 
as well as 1978-89 periods. With the general tide of withdrawing state penetration 
from the countryside, the court now saw a passive role as both justification and 
convenience. This led to widespread grievances when peasant litigants were turned 
down by the alienating formalities demanded by local courts. Such a trend of 
development certainly did not go unheeded, as in 1999, the Supreme Court 
reiterated the need for a proactive role to be played by local court in collecting 
evidence. The court should supervise and assist both parties regarding burdens of 
proof and collection of evidence. For one thing, the masses’ legal skills are limited, 
which presents certain difficulties in the individual collection of evidence or in 
meeting the legal requirements in terms of evidence accessibility. Simplistic or 
reckless rejection of private indictments due to problems of evidence might lead 
to deterioration of dispute or generating further offences. Therefore, the court 
should supervise the collection of evidence while in case of difficulties, the court 
should investigate and collect evidence in accordance with law735.
This judicial guidance, however, still failed to stop a tragedy in Guangdong in 
2001. During a civil suit over a disputed loan of ¥10,000, the plaintiff submitted a 
handwritten IOU (jietiao as evidence to support his claim that the defendant, 
an old couple living in the countryside, had failed to repay the loan. The latter 
protested that this IOU was fabricated, as they were compelled by force to sign it. 
The judge asked them to submit evidence which the old couple failed to do. 
Neither did they appeal when the verdict in favour of the plaintiff arrived. After 
receiving the verdict, however, they both committed suicide in front of the local 
court736. This triggered an internal circular from the Supreme Court to reiterate 
the need for local courts’ proactive collection of evidence during investigation. It 
also led to a revision of the newly-promulgated Act of Evidence.
This case might all seem a small anecdote of discord amidst the sweeping tide of 
formalisation. The judge was later cleared of all charges of negligence and 
delinquency, as he had duly performed his duty as prescribed by law. However, 
behind this case lies the appalling reality of a lost moral consideration of the dire
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conditions faced by the rural residents. The increasingly amoral, single-minded 
legalisation is far from satisfactory. Counterfactually, we could equally imagine: if 
only the judge had had a private conversation with the old couple, went to the 
countryside to investigate, or requested cooperation from the local police, it would 
have been highly likely that the tragedy be avoided. Such a case as would have 
been condemned as bureaucratism in the revolutionary and Mao eras now 
presents only an embarrassment for legalists who not only vindicate but also 
celebrate bureaucratism, which is blindly equated with modernity. Liberal legalist 
commentators may comfort themselves by saying that such sacrifice is no more 
than a necessary price to pay for legal modernisation in China. As for the 
widespread public agony in the mass media, well, no attention is necessary, for the 
court should stand free from influences of any kind, so as to guarantee impartiality 
and justice737.
Arguably the judge as an individual possessed no more resources than the old 
couple and it sounds all fine that the judge should be allowed to do no more than 
whatever is legally required of him. It should not be forgotten, however, that the 
status as a judge has rendered him accessible to many more resources than an 
impoverished old couple living in the countryside. If proactively using these 
resources to restore social justice is regarded as against the modernity project, if 
isolation from the masses is regarded as part and parcel of modernisation, if 
negligence of pressing odds facing the underprivileged could be celebrated as an 
inevitable price to pay, then modernity per se is readily questionable, as it no 
longer requires keeping abreast with the moral development of society or invoking 
popular support as its legitimacy. And it will be the same case with justice, as it no 
longer attends to restoring social balance, rectifying the increasingly unequal 
redistribution, and ameliorating the deteriorated public welfare in rural areas. The 
current amoral, single-minded legalisation poses a serious challenge to the 
development of equity that should be reinvigorated to mitigate the hardship 
arising out of this impatient, insatiable rigour of law.
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Section 4 Globalisation and Transform ed qingli; the 
M arginalised and Creative P ossibilities
So far we have seen that earthbound China is a useful concept to examine equity 
and law in reformist China. Equally it should be noted that equity has reached an 
arrested state, as its role is as much restricted as neglected. This was due to the rise 
of formalism both as a response to Cultural Revolution and globalisation. In this 
part, we shall first look at this process of formalism.
Formalisation was first and foremost a response to the calamitous Cultural 
Revolution. The third plenum of the Eleventh Party Central Committee in 
December 1978 repudiated Mao’s principle o f ‘taking class struggle as the key link’, 
in its replacement with Deng’s resolution to establish a normalised political 
environment and legality. The bitter experience of Party ranks and file with the 
toiling masses paved way to a united conviction for reform in post-Mao era. Peng 
Zhen remarked during the second session of the Fifth NPC in June 1979 on the 
need to ‘strengthen socialist legal system’738.
The push for formalisation was not only from the top echelon of Party officials, 
but also from Marketisation through the Open Door policy. Due to the unfriendly 
environment superimposed by the Cold War and the deteriorated Sino-Soviet 
detente, China had restricted interchange with the outside world. This isolation 
fanned up an unsurpassed zealot to relink with the global standard when Deng 
Xiaoping-led Central Party decided to initiate politico-economic reform. In the 
very beginning, the court started to charge fees for civil litigation. Fee waiver for 
civil disputes — what was once regarded as the privilege of a socialist legality as 
compared to the bourgeoisie sham on the one hand and the imperial tradition on 
the other, faded fast, receded back to bookshelf and passed quickly to ‘the 
international practice of charging fees for civil litigation’. In an increasingly 
commercialised and industrialised China, the judiciary suddenly woke up to find 
that the ideology they held so dear to heart suddenly failed to cope with the 
emerging new realities. Civil litigation was no longer intra-people contradictions. 
Instead, an increasingly merged economy with the outside world had not only 
complicated the civil litigation brought before local courts, but enormously 
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increased the level of effort, both financial and intellectual, committed to 
adjudication. Hence came the courts’ complaint that their budget for the whole 
year’s travel expenditure could not even cover the cost of investigating a single 
case. In return, political ideological propaganda gave way to mounting economic 
imperatives, to cover the rising necessary expenses, where economy suddenly 
became the buzzword for everyone.
Thus, for the courts in the early 1980s, the imperative of connecting to the 
international standard was felt first through the rising cost of adjudication. With 
the revolutionary tradition hijacked by both passage of time and leaning-to-one- 
side repudiation, professionalisation carried with it a strong economic, market- 
oriented undertone. The student protest in 1989 well signified the rising social 
unrest as a result of the derailed reform. Normally it can be expected that the 
crackdown on the protest would have helped to reorient the reform agenda, as the 
popular mandate made itself felt by the state, irrespective of whether the protest 
had been suppressed or otherwise. The state could hardly detach itself from the 
heated debate following the student movement. More attention should be paid to 
public welfare with the power structure further democratised. The court, as part 
and parcel of the socialist bureaucracy, might be expected to make more efforts to 
address the mounting social problems. However, the result was surprisingly to the 
contrary. Further liberalisation was pushed while democratisation was postponed, 
if not wholly subdued. Development, as the ‘iron principle’ in the official 
vocabulary, continued to be a single-minded ‘linkage to the global’ without 
rescuing the moral commitment of the state to public good739.
With this turn, formalisation from 1992 onwards gained enormous momentum, 
this time with dual tasks, to answer the needs of both ‘connecting to the 
international standard’, which is felt more than ever especially after China’s entry 
into the WTO in 1999, and ‘tackling corruption’. It was believed that by means of 
professionalisation in a series of aspects, such as law school education, bar 
examinations, even changing the uniforms of the judges as well as the court layout, 
the Chinese courts would be brought into orbit with international standard. 
Moreover, other means like separating the judges’ lift from the lawyers’ one on
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their way to the courtroom, as adopted in Guangzhou Intermediate Court, was 
supposed to reduced the chance of lawyers bribing the judges. Special attention 
was paid to the issue of increasing the judges7 salary. Propaganda of probity, 
incorruptibility was conducted to educate the judges. This dual mission has 
undoubtedly laid a solid moral justifiability for the professionalisation trend.
If charging fees was only the first step adopted by the Chinese court in the late 
1970s/early 1980s, then the derailed market reform since 1992 had opened a 
Pandora's Box for the Chinese judiciary. For one thing, in the following decade, 
the fast pace of economic growth, an increased involvement with the outside 
world and an ever-increasing economic disputes had not only awakened the court 
to charging fees, but fanned a growing hunger for cutting a slice out of the cake, 
i.e. an ever-increasingly marketised China. Covering the basic expenditures for 
adjudication, which succeeded the revolutionary ideology, quickly found itself 
outdated again. The newly-accepted maxim was now to improve the welfare of 
the judiciary. The rampant corruption within the judiciary did not simply coincide 
with that in other bureaucratic branches, such as the civil service, police, 
procuracy, but more importantly, a boosted market economy had opened doors to 
corruption in various forms and with an all-penetrating power. The judiciary, as 
traditionally not much distinguishable from other offices, can hardly be expected 
to be singularly immune in an environment hot for embezzlement, bribery, gift- 
giving and —taking740.
This is, of course, not to deny that judicial corruption has its own discernible 
forms and substances, causes and effects. The popular ridicule of the judiciary, 
such as ‘eat both plaintiff and defendant7 is hardly applicable to civil servants 
working in local executive governments, or police 741 . Moreover, judicial 
corruption might be due to the constitutionally-designated brotherhood between 
the police, procuracy and court. The court's role, as it was emphasised, was rather 
to fraternally rather than independently cooperate with the police and procuracy in 
maintaining law and order within the society. In the political campaigns of 
clamping down on crimes (yanda the court can hardly be exempt from
invitation, demand, or coercion to pass a swift judgment. Consequendy, it can
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easily foster clientelism, cronyism and patrimonialism between the court and other 
branches of government, not to mention that the local government often exploits 
its control of the judicial payroll to extort submission, whether cooperatively or 
otherwise, from the court in carrying out either local policies, or personal favours.
The corruption in the judicial system, certainly, is particularly eroding public 
trust in the government. It compels litigants, often underprivileged, to resort to 
less official channels for dispute resolution. The peaceful complaints, either by 
letters or visits, is one, while the more violent protest such as barricading the 
entrance to the office buildings, hampering public services or thronging into the 
offices is another. If the court as the last resort for dispute resolution fails, this 
would leave the wounded parties no choice but to seek less institutionalised 
channels. This means bringing in or reinforcing the popularity of grey legality or 
illegality. In the long run, it defeats rather than promotes justice. If  the offices on 
law cannot be trusted and the parties can only resort to unprofessional means for 
rights protection or relief of hardship, then it will simply drive the legality towards 
non-professionalism rather than the other way around.
As a matter of fact, professionalisation carried with it a formalism comparable 
to the amoral legalism in Qin-Han periods on the one hand while to the 
mechanical adherence to formulas and writs in English common law courts of the 
13th-14th centuries on the other. Where professionalism was equated single- 
mindedly with attires, court layouts, procedures and visible records, formalism 
surged to overtake a moral imperative of considering specific circumstances, so 
that an equitable decision may more frequently result. More essentially, the 
revolutionary antiformalism thrust to bring justice closer to the masses was 
discarded. Judicial aloofness, once condemned as a cause of the bourgeois sham 
justice, now resurrected under the cloak of professionalisation, blindly hailed as 
impartiality. Professionalisation in the judiciary, like reform in other areas, was 
pushed through without democratisation. Many judicial policies were copied 
without sufficiently consulting the general public, as seen in the case of adopting 
the WTO rules. The people, which has once been such an endearing epithet by 
the communists to contrast their government from the isolating nationalist
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counterpart, becomes a word of oblivion. Its obsoleteness is even more felt when 
the whole country is after the West for a professionalisation without asking its 
suitability for the current needs.
Moreover, the legalist blind equation of qingli with selling private favours and 
corruption742 further defeats an effort to regurgitate qingli from both imperial and 
revolutionary traditions. It is nothing new for us to be warned that yielding to 
special circumstances defeats rather than promotes justice, as the court has its 
impartiality impaired. In an ever-increasing imperative to professionalise the 
judiciary in China, it would be estranging to call for a more flexible, lenient stance 
for social realities, as discretion remains not only unspoken but a horrifying taboo 
that would simply aggravate the current situation of rampant judicial corruption. 
The development of qingli as a Chinese system of equity is thereby hijacked in the 
increasing demand for professionalisation so as to ‘connect to the international 
standard’ on the one hand, and to clamping down on judicial corruption on the 
other. In other words, qingli as restricted in its scope of application has arrived at a 
stage of arrested development in current China, as can be seen in a 2006 case 
during my interview:
An only son migrated to and got married in Hong Kong, leaving his aged 
mother in his nephew’s care for 20 years. The nephew also prepared funerals and 
cremation for the mother upon her death. Now the son inherited the house and 
seeing no need to keep the nephew any longer, his wife demanded that she move 
out. The grieved nephew sued the wife to the Shenzhen Intermediate Court, 
where the judge did not trouble himself to suggest a satisfactory mediation, but 
instead, pressed the timid niece to rescind her plaint. The judge was not 
concerned with the fact that the nephew had endeavoured for 20 years to look 
after the mother, which could not be testified by any formally written record other 
than neighbourhood witnesses. By comparison, the property deed written in black 
and white was a documentary evidence that can sustain further reviews from 
superior officials and told to move out. In less than 20 minutes, this case was 
discharged, with the nephew officially turned down. Outside the court, the wife 
even went further to demand that the nephew reimburse her the litigation fee.
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BL the secretary, who was accompanying the judge the whole time during this 
so-called ‘mediation’, was emotionally wounded by this hasty, apparently unjust 
disposal. The judge could have at the very least proposed two options, persuading 
the wife to either give the property to the poor and needy nephew or reimburse 
her with money as a reward for her two-decade efforts to care the mother. Both 
solutions would be more equitably acceptable743.
The judge’s unwillingness to do so could be explained by his adherence to 
formalism, as a deed in black and white was formally more sustainable than 
neighbourhood witness testimony, if any. Moreover, gathering such testimony 
means an extra undertaking. The judge might have to visit the local 
neighbourhood to investigate, which could be time-consuming and above all, with 
low efficiency. He might have spent this amount of time writing up internal 
reports, deliberating over important cases or dealing with a case that involve much 
higher value assets. For one thing, in an increasingly marketised China, the court is 
also faced with a demand of efficiency and profit-making. As annual performance 
assessment is based on the ratio of received cases and their adjudication, the 
quicker a judge reaches a decision, the better. Moreover, as the litigation fee is 
proportionate to the value of assets in dispute, the higher the value, the more fee 
that local courts can charge. Thereby, spending a whole day (and probably longer 
if the judge decides on personal visits) on such a minor property dispute would 
seem not only of low efficiency, but poor in profit-making for the court. The 
judge safely retreats behind a cloak of formalism that provides convenience and 
personal comfort.
In another case where no such emotional wound was aroused, there was still a 
tussle between formalism and a moral consideration. BL the secretary recounted a 
conversation between a judge and his chamber leader (ting^hang JiHx:) over a real 
estate administration dispute. Due to the poor quality of construction, a newly- 
purchased apartment was constantly troubled by water leaking that ripped several 
large fissures in the walls despite numerous repairs, for which the owner neither 
moved in nor paid the administration fee for 2 years. When sued, the judge in 
charge suggested that the owner pay the administration fee, but the administration
237
agency waived the penalty charge for late payment. Even this was challenged by 
the chamber leader who argued that the decision should be made in accordance 
with the contract. In other words, the owner’s trouble with the apartment was 
none of the leader’s concern while a contract written in black and write shall 
suffice to reach a decision. To this the judge in charge protested, ‘[The decision] 
would then be truly unfair, as the owner has not moved in at all’. In the end the 
chamber leader gave in but mumbled in complaint, ‘All right. You can rule in that 
way.. .such a tiny case.. .it won’t make any big trouble’744.
The chamber leader’s insinuation was crystal clear: ruling in favour of the owner 
who cannot provide written record would contradict the formalism required by 
positive law. A moral consideration of the owner’s undesirable situation would be 
appallingly informal, which might not sustain further reviews from superior 
officials, thus resulting in reprimand and administrative penalty such as bonus 
reduction. Therefore, the problems might loom large with local courts, but the 
cause lies with the top echelon745. With the dominant ideology to bureaucratise 
Chinese judiciary, certain revolutionary traits of humane, equitable interests were 
lost. The Supreme Court played no small part in instructing local courts to reject 
certain major social problems with an increasing reliance upon formality746. In a 
2002 resolution, local courts should accept no civil suits of fraudulent reports in 
the stock market unless the litigants first turn for a decision to the Stock Market 
Supervision and Management Commission (SMSMC) or its local branches, 
without which the court would reject a suit747. One naturally wonders where a 
grieved individual could turn to if turned down by the SMSMC, for the court 
would reject him/her point blank as well. In the ferocious vicissitudes of a stock 
market pregnant with corruption, fraud and insider deals, it is not unlikely that the 
SMSMC would turn down a powerless commoner, not to mention the enormous 
administrative tasks on the SMSMC’s routine workloads.
In another 2005 directive, local courts were told not to accept lawsuit of 
compensation during land development if the removed residents could not reach 
an agreement with the land developers748. By this directive, removed residents 
were forced quite nakedly to conciliate with the much more powerful land
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developers first, without which they could not bring a suit to court. The court’s 
insistence of an agreement prior to lawsuit will literally force into misery those 
petty removed residents who could not reach agreement with land developers, 
which happens all too often these days. Although it was equally added that the 
removed residents, when rejected by court, could complain to local government, 
this stipulation became lip service when the local government was symbiotically 
intertwined with land developers in land seizures and unjust compensation for 
local residents. With underprivileged citizens stripped of the chance to seek justice 
through the increasingly amoral, formalised court, no wonder the annual number 
of complaints by letters or visits had amounted to astronomical figures and 
showed no sign of ceasing to rise. A CASS interview of 632 peasants that 
personally visited Beijing for lodging complaints, 401 (63.4%) had sued in local 
courts before their journey while 42.9% were rejected749, not to mention the 
numerous cases of migrant workers turned down by local courts in their suits for 
salary. It is incontrovertible that the development of Chinese equity had been 
arrested by the increasingly amoral formalisation of the judiciary750.
And, it is not only the peasantry and urban underclass that have been affected 
adversely by globalisation. Standing alongside with them are other social groups 
that have been equally marginalised, such as migrant workers, urban poor, or 
HIV/AIDS patients. These groups equally demand particular attention, 
commitment and service from the state, as their dire disempowerment makes it as 
much urgent as expedient to apply equitable considerations wherever necessary. 
The transformed qingli, as an equitable concept that points to the local socio­
economic conditions and cultural particularities as contained in Earthbound China, 
shall be duly expanded to include these groups that have been marginalised by the 
ferocious pace of modernisation and globalisation. They point to the necessity as 
well as creative possibilities for equity to be revived in today’s China.
To sum up, in the current reformist age, the imperative of introducing equity to 
mitigate the rigour of law is felt in the lost cause of rural commitment that was 
part of the people’s justice. Side by side with increasing aloofness of a state in 
general and judiciary in particular, the revolutionary celebration of rural
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commitment was ruthlessly discarded. The calling of equity steps in where the 
legalisation was pushed through not only at the cost of democracy, but of one 
group over another. The revitalisation of rural commitment during 1978-89, 
however, proved to be short-lived, as it quickly faded in the state-led integration 
with global capitalism that seeks the Euro-American legal systems for sole 
inspiration. An increasingly urbanised, Westernised legal system can leave a large 
proportion of the Chinese population estranged and peripheralised. Under this 
circumstance, equity can be recoined as the ‘transformed qingli\ This notion 
contains a reintroduction of the concept of earthbound China, which is helpful to 
examine how equity could possibly be concretised in the local, Chinese context. It 
is rich in mores and manners specific to local communities, as well as compelled 
by socio-economic restraint that is in general prevalent in the countryside. Equity 
in the reformist age, thereby, connotes a strong sense of paying attention to the 
marginalised group in the single-minded development process.
Paying attention to rural China was nothing new. At least as early as 1927, the 
issue of ‘rural China* had already become a favourable topic for heated debate. A 
series of rural construction was carried out, such as the County Ding programme 
(1902-32), the Xiaozhuang Normal School in a village on the outskirts of Nanjing 
(1927-30), in Shandong (1931-3), in Henan (1929-39). These programmes varied 
considerably in their nature and orientations, such as Western-influenced vs. 
indigenous, educational vs. military, masses-participatory vs. bureaucrat-led. These 
rural experiments were all wiped out by the Japanese invasion in 1937, but they 
left an inerasable legacy of directing the government’s attention to rural 
development as part and parcel of the state-craft751.
The communist experience of people’s justice had largely contained a rural part, 
not only due to the majority of population being concentrated in the countryside, 
but also because of the communist commitment to social, political and economic 
wellbeing of the countryside, as a revolution coming out of rural China cannot 
afford another revolution from the countryside752. This commitment to the 
countryside was never failed from 1949-76, in the face of the seemingly 
contradictory rise of urban bias. Even during the Cultural Revolution, the state
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carefully mobilised urban dwellers, intellectuals, health workers and bureaucrats 
(including the judicial personnel) to go down to the countryside for assisting rural 
development. It was not uncommon to hear stories of judges using plain language 
to conduct court proceedings, or living, eating and investigating, adjudicating with 
the rural masses. People’s justice had managed to blur the urban-rural divide, fill 
the urban-rural gap and ameliorate the urban-rural inequality.
Despite its continuation from 1978 to 1989, the rural commitment within 
people’s justice incontrovertibly fades in the teeth of state-led integration with 
global capitalism. Gone with it were not only the state commitments to popular 
mandate, but also a ruralised outlook. People’s justice, together with it the rural 
commitment will have to be hotly contested in earthbound China. Additionally, 
apart from the peasantry, globalisation has also created a large, swelling underclass 
in urban areas. These marginalised groups equally demand attention. This points 
to the urgency of revitalising equity, which if properly attended, will aid China to 
muddle through the difficult path to find its own style o f modernity, in both 
judiciary and governance alike. The challenges created by globalisation, if viewed 
from a positive angle, could thus open up possibilities for the Chinese legal system 
to find its own alternative path to mature forms of equity and law. Transformed 
qingli as a concept thereby arises to challenge the ready assumption of universality 
of the Euro-American laws. It is within this context that it will gain its significance 
and retain its sinew to play actively in the everyday life in China. It is also the place 
where reinvigoration of this people’s justice, both morally and institutionally, 
could possibly be maximised.
Summary
So far, we have seen that the development of equity and law in the Chinese 
history needs to be grouped into three broad categories which coincided with the 
chronic order: (1) imperial China (ca. 210 BC to 1911 AD); (2) revolutionary 
China (1911-76); (3) reformist China (1978 onwards). Equity and law had changed 
profoundly in these different phases, in both official representation and judicial 
practices.
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First of all, in terms of official representation, we can see that imperial China 
followed a long path of rigid law first and then incorporation of equity into law, 
which occurred from ca. 210 BC to 653AD, for about 800 years. This was a 
period when morals, especially those of Confucianism, were gradually 
incorporated into the law. I have termed this process as a shift from minimalist to 
maximalist moral incorporation. For one thing, although Legalism, the dominant 
ideology behind law-making in Qin and Han dynasties, opposed vehemendy 
differentiated treatment of penalties according to one’s status and merits, it did 
realise that morals were the ground where the law rested and from where to derive 
its governability. Without incorporating certain morals, such as special treatment 
according to age and physical disability, the law would simply fail to work. 
However, different from Confucianism, Legalism did not see this moral 
incorporation as beyond what was absolutely necessary. Therefore, it proposed 
uniform law and uniform punishment for all ranks within the society.
This minimalist incorporation had resulted in making the law rigid and inflexible 
to many extents. For this very reason, there was a gradual process, starting from 
Han Wudi, o f increasingly moralising the law. The minimalist moral position that 
was deemed undesirable in Qin and Han now gave way to a growing conviction of 
incorporating more moral ideals into the law. It was against this background that 
there was an introduction of Confucianism into the law, as it represented a 
consummate body of moral principles. Confucianisation of the law was thus the 
Chinese path to systematically incorporating equity in law.
This Confucianisation of law lasted about 400 years until 658 the promulgation 
of the Tang Code, which represented the completion of maximalist incorporation 
of morals into law. This Code as a model was copied and used through the 
successive dynasties through the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing. Certainly it does not 
suggest that the law was passed down unchanged from one dynasty to another. As 
a matter of fact, as we can see from different parts, rulers from different dynasties 
did attempt to revise the law at times, supplement it with amendments, royal 
decrees, decided cases and rescripts. These revisions, however, remained miniscule, 
as the main body of legal frame remained loyal to the Tang Code. It is in this
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macroanalysis sense that we can safely suggest that the Tang Code represented a 
maturation of incorporating equity into law in Chinese legal history. This maturity 
of equity and law in one body governed the Chinese legal landscape for centuries 
from 658 to 1911.
In judicial practice, equity rose to correct or supplement law, albeit in a 
subordinate manner. Most of the time, official representation was observed rather 
than corrected or supplemented, which is contrary to a popular impression that 
law was only occasionally consulted by the local magistrate who acted more like a 
benevolent parent conciliating squabbling children rather than rule-oriented 
referee753. Huang’s study showed that over 70% of the cases that entered formal 
court sessions were adjudicated in accordance with law. The reason for this was 
twofold. First, the law (official representation) was already well imbued with 
moralistic principles, such as forbiddance of unfilialness, false charge or incestual 
sex. These moral principles were not necessarily ‘high-flown’ as suggested by 
Huang754, as if they were only intelligible to educated elites while the majority of 
the population (rural and illiterate) were ignorant of these principles. As a matter 
of fact, these principles were well accepted by the society which required no 
precondition of literacy, status or power. It is true that the rites and proprieties in 
classical works by Confucian scholars were highly philosophical and literally well- 
articulated, but this does not necessarily suggest a divorce from commonsense 
right and wrong. Instead, these highly abstract moral ideals were based on 
common sense that provided both inspiration and legitimacy. In terms of official 
representation, there was no such higher command of Confucian moral ideals 
than those as embedded in law, but instead, a shared moral high ground between 
the Confucianised law and accepted social proprieties.
Also, in the Western jurisprudence there has been a long binary 
compartmentalisation of civil versus criminal law. This dichotomy was used as a 
benchmark to judge any pre-modern legal system. The traditional Chinese law was 
no exception. For long it has been popular to hold the view that imperial China 
had no other than a penal law system, which prescribed punishment for civil 
matters such as land, inheritance, marriage and debt. However, Huang’s study had
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shown that although there was no separate law or court for civil matters, 
bypassing the Western model of compartmentalisation does not mean bypassing 
civil justice per se. Although punishment was prescribed for civil matters, they were 
either rarely or not at all used in formal court sessions. Here we can equally see 
the presence of equity in both official representation and legal practice. On the 
one hand, the law has largely incorporated customary practices, such as subsoil 
ownership separated from surface soil rent, whereas on the other, the magistrate 
was reluctant to apply corporal punishment during adjudication of civil matters. 
Thereby a penal code offers protection of property rights, ownership and 
contracts, while in practice the magistrate refrained from using physical 
punishment. It accords with such general definition of equity as to shed the 
harshness of written law.
As far as criminal matter was concerned, the issue of equity became all the more 
prominent. In terms of official representation, not only (Confucian) moral 
principles were highly integrated into law, but also the system had developed a 
high level of sophistication to guide legal practice. It helped to institutionalise the 
flexibility of law at no cost of rampant corruption in terms of selling personal 
favours.
Secondly, such a high level of observation of law within legal practice was 
probably due to the review system in imperial China. Where it was compulsory for 
local magistrates to report criminal adjudications upward, they were supposed to 
write memos on civil matters for superior reviews, despite the fact that these civil 
matters were officially instructed to be within the discretion of county magistrates 
{phouxian j'l'l H* 1=1 3S). Therefore, the pressure of observing the law sprang up 
for both civil and criminal matters once they entered the formal court sessions. 
This, however, does not mean that the path of equity was blocked. It is not rare, 
for instance, for us to observe from case records that a sound equitable decision 
would earn the magistrate an appreciative nod (and probably promotion) from the 
Throne. Adjusting the written law to practical, local contexts was a practice 
equally exalted within the imperial system. Legalists warned that such equitable 
practice might open the way to corruption and selling personal favours, which was
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duly considered and forestalled by law, as these adjustments had to go through 
certain official channels in seeking for higher approval. Therefore, although the 
system allowed equity in legal practice, it was nonetheless premised on a 
presumption of an all-encompassing law fit for both moral and practical concerns. 
The first priority was given to observance of law while equity was only relegated 
to secondary positions.
The coming revolution of 1911 was a sweeping force that engulfed the whole 
nation in its wake to modernity and transformation. The legal system of imperial 
China, despite its maturity, was regarded as outdated, backward and feudal, for 
which reason only discarding it completely could pave the way for China to be 
reborn with modernity. Even this path of westernisation was far from smooth for 
China, as it was tom by wars, immolations, disasters and calamities. The first 
decade after the 1911 revolution was torn by factionalism and warlordism, with 
the Westernised constitutions and laws hijacked by elite and warlords. The coming 
of Nationalist and Communist parties brought temporary unity to the disunited 
nation, which was before very long succeeded by Nationalist-Communist split and 
to its accompaniment the long-drawn war between them. From 1927-49, the 
GMD government promulgated a series of laws based on Western models. 
Western laws were introduced into China by overseas students. In the midst of 
this westernisation, notably the influence of civil law system was predominant, due 
to the proximity between civil law system and imperial Chinese law in emphasising 
legal codes and the subordinate role of equity. The Franco-German civil code was 
almost copied word by word by legalists under Nationalist Government.
This process of westernisation, with neither a necessary involvement of Chinese 
public nor their comprehension, introduced concepts of equity and law that were 
none the less foreign to the main population. A series of legal codes, criminal, civil 
and administrative, began to be drafted by overseas scholars and promulgated 
nationally. The true effect of such promulgation, however, proved to impress 
foreigners more than the Chinese people. The separate jurisdiction of Nationalist 
and Communist-controlled areas was one reason while a closer inspection reveals 
that even within the territory under direct administration from Nanjing, ‘the actual
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social impact of the codes...was of the slightest’755. For the vast majority of the 
population, their daily transactions were still regulated by traditional laws. This is 
particularly the case with the peasantry where former laws still had binding force 
despite the disappearance of imperial government. Moreover, for many, the 
newly-promulgated laws had a limited effect as its effects at best reached small 
towns. As the new laws were mostly devised, designed and discussed by a small 
minority of educated elites, it was isolated even more during practice in the 
grassroots court over day-to-day transactions. Concubinage, for instance, allegedly 
had been abolished by the new Civil Code of Nationalist government. In many 
places, however, it persisted, whether it be conservative elements or where 
financial circumstances allowed. Therefore, despite the law’s ban on concubinage 
and upholding spouse’s right to sue for divorce on basis o f adultery, in legal 
practice, this law was seldom effectively applied. In its stead, concubines, if 
accepted by the wife, the Code indirectly granted rights as members of the 
husband’s family. It was thus a compromise between a westernised law and 
customary practice756.
By comparison, the communists followed an unconventional route that led to 
self-discovery and inspiration. It first underwent a period of fluidity. From 1921- 
34, there had been a marked fluctuation in laws, policies and practices. During the 
first few years 1921-4 the CCP was mainly following the dictates from the 
Comintern. No systematic laws were promulgated during this period, as the CCP 
was still a weak party. From 1924 to 1927, the CCP, following Russian orders, was 
incorporated into the GMD. Therefore, the laws at this period were mainly those 
devised by the GMD. Following the 1927 split with the GMD, the CCP was 
scattered into several separate, small-scale soviets in different provinces, including 
the one led by Mao in Jinggangshan. These soviets operated on almost isolated, 
self-supported ground. Where even a letter could take a few months to be 
delivered, it would be difficult to imagine a cooperated and unified legal landscape 
at this period. The disunited situation did not end until late 1931, when an 
integrated Chinese Soviet Republic was established in Jiangxi. Then from 1931-4, 
both Li Lisan and the 28 Bolsheviks still largely followed Moscow for guidance,
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laws and regulations. During 1931-4, although several regulations were 
promulgated, their real effect in practice was much discounted by war-related 
exigencies, or such infrastructural deficiencies as understaffing, lack of office and 
absence of training. To sum up, from 1921-34, the laws and regulations were 
constantly in a state of fluctuation.
The coming Long March changed this situation. For one thing, the Long March 
forced the CCP to re-evaluate its policies and self-reflectively reorient its strategies. 
It was against this background that Mao rose to his ascendancy. As a firm 
opponent of blindly following Moscow, he derived his popularity from 
independence rather than seeking Russian dictates, Marxism rather than Stalinism, 
and Chinese experiences rather than book learning. From 1935-49, this was a 
period of tremendous construction for Chinese law and a departure from the 
previous period (1921-34), where the CCP no longer regarded it necessary to copy 
the Soviet laws, but to exercise self-initiative in institutionalising their own 
traditions, techniques and methods.
It is within this period of 1935-49 that both equity and law assumed their 
mature forms. More importantly, they developed with equilibrium in the same 
vein within the body of revolution. Laws, regulations or policies, as various forms 
of official representation, were first devised and then tested in judicial practice. 
With the feedback from lower officials, revisions were made to these laws. 
Moreover, parallel to this model of ‘lawmaking-then-testing’ ran the other scheme 
of ‘practice-then-institutionalising’, where new judicial techniques developed in 
real practice were incorporated into official policy or laws. Equity, defined as 
‘enlisting popular support and participation’ in this period, developed mainly 
through judicial practices, which were then institutionalised and incorporated into 
official representation. On the other hand, when official representation was made, 
it was then put to practice for feedback, revision and amendments. Equity and law, 
official representation and judicial practice, thus developed on a dual track without 
sacrificing one for the other. The close tie between the two led to maturity of 
equity and law at the same time. Thus, equity in official representation gained
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legitimacy while in judicial practice they were pragmatic and fully operational. This 
is a period in Chinese legal history of as much self-sustenance as creativity.
After 1949, the CCP sought to extend its successful experience of people's 
justice in Yan’an. This time, it was seen on a whole national scale. Regularisation 
effort (official representation) was carried out with encouragement of innovation 
in judicial practices. The Supreme Court dispatched work teams regularly to glean 
information on and summarise successful experiences of local courts. These 
brainstorming efforts were then put into drafting, publishing and promulgating 
basic laws in China, such as civil procedure law and criminal procedure law.
These new laws, when promulgated, represented the consummate efforts by the 
communists to seek an alternative. The 1950 Marriage Law, for instance, was 
ruthless in pursuit of equality of men and women, freedom of consenting to 
marriage, monogamy and abolition of old, feudal elements. Concerning 
concubinage, it was suggested that unions of this sort could continue as long as 
the situation allowed while any future attempt of such marriage would be strictly 
forbidden. As a matter of fact, in real practice, although theoretically the existent 
unions of concubinage were supposedly to be left undisturbed, social movements, 
alongside with land reform, would make it necessarily an undignified situation for 
a young girl to remain in such union. Moreover, with the wealthy landed class 
ripped off their amassed lots, the financial basis for such union was also 
removed757. The communists were fully aware of weaknesses of the imperial 
tradition and GMD laws, the former in its outright rejection of equality while the 
latter in its incapacity to enforce its legal promises. Therefore, by social 
movements and economic reforms, the CCP sought to widen the social basis for 
law as well as to see to its enforcement through.
All these efforts articulate a communist departure from the imperial legal 
tradition as well the capitalist tradition in Nationalist territories. It sought to 
combat bureaucratism, formalism and factionalism. The predominance of official 
representation over legal practice, which was prevalent in imperial China and 
Western legal systems (classical and modern alike), was challenged when China 
entered its revolutionary period, during which qtng was borne out of the
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communist ideal of people’s justice. This predominance of official representation 
first and legal practice secondary was reversed in their course of development, as 
the communist practice started from dilapidating old and GMD legal mechanisms, 
from where the legal practices were gleaned, summarised and codified into law. 
The people’s justice both as official representation and legal practice, was first and 
foremost borne out of the communist practice and its moral commitment to the 
wellbeing of the masses.
This people’s justice, as coined by the CCP, carried with it a tendency of self- 
destruction. Enlisting popular participation was pushed to the extremes where at 
many times it was blindly equated with rousing public emotions (mostly angers), 
mass accusation, mass humiliation and mass execution. The masses, under the 
communist leadership, participated in the process with either coercion or ignited 
fever. It created red terror on massive scales while simultaneously at times could 
be hijacked by personal vengeance or vested interests. The reason for its 
destructive forces lay in its disrespect for procedures and protection of the 
defendant’s rights. Without procedural guarantee and respect of individual’s right 
to defence, it could be ill-used, misused, or abused. The regularisation and 
bureaucratisation in both 1935-49 and 1956-7 were swept ruthlessly away by 
Mao’s zealot to engage the population in anti-formalism and anti-bureaucratism 
movements, until the thunderstorm of Cultural Revolution completely smashed 
the whole bureaucracy.
Equity and law, thus in Mao’s era (1949-76), reached its golden time in the mid- 
1950s, quickly receded, and passed into oblivion. Aimed at combating 
bureaucratism, Mao attempted to not only counteract the traditional preference of 
official representation over judicial practice, but more importandy, turn the 
imbalance over by subjugating official representation to judicial practice. In a later 
period, even such an effort became unnecessary as official representation was 
completely ‘trashed into the history’s dustbin’. Practice alone was regarded as 
enough, which was the reason why judicial cadres in hundreds of thousands were 
sent down to the countryside instead of receiving formal training within a four- 
walled institution. The corrective power of equity was thus brought to its extremes,
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to combat the vices, whether real or imaginative, of official representation. 
Equally, the inclusive power of equity was maximised where enlisting popular 
participation became the supreme goal. The means, so to speak, superseded the 
end and became an end in and of itself. Justice, as embodied in as much popular 
support as procedural guarantee, regularisation and protection of rights, was 
reduced to popular participation only.
Extremisation of equity thus carried with it the seed of destruction. For one 
thing, equitable correction of the written letter’s rigidity only makes sense when 
there is a presence of such regulation. Where even such written letters were 
annihilated, what will equity be supposed to correct then? The corrective power of 
equity is aimed at restoring balance or countering the inherent shortcoming of 
official representation in unforeseeable situations where written letters were 
incapable of providing justice. Without this prerequisite of an existing body of law, 
equity would make no sense. In other words, the body of positive law is the 
framework, upon which equity depends for existence, support, nutrition and 
function. Erasing this fundamental, equity as unleashed could only lead to 
destruction and ferocity. Without a root or trunk of positive law that provides 
support, equity as the leaves and branches are bound to wither and collapse.
By the same token, the equitable emphasis of popular participation in judicial 
practice equally is presumed on an existence of judicial bureaucracy, within which 
the vices of bureaucratism could be mitigated by enlisting the population into the 
scheme. Bureaucracy and popular participation are the two ingredients that could 
produce better results only when combined, as they mutually hold each other on 
check, augment each other’s strength and co-ordinately bring about a balanced 
product. Anti-formalism as carried in mass mobilisation thus will remain 
unintelligible unless constructed within the framework of formalism. The antidote 
of bringing in the masses to combat bureaucratism, likewise, will only work when 
it is injected into the already-existing bureaucratic structure. Without the 
precondition of an existing and functioning bureaucracy, the equitable means of 
mass participation will cease to function. In a similar manner to its corrective 
power, this inclusive muscle as flexed by equity will be only a piece of dead flesh
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unless it is part of a living body of bureaucracy. It will cease to function the 
moment when bureaucracy as its foundation is dismantled, smashed or 
demolished. Without bureaucracy to hold equity of mass participation in check 
and balance, it will simply lead to atrocity and violence.
Deng’s coming to power in 1978 brought the whole nation back into the course 
of rationalisation, regularisation and bureaucratisation, as the destructive Cultural 
Revolution had awoken the whole nation, party ranks and common citizens alike, 
to the necessity of law and order. For this very reason, the rationalist elements 
within mass mobilisation were revitalised, along with a painstaking effort to 
construct the legal system by legislating laws, regulations and policies. Official 
representation, thus, regained its momentum of development with a revised equity 
of mass participation. The judicial cadres still went tirelessly to the masses for 
investigation, mediation, trial and decision-making, while the masses were equally 
invited to sit on the collegiate board, hear trials, participate in proceeding or 
attend conventions for announcing judicial decisions. However, both aspects were 
now focused on a rational, regularised manner. From 1978 to 1989, this was a 
period when equity and law closely followed each other for reconstruction and 
development.
The coming of the Tiananmen Affair in 1989 marked a turn in this dual-track 
journey of equity-and-law development in a balanced manner. The nation was put 
to a temporary halt for check, reorientation and debate. From 1992 on, however, 
instead of attending to the mounting social problems associated with market 
reform, the nation became even more ruthless in its pursuit of integration with 
global capitalism. Construction of a legal system now assumed an impatient pace 
towards regularisation, while revolution, both as a cause and effect of societal 
transformation in China, was blindly equated with the destructions in Mao’s era 
and ditched without a reflexive, thorough scourge to reinvent the useful. The 
discourse of socialism as seeking alternative to western capitalism quickly became 
outdated, as socialism now became a mask for state-led integration with global 
capitalism.
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In the general socio-economic context of this unrelenting Marketisation, similar 
to policy orientation, the legal landscape equally underwent an almost 180 degree 
turn, now on to the fast track of regularisation and lawmaking. Official 
representation resumed its supremacy and this time with an even more insatiable 
pace and arrogant manner. Construction of a Chinese legal system was thus 
reduced to an overwhelming emphasis on lawmaking and regularisation, as if 
copying Western laws and written letters alone could cure the socio-economic ills 
brought about by this single-minded Marketisation. Equity as mass participation, 
thus, not only lost its lustre but its legitimacy. Where the judiciary underwent 
Marketisation, regularisation and westernisation on massive scales, equity as 
construed in a revolutionary sense was quietly and conveniently shelved. The 
popular image of judicial cadres going tirelessly to the masses for information, 
investigation and mediation was quickly replaced by those who, in a changed attire 
of judicial robe with a gavel in hand as copied from abroad, could try cases within 
courts according to procedures and written laws. Equity, both as a corrective 
power to written letters and inclusive influence to combat bureaucratism, was 
discarded ruthlessly in the state’s embrace of capitalism and market-based 
development.
In this unprecedented dominance of official representation, equity in judicial 
practice was equally squeezed to a minimum space for manoeuvring. Not only 
there lacks a clear, articulate guidance for exercising equitable discretion, but also 
the judges were discouraged from resorting to equity in their decision-making. 
Positive law assumes not only an overwhelming prominence, but in a manner that 
is supposedly all-encompassing by wishful thinking. With equity receded, abated 
or discouraged, the practice of official representation became increasingly amoral. 
Rather than seeing themselves as adjudicators that restore law and order, the 
judges now comfortably sit in offices contemplating how to make judicial 
decision-making more formal and convenient. Gone with the discarded 
revolutionary concern for ‘toiling masses’, was also a humanist effort to restore 
the unbalanced social order up to an equitable level. Justice as hereby construed is 
restricted to what the judicial bureaucracy can offer within its letters, structure and
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boundaries. What it cannot offer, which thereby requires a stretch of justice, an 
exercise of self-initiative and a dose of inspiration and courage, is quickly 
forgotten or blindly criticised as unprofessional. Amoralism in judicial practice was 
thus not only tolerated, but celebrated. The current legal age in China is 
reminiscent of the 13th-14th centuries in England, where living cases were fitted on 
to the procrustean bed of forms as prescribed by positive laws. The yell for an 
equitable antidote, either in establishing a separate court or in changing the 
dominant politico-legal ideology, is thus as compelling as it was in England 
centuries back.
It is right against this background of diminished influence of equity that equity 
per se starts making sense. For one thing, its decline and demise were not only 
reminiscent of the revolutionary traditions that could be reinvented for 
modernisation projects in China, but more importantly they pointed to the need 
of finding an alternative path that is contextualised within Chinese particularities 
and suitable for the construction of a legal system with Chinese characteristics. 
Similar to the market reforms that produced a political system with significant 
portions of the population marginalised, a state-led integration into the global 
capitalist legal order that is heavily imprinted with an America-Eurocentric aura 
could equally lead to leaving large numbers of people stranded, ostracised or 
dumbfounded. It could not only fail to ameliorate the pains brought about by 
Marketisation, but in its turn, acerbate the already acute social conflicts. This 
insatiable pursuit of procedure and positive laws thus could lead to amoral 
rejection of many suits simply based on their nonconformity with the prescribed 
forms. Proceduralism could result in ill-prepared groups, such as peasantry, 
migrant workers, urban poor being excluded from legal relief due to ignorance, 
unfamiliarity or unaffordability. Legal fetishism as brought about in this process 
could equally result in massive scales of discontent, riots and conflicts, as the legal 
mechanism is only one means of restoring social order. Where it does not exhaust 
the possibilities of restoring order, the law should equally seek to coordinate with 
other channels to bring about peace and order within a transitional society. 
Inasmuch as Marketisation single-handedly is incapable of bringing China to
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modernity, regularisation and lawmaking alone, especially when it is directed by 
single-mindedly copying Western laws, could not bring a modern legal landscape 
that is unique to China, catering to its needs and rooted in its socio-economic and 
cultural specificities.
Moreover, even the current dominant Western laws, namely common law and 
civil law systems, are mature but far from perfect. In both systems, the 
incorporation of equity into law is at best incomplete, as equity has been relegated 
to a position of secondary importance. In the civil law system, this can be seen 
from lack of articulate guidance for the exercise of judicial discretion or 
application of equitable doctrine758. The absence of criteria for determining the 
moral quality of the legal norms limits the capacity of the law for moral growth by 
leaving it without means of discovering deficiencies in the application of principle 
of equity to existing legal institutions, or means of aiding the moral growth of law 
by applying the principles of equity to new situations’759. Such a reserve towards 
the equitable principle made the reception of equity arrested rather than fully 
accomplished.
Similarly, in the common law system, despite the abolition of separate 
administration of equity and law in two courts, fusion was regarded as 
incomplete 760. For one thing, in both the US and England, there is a 
subordination of moral right and duty to procedural formalism, resulting in legal 
justice lagging behind equitable justice. For instance, in contract law, concerning a 
unilateral mistake resulting from failure to disclosure, specific performance of 
contracts, delay of performance, unjust enrichment, considerations by common 
law are remarkably insufficient compared with those by equity. This is also the 
case in adjective law, such as the Statute of Limitations761. Therefore, for the 
common law system, from the 14th to 20th century, equitable relief was only 
administered in a separate Court of Chancery, as auxiliary to the system of law and 
applied only in cases of hardship resulting from application of law, as well as in 
case of damage failing to provide an adequate remedy. Later even when this 
separation of the court of equity from that of law ceased to exist, it still continued 
to influence the mentality of judges that is subconsciously compartmentalised into
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two parts, equity and law762. Here comes Newman’s complaint that the common 
law, despite this trend, still manifests certain signs of reluctance and resistance to 
accepting the principles of equity fully into law, such as relief for frustration of 
purpose in contract law, relief for unilateral mistake and the doctrine of occupancy 
in good faith as a condition to acquiring title by adverse possession763.
Succincdy speaking, concerning the fusion of equity into law, in spite of 
considerable maturation that has been achieved in both common and civil law 
systems, there is still plenty of room for improvement. Legal historians tried to 
attribute this unsatisfactory incomplete coalescence to the closedness of the 
Roman system of equity, arguing that the Justinian Code was markedly immutable. 
This closedness not only rendered equity incapacitated to offer an adequate moral 
supply to the society’s demand, but had its inadequacy unnecessarily preserved in 
modern civil law system764.
The implication for China is that in its legal modernisation, inasmuch as 
attention is paid to examining the advanced Western laws for inspiration, efforts 
should be made to scrutinise both merits and demerits inherent within these 
systems. This subordination of equity to positive laws, for instance, marks not 
only a defect in the Western legal system, but also, where China could aspire to 
transcend, innovate and rectify. Only a selective, constructive learning of the 
common law and civil law systems could bring meaningful fruits for China’s 
project of legal modernisation. A blind passion for catching-up or unreflective 
copying of the Western laws would not help China to construct its own legal 
system.
Fully aware of the weaknesses in its scrutiny of Western laws, China should 
equally look to its traditions for inspiration. For one thing, the mature legal 
systems in imperial China had offered not only sources for criticism, but also for 
renewal. Its rich concern for disability, age, gender and poor, for instance, is of 
considerable interest as much in modern times as in imperial China. The 
complicated grading system in its penal code is another example that has been 
reinvented in China and worth further study. Apart from this imperial tradition, 
the Chinese revolution from 1911-76 was equally a historical period, as much of
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remarkable achievement for regurgitation, as of massive destruction from which 
to take lessons. Disaster and achievement, so to speak, are only the two sides of a 
coin for us to look at this revolutionary experience. For one thing, in its effort to 
dismande the old imperial mansion, the revolution equally attempted to construct 
on the ruins of feudalism a whole new mansion. The communist revolution bore a 
distinctive birthmark in its pursuit of a wide variety of social engineering projects 
that aimed at ushering in democracy, social justice, gender equality and humanism. 
It sought to replace imperial tradition on the one hand and capitalism on the other. 
Then it carried with it a third task of seeking its own path in the midst of such 
alternative efforts. The model of mass participation, as well as preferring judicial 
practice to official representation, had on massive scales renewed our concepts on 
justice, law and equity. Unattractive as this might seem nowadays due to its 
capability of as much construction as destruction, as a conscious, collective effort 
to seek China’s own style, this model is still worthwhile of reinvention.
This revolutionary tradition of enlisting popular support is of particular 
importance for us to study equity in Chinese legal system. Without it, legal 
modernisation in China will be hardly meaningful for the public, as it does not 
seek popular participation, public debate, or public appreciation. Such a legal 
institution will be ridden with deficiencies, as it is not premised on public consent, 
appreciation or approval. Moreover, involving the public in this project can help 
to discover, contain or remedy the vices of imported laws. Only through a 
democratised judicial structure could positive laws or written letters acquire its 
most inclusive oudook, which is part and parcel of modernity. China’s 
modernisation project of its legal system in particular and of the whole nation in 
general will only be successful when it has thrived to include public support and 
participation. This revolutionary tradition, thus, in post-Tiananmen China, 
acquires a character of as much necessity as urgency.
Finally, besides this awareness of defects in Western legal systems and efforts to 
reinvent its traditions, China should also contextualise its legal modernisation 
project within its cultural richness, socio-economic environment and ethnic 
diversity. Globalisation will not become readily comprehensible unless and until
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seriously contested in the context of local knowledge. In neglecting the plight of 
social reality, especially the underprivileged, the marginalised or the 
underrepresented, a liberalist commentator might assuage their conscience with 
the thought that the fruit of legal modernisation is a slow-coming product that has 
to be patiently awaited. Such a future-oriented outlook not only carries with it the 
complacency of predicting a self-fulfilling prophecy, but shuts down all possibility 
of imbuing this process with a richness of local knowledge. It should not be 
forgotten that no matter how modernised a legal system might be, it has to be 
rooted in the national culture and heritage. A legal system in China, past and 
future alike, should be Chinese-oriented in both its oudook and content. A legal 
landscape in China should be more Chinese than American or European. Looking 
to the ready-made Western legal systems is not only to forget the long history of 
evolution for these legal systems, but more essentially, to forget the onerous task 
of solving social conflicts, assuaging social pains and restoring public order 
situated in China’s own contexts, traditions and experiences. The Japanese 
academic effort to compile local customs, mores and manners and codify them 
into the Westernised state laws in the post-WWII period still awaits to be seen in 
China.
As Newman765 maintains, ‘a measure of harmony between the progress of the 
law and social progress is indispensable’. This observation is of particular 
relevance to today’s China. It is true that formalism, in terms of regularisation, 
bureaucratisation and professionalisation might represent a stronger tide that 
China is riding. All the same, it should not be forgotten that despite a rapid pace 
of industrialisation, urbanisation and economic growth, a massive proportion of 
the population has been left underprivileged, with equitable consideration of these 
groups relegated to at best second importance. The exigency of bending rigorous 
rules to relief hardship is thus more demanding than ever. This is an age that 
needs rather than obliterates equity, as pushing professionalisation too far and too 
fast at the sacrifice of attending to social needs has proven too costly to sustain. It 
could be both the best and the worst time. The coming of Chinese-centred legal
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landscape, including equity, should not only inspire imagination but more 
importandy painstaking efforts of concretisation.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, my contribution lies in showing that equity, both as a notion and as 
a development process, existed in the Chinese legal tradition. This study of equity 
is not confined to the boundaries of jurisprudence, but instead, adopts an 
interdisciplinary perspective that seeks to engage in the discourse such various 
notions as of political ideology, social control, as well as globalisation and local 
resistance. It raises the issue of studying law and equity in a wider context of 
society and politics, economy and culture, development and history. Law, as 
Hanfeizi put it centuries back, cannot operate alone. Law cannot be ratified in and 
of itself, but instead, has to derive its legitimacy, authority and influence from 
political ideology, cultural notions, local customs, socioeconomic context and 
public engagement. By the same token, equity will remain unintelligible unless and 
until we contextualise it within a given country’s history, development and policy.
In the light of the abovementioned contexts, it will be necessary to discern the
Chinese equity from its Western equivalent, which is commonly understood as a
correction of the positive law, discretion to fill a legal vacuum and
particularisation of law to suit the needs of individual cases766. First of all, the
Western notion of law and equity is founded on a masculine-feminine dichotomy.
On the one hand, ‘[t]he western concept of law is based on a patriarchal paradigm
characterised by hierarchy, linear reasoning, the resolution of disputes through the
application of abstract principles, and the ideal of the reasonable person. Its
fundamental aspiration is objectivity, and to that end it separates public from
private, form from substance, and process from policy’767. In other words, the
western conceptualisation of law was founded on a masculine aspiration of
generalisation rather than particularity, regularity rather than flexibility and
certainty rather than adaptation768. Heavily reliant on individual rights, it adopts an
abstract hierarchy of rules to regulate the interactions between parties769. By
comparison, equity, as a concern for the particular facts of a dispute, has been
characterised as a feminine search for context770. As is argued, ‘[t]he female mode
is characterised by an “ethic of care” which emphasises nurturance, connection
with others and contextual thinking. The male mode is characterised by an “ethic 
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of justice” which emphasises individualism, the use of rules to resolve moral 
dilemmas and equality’771. This feminist interpretation of law and equity does 
pinpoint the subordination of equity to law (i.e. female to male mode of justice) in 
the Western legal tradition.
This argument can also be applied to the relationship between equity and law in 
imperial China. The patriarchal legal codes aimed at universality and certainty, in 
which equity played a feminine, minor and corrective role. Nonetheless it should 
be stressed that equality was immaterial to both law and equity in imperial China. 
Instead, both law and equity were coloured by the dominant ideology of 
Confucianism that accentuated differentiation, subordination and inequality. 
Differentiation in terms of social status, subordination by reference to family 
relations, and inequality with regard to gender, class and ethnicity, were all 
incorporated into both official representation and legal practice. As is argued, 
‘[historically, inequality has been “justified” by reference to differences and 
deficiencies that dominant groups attribute to subordinate groups’772. The Chinese 
law, as founded on the Confucian ideal of harmony, was not only patriarchal but 
also hierarchal. For this very reason, the feminist discourse of law and equity in 
the Western tradition helps to elucidate our discussion of the Chinese legal 
tradition.
This patriarchal/feminine dichotomy of law and equity was challenged in 
revolutionary China. Equality was introduced into the notion of equity, where the 
communists sought alternatives to both imperial and imported modes of justice. 
The communist critique of the imperial inequality and the bourgeois sham of 
equality was thorough. Whereas the imperial inequality was conspicuously 
celebrated, the bourgeois notion of equality, couched in such captivating terms as 
freedom, liberty and impartiality, failed to address the concealed inequalities in 
terms of inability to afford the expensive legal fees, unfamiliarity with the complex 
procedures or unintelligence of the alien terminologies. Bureaucratism, formality 
and procedural fetishism could render law inaccessible to the masses. Fully aware 
of these inadequacies of bourgeois ‘equality’, the communists searched for an 
alternative mode of justice that would steer clear of the obstacles that stood
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between the people and justice. The people’s justice thus conceived was first and 
foremost a product of the socialist aspiration of achieving substantial rather than 
formal equality.
Therefore, while the feminist critique of law and equity took momentum in the 
West since the early 1980s, the Chinese revolutionaries had already started their 
journey to not only critiquing the traditional and capitalist notions, but also to 
bridging the gaps between theory and practice. Although it was not until the late 
1950s that Mao put forward his famous metaphor of China as a blank sheet of 
paper on which to draw the best possible pictures773, the communist endeavour to 
construct anew a People’s Justice in general and socialist equity in particular could 
be dated back to the Chinese Soviets in the first two quarters of the 20th century. 
Inequalities as veiled behind money, hierarchy, bureaucracy, social status and 
family relations were targeted for abolitions. In seeking to make the toiling masses 
masters of society, the communists embarked upon an ambitious engineering 
project of creating a classless society. This line of undertaking fostered a variety of 
innovative judicial techniques. Alongside litigation fee waiver and free services of 
legal counsel and document processing, a series of measures were adopted to 
broaden access to justice, such as circuit court, mass trial, people’s tribunal and 
mediation.
While such forms as of circuit court, mass trial and people’s tribunal seemed 
innovative, mediation was a long-established practice in the Chinese legal tradition. 
How is it possible for us to assert the communist novelty from its traditional 
practice? Furthermore, mediation has become a popular mode of justice, as can be 
seen in the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Movement in the West since 
the 1960s. Where can we draw the dividing line, then, between this communist-led 
mediation and its Western counterpart? These two questions, prima facie, are 
separate, but actually they are the two sides of the same coin, as they were both 
the dominant modes of justice to which the communists sought alternatives. For 
this reason, we shall address these two questions at one fell swoop.
Undeniably the communist-led mediation shared certain traits of similarity with 
both the imperial and Western equivalents, such as lower cost, community
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participation and informality. Inviting local prestige and village seniors to mediate 
rang the bell of legal practice in imperial China, while in facilitating the mediation 
process, mediators in China employed a method similar to the notion of ‘selective 
facilitation’, through which ‘clients may be steered in particular directions chosen 
by the mediator’774, such as empowerment of a weaker party or prevention of 
victimising a third-party, such as a child775. As is argued, ‘[i]t may become 
necessary to explain to the parties that the mediator is not taking a position on the 
outcome but rather that he or she is trying to create an equitable negotiation 
setting so that a settlement can be reached that each party will perceive as 
reasonable and therefore be more apt to honour its terms’776. It was recognised in 
both China and the West that the disputing parties oftener were not on parity in 
terms of access to resources, social status, power etc. For this, mediators would 
consider the ‘fairness’ of the mediation and aspire to prevent unfair or undesirable 
agreements 777. The communist practice was also reminiscent of judge-led 
promotion of informalism by emphasising ‘consensual settlement’ at every stage 
of lawsuit, or the extra-judicial ‘conciliatory board’ as started in the German 
judiciary since the 1960s778.
Thus, both systems acknowledged the importance of mediation, as part and 
parcel of equity, in that it reflected ‘equality, participation, self-determination and a 
form of leaderless leadership in problem-solving and decision-making’ 779 , 
especially in its emphasis on particularistic solutions tailored to the very nature of 
each conflict780. Mediation was regarded as a means to re-forge a sense of ‘we’ — 
‘people who are willing to work together and trust each other’. By leaving 
decision-making to elites, community member could be disenfranchised, especially 
in case of minor criminal offences. This predicament could be mended through 
mediation by attending to the needs of victims and repairing communities rather 
than simply imprisoning wrongdoers781. In comparison to positive law, mediation 
considers disputes in terms of relationship and responsibility; it is cooperative, 
consensual and voluntary; it is informed by context rather than by abstract 
principles; and finally, it recognises emotions782. Its strengths of empowerment, 
emotional venting, open exploration of options and voluntary settlement783 are
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thus an equitable antidote to the potential hardship that might arise out of positive 
law.
Having outlined the similarities, we should none the less notice the essential 
differences in the communist practice. For one thing, traditionally, mediation was 
viewed as auxiliary to the imperial justice system, where local magistrates 
dispensed with civil suits or insignificant cases to local communities or clans. It 
was normally chaired by local tithing, village seniors, reputable figures or clan 
heads. They were in general well-educated men endowed with great informal 
power and considerable prestige in local circles.784 The state withheld its 
involvement from the mediation process785. Similarly in the West, although 
mediation was praised as a faster, cheaper and less confrontational alternative to 
litigation786, in practice judges and lawyers would readily dispense with cases that 
were inconvenient, time-consuming or unprofitable, so as to reduce caseload for 
courts and to enable judges to concentrate on more important or profitable 
cases787. Thus, in common with the practice in imperial China, mediation was 
reduced to a position only secondary to adjudication.
Such a utilitarian viewpoint of mediation was not the case with the communist 
practice in China, where mediation was viewed part and parcel of the state-led 
effort to bring justice to the masses. The driving force behind this movement was 
not because of money, importance, or time, but because of a moral commitment 
to the masses by broadening access to justice, democratising the judiciary and 
widening public participation in the decision-making process of adjudication. It 
meant more efforts to be undertaken by the judges as they had to travel miles to 
reach a remote village or local community for mediation. Judging by modern 
standards of time, cost and efficiency, this mode of practice apparently had its 
obvious demerits. Nevertheless what it lost on the grounds of economic concerns 
was gained back from its moral gains of constructing a legal system that 
transcended both imperial and capitalist models.
Neither did this mode of justice label mediation as cheap, unrefined and 
secondary. As we can see from the Ma Xiwu Style, it started from a conviction to 
bring justice closer to the masses, even where there existed severe restrictions in
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terms of financial resources, legal infrastructure or sufficient staff. Through the 
years, this conviction gradually evolved into a detailed body of rules, procedures 
and trainings. Without relegating mediation to a position secondary to 
adjudication, it instead sought to combine mediation and adjudication. The 
rationale for mediation here thus was not simply a reduction of workload, or 
offering a cheaper alternative to courts of law, but instead, was zealous to enable 
even the most marginalised groups of the population to be able to access justice 
and legal service. Although restrictions in terms of resources and infrastructure 
did play a part in this movement, cost, time and workload were not the primary 
concerns for this judicial innovation. Nor was it attached with secondary 
importance from the very beginning. Whereas the imperial tradition was imbued 
with Confucian ideals of hierarchy and patriarchy and the ADR movement by an 
adversarial legal culture, the communist-led mediation, as part and parcel of 
equity as embodied in people’s justice, sought to transcend both ideologies.
Equality thus introduced in the revolutionary period carried with it a tripartite 
mission: to overcome the imperial celebration of inequality, to transcend the 
bourgeois equality as cloaked in formality and to construct anew a socialist mode 
by restoring to the oppressed toiling masses their due and entitlements in terms of 
economic, political and social wellbeing. All the same, it should be pointed out in 
this communist mission, it had a mixed record of achievements and failures. 
Where equality was interpreted as reversing the oppression mechanism by making 
the exploited masters of society, it also meant subjecting the exploiters to mass 
struggles. Therefore, it inspired inventiveness, innovation and creativity on the 
part of generations of devotees, while simultaneously it unleashed the ferocity of 
human nature by instituting an all-encompassing system of ‘politics in command’. 
The journey to a classless society was soon engulfed in chaos and brutality once 
the whole nation boarded the train. Equality in terms of access to justice was as 
real and logical as equality defined in fierce struggles, humiliation and unrestrained 
populism. Equality, as coined by the revolutionaries to inspire the populace and 
empower the disenfranchised, ironically led to its own demise as it deepened
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inequalities across many social spheres by instituting terror, fear and abuse on a 
massive scale.
Fully aware of this dual face of the people’s justice, the Deng-led reformists 
aimed to rescue its democratic, participatory and legitimate outlook while 
shedding its harshness, extremism and rampancy -  a task that was performed 
relatively well in the first decade in the reformist era. Equity in this period was 
defined as rejuvenating the good practices from the revolutionary tradition, as well 
as avoiding the past mistakes by formalisation, bureaucratisation and professional 
-isation. Alongside mediation, such judicial techniques as circuit court, on-the-spot 
investigations and public trials were reinvigorated, as they carried a transformative 
power of democratisation and legitimation. As is argued, they can help to ‘develop 
new and creative human solutions to otherwise difficult or intractable problems’ 
between conflicting parties, be it ethnic groups, communities, workplaces, families 
or individuals, through replacing the traditional hierarchical, top-down decision­
making processes with democratic and more participatory processes788. These 
forms can be regarded as an integral part of a process of democratic speech and 
conversation789.
The significance of this transformative power can be discussed with reference to 
the Habermasian notions of ‘communicative action’, ‘discourse ethics’ and ‘ideal 
speech conditions’. For Habermas, consensus-building process has ‘emancipatory’ 
implications for human socio-political life, where ‘the validity of every norm of 
political consequence [should be] made dependent on a consensus arrived at in 
communication free from domination’790. Through collective actions, individual 
rights could be reconciled with community solidarity. Real consensus that is 
‘freely’ arrived at can empower the powerless, assuage the disgruntled, and heal 
the wounded, where interested parties, groups or institutions could achieve true 
understanding and address imbalances. A discourse free of intimidation, coercion 
or domination, i.e. ‘ideal speech condition*, could significantly enable the parties 
involved. Clearly, Habermas has seen discourse as legitimate and moral in and of 
itself, as long as it fulfils the following procedural condition, in that everyone with
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competence should be allowed to take part in the discourse, make or question an 
assertion, express his/her attitudes, desires and needs free of coercion791.
These Habermasian notions can help to illuminate certain aspects of the 
communist practices. The democratising, empowering and participatory force in 
the people’s justice addressed the core issue of legitimacy that underlined the legal 
order. In Mao’s era, as part and parcel of the Communist’s conscious effort to 
transcend both traditional and capitalist models, this people’s justice consolidated 
these communist aspirations by concretising their promises, institutionalising their 
visions and bringing socialism to even the remotest part and most marginalised 
group in the country. Equity, as enshrined in the people’s justice, addressed the 
legitimacy of the communist rule by putting into practice the socialist ideals.
In the first decade since Mao’s death and China’s opening up, rejuvenating the 
people’s justice helped to legitimise the communist regime in the new era. For one 
thing, Mao’s idealism disillusioned the Party rank-and-file and the masses alike. 
The debate on Mao’s legacy, as well as the relations between Mao and Maoism, 
was only a caricature of the dissatisfaction on the part o f the whole society. The 
Party faced a dual task to rescue its revolutionary traditions while simultaneously 
to reform itself. For justice, the answer lay in reinvigorating the past good 
practices without excesses, as well as formalisation by looking up to the Western 
models. For the period between 1978 and 1989, equity maintained a relatively 
good record in achieving these two aims.
Since 1992, however, legitimacy became an acute issue, where the rapid process 
of modernisation, formalisation and bureaucratisation resulted in an increasingly 
large proportion of the population being marginalised. Building a socialism with 
Chinese characters thus became an empty promise, pending for concrete and 
conscious efforts of institutionalisation, democratisation and accountability. To 
legitimise this process of legal modernisation in particular within national 
development in general, therefore, cannot be justified in economic terms alone. 
The need to reinvigorate its communist tradition of equity will not only address 
the legitimacy of this new legal order but more importantly help to address the 
forgotten moral dimension of development and modernisation.
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And it is not only legitimacy and democratic component of equity that have 
suffered. Equality, too, was reduced to formality alone. Under the slogan ‘let a 
certain proportion of the population become rich first’, equality now had to be 
interpreted in monetary terms. Marketisation deprived the revolutionary political 
of its soul and replaced the latter with a universal law of contract792. The previous 
revolutionary commitment to address embedded social inequalities became 
increasingly obsolete, where the terminologies a la mode were impartiality, judiciary 
independence and rights. It was seldom realised that in this process of 
westernisation, the heavy reliance upon formality, rights and bureaucracy could 
perpetuate dichotomies between individual and community, self and other, and 
family and market, for which it would not promote social reconstruction. As a 
result, this newly acquired hierarchal mode was joined in hand by certain revived 
patriarchal traditions. For instance, discrimination against women sprang back 
into life, old-fashioned customs concerning marriage and divorce were raised from 
the dead, the circuit court gradually fell into disuse, legal fees soared, and 
mediation became predominantly a low- or non-paid women’s job, which 
represented a form of gender stratification within the realm of legal institutions793. 
Where the formal, hierarchal and patriarchal rights were reified and conceptualised 
as real or thing-like794, the social aspect of equity, together with its transformative 
power, was lost. The rich human capital as accumulated by the mass line policy 
and people’s justice was gradually swept away.
The current unsatisfactory situation points to not only where the state has failed, 
but also where it can achieve, as predicament and opportunity are always the two 
sides of the same coin. The Internet, if well used, can help to restore legitimacy of 
the judiciary, as it can be an effective way to survey popular opinions, collect their 
feedback, systemise these inputs and then reintroduce them back to the public. 
The mass line policy as proposed by Mao in the early 1940s can then be 
reinvigorated in the new age. By addressing the towering social inequalities, equity 
can help to empower the disempowered, restore social balance and attend to the 
marginalised. Equality that has been eroded by marketisation can be regained by
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introducing an equitable consideration of the weak, the disenfranchised or the 
needy.
And it is not only with reference to legitimacy, democratisation and equality that 
equity can be revitalised. In the current age, equity also points to the issue of legal 
pluralism. Considering the vastness of China in terms of ethnicity, geography, 
language and customs, it is a matter of necessity to strike a balance between 
universality and particularism of state law. Equity can serve as the transmission 
belt where both customary and national laws are duly considered. For one thing, 
customary and national laws can run into conflicts due to their differences as 
follows: (1) specialisation between social control, self-government and the 
administration of justice within state law in contrast with lack of such formal 
distinctions in customary law; (2) national law being applied to individuals while 
indigenous law can be applied to the unit of society of which the offender is a 
member, where the entire family can be subject to sanction; (3) the pre-existence 
of punishment for each offence in national law while lack of such detailed 
institutionalisation in indigenous law; and (4) different forms of punishments, 
where ‘in indigenous communities, corporal punishment, forced labour and loss 
of community rights are common, while imprisonment is rare’795. Considering the 
uneven development in China across provinces and regions, it would be difficult 
to assure a uniform practice of law without due consideration of local variation. 
Where pluralism abounds, there is always a tension between the observance of 
state law and an equitable adjustment. In this context, equity is the right prism 
through which legal pluralism is combined with a state effort to craft a universal 
and applicable legal order.
Moreover, an equitable recognition of legal pluralism may provide a gateway for 
indigenous groups to escape from the hidden chauvinism inherent in the 
overarching national or international legal systems. The national and international 
legal discourses dominate the way ‘indigenous organisations articulate their 
identities and aspirations’796. The recognition of legal pluralism can help the 
indigenous groups to assert a collective right to self-determination and seek their 
autonomous collective citizenship within the state. For instance, Qiujii’s claim of
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shuofa represents an indigenous sense of justice and fairness, which was informed 
by local mores and manners, as well as contextualised by the corresponding local 
socioeconomic development. Failure to incorporate such shuofa resulted in
dissatisfaction and disillusionment with state law. By comparison, speaking local 
languages, recognising a local sense of proportionate share of benefits in
partnership, as well as respecting an indigenous notion of right and wrong in 
sexuality, helped to mould a collective citizenship in the teeth of a state-led 
integration with the global legal order. This was done through localising the 
westernised state laws, deflecting the encroaching effect of the globalisation of law 
and shedding the harshness of an increasingly formalised legal bureaucracy.
It is in this sense that for our discussion of equity, these equitable issues of legal 
pluralism, democratisation, legitimacy and equality are mutually embedded. By
rendering state justice accessible to the indigenous, the disempowered, the
marginalised and the underprivileged, legal pluralism ensures a substantially 
equitable distribution of judicial resources and an equal share of the state 
protection of rights and citizenship. By making the legal and political systems 
more inclusive and participatory, this approach in its turn helps to recuperate 
legitimacy for the state797. It is thereby a matter o f necessity for China to systemise 
and institutionalise equity, as legal pluralism in particular and equity in general are 
essentially a political issue798.
One of the areas that has not been researched by this thesis is the changing role 
of the Party in quasi-judicial processes. For instance, the Party officials can be 
subjected to a process called ‘dual-discipline’ (.shuanggui) for such official 
misconducts as corruption, bribery and abuses of power. This dual-disciplinary 
procedure is operated by the Party’s own inspectorate that is independent from 
the state justice bureaucracies like the procuracy and courts of law. This poses 
certain dilemmas to legal modernisation as the Party, at certain places, situates 
itself away from or on the top of the law. Having said this, it should also be 
recognised that the Party remains the sole source of sanctioning state policies, 
legitimising legal development and charting social engineering projects. Its mutual 
embeddedness with China’s legal modernisation has rendered the issue of equity
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inescapably intertwined with the Party’s competence, development and self­
perceptions. Therefore, the Party must be regarded ‘not only as part of the 
problem but also as carrying with it the needed sources of a solution’799. How the 
changing role as played by the Party can influence our discourse of equity, legality 
and legal modernisation in China needs to be further researched.
As is argued, ‘[disputes are cultural events, evolving within a framework of rules 
about what is worth fighting for, what is the normal or moral way to fight, what 
kinds of wrongs warrant action, and what kinds of remedies are acceptable’800. 
Our study of equity points to the essential issue of regarding the project of legal 
modernisation in China as an open system where a wide variety of sources, be it 
traditional or modern, legal or political, social or moral, historical or imported, can 
contest for validity, rejuvenation and adaptation. It is only through this openness 
that a modern landscape of Chinese law and equity can be envisioned.
270
Endnote
1 Pound 1960: 2.
2 Newman 1961,1973.
3 cf. Newman 1961: 18-n.33, 71-n.5,174-5, 206,215-8, 231-2 on Chinese law; 95-6,109-10, 232 on Islamic 
law.
4 Cf. Tsao 1962; Shinga 1998; Huang 1996, Lin Duan 1994.
5 Cf. Gassin 1973: 549; Borga 1973: 396 quoting Stagarite; Friedmann 1960: 494; Szladits 1973: 471.
6 Aristotle Nich. Eth. III. 10, also Rhetoric 1.13,15. Later, Grotius framed a similar idea as ‘lex non exacte 
dejinit, sed arbitrio boni viripermitUf (correction of that, wherein the law is deficient). Quoting Grotius, 
Blackstone defined equity as ‘the name of methods whereby the law, as a set of “established rules and fixed 
precepts” is corrected’ (quoted in Stromholm 1973: 444).
7 Neil Snyder 1973: p34-7.
8 Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No.2) [1974] Ch. 269, 322.
9 Neil Snyder 1973: 37.
10 Amos 1874: 57.
1 Plato, Republic, Ch.4: Concerning Justice.
12 Cf. Jowett, translator’s introduction, Plato Republic.
13 Newman 1961: 11.
14 Quoted in ibid: 11.
15 Buckland 1911: 121.
16 Quoted in Matteucci 1973: p368-9.
17 Maine 1920: 32.
18 Holdsworth 1914: 295.
19 Newman 1973a: 27.
20 Cf. Ollero 1973: 381 on equity in the Spanish law; Koshikawa 1973: 425 on Japanese; Zepos 1973: 435, 
436 on Greek civil law before 1946.
21 Wagner 1973: 539.
2 Borga 1973: 396.
23 See also Cardozo 1921:112; Pollock 1922: 37. Socrates’ refusal to plead for mercy after being sentenced 
to death is a famous illustration of respect for this generality of law. see Newman 1961:16. also, Plato 
(1928): 78.
24 On the infinite variety of human circumstances, cf. Burke 1871: 357; Pound 1924: 65. the moral question 
as present in every case can be as infinite as the cases themselves. See Newman 1961: 16; Cohen 1935: 809, 
833.
25 Newman 1961:16,1973b: 626; Pound 1921:141,1959: 407.
26 Diederichsen and Gursky 1973: p277-8.
27 Maine 1920: 4.
28 Matteucci 1973: p367-72.
29 Neil Snyder 1973: p38-9.
30 Huang 1996, 2001.
31 Tsao 1962: 21,30, 43.
32 Tsao 1962: 30; cf. Neil Snyder 1973: 36.
3 Shinga 1998: p36-7.
34 cf. Liang 2004: 73; Wang 2001:171-2.
35 Ma, Xiaohong 1997: 86-7.
36 Zhang, Jinfan 2005: 85.
37 Lin Duan 2003: 16-21.
38 Huang 1996:12-3.
39 MS.93.
40 Cf. Tsao 1962: 21; Shinga 1998: 24; Li, Maoqing 2004: 19; Ma, Xiaohong 2004: 227; Langlois 1981:177- 
8; Weld 2004:133; Shu, Hongxi 2004: 46; Liu, Xiaowen (2003): 54.
271
41 Dl: 1131, D2: 612, D3:1131; D4: 918, D5: 772, D6: 854; D7: 870; D8:1991, D9: 2276, DIO: 2813, Dll: 
2678,; D12: 5326, where there are 18 meanings of this word and only the commonly-used ones are selected; 
D13: 2377, 2326, 2744,1765-6,1891,2377; D14: 279; D15: 1642.
In D16: 2897 and D17: 810, it was translated as (1) ‘feeling; affection; sentiment’; (2) ‘kindness; 
sensibilities; favour, feelings’; (3) ‘love, passion’; (4) ‘situation; circumstances, conditions; facts; detail’; (5) 
‘sexual passion; lust’.
42I use lii to transliterate 81 while li for 4L, as in pinyin, both SI and 4L are pronounced as 11. Therefore, 
for distinguishing purpose, I will use lii and li separately. This was first used by Tsao Wen-yen. See Tsao 
(1962). D12: 5326; He, Qinghua (2004c: p36-7) even outlined 10 different meanings of qingli with 
reference to case studies of the decisions by a Qing magistrate — Fan Zenxiang.
43 SeeDl: 159, D2: 86, D3:159; D12: 3380.
4 Scogin 1990, 2004.
45 SZ.8.
46 SZ.2.
47 Analects-. XX.4.
48 GZ.l.
49 SJS.6.
50 HS.49.
51 Fan et al. 1992: 22.
52 S1J.2.
53 WZ.11.
54 WZ.8.
5 ZZ.ZhuanggonglO.
56 Analects XIX. 19.
57 HHS.46.
58 Cf. QSG 480.267. Zhang Tang regarded this teaching as the Spirit to guide his adjudication. See HS: 
LIX.29. On Lu Gong, cf. comments by Xiao, Tongxuan in WX: LIX59; DGHJ: XIII.
59 SJS.8.
60 S1J. 1; cf. Wei, Zhiqiang 1986: 85.
61 XZYS: 11.
62 ZYSWJ.53.
63 MGSPQMJ.
64 Langlois 1981:170; 2004: 339.
65 Wilhelm and Baynes 1960: 20-2.
6 Analects-. IX.30.
67 CQGYZ.Henggongll. As is argued, *What is quan? It bends jing, hence availing an improved result’.
68 As Mencius said, ‘jing is regularity while quan is flexibility. To know the regularity by heart while at times 
assume flexibility is [the way to] excellence’. See HSWZ: II.3. In fact, Mencius has illustrated this with the 
story of saving a drowning sister-in-law despite the propriety of refraining from physical contact with 
female unless by marriage. See Mencius.7. For further comments, see Li, Xueqin et al 1999: 98
69 CQFL: II.3, III.5.
70 Ma, Zuowu 2004:121.
71 SQ.
72 Langlois 1981:170,187,188.
73 Ma, Zuowu 2004: pi 32-4.
74 cf. THY 40.1; TLSY 6,11; SS.199.
75 Fan et al. 1992: p26-7.
76 Zhang Jinfan 2005: 93.
7 Zhang, Jinfan 2005: 83.
78 Quoted in Ma, Zuowu 2004: 278.
79 Quoted in Ma, Zuowu 2004: p270-l.
80 PPY.II.
81 Ma, Zuowu 2004: 271.
82 Hu 1999.
272
83 He Weifang 1995: 214.
84 XAHL 50.A.3.
85 Quoted in Ma, Zuowu 2004: 278.
86 Maine 1920; Pound 1921.
87 This is a concept borrowed from Aristotelian analysis that distinguishes distributive justice from its 
commutative counterpart, the former aimed at giving to each member of a community a share 
proportionate to his merit while the later equalising or correcting in exchanges of obligations. See 
Hamburger 1942.
8 Newman 1961: 21-2, 255-6
89 Stein 1973: p75-7.
90 Cf. Stein 1973: 84.
91 Buckland 1911: 10-4, 52.
92 Stein 1973: 77-8, 84-6, 91-2.
93 It was remarked by a formula restated by a law of the Vatican City State, ‘the judge “shall render his 
judgment in the spirit of the sae rule she would make if he were the legislator”’ (Lefebvre 1973: 106).
94 Newman 1961: ch.2; Lefebvre 1973; Zepos 1973.
95 This can have four scenarios: (1) where there is a clear statute, the judge may ‘for meeting practical needs, 
[be] willing to bury the principle under a succession of exceptions’; (2) to infer from statutory law an 
underlying principle; (3) infer from a few words an entire theory; (4) a maintenance of solutions of the old 
French law; (5) abuse of rights not to the owner’s interests but aimed at harming others. See Dufeaux 1973: 
248-50.
96 Dufeaux 1973: 254.
97 Dufeaux 1973.
98 Esser 1973.
9 E.g. sect.242 of the German Civil Code, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, or BGB for short, Diederichsen and 
Gursky 1973: 277.
10 Extensions of rights and duties can be made to insure execution of the contract, accessory care and 
protection, or disclosure of information, such duties arising out of the principle of good faith as culpa in 
contrahendo (violating a pre-contract duty), positive vertragsverletzung (positive violation of contractual 
duty), ibid: 279-81.
101 The occasions can include: (1) absence of permanent self-interest on the part of the creditor, as it will 
be ‘an abuse of a formal legal position if the creditor demands a performance which, according to another 
legal provision, he would have to return again’ (dolo agt, quipetit, quod statim redditurus est); (2) the right is 
exercised in a manner contrary to the purpose of the rule of law from which the right is derived; (3) 
disappointment of reasonable expectations, the prohibition of venire factum prcprium (contrary conduct); (4) 
the principle of Laches; (5) the debtor may not plead limitation should the defence constitute a venire 
contra factum proprium; (6) dishonest acquisition of rights (corresponding to the exceptio doli praeteriti of 
Roman law); (7) inconsiderate, excessive self-interest; (8) abuse of rules of form; (9) disregard of legal entity, 
such as limiting the principle of separation of juristic persons from their individual members whenever it 
violates the precept of good faith (ibid: 281-90).
102 This is referred to as ‘the doctrine of absence or lapse of the contractual basis’, where absence indicates 
‘non-existence’ of contractual obligation even at the moment of its conclusion while lapse means ‘ceasing 
to exist at a later stage’, in subdivisions of subjective and objective contractual bases. The former refers to a 
situation where the contracting parties found their contract based on an erroneous premise; while the 
objective counterpart refers to unforeseeable events that change or make disappear the situations on which 
the contract is based, such as disproportion of value of performances, frustration of the contractual 
purpose (ibid: 290-6).
103 Matteucci 1973: p372-80.
104 Elders 1973.
105 Vinogradoff (1913: 379) asserts that the time for the common law courts to apply both equity and law 
was in the 13th and early 14th centuries; Adams (1916: 87) maintained that as early as the 12th century and 
until the 14th century, equity and common law were administered in a singular court system; Bowman 
(1929: 276) and Barbour (1918: 873) put the time as ‘from the latter half of the 12th century to the latter 
half of the 14th century’; Baildon (1896: intro: xix) prolonged the time to the latter half of the 15th century 
when equity became exclusively administered by the Court of Chancery. On the disappearance of equitable 
principles from the common law courts, see Ogilvie 1958: 25-33.
273
106 Coing (1955: 240) maintains that ‘[i]n England, equity had to supplement a much less advanced system 
of law than on the [European] continent’. Cf. Smith 1954.
107 As Pound (1924: 31) commented, ‘No development of common law writs, as they took fixed form after 
the 13th century, could give equitable relief for fraud and so at the end of this stage the law had come to be 
highly immoral. It regarded nothing but conformity or want of conformity ot its forms and rules. The 
moral aspect of situations, the moral aspects of conduct were wholly indifferent’. Ames (1908) and 
Newman (1961: 25-6) gave illustrations of these immoral situations.
108 Pound (1905: 350) commented that the rise of the Court of Chancery preserved the common law 
system from dry rot.
109 This is, ‘if A enfeoffed land to B with a promise from B that he would return it upon A’s request, and B 
later refused to honour his promise, neither Parliament nor the courts of amoralised common law would 
provide a remedy’ (Brown 1973: 210).
10 In 1350, the Ordinance of London was passed that required petitions for writs be addressed directly to 
the Chancellor. See Holdsworth 1914: 403; Barbour (1918) placed the time in the 15th century.
11 Newman 1973a: 22-4.
12 For a jurisprudential discussion of such periods of darkening and involution, cf. Allen 1958: 392; Del 
Vecchio 1969; Holdsworth 1914: 217; Newman 1961: p38-9.
13 In judicial practice, for instance, in 1609, equity was described as ‘a ruled kind of justice’; in 1672, Lord 
Nottingham (Cook v. fountain, 3 Swanst. 385) refuted that conscience was simply natural and internal; in 
1750, equity was particularly hardened in the time of Lord Hardwick (Chesterfield v. Janssen, 1 Atk. At 353 
— 1750); in 1818, Lord Eldon (Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 414) flatly dispelled any individual 
discretion in applying equitable principles. For all the cases cited, see Allen 1958: 392, 406.
14 Walker 1973: 190; Newman 1973a: 23, 39ff; Heuston 1987: 73.
15 Pound 1935: 20, 29, 35.
16 Brown 1973: 209-14.
17 Newman 1961: 50-1; Kharas 1950:186; Walsh 1938.
18 Cf. Newman 1961: 51-2; Pound and Plucknett 1927:142.
19 Gassin 1973: 549.
120 Stein 1973: 78-89.
121 Newman 1973b: p603-4, 630-40.
12 Newman 1973b: 604.
123 Lefebvre 1973.
124 Gassin 1973: 552, 554-5.
125 Gassin 1973: 557-73.
126 Gasin 1973: 571.
127 Gassin 1973: 573-80.
128 Huang 1996: 12-3.
129 SSZY.19, Legge 1867: 588-612, Shaughnessy 1999: 323.
130 ZZ.43, 53; Hsu 1999: 584-5.
131 HS.30.
132JS.30, Lewis 1999: 603-4.
13 Lewis 1999: 589-90, 605-6.
134 SJ.5, 68.
135 Lewis 1999: 610, 612.
136 Lewis 1999: 603-16.
137 HS.l, 23; Hulsewe 1955: 26ff., 333. After Han, there is a sophisticated differentiation of positive laws at 
various levels: statute (IuW ) refers to the supreme legal code while substatutes were called ting ('§ '),&  (t&), 
shi (i^ )or %hi ($i!j). In Han, there was no such differentiation as Hi or ling can refer to either statute or 
substatute (Hulsewe 1987; Loewe 1999: 1005-6). As for the si2e of the Han Code, no archaeological record 
had been unearthed yet to attest the claim of‘960 volumes and 26,272 clauses’ in the Book of Wei (WS.lll; 
Hulsewe 1955: 52ff.).
138 CBSQTS 1978: 264, 267, 270; Hulsewe 1985: n.20-2,1987.
139 CBSQTS 1978: 245-6; Hulsewe 1985: n.1-2,1987.
140 HS.23, Loewe 1999: 1003-10.
274
141 HS.23, cf. Hulsewe 1955: 337.
142 Hulsewe 1955: 72-80,1987.
143 Hulsewe 1985: doc 56, 58, 86, n.18 on the Qin law; 1955: 88 ff. on the Han law.
144 Ch’ii 1961: 273.
145 Analects II.2.
146 Laozi.3.
147 Ch’ii 1961: p247-67.
148 Ch’ii 1961: 268.
149 Kongcongzi.4.
150 Xunzi.28, 30.
151 Analects III. 19, 22.
152 Ch’ii 1961: 226-41.
153 Hanfeizi.30, translated in Ch’ii 1961: 246.
154 HS.30, 56; HHS.48e.
15 JS.30.
156 As for the later codes immediately after Han, up so far we only knew the number of clauses in these 
codes: 1,522 in the Jin Code (268AD), 2,529 in the Code of South Dynasty Liang (in early 6th century AD), 
832 in the North Wei Code and 500 in the Sui Code (583 AD). The Tang Code (653 AD), inheriting its Sui 
predecessor, fixed the number of clauses at 500 (Hulsewe 1987). After Tang, we generally had an 
impression that the successive imperial legal codes were more an adjusted continuation than of 
revolutionary originality a break from the Tang Code (Hulsewe 1987). Despite non-existence of these 
codes, we can glean from historical records the information on law and legal practice.
157 SJ.68.
158 MacCormack 1990: 132; 1996.
159 Stafford 1995, 2000.
160 SWJZ.
161 Analects: XVII.21.
162 Analects II.5.
163 See LJ.12. Also, by record, Wang Senbian, a commander of over 3,000 soldiers in his forties in Liang 
Dynasty, was so filial that he submitted to his mother’s whips peacefully.YSJX.1.
164SJ.10.
165 It is also called xiaoshi%.7f,. As Gui Boulais (1891: p5-6) defined, ‘on expose dans une cage la tete du 
condamne, afin d’inspirer la terreur au peuple’.
16 TPYL.640.
167 HHS.76.11.
168 ZYGJ.
169 MS.93.
170 MSJSBM.14.
171 TD.164.
172 TPYL.646; QJW.10.
173 The Wei Law in WS.126, the Late Wei Law in JCLK.5; for comment, see Qii (1998): 70.
174 A son was given a period to mourn over his mother’s death and then continued his banishment. See 
WS.126.
175 In Tang Code, for the convict committing crimes other than Ten Sins (r&V_h^£), if his grand/parents 
are octogenarian or severely ill while in the family there is no other ql ql n male (e.g. grown-up uncle or 
brother etc.), to take care [of the grand/parents], he can apply for ‘reserving life to care parents’, to the 
Board of Justice {xingbu )PJ nP) and finally to be agreed by the Emperor. Those culpable to be exiled can 
also apply and re-take the punishment until the other male from patrilineal relatives (ql ql n) grew up (uncle 
or brother) or until after one year mourning over the grand/parents’ decease. See TLSY 26; SXT.3
176 Qii 1998: 71, n.l.
17 TLSY 26; SXT.3; DQLLBL 88-93, 96-106; Qii 1998: 72.
178 MLL.2, DQLLBL 96-101, see its revisions in 1801 and 1835.
179 There are deviant case certainly. For instance, in 1173, the Emperor rejected a cunliu yangqin 
application by a death convict who committed killing in battery. The Emperor argued that since he was the
275
only son, he should have bom in mind all the time his responsibility of caring his father. Engaging in an 
impulsive fight, he had completely forsaken this primary duty. For this very reason, his application was 
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family; or if the culpable committed ethically unacceptable cases like adultery, theft, abduction, fraud; in 
1811, it was added the circumstance of the son deliberately wandering in other places than his origin 
without due care of his parents, except being on official duty, conducting business with a proven record of 
sending money home to parents, or a place within radius of 10 li across the border of two provinces. See 
DQHDSL 732; DQLLBL 101. For comment, see Qii (1998): 72.
182 The convict can become an only son under a few circumstances, such as his siblings going to 
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257 Qii 1998:184-7.
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263 JS.30. Hulsewe 1955: 285 ff., 1987.
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aristocrats must be reported to the emperor for decisions. See HS.12. In 27 A.D., a similar royal writ was 
issued, see HHS.l. The emperor rejected quite often such arrest applications. See HS.49, 74, 78.
265 TLSY 7; SXT.2; WDHY.10; MLL.1; DQLLBL 51-5.
266 This was incorporated into bayi in the law of Wei. For later legal codes, see JL as quoted in TLSY 5; 
TPYL: 651; S1S.25.XFZ; TLSY 7,11; SXT.2; MLL.1 DQLLBL 51-5.
267 Han started lessening penalty on the offspring of aristocracy, see HS.2. For later laws, see TLSY 11; 
SXT.2; MLL.1; DQLLBL 56-60.
268 For a debate on the time when the Rites of Zhou was written, cf. Yang Xiangkui 1992.
269 ZL.5.
270 Cf. Yuan Law in YS.102,105. Also, a new development should be noted here: in 1303, bureaucrats 
were not allowed to use official paperwork to deal personal disputes at court. See YDZ.53.15. This clause 
was then continued in Ming and Qing codes. See MLL.10.2; DQLLBL 1743.
271 This applied to the bureaucrats above the 600-stone rank in Han, above 5-pin in Tang, with pin titles in 
Song, above 5-pin and those living in the capital in Ming, and all ranks in Qing. see HHS.Z24-5. TLSY 9; a 
1068 royal writ SS.199.XFZ; SXT.2; MLL; DQLLBL 63-8. For a classification of the official ranks, see 
HHS.127
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272 In 194 B.C., Xiaohuidi Emperor of Han issued a royal writ to exempt bureaucrats above 600-stone rank 
from torture for inquisition. HS.2. This was continued in later legal codes. Cf. the Liang, Sui and North 
Zhou laws in S1S.25.
273 Rather than torture for inquisition, evidence should be obtained through three or more witnesses, 
which was started in Tang. See TLSY 474. It was continued in later legal codes. For Song, see SXT.29, also 
a royal writ in 1117 in SS. 199. For Yuan, see YS.102. For Ming, see MLL.12.4. For Qing, see DQLLBL 
1673; the Qing law also required that in case torture for inquisition has to be used on bureaucrats above 3- 
pin rank, the emperor’s approval must be sought first, see DQLLBL 54.
274 By Sui Law*bureaucrats above 7-pin can have penalty reduced by one degree. S1S.25; TLSY 10,11; 
SXT.2.
275 These financial means include monetary redemption (shoushul$Cj|^ )and salary deduction {fafeng^s\$$). 
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20 3
30 6
40 9
50 12
See DQLLBL 71.
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(1998): 233, HS.2, JL as quoted in TPYL.651; for Chen and Sui laws, see S1S.25.XFZ;
For Tang law, redemption of banishment (in years) through official ranks can be seen from the following:
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See TLSY 17; for Song law, see SXT.2.
27 ZL.2.
278 Cf. GY.6; ZZ.Chenggong2; QHD.17.
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280 DQLLBL 28.
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284 DQLLBL 350-60, for cases, see XAHL. 7.L.
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rescript quoted in TLSY 159,192; SXT.14; YS.103; MLL.4.1; DQLLBL 621. In Ming and Qing, the mean 
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entertainer female was regarded as ‘loss of decorum’ (yousbi titong W (Qii 1998: 192), thereby
subject to a penalty of 60 strokes. See MLL.11.3; DQLLBL 1629,1630; MLL.4.1; DQLLBL 603.
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TLSY 320; SXT.22; YS.XFZ; YDZ.42.4; MLL.10.2; DQLLBL 1381-4.
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decapitation in case of rape, while a good will correspondingly be punished by one degree less. MLL.11.3; 
DQLLBL 1628.
28 Cf. Loewe and Twichett 1987.
289 Cf. LS.l, J2S.1, YS.l, QSG.l.
290 The different laws and customs were codified in 1070, but in 1090, a royal writ ordered the judiciary to 
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291 LS.61.
292 A Han who kills a Qidan will be decapitated, with relatives sold as slaves while a Qidan who kills a Han 
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treated the same. See Qii (1998): 269; also XZZTJ.12; LS.61.
293 Qii 1998: p265-6.
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Han will be punished if fighting back a Mongolian in a physical embroil. YDZ.44.6.
295 YS.87,102
296 Qii 1998: 271.
297 DQLLBL 74.
298 This law was revised in both 1785 and 1825, see ibid.
29 Cf. XAHL 6.B.16, 24-8; 16.A.4; 18.A.3; 19.A.53, 55; 13.A.25,26; C9.A.5; C14.K.5; N3.N.1; N8.A.2.
300 TLsy 297; SXT.20; MLL. 10.3; DQLLBL 1061-75.
301 Cf. on buyingzhong lii, XAHL 1.C.3; 5.D.33; 7.W.2; 8.C.24; 9.D.2, G.l, H.2; 10.A.29, B.l, 5, H.4;
11.A.2, C.l, K.2, M.4; 12.0.4,13.A.8, C.33, C6.D.7, C7.B.10,19, C.4, 31, D.7; C8.A.4, 46, C.5; C9.A.7, 8, 
B.l, H.33, 37; C10.D.4; C12.F.25; C13.A.4, 8, 20, E.2; C14.D.7, E.2, K.8, M.4; C15.B.7, C.2; C16.B.12, D.3, 
E.l, F.W, H.7,10,11; N2.E.1,1, N3.B.1, E.l, N4.A.1, C.l; N5.A.1, B.l; N6.B.1; N8.A.1; N9.A.10, N11.I.3; 
N12.J.5; N14.D.1, 2, F.l, 2; N15.D.1; on buyingqing lii, XAHL. C8.E.2, K.7; C14.L.1; N14.D.1; N15.D.1, 
13, C.33; buyingwei er weizhi lii, XAHL. N2.M.1; N3.H.1; yingshenbushen lii, XAHL: N2.1.
302 XAHL. N3.E.1.
303 XAHL. N10.C.1.
304 TLSY 170-86; SXT.24; MLL.12.4; DQLLBL 518-48.
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(coaxed intercourse). See MLL 11; DQLLBL 1580-90; YS.103; also, in Yuan law, if a wufujian is uncovered, 
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308 Fan et al. 1992: 237.
309 TLSY 410; SXT.26; YS.103; Yuan law also distinguished an aborted adultery and a completed one. An 
aborted adultery will receive a penalty by reducing 4 degrees. MLL.11. Also, in 1472, it was laid down in 
Ming law that the adulteress is not allowed monetary redemption of her adultery offence MS.69; DQLLBL 
1580.
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escaped, the husband only receives a light penalty of 80 strokes after the magistrate office obtained 
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law as laid down in 1767 and revised on 1825. Cf. Qii (1998): 124.
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315 This can be seen from the table below:
Commoners Non­
mourning
relatives
Sima Gong Qiqin Matrilineal
relatives
Concubines
Tang,
Song
Banishment n/a 3-year
banishment
2,000-li exile Strangulation Same to 
sima, but 
more severe 
when with 
uncle’s wife 
and mother- 
in-law
Reduced from 
one degree from 
relative’s wives, 
but aggravated 
with
grand / parent’s 
concubine
Yuan Strokes n/a n/a Adulterer of 
brother or 
nephew’s wife: 
170 strokes 
plus 2,000-li 
exile
Death penalty 
in adultery 
with niece or 
daughter-in- 
law
Ming,
Qing
Strokes Same to 
intra­
commoner 
diaqjian
100 strokes 
plus 3-year 
banishment
Strangulation decapitation
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